DCI/NIO REGIONAL MEETING -- 5 FEBRUARY 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100050055-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: February 3, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2011/05/18: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100050055-9
NIO/EUROPE
3 February 1986
DCI/NIO Regional Meeting -- 5 February 1986
1. Berlin Issues
Rather than progress there has been some regression on the two main
items on the US-Soviet agenda:
-- In the MLM discussions the Soviets have proposed qualifying the
instructions to be issued to sentries in a way unacceptable to the
US. A new controversy has also risen over the sequence for
exchanging new PRA maps. The Soviets are now asking that the
exchange be simultaneous rather than having the three Western
powers produce their map after the Soviets produced theirs.
-- In the Berlin Air Corridors discussions the Soviets have reverted
to a less forthcoming tone and have once again been imposing
higher level reservations. To complicate the issue further,
Lufthansa is continuing its campaign of acquiring some landing
rights in East Germany in exchange for the East German airline
Interflug being allowed to fly to some West German airports. The
three Western Allies fear these arrangements might eventually
undermine the West Berlin air regime and put the issue on the Bonn
quadripartite group agenda.
2. Greece
There has been a setback in the slow improvement of US-Greek
relations. The Greeks have balked at the US proposal to sell them 40 F-16s
on a government controlled FMS basis. Greece argues that a purely
commercial arrangement with General Dynamics would produce 100 percent
offset purchases and guarantee completion of the sale. The last argument
is the sticking point as the USG wants to maintain control over the sale in
order to keep prodding the Greeks toward better security practices. In
addition to this development, the Greeks have not undertaken practical
measures to implement their promise to issue US personnel Greek auto
license plates for security purposes. They have taken afront at the US
linkage of the F-16 sale to the issuance of those plates. The Greek
military, however, very much wants to buy the F-16 and Greece eventually
will probably agree to the US conditions. But the setback is an
illustration of the difficulties we will continue having in our dealings
with the Papandreou government.
3. Pre-Party Congress Maneuverings in Eastern Europe
-- Four East European parties will be holding Congresses this spring
and summer--the Czechoslovaks in April, the Bulgarians and East
Germans in May and the Poles in June. Their leaderships are
already engaged in jockeying for position.
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In East Germany Honecker made an important move late last year
by dumping some Politburo members and setting up his ally Egon
Krenz as heir apparent.
In Czechoslovakia no open moves have yet been made, but intense
behind-the-scene maneuvering seems to be taking place.
In Poland Jaruzelski is continuing to consolidate his control
and can well claim to have "normalized" the country, albeit
Polish communist style.
- Through a series of so-called balanced moves he has managed
to install a number of men beholden to him in important
Party apparat positions.
In a highly publicized move last fall he turned over the Prime
Ministership to a technocrat, Messner, thus recreating the
traditional division of reponsibility between Party and
Government wherein the party produces high blown rhetoric and
the government can be blamed for what ever goes wrong.
In a simultaneous move he most likely served his and Soviet
interests by ousting his foe Olszowski from the Foreign Ministry
and appointing in his stead the colorless Orzechowski, who has
spent five years studying in Leningrad and probably enjoys
Soviet trust.
But these personnel moves are not producing any more Party unity
or devotion to genuine reform than existed under Gierek.
As a result Jaruzelski still has no realistic plan for leading
Poland out of its social and economic crisis and the gap between
ruler and ruled is as wide as ever.
- In sum, Jaruzelski maintains enough control over the Party
and uses enough repression to maintain order, but the lack
of serious efforts to create a social contract leaves
Poland susceptible to the kind of crises that have
regularly brought down party leaders.
In Bulgaria party leader Zhivkov's recent personnel reshuffle
and shifts in the economic management system are an attempt to
mollify Soviet criticisms of his regime's mismanagement.
His moves mark a retreat from previous verbal commitments
to decentralization, Hurgarian-style.
He created four "super-ministries" to "improve the central
planning system" and control central ministries--as in East
Germany's "kombinat" system now favored by Moscow.
He sacked or bypassed many senior reform advocates in the
reorganization.
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Zhivkov gave Chudomir Alexandrov--a 50-year old apparatchik
and a favorite of the Soviet Ambassador--a major promotion
and precedence over other potential successors. Alexandrov
probably will work to preserve party controls on the
economy while ducking the onus for its day-to-day failings.
Zhivkov assigned Ognan Doynov, an outspoken reformer, the
tougher job of making the borrowed and highly technocratic
East German system work in Bulgaria's more primitive
economy.
So far, Zhivkov is the Soviet vassal who has made the most
blatant moves to anticipate Gorbachev's wishes. A past
master of preemptive subservience to Moscow, Zhivkov is
trying to demonstrate that he can "read Gorbachev" as well
as he did Brezhnev.
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