INPUT FOR NIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100040036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: December 2, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100040036-1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Hal Ford
NIO at Large
FROM: George Kolt
NIO for Europe
SUBJECT: Input for NIC Strategic Outlook
1. The President's handling of the Summit has won near unanimous
approval in Europe. At the same time the comments of a number of
European leaders were shaped both by the desire to praise the President
and by underlying concerns about how the new East-West atmosphere would
affect their own interest:
Kohl stressed the utility of his government's advice to the
US Administration in bringing about a successful Summit and
emphasized the new possibilities that have opened for the
INF negotiations.
Likewise Foreign Minister Tindemans emphasized how the
Summit has made possible a separate INF deal.
As is her wont, Thatcher gave unabashed support to the
President but was probably also dismayed by the prominent
play given by British TV to US critics of the President's
policies, for instance former Secretary of Defense Robert
MacNamara and Salt II negotiator Paul Warnke.
Craxi balanced his praise of the President with a personal
message of congratulations to Gorbachev--a measure
seemingly designed to please his Foreign Minister Andreotti.
Mitterrand underlined his independence from superpower
dealings by staying away from the President's NATO briefing
and holding a press conference devoted primarily to
domestic issues on the day of that briefing. Mitterrand
further underlined his independence by balancing his
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP87ROO529R000100040036-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100040036-1
SECRET
approval of the Summit results with a reaffirmation that
any US-Soviet understandings will have no affect whatsoever
on French strategic policy. Mitterrand's underlying fear
may be that his European allies could pressure France to
place limits on its Strategic Nuclear Force in order to
make possible an INF agreement.
2. In the coming months European leaders will probably be paying
particular attention to:
the extent and effectivenss of the probable Soviet drive to
portray SDI as the obstacle to any further progress.
The tendency of many in Europe to see Gorbachev not only as
a different type of Soviet leader, but also as one who is
"better for Europe".
-- The impact of European press speculations--supported by the
solicited comments of former US officials--that the US
military-industrial complex will lobby hard against any
arms reduction agreements.
-- Any signs of a competition developing among themselves to
create separate "detentes" with Moscow, and domestically,
pressures by parties out-of-power to push governments in
that direction. As could be expected, Brandt and the SPD
in Germany were quick to state that the Europeans must now
do their own talking with Moscow.
3. In sum, the Summit surprised many European critics by
demonstrating the validity of the President's approach to the Soviet
Union. At the same time it has not resolved--and could not have been
expected to resolve--the underlying difficulties in managing the
Alliances approach to East-West relations.
A-V
George Kolt
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100040036-1