THE EUROPEAN ALLIES' VIEW OF THE THIRD WORLD AND THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100060004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02923-86
19 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: The European Allies' View of the Third World
and the Reagan Doctrine
1. In general West Europeans do not share our perception of the need
to confront and roll back Soviet influence in the Third World. At the heart
of the difference in US and European perspectives are diverging views of the
Soviet Union as well as different assessments of national interests.
2. Some differences stem from historical trends. As European empires
have retracted, West Europe's outlook has become less global and more
insular. Thus, West Europeans do not always share the US belief that common
national security is jeopardized if we fail to react strongly to critical
developments in Third World areas. They tend to stress diplomacy in Third
World conflicts such as Nicaragua and distrust the use of force. (Most have
foreclosed this option anyway by gradually allowing their own military's
geographic reach to deteriorate.)
3. Differences in broad policy priorities also come into play.
-- Many West Europeans fear that the Reagan doctrine will
distract the US from disarmament talks -- the key concern
in East-West relations for them -- or worse, set back
arms negotiations.
-- They also fear that the doctrine will generate new
pressures from the US for out-of-area activities by NATO
forces.
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SECRET
They prefer to believe that Moscow's severe economic
problems will force the Soviets to adopt a more pragmatic
and defensive policy in the Third World. They also
expect that Gorbachev in particular will consolidate
Third World gains of the 1970s rather than risk new
expansionism.
Finally, they worry that US actions against Soviet
clients and associates in the Third World areas could
raise East-West tensions, adversely affect their economic
interests in the Third World, lead to terrorist
retaliation in Europe and, at the extreme, produce a
Soviet-US confrontation that might transcend the Third
World.
4. A potentially more serious development in West Europe is a growing
trend -- especially among the youth -- to rank Soviet and US foreign
policies as "morally equivalent."
-- Certain European circles such as intellectuals and the
media in the UK and FRG are prone to be more critical of
US activities in the Third World than they are of Soviet
behavior.
This does not mean that anti-US feelings become
pro-Soviet leanings; rather the trend is towards a "pox
on both your houses" mentality.
Most national leaders do not share this perspective but
are still under pressure to respond to these new voters.
Conflicts between the US and West European policy in the undeveloped world
will intensify if Labor in the United Kingdom or the SPD in West Germany
make a strong showing in polls prior to national elections in 1987.
5. Not all the trends are unfavorable.
-- Qadhafi's increasingly erratic behavior has made some
West European governments such as Italy and France more
sympathetic to US concerns and more willing to condone
the use of force at least in instances of Libya's direct
challenges to Europe's security interests.
-- French public opinion is increasingly jaundiced towards
Soviet policy goals and favorable to the US. There is
some hope that this hard-headed view will expand to other
European elites.
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-- Many Europeans are increasingly aware that Gorbachev is
making a major military resupply effort to Angola and
Central America and becoming more committed to a military
solution in Afghanistan.
.6. For the moment though these encouraging signs tend to be scattered
and issue-specific. It would take a good scare -- say a major Soviet
adventure in the Third World or another crackdown in East Europe -- to
reverse the contention between West Europe and the US over the Third World.
7. Intelligence support for the Reagan doctrine in Europe falls into
several categories.
-- Our analysts help policymakers calculate the factors
which influence European leaders to support or reject US
proposed action in the Third World. In part this effort
entails a persistent effort to understand new trends in
European opinion as they become influential on
policymakers.
-- Both collectors and analysts are working dilligently to
expose the surrogate roles of East European regimes in
manipulating opinion in West Europe and augmenting Soviet
policy in the Third World.
cc: NIO/USSR
D/EURA
DDO/C/SE
DDO/C/EUR
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