LETTER TO DAVID M. ABSHIRE FROM GEORGE KOLT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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National Intelligence Council
UNCLASSIFIED
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
June 28, 1985
The Honorable David M. Abshire
Ambassador to US Mission NATO
APO
New York, New York 09667
Following up on our recent conversation in London I have checked into
where Washington stood on the preparation of an unclassified fact sheet
on Soviet efforts in the SDI field. You will be glad to know that State
is putting the finishing touches on such a paper and I am told you should
have it fairly soon.
In the meantime, I thought you would be interested in two
unclassified articles done by Agency analysts. Although these papers do
not have any official status. they contain much excellent information
that should prove valuable for use as background information.
I very much enjoyed your presentation and was glad that we had a few
minutes to chat. I hope to stop in Brussels sometime this fall and would
look forward to seeing you at that time.
Best regards,
George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer
for
Europe
Attachments:
1. Soviet Letter Signatories
2. Soviet Directed Energy Weapons
UNCLASSIFIED
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SUBJECT: Soviet letter signatories
In a letter in the New York times of 22 April , of Soviet scientists denounced the creation of new ballisticgmissile
defense (BMD) systems as called for in President Reagan's televised
speech of 23 March. The Soviets, "basing ourselves on the knowledge
which we as scientists have, and proceeding from our understanding of
the very nature of nuclear weapons... declare in all responsibility that
there are no effective defensive means in nuclear war, and their
creation is practically impossible." Moreover, the scientists assert
that the purpose of a BMD system cannot be truly defensive, because
"Such a 'defensive' weapon offers practically nothing to a country that
is the target of a sudden massive attack, as it is apparently unable to
protect the overwhelming majority of its population. The use of an
antiballistic missile weapons systems suits the attacking side best of
all, because they are striving to lessen the power of a retaliatory
strike. But it cannot, however, fully prevent such a retaliatory strike.
"Thus, the initiative of the U.S. President, who promises to create
a new anti-ballistic missile weapons system, is clearly oriented toward
a destabilization of the strategic balance..."
They conclude by stating that "every scientist should honestly and
clearly, guided by his knowledge and his conscience, declare where the
world should go -- in the direction of creating new types of strategic
weapons, which increase the danger of a mutually destructive conflict,
or along the path of curbing the arms race and, subsequently, leading to
disarmament. This is the historical moral duty of scientists to
humankind. On our part, we are firmly convinced, and this conclusion
has been made on the basis of a strict scientific analysis of all
aspects of the problem, that nuclear disarmament is the only way in
which the states and the peoples can ensure true security."
It is doubtless true that many of the signatories have considerable
"understanding of the very nature of nuclear weapons." What is less
apparent, however, is their commitment to turning away from creating new
types of strategic weapons and onto the "path of curbing the arms race."
Of the more than two hundred signatories of the letter, one group has
been instrumental in development of both conventional and exotic BMD
systems.
-- Grushin heads the design bureau responsible for antiaircraft and
antiballistic missiles, including the Galosh ABM interceptor
missile now deployed at Moscow and the high acceleration ABM
UNCLASSIFIED
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interceptor now in development.
-- Semenikhin is the leading figure in developing command, control
and communications systems for antiaircraft and antimissile use.
-- Bunkin is an important figure in the development of radars and
other key components of strategic defensive weapons systems.
-- Velikhov and the Nobel Prize winners Basov and Prokhorov have
been driving forces in Soviet laser weapons development for at
least the past 15 years. Velikhov was the director for several
years of the Institute of Atomic Energy laboratories at Troitsk
where lasers for strategic and tactical applications are being
developed.
-- Avduyevskiy has long been involved with design of strategic
systems. In recent years, he has moved into the area of space
systems, and now has responsibility for a number of projects for
military use of space, including a space-based laser weapon.
Far from advising the Soviet government that BMD systems are
technically infeasible and strategically destabilizing, these
individuals have been central in promoting and developing the very kinds
of systems they denounce the President for advocating the US develop.
Others of the signatories have spent their careers developing
strategic offensive and other military systems.
-- Chelomey is the designer of the SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs.
-- Nadiradze is the designer of the SS-16 mobile ICBM and the SS-20
intermediate range ballistic missile.
-- Glushko has designed the engines for most of the liquid
propellant ICBMs deployed by the Soviet Union.
-- Makeyev is the Soviet's chief designer of submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
-- Antonov, Belyakov and Yakovlev are designers of combat and
military transport aircraft. Belyakov is the successor to A.I.
Mikoyan, and continues design of the well-known series of MiG
fighters.
-- Dollezhal and Khariton are 'grand old men' of the Soviet
military nuclear energy program. Khariton served for many years as
the head of the nuclear weapons R&D facility at Sarova.
-- Kabachnik is a chemist working in the areas of offensive and
defensive chemical warfare. He is reported to be the leading Soviet
expert in the synthesis of nerve agents.
-- Many others are involved, either as designers, administrators,
or scientific consultants in research and development on laser
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weapons, missiles, aircraft, antisubmarine warfare systems,and
military space systems.
Given the occupations and interests of many of the letter's
signatories, they obviously are not as committed to disarmament as their
joint statement implies.
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r inR "14 PAPER
SOVIET DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS --
Perspectives on Strategic Defense
March, 1985
Defensive Systems Division
STAT
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rev SMar85
Preface
Since the President's announcement on March 23, 1983, which
marked the birth of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a
controversy has arisen over it which is concerned not only with
the technical feasibility and costs of strategic defense against
ballistic missiles but also its impact on the strategic balance
between the US and the Soviet Union, on US allies, and on arms
control negotiations.
In the past few months, however, lines of argument have be-
gun to be made which involve counterpart Soviet defensive systems.
And though we believe that in the planning and development of
defensive weapons attention should be directed primarily at the
threat posed by the enemy's offensive systems, i.e., the numbers,
characteristics, performance and vulnerabilities of Soviet ICBMs
and SLBMs, it is becoming necessary to provide basic information
on Soviet defensive, :or counterpart-SDI, research and developments.
Opponents and proponents alike of the SDI should have a basic
understanding and an appreciation of the nature and magnitude of
Soviet efforts in strategic ballistic missile defense.
This paper is intended to meet a part of that requirement. It
addresses Soviet research and development in directed-energy
weapons: high-power/high-energy lasers, particle beams, and the
microwave or radio-frequency beams.
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"Directed energy" is a term that has become popular
in the past decade and is used to refer to three types of
beam weapon concepts based on lasers, radiofre-
quency (microwave) devices, or particle beams:
? In a laser weapon, an intense beam or pulse of
visible or invisible (infrared, ultraviolet, X-ray,
gamma-ray) electromagnetic radiation is aimed at a
target by a telescope or other aiming device. The
target's surface may be damaged by explosive
shock, melting, or vaporizing; optical components
can be damaged and personnel injured or blinded.
? In a radiofrequency (RF) weapon, electromagnetic
radiation at wavelengths close to those of conven-
tional radars is aimed at a target by an antenna;
electronic components, or possibly the target struc-
ture itself, may be damaged or destroyed by circuit
overloading or thermal effects.
? In a particle beam weapon (PBW), intense beams of
electrons, protons, or atoms are produced by a high-
energy accelerator and aimed at a target by mag-
nets. In addition to thermal or mechanical damage,
such beams can produce damaging secondary nucle-
ar or X-ray radiation deep within a target.
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SOVIET DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS --
Perspectives on Strategic Defense
Key Judgements
o The Soviet Union is believed to be interested in the
development of directed energy weapons (lasers, parti-
cle beams, and microwaves) for ballistic missile
defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) applications.
o The Soviet Union has been engaged in research on the
directed energy weapons technologies for as long as the
United States. Soviet efforts are under the leadership
of some of the finest scientific minds in the USSR. The
resources the Soviets have applied to these efforts are
believed to be greater than those which the United
States has applied.
o In directed energy technologies, the Soviets are in a
comparable, or highly competitive position with respect
to the United States. In laser technologies, there is
an essential equivalence, though the Soviets are pur-
suing some types of lasers which the US has either
abandoned or has ignored for weapons applications. In
particle beam and microwave technologies, the Soviets
may have the edge over the US in some important areas.
o The Soviets are believed to have progressed beyond the
stage of pure or basic laboratory research in directed
energy technologies; the Soviets have begun to develop
and test laser weapons. The Soviets already have a
ground-based laser capable of damaging some US satellites
and which may be used to investigate the feasibility of
lasers for ballistic missile defense applications.
o Hostile Soviet reactions to the US Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) and lobbying against the SDI by high-
level Soviet scientists must be tempered by the fact
that the Soviet Union has not admitted to its own long-
standing counterpart research and the most vocal Soviet
scientists have themselves been heavily involved in that
weapons research.
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CONTENTS
Key Judgements
iii
Introduction
1
Laser Weapons
2
Management $ Resources
4
Technologies
7
Advanced Developments
11
Particle Beam Weapons
12
Macro-Particle Streams
13
Microwave Weapons
13
Soviet Responses to the SDI
15
Bibliography
18
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Introduction
Strategic defenses are important to the Soviets' overall
strategy for nuclear war. The Soviets believe that nuclear war
could occur and, if it does, they intend to do everything pos-
sible to survive and prevail. The operations of their defensive
and offensive forces are closely coupled; offensive strikes would
reduce the burden of the defensive forces. In the Soviet concept
of a layered defense, effectiveness is achieved through multiple
types of defensive capabilities compensating for shortcomings in
individual systems.
The Soviets have devoted considerable resources to strategic
defense. Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent
roughly as much on defense as it has on. its massive offensive
forces. The Soviets have been working on traditional and advanced
technologies with the potential-for defending against ballistic
missiles.
-- The Soviet-Union has the world's only operational
ballistic missile defense system (at Moscow) and it
has had, for over a decade, an operational anti-
satellite (ASAT) system (the orbital interceptor).
Within the constraints of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets are
currently upgrading their present systems. But they are also en-
gaged in research and development on rapidly deployable systems
which raise concerns about their potential ability to "break out"
of the ABM Treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM system in the next
decade.
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The USSR has an improving potential for large-scale deploy-
ment of modernized ballistic missile defenses beyond the 100-
launcher Treaty limits. Since the signing of the Treaty, the
Soviets have built large phased-array radars with improved cap-
abilities to provide target tracking data in support of ABM deploy-
ment, they have upgraded the Moscow system, and continued develop-
ment of a rapidly-deployable system. Also, they are deploying a
surface-to-air missile system, the SA-X-12, which has the potential
to intercept some types of US ballistic missiles.
Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has also been pursuing
advanced technologies for strategic defense--technologies which the
US is intending to explore in its Strategic Defense Initiative
Program. The Soviets have expectations that military applications
of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weak-
nesses in their conventional air and missile defenses. The Soviets
have been working as long as the United States in laser, particle
beam; and microwave technologies applicable to strategic weapons.
Of these, the Soviet: emphasis has been on laser weapons.
? Lager Weaj)Pns
The Soviet laser weapons program began in the 1960s. Many
Soviet organizations, and personnel, both civilian and military,
are involved. Key institutes and design bureaus are located in
and around Moscow and Leningrad, and the Saryshagan proving ground
is the traditional site for most of the Soviet Union's ballistic
missile defense testing since the 1950s.
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Management and Resources
The Soviet laser weapon effort is guided and supported by
some of the best scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union.
Yevgeniy Velikhov,-the rising Vice President of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences, made his early mark in directed-energy
related research; Nobel Laureates Basov and Prokhorov are be-
lieved to be driving forces behind the Soviet effort for over
twenty. years.
The level-of-effort that the Soviets have applied to their
laser weapons program is considerable. Cost data are unavailable
and the estimates have had to be more subjective. Some have esti-
mated that the Soviet effort is some 3-5 times greater than that
of the United States. We believe that it is not possible to make
an estimate of this ratio but that it.seems clear, based on the
observed scale and scope of the Soviet effort, that the Soviet
program is larger than that of the US. Exaggeration of the rela-
tive effort is not warranted, as the Soviet effort is clearly
appreciable.
-- The Soviets have built over half a dozen
major RFD facilities and test ranges. .
-- The Soviets have an estimated 10,000
scientists and engineers associated with the
development of lasers for weapons.
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STAT
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-- Estimates have been made of the amount of
floorspace-that the Soviets have allocated to
laser weapons RED. The growth was very rapid
in the first decade; now it is leveling off
with a growth rate of a few per cent per year.
Currently, the Soviets appear to have space
for lasers that is comparable to that of a
typical large Soviet missile or space design
bureau.
Years
SOVIET LASER FACILITIES--GRO%,'TH IN FLOORSPACES
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Technologies
The United States is judged to be currently ahead of, or
equal to, the Soviet Union in many of the technologies that are
relevant to a strategic ballistic missile defense system. These
include: computers, signal processing, command and control, and
radar or electro-optical sensors and sensing systems.
In lasers, the Soviets have conducted research in the three
types of gas lasers that the US considered promising for weapons
applications: the gas-dynamic laser (GDL), the electric discharge
laser (EDL), and the chemical laser. These lasers operate at
various wavelengths in the infra-red region, from about 10.6 to
2.7 microns, depending upon the lasing medium that is being used.
Laser Type Medium Wavelength
-----------------------------------------
GDL, EDL
CO2
10.6
GDL, EDL
CO
5.0
chemical
DF
3.8
chemical
HF
2.7
-----------------------------------------
Soviet achievements, as measured by output power, are impres-
sive. Their work on GDLs, EDLs, and chemical lasers seem to mir-
ror US efforts. The Soviets have not only "followed suit" with
the US--they have continued to work on certain types of lasers
which the US abandoned in favor of other, more attractive, short-
wavelength lasers. Soviet work is cumulative; the US is progressive.
Yet there are asymmetries: the Soviets have been working on other
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Soviet and US CW High Energy Laser Developments
Gas Dynamic Lasers
Years
I IS
Years
us
USSR
i
Years
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types of lasers that the US-has not seriously considered for
weapons applications until very recently. These are the lasers
which operate at about a micron wavelength.
The.Soviets are aware of the visible and very short wave-
length lasers and their potential for military applications. The
Soviets are investigating the excimer and free-electron lasers.
For over a decade, researchers at Novosibirsk have been develop-
ing argon-ion lasers; the Soviets continue to dominate in litera-
ture published on metal-vapor lasers. And the Soviets have pub-
lished work on X-ray lasers; the use of nuclear explosions has
been proposed as a method for creating conditions for X-ray.lasers.
(a)
(b)
DESCRIPTIONS OF A SOVIET GDL IN THE POPULAR LITERATURE (CA 1975)
(a) Gas-dynamic continuous-wave laser with output power of 15
kW. It operates on ignition of carbon monoxide. (b) Gas-dynamic
laser in operation. Its emission is directed by means of a mir-
ror to a target in the upper part of the photograph. The burn-
ing torch is formed by the incandescent particles of the target
material.
Aside from the asymmetries already noted, we believe the
Soviets are on a par with the US in high-power/high-energy lasers
and laser technologies for weapons applications.
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We believe the Soviets'are generally capable of supplying
the requisite prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary com-
ponents for.most laser (and other directed-energy) weapons.
-- The Soviet magneto-hydrodynamic (MHD) power
source development is the largest in the world;
they have developed a rocket-driven MHD gener-
ator which produces over 15 MW of electrical
power. This device has no western counterpart.
1) ROCKET ENGINES
The Soviets may have the capability to develop the necessary
optical systems for laser weapons. They produced a 1.2-meter seg-
mented mirror, the AST-1200, for an astrophysical telescope in
1978 and claimed that this was a prototype for a 25-meter mirror
that would be constructed in the future.
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Advanced Developments
The Soviets have progressed beyond basic technology research
in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. They
already have a ground-based laser that could be used to interfere
with US satellites.
This directed-snorgy R&D alts at the Sary Shegan proving ground In the central USSR could provide
some and-satellite capabilities today and possibly ABM prototype testing In the future.
In the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes of
ground- and space-based laser weapons for use against satellites
and ballistic missiles. They may deploy operational space-based
laser systems for antisatellite purposes in the 1990s if their
technology developments prove successful. And they can be expected
to pursue development of space-based laser weapons for ballistic
missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000.
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Particle Beam Weapons
Soviet research and development of those technologies that
could support a particle beam weapon have been impressive. Work
on ion sources has been spectacular. And a recent Rand study has
noted that "Soviet development of ion induction linear acceler-
ators has been remarkable in its steady pursuit of such goals as
high current levels, reliability, efficiency, reduced size, and
simplicity of operation." It was noted also that the Soviets
acknowledge only peaceful, high-energy physics research as the
intended applications of these developments, but it was observed
that "Soviet ion linac development (appears) singularly applicable
to the task of propagating particle beams in space."
-- Soviet ion source designs, developed in
their fusion research but applicable to beam
weapons, have been superior to those of the
West.
The Soviets.are-believed to have had research projects since
the early 1970s to explore the feasibility of a space-based particle
beam weapon. A prototype weapon intended to disrupt the electronics
of satellites could be tested in the 1990s; a weapon designed to
destroy satellites could follow later.
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Macro-Particle Streams
In the particle beam weapon, the particle (electrons or
protons) are accelerated to velocities approaching that of
light. A macro-particle stream, on the other hand, consists of
heavier particles with velocities of less than one per cent of
the speed of light.
Open literature indicates that as early as 1966 the Soviets
had an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles
of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at velocities of
over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum and nearly 25 kilometers
per second in air.
-- The impressive target penetration effects of
the macro-particle streams in air have been pub-
lished openly. The effects of the higher velocity
streams in vacuum have not.
Microwave Weapons
We believe there are no technological obstacles to Soviet
development of a radio-frequency or microwave weapon for strategic
applications. The Soviets have conducted research for decades on
sources of high-power microwaves (magnetrons, gyrocons, gyrotrons)
and the antennas which would be required to direct and focus the
beams on distant targets. Soviet capabilities to develop microwave
weapong are on a par, if not superior to those of the US.
-- Many systems would be vulnerable to an rf
weapon; critical electronic components could
be damaged or disrupted.
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SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS IN RAD19FREQUENCY SOURCES
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Soviet Responses to the SDI
Soviet reactions and responses to the SDI have, not unex-
pectedly, been negative. Their statements on the SDI must be
tempered by-':the knowledge that well before the President's
speech on March 23rd, 1983, the Soviets were themselves pursuing
most of the technologies that are to be investigated in the US
SDI and were heavily involved in applied research toward testing
the feasibility of advanced weapons for ballistic missile defense.
Within a month of the President's announcement, a letter
signed by a large group of senior Soviet scientists was published
in the New York Times, denouncing the US initiative. But it is
significant to note that of the more than 200 signatories of the
letter, a number of them have been instrumental in the develop-
ment of both conventional and exotic ballistic missile defense
systems: Grushin, Semenikhin, Bunkin, Velikhov, Prokhorov, and
Basov.
-- Velikhov was the director for several years
of the Institute of Atomic Energy laboratories
at Troitsk where lasers for strategic and tac-
tical applications are being developed.
-- Avduyevskiy has long been involved with
strategic systems, and he now has responsibility
for a number of projects for the military use
of space, including a space-based laser weapon.
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Other signatories have spent-their careers developing strategic
offensive weapons and other military systems: Chelomey, Glushko,
Nadiradze, and Makeyev in ICBMs and SLBMs; Antonov, Belyakov,
and Yakovlev have designed military aircraft; Isanin is a chief
designer of nuclear submarines; and Dollezhal and Khariton are
long-standing leaders in the Soviet military nuclear energy pro-
grams.
Last year, a group of scientists published a technical report
critical of space-based weapons. The report was prepared by a
working group of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace,
Against Nyiclear Threat and headed by Academician R. Z. Sagdeyev,
Director of the Institute of Space Research of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences. We believe this report was written and disseminated
to serve as a propaganda tool against the SDI. The report was
made widely available in the West, but it has apparently been
given little attention within the Soviet Union. The report asserts
that space-based systems are too technically complex, expensive,
and easily counter-measured to be worthwhile. The report examines
only the hydrogen fluoride chemical laser in detail; neutral
particle beams, x-ray lasers, and excimer lasers are barely dis-
cussed. Ground-based terminal defense systems and space-based
kinetic-energy weapons are omitted.
s "A Space-Based Anti-Missile System with Directed-Energy Weapons:
Strategic, Legal, and Political Implications," Committee of
Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against Nuclear Threat, Moscow,
1984.
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The Soviets probably wish that the March 23rd announcement
had never been made and that they could pursue their own research
on strategic defense without real competition from the US. With
the advent of the SDI, the Soviets are faced with a mobilization
of efforts on strategic missile defense in the US and their
actions of late are intended to persuade the US to drop it. The
Soviet lobbying and criticism of the SDI is the cheapest and
least risky approach to undermining congressional and public sup-
port for the SDI.
The Soviets have not admitted to their own efforts in SDI-
counterpart activities. And they may never do so. But perhaps we
are now on the threshold of an alternative Soviet line of attack--
to compete with the US.
-- Nikolay Basov declared in January that Moscow
would have 'no technological difficulty' in
matching the US SDI program.
And from what we have observed thus far of Soviet capabilities in
directed energy research, development, and testing, his claim is
not without foundation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100020001-1