MAY FORECAST AND WARNING REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100060010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 30, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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e trector o entra n elligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NIC No. 02652-86/1
30 May 1986
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: May Forecast and Warning Report
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our warning meeting
held on 21 May 1986.
2. Next month's warning meeting will be held on Wednesday, 18 June
1986 at 1015 in room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please telephone
attendance plans to o~!r office and have clearances certified
by COB 16 June 1986.
3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and
names of volunteers to make opening presentations. It would be helpful
to have your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 9 June 1986.
George Kolt
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SECRET
e t ector o entra ntelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC N0. 02652-86
30 May 1986.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intellgence
D
eputy Director of Central Intelligence
vcv~ tJC ICU 1 G
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
"JO~~~~~ May Warning and Forecast Report
I. Full Discussion Items
A. Turkey-Greece-Cyorus? Harricn
inq Positions
1. Discussion. A combination of circumstances have sharpened
long-standing reek=Turkish disputes and this situation is likely to
continue through fall.
The Turkish press is alleging the US has secretly agreed to
support Athens on the Limnos issue in return for Greek concessions on
US bases. In part because of this, Turkey has recently shown
heightened sensitivity on Limnos's role in NATO contingency plans.
Ozal also has taken a sharper polemical tone because of Greece's
renewed efforts to block improvement in Turkey's status with the EC.
Media speculation that Uzal is "burning his olive branch" toward
Papandreou also may aim at helping the Premier's party in
by-elections this fall.
Papandreou meanwhile has made a demarche to NATO
ambassadors on Turkey's "provocations" and staked out a tough line on
Cyprus talks. He is expected to adhere to such tactics as PASOK
prepares for municipal elections this fall.
2? Warnin Note. The tougher line of the Turks will further
complicate the sta a DECA negotiations and likely extend them to
the end of the year when base talks with Greece will begin creating a
difficult situation for the US. In addition, the ever present risk
of an unintentional escalation to violence will grow with the hostile
rhetoric.
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B? The Security Issues Agenda
1? Discussion. For the rest of this year numerous major
developments--inc u ing the expected US-Soviet summit, and new rounds
of talks on MBFR, CDE and CSCE--will create difficult coordination
problems for the Western Alliance.
The key problems will be to keep Gorbachev from using any
differences and heightened expectations about the summit to drive
wedges, to isolate US-West European trade disputes from the Basket II
(economic) discussions at the-CSCE review conference, and to mana e
the Western response to Gorbachev's conventional force reduction g
speech. Moreover some Allied leaders may call in public for progress
in the INF talks and privately nurse fears that the US might undercut
hard-won deployment victories in talks with the USSR on the
"zero-option". Allied reaction to the congressional debate on binar
weapons production and the continuing impact of the Chernobyl scare y
is also likely to spur new pressure for "chemical free-zones" in some
European capitals.
- 2? Warnin Note. With elections pending in the FRG in January
and increasing y posse le in the UK sometime next year, beleaguered
pro US governments will be shaping their reactions to events with at
least one eye on she polls. This means a higher risk of hyperbole,
misunderstandings and spillover of differences, even on unrelated
issues.
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II. Monitoring Items
A? Chancellor Kohl's Status.
1. Discussion. Despite the dropping of one investigation
against C ance or ohl, the Lower Saxony elections in June look bad
for the CDU and the FDP might not make the 5 per cent hurdle--eosin
the risk of an important symbolic setback prior to national elections
in January. In the event of a COU defeat on 15 June, the CDU would
have to decide by July whether to let Kohl lead the ticket in Januar .
Y
B. Spain's National Elections
C? Additional To is -- Ceausescu's Tri to the USSR
1. Discussion. The main reason for President Ceausescu's one
day visit to the USSR on 16 May was apparently to sign several lon
term economic agreements. But the joint statement also included
strange new promise of "
g
a
comradely support" as the basis for bilateral
relations. Analysts remain skeptical that the Romanian leader
c-onceded much to the Sovietc
George Kolt
to return Premier Gonzalez'sapartyrtoepowerowithnanother2absol~ikely
slightly smaller majority. Une wild card is whether abstentions wbll
increase across the board. So far all voters seem to lack enthusiasm
for elections so soon after the NATO referendum and the abstention
effect may be neutral. The right is expected to do poorly--in effect
leaving Gonzalez without the threat of a rightist damper to help kee
his radical left in line. p
1? Discussion P 1?
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