DCI/NIO REGIONAL MEETING -- 30 APRIL 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100060035-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: April 28, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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NIO/EUROPE
28 April 1986
DCI/NIO Regional Meeting -- 30 April 1986
The Evolution of Turkish Policy Toward the US
Recent Turkish actions underline the country's more assertive course
toward us:
-- Turkey has extended to DECA by moving its 30 April deadline for
a new agreement back to September. As welcome as this action
is, it only confirms that the DECA negotiations are deadlocked.
-- The Turks have rejected our charges against the chief of the
Libyan Peoples Bureau in Ankara by making it publicly known that
he has not been linked to any terrorist acts in Turkey. Yet
this individual has been so incontrovertibly linked to terrorism
that he had been PNGd by the US and Switzerland.
Besides being irritating, these actions are also symptomatic of anew
Turkish attitude that is engendered by three main factors--long-standing
prejudices, old grievances, and new pressures.
The prejudice relates to the ethnocentric Turkish view of the
world and to perceived slights when the US is more generous in
its aid to Israel and Egypt and when the US makes a five year
military support commitment to Pakistan while telling the Turks
that the budget process makes it impossible to give them a five
year commitment.
The grievances are the memories created by the 1964 "Johnson
letter" (written primarily by George Ball and warning Ankara
that it could not count on US support in case of a Soviet
countermove to any Turkish military action on Cyprus); the 1974
arms embargo; and, more recently, the recurring pin pricks
administered by Greece (a NATO member proclaiming another NATO
member as its main enemy) as well as Congress (support of the 7
to 10 Greek-Turkey military support ratio and recurring
consideration of the Armenian Genocide resolution).
The new pressures involve Turkey's evolution as a nation and its
relationship with its neighbors. They include:
- On the economic front, Prime Minister Ozal is pushing
systemic and structural change, that is a free market
economy based on new industries. For his program to
succeed he needs to attract investments and increase
exports. Western investors, however, remain wary of the
country's commitment to the free market system and of the
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possibility of a return to the chaos of the 70s. As to
exports, Western European countries and the US have imposed
limits on the rate of growth of the market share of
Turkey's most competitive products which are textiles and
steel. So far, Ozal has spurred the economy into faster
growth, has greatly improved Turkey's foreign exchange
position; but has been able to do little about inflation
and unemployment which. are still running at around 40 and
20 percent respectively.
These continuing high inflation and unemployment rates are
becoming particularly worrisome when the government is
gradually lifting the controls imposed during the martial
law period and as Ozal starts shaping a strategy for the
next general election which must be held by 1988.
Finally, in foreign policy, Turkey is interested in living
up to what it sees as its manifest destiny of serving as a
bridge between the West and much of the Islamic world.
Unfortunately, Turkey has as its neighbors three of the
most belligerent Islamic countries--Iran, Syria and Iraq.
Yet this aspect of its foreign relations is not just a
mythical quest but rather an important part of its economic
hope of developing markets in Islamic countries. Thus,
Turkish interests are being vitally affected by the oil
market fluctuations, the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestinian
issue, and the current Libyan crisis. Its frustration
about being able to do so little to shape the outcome of
these issues probably contributes to its more demanding
attitude toward the US. Right now, however, its exports to
mid-Eastern oil producers are being disrupted by the
decreased revenues of those states.
Of the three factors c;iscussed above the new pressures are probably
the most important stimuli pushing Turkey toward reshaping its
relationship with us. The new dynamic they are engendering does not mean
the US-Turkish alliance is ending. Rather it means that in order to
maintain this mutually important alliance we must monitor more closely
than ever the context in which Turkish policy toward us is being made.
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