WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000300250048-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: January 29, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NIC No. 00512-85/1
29 January 1985
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Europe
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 23
January 1985. If there are any significant amendments or additions you
would wish to make, please let me know.
2. Next month's warning meeting will be on 20 February 1985 at 1015
in room 7-E-62 CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed and
call with names of the attendees by noon, 19
February 1985.
3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and
proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have
your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 11 February 1985.
George Kolt
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 00512-85
29 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Europe
I. European Reactions to the Geneva Talks and the Strategic Defense
Initiative
A. Discussion
Depsite media concentration on SDI, maintaining the INF
deployment schedule remains the most important operation issue. The
NATO allies fear that unrealistic popular expectations will offer
Moscow opportunities to revitalize and manipulate the peace
movements again. In particular, they worry that Moscow will use
vague promises of concessions and try to convince Europeans that the
US will not defend European interests in order to undermine NATO
resolve on INF deployment.
Belgium is particularly vulnerable to such tactics. Its
pro-INF government faces an election this year and risks voter
displeasure if it goes ahead with deployment roughly on schedule
this spring. There is nevertheless an even chance that Belgium will
deploy. Foreign Minister Tindemans is currently visiting other
European capitals and eliciting strong support for Belgian
deployments. Prime Minister Martens may then calculate that he
could justify deployments on the grounds of alliance solidarity, and
CL BY SIGNER
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hope that enough time will have expired between the deployments and
elections to defuse the INF issue. His own party, which has been
unenthusiastic about deployments, would then be faced the dilemma of
accepting Martens' fait accompli or bringing down the government,
thereby forcing early elections that it would almost surely lose.
The outcome in Belgium will affect the way INF is played in Holland,
where the scheduled 1986 deployment continues to look problematical.
The Strategic Defense Initiative poses both near term and
longer term problems for our NATO allies. It is of immediate
concern to our allies as a focal point for Soviet negotiation
tactics in Geneva and a new, prime target for Soviet manipulations
of Western European public opinion, over the longer term. The
allies are the more uneasy because of many unknowns surrounding the
new concept's impact on their security.
For now, the peace movements, wrestling with the lack of firm
details about SDI, are unsure if they have a new rallying point or
an incentive to confusion and divisions in their ranks. But the
rhetoric against SDI already includes renewed speculations about US
"decoupling" from Europe, potential inequalities in the US and
Europe's shared security risks and an increased threat of
conventional war in Europe.
NATO leaders do not agree on the SDI issue. France is most
opposed to the SDI concept as it fears a new high technology weapons
race would negate its nuclear deterrent and mainly benefit the U.K.
due to London's special relationships with the US. Paris is urging
the Europeans to chart a separate position asserting their own
special interests, possibly through the WEU. The British share some
French misgivings but mute them in public to preserve good ties with
the US. The non-nuclear NATO partners, particularly West Germany
and Italy appear more favorably disposed to SDI, especially because
of US promises to share new technology.
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SECRET
Monitoring Items
Poland. The likely outcome of Father Popieluszko's murder
trial -- a death sentence, possibly commuted, for one secret
policeman involved and lighter sentences for others -- is expected
to contain popular anger while not allaying widespread suspicions of
a cover-up. The main long-range concern for the regime, however, is
whether a more subdued and demoralized secret police will still be
able to maintain a satisfactory degree of control over an alienated
society. The regime's most immediate worry is over popular reactions
to the price hikes scheduled for February. Although the regime has
carefully prepared the population and cushioned the impact of on the
hikes on fixed-income families by increasing pensions, it remains
alert to any possible protest actions.
Malta. All analysts agreed that Dom Mintoff is still very much
in charge despite ceding the Premiership to Mifsud Bonnici in
December. The latter's first, slightly more conciliatory, stance
toward the West probably is an effort to offset the impact of
Mintoff's recent visit to Moscow and his decision to reestablish
close ties with Qadhafi. The key question is whether Bonnici is a
transitional figure or a serious contandPr to ci,rroor$ Mintnff
rumorea or is spring, mig
provide indications about the staying power of Bonnici's potential
challengers, primarily Foreign Minister Trigona and Public Works
Minister Lorry Sant.
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots believe that world opinion -- and
most importantly, the US Congress -- will blame the Greek side for
the failure of the UN-sponsored Cyprus summit. Although Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash has agreed in principle to new talks, he has
also implied he might push ahead with a referendum on a constituion
for his proclaimed Turkish National Republic of Cyprus. For their
part, the Greek Cypriots may resume the modernization of the Greek
National Guard, a process that was suspended during the talks.
Either one of these developments would
renewal of talks more difficult,
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Greece-NATO. The Greek pullout from the NATO Defense College
in Rome last week, in reaction to an objectionable war-game scenario
positing a CIA-directed coup in Athens, apparently has no direct
relation to Athens' other problems with NATO. It is possible,
however, that the incident will have wider repercussions and that
Pasok may exploit it during the election campaign.
George Kolt
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