TYPESCRIPTS ON YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160003-3
25 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Typescripts on Yugoslavia
The attached typescripts were done at the request
of Deputy Assistant Secretary Ronald Lauder in
preparation for the joint Military Committee meeting
with the Yugoslvas later this month.
Attachments:
1. F
2.
George Kolt
CRET
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25 September 1984
.MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Ronald S. Lauder
Deputy Assistant Secretary (European
and NATO Policy), International
Security Policy
Department of Defense
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer
for Europe
SUBJECT: Typescripts on Yugoslavia
Attached please find the two typescripts you
requested. As I told the Colonel on Friday, we stand
ready to brief you on the other questions you raised
(views of the Yugoslav military and political
leadership).
Attachments:
1.
2.
George Kolt
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 September 1984
Yugoslav Support for International Terrorist Groups
SUMMARY
Yugoslavia has provided support for some
radical Palestinian groups and international
terrorists orr a select basis for over a decade.
Much of this assistance--training, military
equipment, and safe haven--has been kept secret.
Be-lgrade, however, openly gives political support
and quietly furnishes conventional military
training and arms to Fatah and other PLO-
affiliated groups that continue to launch
terrorist attacks in Israel and the occupied
'This memorandum was prepared b East European Division, Office 25X1
of European is ana ques ion are welcome and should be 25X1
addressed t Chief, East European Division, Office of European
Analysis, 25X1
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? .!
Our best evidence of Belgrade's involvement with
international terrorism comes from
Yugoslavia's long-standing cooperation with Abu Nidal's Black
June Organization. (The Abu Nidal group, formerly known as Black
June, was responsible for terrorist operations worldwide against
conservative Arab governments; Israeli?interests, and moderate
Palestinian leaders). Yugoslavia reportedly agreed to allow Abu
Nidal's group to use Yugoslavia for safe haven and transit as
long as Black June kept it secret and informed Belgrade in
advance. Belgrade refused a request for explosives but offered
to provide assault rifles and training to Black June members. In
exchange Black June reportedly transferred $2 million to a
Yugoslav bank and promised to induce bs to invest in
troubled Yugoslav firms
Yugoslavia has had other associations with international
terrorists.
Belgrade provides this assistance for a variety of reasons:
-- Yugoslavia wants to protect its standing with the
nonaligned movement--and the Arab and Moslem world forms
a large part of that movement.
-- Military sales to Arab states are a lucrative source of
hard currency for Yugoslavia. Belgrade does not want to
lose access to this market by refusing to cooperate with
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Palestinian terrorist factions.
-- Belgrade does not want to jeopardize its access to Middle
Eastern oil.
Terrorist groups sometimes are a source of intelligence
on'the Soviets. (It was clear during their negotiations
with Nidal that the Yugoslavs prefer Arab nationalist
groups that are not directed by the USSR).
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Yugoslav Support for International Terrorist Groups
DISTRIBUTION
1 - The Honorable Ronald S. Lauder (copy 1 of 24)
1 - Ambassador John Matlock (copy 2 of 24)
1 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery (copy 3 of 24)
1 - The Honorable Richard R. Burt (copy 4 of 24)
1 - The Honorable Mark Palmer (copy 5 of 24)
1 - LTG James A. Williams (copy 6 of 24)
1 -?NIO/Europe (copy 7 of 24)
1 - NIO/USSR (copy 8 of 24)
1 - NIO/Warning (copy 9 of 24)
1 - D/EURA (copy 10 of 24)
1 - C/EURA/EE (copy 11 of 24)
1 - DC/EURA/EE (copy 12 of 24)
1 - C/EE/SE co 13 of 24)
of of 24)
1 - UU1 e is r copy y 15 14
24)
1 - DDO (copy 16 of 24)
4 - IMC/CB 7G07 (copies 17,18,19,20 of 24)
2 - EURA/PROD. (copies 21,22 of 24)
1 - Chrono EURA/EE/SE (copy 23 of 24)
1 - Production EURA/EE/SE (copy 24 of 24)
DDI/EURA/EE/SE:
17 Sep 84
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 September 1984
YUGOSLAV PERFORMANCE IN THE EXPORT CONTROL AREA
Summary
Except for the well documented illegal Yugoslavian
transfers that occurred a decade ago, there have been
no additional proven diversions of COCOM-controlled
equipment to the Soviet Bloc. Our evidence as of
September 1984 shows that Belgrade carefully guards
Western technology--particularly military--as well as
Soviet Bloc technology from falling into unauthorized
hands. But despite their relatively untarnished
record--which is better than many of our COCOM
partners--opportunities remain for illegal transfers.
Because of Yugoslavia's provincial politics, it is
possible that Belgrade may not be able to insure
compliance with Western controls in parts of the
country. Also, Soviet intelligence operations in
Yugoslavia may be an avenue for
This memorandum was prepared by
Office o cien i is and eaoons
addressed to the Chief
Office of scientific an'
eapons Research,
SW M #84-10061X
COPY/ of 2
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We believe that Belgrade's unauthorized direct or indirect
transfer to Moscow of sophisticated technology, especially US
technical data and hardware,-would undercut Yugoslav security and
independence vis-a-vis the USSR. It is our judgment that
Belgrade would protect as best it could against unauthorized
transfers to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. They may
even be more sensitive to these transfers than our COCOM
partners, who have not always agreed with US concerns in this
area. Belgrade's continued concern with meeting the letter of
the law regarding US export controls was shown several years ago
when it sought US permission to sell the Soviets switching
equipment which Yugoslavia has been 'manufacturing,under US
license for some years. They appeared to accept the denial
without a furor. Belgrade also may not want to jeopardize its
trade with the West nor chance a reduction in investments,
particularly from the US, by flirting with diversions. We
believe that Yugoslavia's concern with protecting US technology
also applies to the technologies of other countries. They
simply do not appear willing to transfer technology--
particularly military--to third countries that they acquired
from others including the Soviet Union. Indeed, in 1978, they
even formed a unit to monitor technology flows into and out of
the country. This tends to substantiate Yugoslav military
officials, wish claim that US technology will remain in
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The possibility of illegal transfers does remain, however.
Some transfers might take place because of vagueness in controls
which may offer the possibility of fudging the rules. If
uncovered, the digression may well be explained away because of
confusing regulations. But more importantly, the provincial
nature of Yugoslavian politics may lend itself to some
unauthorized transfers, although probably none where government-
to-government transfers are involved (i.e.., military sales). In
the past, the Soviets have,courted several individual Yugoslavian
Republics in the economic area. From the standpoint of export
controls, these arrangements may well provide Moscow with
additional opportunities to acquire technology transferred to
Yugoslavia from the West. We conclude it is difficult for
Belgrade to closely monitor Soviet ties with the Republics. If
true, the Republics could acquire a technology of interest to the
Soviets and pass it on to Moscow without Belgrade knowledge; we
would still be receiving guarantees from Belgrade that nothing
had gone. Contributing to this possibility is the fact that,
despite our agreements with Belgrade to carry out post-licensing
checks, in practice, the US Embassy conducts only a few each
year. While we believe the central government would do its
utmost to protect acquired technology, Belgrade simply may not he
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One unknown is the possible work of Soviet or other Warsaw
Pact intelligence operations in Yugoslavia. There are in fact
many Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia, representing various
organizations including the KGB and GRU. It is logical to expect
Soviet and other Bloc intelligence organizations to step up
efforts to penetrate the Yugoslavian government as Yugoslavia
acquires more advanced US technology. We also expect Yugoslavian
counterintelligence to do its best to neutralize this threat.
Nonetheless, we would expect Yugoslavia's internal security
services to hold closely any evidence uncovered of Soviet Bloc
intelligence 'efforts in Yugoslavia. In such case, we may never
learn of a oscow-directpd operation aimed at obtaining US
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SUBJECT: Yugoslav Performance in the Export Control Area
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Hon. Ronald S. Lauder
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(European and NATO Policy)
International Security Policy,
Department of Defense
2 - Hon. Richard Burt
Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Department of State
3 - Hon. Richard N. Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy
Department of Defense
4 - Hon. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Europe
Department of State
5 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
6 - Amb. John Matlock
National Security Council
aV
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SUBJECT: Yugoslav Performance in the Export Control Area
Distribution:
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OSWR/
Executive Director
Executive Registry
DDI
ADDI
DDI Registry
NIO Europe
C/EURA/EE
DOO
DDI PES
CPAS/ILS
NIC/AG
CPAS/IMC
P&PD (via CPAS/IMC)
OCR/SSG/DB
OCR/SSG/DB
OSWR Chrono
TTAC Chrono
OSWR/PG/PS
Executive Secretary/TTIC
18 Sep 84)
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