THE GREEK SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100010027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
The Greek Situation
FROM: NIO/EUR
NO.
G
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DATE 12 March 1985
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
VC/NIC
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Has copy
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C/NIC
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Has copy
3.
EX REG
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EX DIR
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1 5
AR 1985
DDCI
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
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SECRE~
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC No. 01364-85
12 March 1985
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
1. Introduction. Papandreou's unexpected decision not to back
Karamanlis for reelection as President and Karamanlis's ensuing
resignation from the Presidency have thrown Greek politics into an uproar,
with potentially enormous implications for us. Having discussed the
situation with our Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, and with my
DDI colleagues, I want to summarize for you my reading of the situation.
2. Why Did Papandreou and Karamanlis do what they did? After having
promised Karamanlis that he would support him, Papandreou probably
reversed himself for two fundamental reasons-- pique and a political
calculation: pique because he resented polls showing that Karamanlis
remained the most popular politician in Greece while he, Papandreou, was
being ridiculed in leftist journals for continuing to compromise with
Karamanlis; and political calculation because he came to fear (possibly
after having received representations to that effect from leftist members
of his party) that supporting Karamanlis would divide PASOK. As for
Karamanlis, he rightly felt insulted by Papandreou's double-dealing, and
probably resigned rather than face a possible defeat. Because a resigned
president cannot have his name put in nomination in the ensuing election,
this move takes him out of the running for now but is also likely to
maximize popular misgivings about Papandreou's mistreatment of Greece's
elder statesman.
1
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CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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3. What happens now. The Parliament will begin voting this Sunday,
17 March, on a new president. To win, a candidate must have the support
of 200 of the 300 deputies on the first or second ballots, or 180 deputies
on a third ballot. Papandreou's candidate, Sartzetakis, is certainly
within striking distance since PASOK has 165 seats, the communists, who
have welcomed Papandreou''s move, control 13 votes, (for a total of 178),
and at least four of the 11 independent or small party deputies generally
vote for PASOK. Still, Sartzetakis' victory is not assured: Some of the
more moderate PASOK deputies may well take advantage of the secret ballot
to defect and thus block his election.
4. What if Sartzetakis becomes President? Papandreou will have
improved his position. Between now and October he must still hold
parliamentary elections, but the timing will be up to him. Most
important, should he win those elections, Papandreou will not only be able
to diminish the powers of the Presidency as he wants to but he will also
benefit from the benevolent neutrality of the new president instead of the
malevolent neutrality of Karamanlis. Further, he will probably have at
least the tacit support of the communist party, which has been buoyed by
his dumping of Karamanlis. Thus, if Papandreou succeeds in forming a new
government after the elections, the constraints on him will be lessened
and it will be easier for him to implement some of the anti-US planks of
his platform. (Some of my DDI colleagues believe that if PASOK's majority
decreases, as may well happen, Papandreou will still face significant
political constraints because the defections of a few deputies will be
enough to topple his government.) .
5. What if Parliament refuses to elect Sartzetakis President?
Parliament must dissolve itself and new elections be held within 30 days.
The new parliament then chooses a President by simple majority and,
failing that, by a relative majority. Papandreou would enter these
elections in the knowledge that some members of his party had deserted him
and in the fear that a sizable number of centrist voters would also swing
away from him to Mitsotakis. The danger is that he would try to recoup
some popularity by provoking a foreign crisis--for instance, by
prosecuting more vigorously his quarrels with the EC, NATO, or the US, or,
more likely and more dangerously, with Turkey. Should he try this course,
he probably still would not want to do something irreversible, such as
pulling Greece out of NATO or actually initiating hostilities with
Turkey. He would be playing for an internal audience and it would really
be up to his self-chosen external enemy to show restraint so as not to
give Papandreou the aura of martyrdom. If Papandreou can be kept from
fully exploiting Greek nationalist feelings, his chances of winning the
election will be lessened. Should Mitsotakis then win the elections, he
would, of course, have to deal with the passions aroused by Papandreou and
would still prosecute the more nationalist foreign policy adopted by
Greece in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus debacle. But he would act in a more
responsible way and would pay greater attention to the interests of the
Alliance as a whole.
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SECRET/
6. What will and should the US do? Right now, the State Department
is working on a message for President Reagan to send to Karamanlis. Its
import would be to praise Karamanlis for his contributions to Greek
democracy and to US-Greek relations, as well as to express the desire for
continued good relations with the Greek people. I think this is the right
approach: to take a positive stance toward Greece, implicitly to
criticize Papandreou, but to do nothing that would give him the
opportunity to present himself as an aggrieved victim and defender of
Greek honor against foreign pressures.
7. In sum:
-- Papandreou has embarked on a high-risk strategy. He has created
an entirely new situation in which more surprise moves and
unexpected developments are possible.
It will be close, but Papandreou's chance of getting his man
Sartzetakis elected President are slightly better than even.
Whether Sartzetakis becomes President or not, Papandreou's
dumping of Karamanlis will further polarize the Greek body
politic and make for a bitterly fought Parliamentary election,
whenever it is held.
Mitsotakis's chances of winning the Parliamentary election have
increased to about even. (My DDI colleagues believe the odds now
favor Mitsotakis.) The sooner the election is held, the better
for him.
Should Papandreou win the election, he is unlikely to have a
majority and will probably rely on the tacit or explicit support
of the communists. He will probably prosecute much more
vigorously the domestic socialist and international unaligned
course which is at the heart of his philosophy.
The Greek Parliament and the Greek people will, in effect, soon
be voting not only on finite issues but shaping the future of
Greek political life and deciding on the future of their
country's relationship with the Western alliance. ..
cc: C/EURA
EURA/WED
EURA/WED/A/I BRANCH
DCI/NIC/NI0/EUR/GKOLT:em,
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - Addressee 1 - DDI REG
1 - DDCI 1 - EX REG
1 - C/NIC 1 - SA/DCI
1 - VC/NIC
Qar-~A
eorge Kolt
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