WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: August 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 04871-84/1
28 August 1984
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Europe
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 22
August 1984. If there are any significant amendments or additions you
would wish to make, please let me know.
2. Next month's warning meeting will be on 19 September 1984 at
1015 in room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances
passed and call ith names of the attendees
by noon 20 Sept
3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda
and proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to
have your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 10 September 1984.
Attachment:
a/s
eorge Kolt
25X1
LJ^ I
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
~ ~sEert~ ~
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 04871-84
28 August 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Europe
I. France: Prospects for the New Government
A. Analysts believe the second half of 1984 will prove easier
for the Mitterrand government than the first. The opposition forces
are in some disarray and the economic recovery program, which will
remain the government's number one priority under new Prime Minister
Fabius.is working (albeit slowly). Fabius will probably downplay the
inflamatory issues of educational reform and a referendum to change
the constitution. He will also try to work with center-right parties
on issues like social security reform. The two key challenges facing
the government over the next six months are labor unrest and electoral
reform. Although labor leaders are warning of a hot autumn, they do
not seem to have gained any strong support within the rank-and-file
for large-scale strike actions. If Mitterrand reveals his thinking on
the electoral reform issue, it is likely to spark controversy as it
would affect the future electoral prospects of all parties.
Cheysson's upcoming visit to Washington (19-21 September) and
his participation at the EC-Central American foreign ministers meeting
scheduled for late September are likely to be his last major foreign
policy actions. He is widely viewed as a lame-duck foreign minister
and is coming here at the personal invitation of the Secretary of
State. Thus, analysts believe that he will bring little in the way of
new French initiatives, but rather will be collecting impressions on
what a second Reagan Administration's views and actions will likely be
RET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
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? SECRET ?
on the Middle East, arms control, and Central American policy. Since
Cheysson will be traveling to-Latin America after his Washington trip,
some analysts believe that Central America could be a major focus of
his discussions. In view of his long standing interest in Third World
issues he may also want to discuss the problem of LDC debt.
II. The Two Germanies: East and West European Perspectives
The discussion highlighted two possible interpretations of
recent Soviet actions on inner-German relations. One holds that
Moscow is so concerned about its weakened control over East Berlin and
Bonn's alleged attempt to use economic levers to undermine East German
ties with the Warsaw Pact that it is using its campaign against Bonn's
"revanchism" to warn East Berlin and maintain discipline within the
East European camp. The other view holds that there is no major split
between Moscow and East Berlin and that the recent Soviet press
campaign is primarily designed to dampen West German hopes for greater
humanitarian concessions. Most analysts hold the second view, arguing
that Moscow would have taken action stronger than a Pravda article in
case of a major disagreement. Nonetheless, all analysts agree that
Moscow probably has greater concerns about the long-term implication
of inner-German ties for East European developments and is putting
both German capitals on notice that they must be careful. Some
analysts believe that Moscow may already be somewhat reassured that
Foreign Minister Genscher's statements favoring a renunciation of
force agreement indicates that the message was received in Bonn.
crrnrT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
? SECRET .
While analysts believe that Moscow could intervene any time
it wished, they believe that the Honecker visit to West Germany in
late September is likely to occur. More importantly, Honecker is
likely to get more out of the meeting than Chancellor Kohl. East
Berlin will have gained another large credit to strengthen its foreign
exchange position, and the visit will further legitimize the regime
both domestically and internationally. Reports from Bonn suggest that
Bonn is not likely to press for any major concessions on humanitarian
issues.
While drawing some benefits from the trip's symbolic value,
Kohl will have to answer to the criticism of the public, the SPD and
even of some of his own party members over Bonn's agreement to a
credit deal that does not include East German concessions for freer
travel to East Berlin. Somewhat paradoxically the opposition is also
likely to press Kohl to consider moderating standing West German
objections to East Berlin's demands that its citizenship be recognized
and that the Salzgitter center be abolished. Some analysts believe
that the Chancellor might feel obliged to be more responsive to the
GDR demands at the risk of alienating some in his own party, or he
might lean toward a Genscher line of emphasizing an East-West German
role in disarmament discussions in ways that complicate the present
NATO position on INF and CDE.
George Kolt
-4-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200160017-8