REVIEW OF MLM SITUATION FOR DISCUSSION WITH SECDEF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000300260008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 3, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 04914-85
3 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Review of MLM Situation for Discussion with SECDEF
t staffff play as ows:
The Soviets, smarting from the PRAs we imposed upon them in
retaliation for their new PRA map in the spring 1985, want
a mutual reduction in PRAs. The PRA issue, however, has
now become entangled in the post-Nicholson
"rules-of-behavior" military-to-military talks.
The current informal understanding in these talks is that
the two sides will first come to an agreement on
"rules-of-behavior" and this agreement will include the
intent to reduce PRAs. The Soviets would then give the
Allies a proposed new PRA map which would reduce PRAs from
40 percent of GDR territory to about 25 to 30 percent. The
Allies would have two months to produce their new PRA maps
and if the proposed Allied map were acceptable to the
Soviets, the Allied and Soviet PRA maps then would go into
effect simultaneously. The sequencing, of course, means
that we will only know exactly what kind of PRA reductions
the Soviets have in mind after we have reached agreement
with them on a rules of behavior document.
If agreement can be reached on "rules-of-behavior" document
it will be a compromise package and will not be a blanket
security guarantee for the MLMs, -- an ideal which it has
always been unrealistic to expect.
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-- The French and UK solidarity with us in the wake of the
Nicholson murder has impressed the Soviets and probably
made them more anxious to conclude the US-Soviet military
talks and move on to PRA reductions. But the French and
the British remain leary of the US-Soviet
"rules-of-behavior" negotiations and have no intentions of
either endorsing any subsequent document or negotiating one
of their own. They feel that the original bilateral
agreements setting up the Missions (the Huebner-Malinin
-- As long as the military-to-military talks go on, the US
Mission will most likely continue to operate in a
restricted mode. Yet as the 9 September incident shows
2. My overall impression is that, although all four countries
involved want the Missions to continue to exist and want the PRAs to be
reduced, the military-to-military talks will not produce a document that
ensures the safety of all MLM members under all circumstances.
is not the "rules-of-behavior" ocument that will be produced but the
real instructions that the Soviets give to their troops, the way Soviet
troops in the field actually behave and the way we react to grievous
violations of the norms.
a is truly impor an or us
3. There will always be incidents and detentions. We will have to
judge in each case whether the incident fits the bounds of acceptability
and, if it does not, how much it exceeds those bounds and what we should
then do about it. On the one hand we will not want to escalate fairly
routine incidents above the level at which they can and should be
handled. On the other hand we will want to guard against letting the
Soviets gradually escalate the use of force as they did between the late
70s and 1984 (periodic rammings, roughing up of Mission personnel etc.)
Should Soviet behavior, then, go beyond the bounds of the acceptable, we
will have to retaliate against the Soviet Mission -- not necessarily in a
tit-for-tat way -- but rather in a way that brings home to the Soviets
that their Mission will have to pay for any unwarranted harassment of US
personnel.
4. That, however, is for the longer term. What should we do now?
In my view we should end the military-to-military talks on "rules-of-
behavior" in a mutually acceptable way as soon as possible and thereby
SECRETF--]
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open the way for reducing the PRAs. Since the day-to-day control of the
military-to-military talks rest with USAREUR, I don't know the exact
state-of-play today. But, because I share the low regard the French and
British hold for these talks, I would not be disturbed if the talks ended
by a low-level exchange of oral declarations of good intent. It will be
important, however, to end the talks in a mutually aceptable fashion so
that we do not make the position of the MLMs worse. Further, I think the
pre-Summit period provides us a good opportunity to end the talks in a
way acceptable to us: This is when the new GSFG CINC is apt to be under
the greatest pressure to finish the nasty business left him by his
predecessor.
George Kolt
Attachment:
DCI Memo to Sec.Defense,
Dtd. 9 Sept. 85
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Vt shington. D C.20505
09S;P 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Berlin Issues
1. There are two issues which I did not have time to raise with you
at our breakfast this morning and on which I would like to give you my
thoughts:
-- The possibility of using the upcoming Summit and probable
resumption of direct air links between the US and USSR to
settle the Berlin Air Corridor problem to our satisfaction.
-- The MLM negotiations.
2. Regarding the Berlin Air Corridor problem, we have made progress
in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) negotiations, but not enough to
achieve the desirable degree of safety for flights through the
corridors. Unfortunately the UK and possibly ever France will probably
judge that the current situation no longer requires demonstration flights
to make our points. The prospect, therefore, is for prolonged palavers
in the BASC with little prospect of progress. My idea is to create a
link between the air corridor issue and any resumption of direct air
routes between. the United States and the Soviet Union. The link would
not be direct. Rather we would tell the Soviets that we cannot in good
conscience reestablish air routes between our two countries while the
Soviets are still endangering western flights in the Berlin air
corridors. We know that Aeroflot and more importantly the KGB would like
to reestablish service to the US and once again open offices here. Our
making the linkage described above might thus move the Soviets to direct
their military to give us the few additional miles we require in the
Berlin Air Corridors (for a resume on where we stand in the BASC
discussions I attach a memorandum from my NIO for Europe).
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3. On the MLMs I have read with great interest your memorandum of 26
August 1985 to Bud MacFarlane. I am glad there is some prospect the
Soviets may scale back the PRAs and provide better instructions to their
troops on the non-use of force toward the Missions. We shall, of course,
have to wait and see if the Soviets really deliver and if we can get them
to drop the three unacceptable demands they are making on penetration of
training areas, scrupulous obeyance of all orders by their sentries, and
Mission restriction signs. Soviet behavior in the 13 July incident and
apparent desire to come to some sort of an agreement in the
military-to-military talks give grounds for guarded optimism on-our
art. Should this optimism be borne out, we could achieve an improvement
he safety of our
men hus, I want to
sug to handle the Soviet
refusal to provide an apology and compensation. In my estimation they
are highly unlikely to budge on this and it would be very unfortunate if
we were
to pursue what is most likely unachievable. think it is possible
Huebner-Malinin agreement. Second, it would occur before or maybe even
at the Summit--a period when the Soviets are prone to make moves of this
sort. Again, all this is predicated on the Soviets giving us something
tangible to improve the safety and capability of the Allied Missions.
Of course, when we went public with Zaytsev's
private expressior of regret, the Soviets reacted violently and accused
us of having caused Nicholson's death. In the current circumstances the
Soviets may behave differently. First their expression of regret would
come at a time when the two sides would be revalidating the
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4. We should discuss these two issues at one of our future meetings.
William J. Casey
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Review of MLM Situation for Discussion with SECDEF
FROM: EXTENSION
NIO/EUROPE
NO.
NIC No. 04914-85
DATE
3 October 1985
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
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to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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