NIC NO. 03556-85

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100030074-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: July 23, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Executive Rzg3~,t;y
The Director of Cent ntelli a ce
23 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO for Europe
D/EURA, DI
FROM: DCI
SUBJECT: NIC No. 03556-85
That was a very interesting and I think
useful conference you organized on the
Balkans.
William J. Casey
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JLVI\L 1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 03556-85
18 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on the Balkans
1. The NIO/Europe and DDI/EURA sponsored a conference on Balkan
regional affairs on 11-13 June to give community and outside analysts an
opportunity to discuss trends in the region--both the general patterns of
instability and efforts at regional cooperation. Personally, I came away
with several strong impressions and some ideas for follow-up projects
which I wish to outline for you.
2. My first and strongest impression is a sense that the Balkans
remains the Balkans: Despite its post-World War II quietude, the region
remains a potential hotbed for crises that could expand beyond its
boundaries. As our key noter Bob Barry, ex-DAS in STATE/EUR and
ex-Ambassador to Sofia, put it, he expects that:
US policymakers, possibly soon, will be faced with a crisis
in the Balkans.
The crisis will most likely come as a surprise to them.
They probably would not find ready answers from the
intelligence community to all of their questions. He
praised the intelligence analysis he has used in the past
(and I would specifically point to typescript*
of June 1983 on instability in the Communist Balkans as an
example of intelligence alerting policymakers to looming
strategic problems.) But Bob also indicated that there was
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not enough intelligence precisely when needed. Then,
closing a circle of futility, he admitted that most
policymakers' preoccupations with immediate tasks make it
unlikely they would focus much on topics of future concern
even with the best analytical assistance.
Another factor influencing my thinking is that the wrapup session
produced a near consensus--and for Balkan specialists that is about as
close to unanimity as you can come--that Yugoslavia's internal problems
could be the spark that sets the region alight again.
3. As a corollary to my unease about the region, I also sense that
the historically anomolous absence of an active rivalry between outside
powers--the old "Great Game" of subversion and battles for
influence--might be lulling us to dangerous assumptions about regional
stability. Throughout the conference, speakers stressed that the nature
of the Balkan problem has shifted from classic disruptions by foreign
meddlers to risks arising from internal instability--which the Blocs
cannot control, yet ignore at considerable risk.
of Oxford --an ex-RFE staffer--best expressed the
idea by setting a historical context in which the waning of
the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and Russian imperial
influences have left the Balkan states freer to pursue
their narrow rivalries without restraint.
from the University of Illinois at Chicago
also pointed out the lack of mutual security attempts since
the failure of the Balkan Pact of 1954 due to the collapse
of a brief, Greek-Turkish rapprochement. He may not know
about some of the bilateral contacts--like, the regular
Yugoslav- Romanian military talks--but his point about
multilateral security efforts and understandings is valid.
On the more positive side,) o (from
Indiana stressed that the impact of the process of
modernization on the once rigid social systems in the area
is badly understood. There is now a common pool of
information, an extensive exposure to foreign attitudes and
technology and first-hand experience in Europe by millions
of Balkan tourists and guest-workers. But the effects of
these developments is hard to gauge. Some disruptions are
evident but there also are some trends that might have a
unifying effect on the region and could provide
opportunities for an imaginative Western policy.
The Balkan situation seems ripe for an increase in Soviet
activity but only a few of the speakers credited the
proposition that the Soviets would see threats or
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opportunities in this situation.
and I dissented from this relaxed view. We pointed out the
existence of two troubled Warsaw Pact regimes in the Balkan
Peninsula and opportunities for Soviet meddling in
Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Albania.)
4. My last point concerns general US inattention to the region.
-- The academics stated that this was the first conference
held on the topic in the US since the late 1950s.
-- Ambassador Barry complained that Dartmouth, where he
studied Balkan affairs as an undergraduate, has scotched
the program for economy's sake.
I think we do a better job in government and specificially in the
intelligence sector but, since our priorities are shaped by the needs of
policymakers, we tend to concentrate on short-term and departmental
issues with operational priorities in mind. And there is no evidence that
our major NATO partners--despite their past experiences in the
region--are doing a better job than we. In short, if we continue to
neglect the broad strategic context and knowledge about a region as
potentially important as the Balkans, we may pay the price later in hasty
and poorly advised policy responses. I would therefore add the Balkans
to Bob Gates' list of regions and issues* where we would be wise to begin
thinking more about the unthinkable.
6. Clearly there are no quick fixes nor simple ways to address the
problem. The conference helped in raising sensitivities both inside and
outside the government. The next step is to tap some of the better ideas
which came f . Of these Balkan
specialists, -struck me as the
more provo king. With Bob Gates' approval in
principle, have already followed up with
to consider papers on problems looming in the Balkans.
ook at the possible catalysts for conflict in
the region--which he sees as coming primarily from
Yugoslavia.
started by giving us an advance copy of a
paper he hopes to publish in an academic journal on the
Yugoslav situation. We are talking about doing a
contract paper on what might happen in Yugoslavia between
now and 1990.
-3-
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-- In addition, I will be getting) I advice on some
experts who might give fresh thoughts on Soviet attitudes
toward the region and on Moscow's likely behavior in the
event of a crisis there.
-- I am also considering asking) Ido a paper on how
the Greeks and Turks might get a grip on their
bloody-minded quarrelsomeness.
I intend these papers to be free form and speculative. Their main
purpose would be to help us develop future collection and analytical
strategies.
s v
George Kolt
Attachment:
Agenda for the Balkan Conference
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1
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BALKANS REGIONAL CONFERENCE
1. Dinner Session, June 11, 6:30 pm. Keynote Address and Conference
Theme: "The Strategic Importance of the Balkans for US Interests"
Speaker: Ambassador Robert Barry
2. Wednesday, June 12.
ELEMENTS OF INSTABILITY 9:00 am
0915-1030 Traditional Destabilizing Forces
Overview of ethnic problems and irredentist movements in
the Balkans.
Presenter: Alex Alexiev, The Rand Corporation.
1030-1045 BREAK
1045-1200 New Destabilizing Developments
Prospects for post-Hoxha Albania
Presenter: Elez Biberaj, USIA
1200-1330 LUNCH
1330-1500 Other States in Transition
Jugoslavia: five years after Tito
Presenter: Brandeis University
Turkey's post-martial law prospects
Presenter: University of Illinois
What's ahead for Greece?
Presenter: , Queens college
1500-1515 BREAK
1515-1700 KEY FORCES FOR STABILITY AND INSTABILITY--Overview
Generational change
Role-of .the military
Economic decline
Presenter: formerly Radio Free Europe
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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3. Thursday, June 13.
CROSS-BLOC DEVELOPMENTS: DIVERGENCES FROM EAST/WEST PATTERNS?
0900-1030 Bilateral Cross-Bloc Relations
Balkan Regional Cooperation
Presenter: Institute for East-West
Security, Cornell University
1030-1045 BREAK
1100-1230 WRAP-UP--CATALYSTS FOR CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR US
Strategic concerns in the Balkans (Southern Flank;
trends in Bloc relations)
Implications for Great Power rivalry
Presenter: Indiana University
STAT
STAT
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Some Thoughts on the Balkans
FROM: EXTENSION
George Kolt
7~
NO.
NIC No. 03556-85
NIO for EUROPE
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DATE 25,
18 July 1985
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