CIA COMMENTS ON STATE MEMORANDUM ENTITLED POLAND NEXT STEPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DI CTOR OF
CENTRAL I ELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR:
Executive Secretary
FROM: George Kolt
.NIO/Europe
SUBJECT: CIA Comments on State Memorandum Entitled
Poland Next Steps
This memo responds to your request. It has
been coordinated with the relevant DDI and DDO
offices.
George Kolt
Attachment:
As stated
Ct. BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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NIC #06977-84
13 December 1984
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SECRET/
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR:
NIC #06977-84
13 December 1984
Executive Secretary
FROM: George Kolt
NIO/Europe
SUBJECT: CIA Cos on State Memorandum Entitled
Poland Next Steps
This memo responds to your request. It has
been coordinated with the relevant DDI and DDO
offices.
George Kolt
Attachment:
As stated
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DECL OADR
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CaKra ~Id IBrnoe A~rxy
NIC #06977-84/A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
-St
Executive ecre
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: CIA Comments on State Memorandum Entitled Poland Next
Steps
1. The policy advocated in the State memorandum is essentially one of
responding positively to any Polish moves toward liberalization and
negatively toward repressive action. As such,'this policy is well in
accord with NSDD 54 (US Policy Toward Eastern Europe). From the
intelligence standpoint, however, we would caution against a search for
direct or indirect deals on issues affecting Polish domestic affairs,
that is against a policy based on promises of US quids for Polish
domestic policy quos. While Jaruzelski undoubtedly attaches some
attention to Western reactions, his domestic moves will be dictated
primarily by his own long-term domestic objectives and by his perception
of the balance of forces within the ruling Polish apparatus. Any US
attempts to strike specific bargains with him will probably flounder as
Jaruzelski's implementation of his side of the bargain will be influenced
by his desire to keep a consensus in his apparatus, will probably not
meet US expectations, and may well lead to recriminations rather than
improvements in relations.
2. We note that since the memo was written Jaruzelski has freed Lis
and Mierzewski. We assume that the USG is therefore lifting our
opposition to the Polish application for IMF membership as we have
explicitly told the Poles we would do.
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ECRET)
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3. As for the specifics of the State memorandum we offer the
following comments:
We are not as optimistic as State on the Polish balance of
payments situation. Although there was a small increase
(almost $300 million) in the trade surplus in 1984, the
overall hard currency balance of payments situation has
declined (-$260 million) this year. Poland still faces
serious financial problems and we do not expect an
improvement soon.
- The Poles are in the third year of a moratorium on
payments to Western governments during which arrears
have risen to $11 billion. This moratorium has
allowed the regime to give greater priority to imports
to increase production and market supplies.
- Financing sources are dwindling as new credits dry up.
- Warsaw cannot even cover the interest on its debt, and
interest arrears now amount to $2.5 billion.
We believe more attention should be paid to the views of
Polish society. In essence, the chasm between the
government and society remains as wide as ever. Although
the government's tools of repression effectively crush any
outright resistance, society continues to defy the
government whenever it can, such as the use of the
Popieluszko funeral to demonstrate its continued loyalty to
the ideals of Solidarity, the continued circulation of some
1,000 underground publications and the outright rejection
of the PRON (the government's 1980s version of the "United
Fronts" of the 1940s. It is important to note that Poland
had eighteen months of freedom during the Solidarity
period, that the population has not been cowed as in
Czecholovakia, and that it wants more political
participation today than Kadar has given Hungary after over
twenty years o rue. We believe there will be continued
refusal by the Poles to accept the well-disciplined society
model that Jaruzelski apparently has in mind. Human rights
commmittes have been established in various cities but the
government has not allowed them to operate. They are,
however, a manifestation of a continued search for more
effective resistance and may require our attention in the
future.
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As for Jaruzelski we see him as a consensus man and one who
either does not see or does not want to use all the freedom
of action which the lack of a viable alternative gives him
vis-a-vis the Soviets. Consequently, we do not believe he
will take actions outside the standard Communist framework
and will continue his attempt to preserve the standard
Communist system of rule from above. That system will not
be accepted by Polish society and Jaruzelski will have to
continue relying on the repressive apparatus of the
Interior Ministry, therefore greatly diminishing his
freedom of action.
On economic policy the Polish government has repeatedly
said that unless it can get cooperation from the West it
will orient the Polish economy toward the Soviet Union.
These Statements shnuld ho t ed with caution.
the Poles did con uc
eas y of t is policy and found that it
would not be viable. The government could nevertheless opt
for it in lieu of economic reforms that would make the
country a more acceptable partner to the West but doing so
would be choosing the path of continued impoverishment for
Poland.
-- On economic interactions with the West we note that the
plan for private aid to Polish agriculture is currently
stalled because of Polish government demands that would
undermine the effectiveness of the aid. If Jaruzelski
really intends to move in a meaningful way on reform it
would seem that he would overcome whatever resistance there
might be to this admittedly difficult ideological deviation.
-- As far as relations with the US go, we believe that if the
Poles really want an improvement they would give agreement
to our Ambassador designate. We would also note the
periodic recurrence of reports that the Poles believe the
US so badly wants to have an Ambassador in Warsaw that it
will make concessions to get Polish agreement. We believe
that the dispatch of any high level interlocutor to Poland
prior to that agreement would lend support to that belief.
SECRET)
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NIC #06977-84
13 December 1984
Distribution:
Orig - Executive Secretary
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - EX REG
1 - DDI Reg
1 - NIO/EUR Chron
DCI/NIC/NI0/EUR/GKo1t:
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
-.AOVUNGSUP
Dec 84
Remarks
TO 19: Please ensure coordinated
(DI/DO/NIO) response is prepared for my
signature.
8'Dec 84
3637 (104')
TO
ACTION
INFO
DATE
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~... VIA LOX
1 SYSTV1 11
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL R. J. AFP`OURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of Deflense
NATIONAL ![PURITY COUNCIL
WASNIasroM.4.c. Seri
Dsgember 7, 1984
SECRET
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91207
Executive i er'!s$ry
64. 10266
--~
ACLU V ' aVcrWLary I
Central Intelliggnce Agency
SUBJECT: Poland: Next Steps (S)
in response to the President's request, the Departments of State
and Treasury have reviewed and devised a broad contingency plan
to respond to Polish events, which is attached. Please provide
your comments to NSC by COO, Friday, December 14, 1984.--IS)
Robert M. immitt
E7ecutive Secretary
State Department's memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of November 26
cc: Charles Hill
Department of State
Christopher Hicks
Department of the Treasury
SECRET
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November 26, 1984
ES SENSITIVE 8432258/8430868
United States Depertiuent of State '
slim" II
ftAinpax. AC MN 91267
MEMORANDIM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLAME
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Poland: Nest Steps
In response to your October 17 memorandum to the secretary,
the Departments of State and Treasury have reviewed the
situation in Poland and developed a broad contingency plan for
dealing with possible positive and aevative developments in
that country.
The Current Situation in Poland Poland remains relatively calm
in Me atermat of the July 21 s+nesty and the Popielussko
affair. However, the amnesty appears to have done little to
bridge the appreciable gap that separates the government from
society. The kidnapping and murder of Father Popielueskobby
officers of the secret police hi hlights the continued
unprsdictibility of the situation. It is impossible at this
point to foresee how the Popieluszko affair will play out. The
government promptly arrested three secret police officers who
have subsequently confessed to toe crime, but insist that they
did not mean to kill the priest. The government has provided
considerable detail about the cr me to date and probably will
put the three officers on trial Ind obtain a conviction, an
unprecedented occurrence in post. ar Eastern Europe.
General Jaruzelski has assumed personal control of the
Communist party apparatus in the+Ministry of Internal Affairs,
implying that the Politburo member who'oversees security
matters, police general Miroslaw~Milewski, is on his way out.
A large-scale shake-up in the secret police could'follow.
Milewski is widely assumed to beta hard-line, pro-Soviet
opponent of'Jaruzelski and possibly the eminence rise behind
the murder of Popielussko. Rumors of KG involves Int:n the
Popielusako'affair are unsubstantiated but widely I believed in
Poland and, we understand, in the Vatican.
On the economic front, Poland's balance of payments
situation has improved somewhat in the past year. Warsaw
sustained a hard currency surplus by severely cutting back on
imports, but the level of production and standard of living is
still 200 lower than in 1979, the last pre-crisis year.
Officially, the Polish Government remains committed to economic
reform and has passed a number of related legislative acts, but
the Polish economy has yet to be reformed in any meaningful
fashion.
Solidarity continues to play an important symbolic role,
even though it is outlawed and lacks organizational'cohesion.
For example, Walesa was instrumental in keeping public passions
reined in after Popieluszko's murder. He has called repeatedly
for talks with the Government, but to date Warsaw has shown no
sign of a willingness to enter into meaningful discussions with
his or any other Solidarity leader. Meanwhile, Walesa and his
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(rft,
SECRET:
colleagues are calling for trade unioo.:pluralisao and a debate
is underway within Solidarity. over. how to deal with the new
official trade unions. One segment.-.segues that terser,-
Solidarity members should participate in the unions, and
particularly the worker's councils at individual-enterprises in
an attempt to exert-control.oves.union-policies, while thess
argue for creation of separate Solidarity-type-unions.--0n the
sanctions goestion.:.Walesa continua to favor :our. 4i1fti
economic.. sanctions against the OOP,B. but only in return for
forward progress-.on the part of :the ;dish Government.
The Church and state continue to share an interest.-in
social peace but have .little also in common.- ,Th. Church ,plays
an increasingly important role, particularly ,a& an altegnate
outlet for political expression. In the meantime, the Church
is. significantly expanding its.influence'in -,areas, suoh~,aa,..the
eonstsuctf e i .,Of :,fie*. places Of -worship (20o.in ,one. year.), .and its
plan .to.assist. private farmers. Differences between, the*two
.will, contthue.rto, cause problems.: although..both:ssides .:hays gone
out .of the. Bay. during the past year to .avoid confrontations.
This.. is particularly true in the aftermath of the kidnapping
and murder -of- -lather . Popi elusskp.
Despite.tbe..Popdelusskooffair* Jaruselski's.Position
appears secure, thanks in large part to the absence of a viable
alternative Polish leader. Polish public opinion apparently
does not view-aim as?pprionally(responsible for rather
Popielussbo's ?iusder, although is 'investigation .of .the case
will .continue '?to >be carefully ' aid critically scrutinized. be
evidently intends to play a bal acing act between ...t,;;; ..
;."reactionaries".-, who want to th4ottle. dissent oompletelyo and
"liberals",,. who hops, under sun able circumstances,- to. .revive
Poland's Western connection. Host observers, both within and
Outside Of Poland,-generally agfee that his replacement-!,by a
"hardliner" such as Olssowski would only lead to a worsening of
the. situation. if, I ,.,
The Kremlin views the situation in Poland as far ftos
ideal. Moscow, for example, ? is.{ clearly unhappy with the;.
enhanced role of the Church, thi prominent.leadership:tole
played by the :army (and oonsequfnt displacement -of :the -Pesty),
the large private agricultural ector;:. the .ecomomie'..orals,
-Jaruselski $ a refusal. to, date to crackdown sharply .on dissent,
and the -relative (for a communist country) : openness of, the ti
podia.
As we-;consider. our long-term objectives. we must be. ?x
realistic shout what is possible in sastern lurope. Although
likely to middle along on its :'current.course a while longer.
the Polish leadership could follow one of two broad paths. The
first is one of strong central control, repression of all
dissent and meager, if any, economic reform. The second
permits a limited but significant amount of openness, economic
experimentation, and dialogue with"the'populace.
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Czechoslovakia approximates the first model. Hungary the
second. Given the Polish people's historical record, the
strong role played by the Church, and the fact that every
post-war regime has known it needed the people's cooperation to
"succeed", severe repression is a much less likely long-term
option. it is too early to tell what direction Poland will
take. Jaruselski says he wants to follow the second paths
however, as the murder of Father Popielussko indicates,
reactionary elements in Poland still wield considerable power
and undoubtedly would be more comfortable with a more
repressive regime. Our specific policy decisions should be
designed to encourage the Poles along the path of social
dialogue and economic reform and our assessment of whether, in
general, this is the direction in which they are heading.
Dealing with Positive Developments We have informed Warsaw
that we will move on o sh IMF membership once Solidar ty
activists Bogdan Lis and Piotr Miersewski are released from
prison. Two major U.S. sanctions would then remain in places
MPN and access to official credits. We could thus lift one or
both of these sanctions in response to appropriate positive
developments within'Poland. We could also lift our informal
ban against high-level USG contacts with Polish counterparts.
The latter is such desired by Warsaw for its symbolic
significance.
and Italians) to send nigh leveA delegations to Warsaw.
Nevertheless, it is a U.S. visit that they seek the most.
r%
-- MFd. The suspension of Poland's MPH status was linked
to the Legalization of Solidarity. Its reinstatement
logically should be associated with freer trade union
activity. As noted, Lech Walesa and other leading Solidarity
activists have on several occasions called for trade union
pluralism, although they have n t yet made clear what this term
means. We think substantial movement toward trade union
pluralism and greater social dialogue should be our primary
conditions for restoration of MP status, although we should
take our cue from Walesa and other Solidarity leaders in
defining this process.
-- Access to Official Credits. Walesa has stated on a
number of occasions that he wouz welcome aid for Poland, but
has always qualified his states nts with the observation that
this aid must be used for the benefit of the populace, not 4
squandered by the regime as in the past. We should make
lifting the sanction against access to USG credits (as opposed
to the actual provision of credits) contingent on the
implementation of meaningful economic reforms and agreement
with the Paris Club on rescheduling debt and arrears since 1981.
-- High Level Visit to Warsaw. Warsaw is elated over the
decisions of a number of our Al ies (the Greeks, Germans, Brits
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Indeed, Important Polish-American leaders have pcoposedlthat a
senior USG official offer to visit Poland, tooling this1would?
be viewed there as a clear sign of our interest in a dialogue
and could help strengthen those forces within Poland who favor
a more moderate course. Obviously we should not consider such
a visit unless we were assured of gaining something from it.
At the same time, to be effective, such a step should not be
made directly conditional on specific actions by the Warsaw
Government. Rather, we should make it quietly clear to the
Poles that we would be prepared to consider such a visit once
we had a clear sense that Jarutelski was moving in a positive
direction. This "bait" might help to urge Jaruselski to move
more clearly in this direction.
Dealing with Negative Developments The USG must also be
prepared to deal with a serious deterioration within Poland.
In addition to criticizing publicly specific negative
developments, there would be a six of concrete steps we could
take to respond. These might include warnings to Warsaw of the
consequences further deterioration would have on our lifting
sanctions which are still in effect (i.e., 14PH and credits),
or, if we have already granted MPh or credits take steps to
withdraw then. However, it would be unwise at this point to
settle on a specific strategy, since any action on our part
will be heavily conditioned by circumstances. To wits
-- The Soviet Role. Depending on the extent/magnitude of
Soviet involvement, we will want to focus part or most Qf our
attention on Moscow.
'- The Allies. Experience over the past two years
indicates t t, to be most effective, actions on our part
vis-a-vis the Poles must have Allied support. We will need to
carefully assess the position of our Allies at the time to
determine what type of actions on out part will hav 416-
W
desired effect. It is very clear, however, that for the Allies
to respond forcefully to negative developments in Poland, those
developments would have to be egregious and the U.S. would have
to exert an active, high-level, it behind-the-scenes effort.
-- The Domestic Scene. Mainline Polish-American leaders
appear to loaning away from our use of the stick and toward
our dangling some carrots. This does not mean they will not
call for a strong USG response to repressive acts by the Warsaw
Government, only that their reaction will be heavily influenced
by actual events. Others seem more unremittingly "hardline" on
how best t d
o
eal with warsaw. This same mix of views is
evident on the Hill and among some other domestic groups.
i
-- The Situation in Poland. To have maximum impact, any
actions on our part must be carefully calibrated. If we react
too strongly or too weakly, we could risk not only undermining
our own interests in Poland, butt in aiding our enemies as well.
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should significant deteriortion occur in Poland, the
Department, in consultation w a
it other appropriate agencies,
will provide timely, specific r6commendations fop dealing with
the situation.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
CIA Comments on State Memorandum Entitled Poland Next Steps
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
George Kolt
NIC #.06977-84
N I 0/ E U R
DATE
13 December 1984
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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VC/NIC
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C/NIC
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EX SEC
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
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