THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The study. presented here is an examination. of the political status. of.
Islam in Southeast Asia both as a religion and a vital determinant of ethnic
identity. We conclude-that the .two phenomena of Islamic-fundamentalism and
Islamic "neomodernism" will. be important variables in. the evolution of
politics in the. region.
..Although the manifestations-differ from country to country, throughout
Southeast Asia-, the Islamic consciousness of its nearly 160 milllion Muslims
has -been raised:. This is in part. an extension of. the global resurgence of
the Islamic identity. The-dynamics of Islamic politics in the-six domestic.
settings 6'f'ASEAN.can only partially be explained, .however, by externalities
of'the "Islamic Revolution."
The - assertion by fundamentalists of the demand for an orthodoxy- in
which- all institutions of society will conform to Islamic law'(shari'a) ..is
rejected.' by the incumbent elites of Malaysia and Indonesia as_ incompatible
with the demands of modernization. In Malaysia the strategy. has. been
adaptive accommodation and cooptation. In Indonesia-the approach has been
to'legally "depo.liticize" Islam. In both cases, the fundamentalist extreme
presents some threat:of political violence.
In the Philippines. and Thailand, the Muslim problem is one of
separatism. In neither case does it appear probable that the maximum
:goals will be realized. In the Philippines, however, the evolution of
Muslim 'autonomy will be closely connected to the outcome of the wider.
political crisis. In both Thailand and the Philippines there are possible
scenarios of separatist alliance with communist insurgents.
The 'two mini-states of Brunei and Singapore contrast. sharply. Brunei
is the most thoroughly Islamized state in ASEAN,. while the.Muslim minority
in-Singapore is socially and economically disadvantged.
Nowhere in Southeast Asia do we find any real prospect of_. Islamic
fundamentalist seizure of political power in the sense of a clerical
wresting of the state from secular leadership. Yet, throughout the region
the political culture is being infused with Islamic values. Islam in its
"rieomodernist" guise provides an alternative political ideology for the
modern state in competition with capitalism and socialism. Great attention
should be paid to the linkage between Islam and real social and economic
grievances in urban centers in particular.
At this point, the foreign policy implications for. the United States of
political Islam in Southeast Asia seem limited. There has been some value
distancing- as the anti-western orientation of the Islamic revitalization
proceeds, but this does not seem reflected in state behavior. The most
important foreign policy dimension that may be affected will be interactions
in ASEAN.itself both: instrumentally in terms of support from Muslims in
Malaysia and Indonesia for minorities in the Philippines and Thailand. As
the Islamicization process at the Malay-Indonesian-Brunei core continues the
potential for the disruption of ASEAN concord will increase.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION::.. ............... ....................1
II. MALAYSIA................................. ...... .... 15
III. -INDONESIA ....... ............... ............... ......:::...38
IV. PHILIPPINES... :.....................................:...58
V. THAILAND. ....................:..........................74
VI. SINGAPORE... .......... ................:.:...........86
VII. BRUNEI ....................... ...........................95
VIII. CONCLUSIONS ............................................101
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?
IV THE PHILIPPINES:
Introduction.
The Muslim ..minority in-the Philippines: numbers 2.5 million or about
The
Catholic Christian
five percent. of a total population that is largely.-Catholic
in the south, being a majority in five provinces in
Muslims. are concentrated of as
can be broadly thought.
ela o. While they
Mindanao and the Sulu archip g called
collectively.
rthern extension of the Malay Islamic culture,
the no
nt
this. iso ..an.,.
used proudly),
Moros .(office a term of opprobrium but today
definition of the community. Filipino Muslims consist of ten ethno
ethnic defini Maguindanao
linguistic groups Three. groups form the great - majority:
inces); Maranao. (North
tan Kudarat, and Maguindanao prov- and
(Cotabato, Su
An Islamic sense
Sulu).
Lanao provinces); .and Tausug(Jolo island in .
to the uinmat has been limited by the fiercly-defended separate
of belonging
identities over.centu-ries of ethnic conflict. The ethnic divisions-
cultural roues, from
the g
are-reinforced by differing. degrees of Islamicization among
the first to embrace Islam in the 14th century,
the orthodoxy of the Tausug,
to the indigenous syncretism (animism) of the Bajau sea- people.
they do share a
Nevertheless, despite the many differences among the group s,
When, as
1 .
social, and legal institutions.
f Islamic cultural,.
tock o
the commonality of
I non-Muslim forces,
ommon s n recent years, pressed by externa non-Muslim forces,
Islam prevails over ethnic distinction..
d Mindanao
11 it was Filipino Muslim-sultanates in Sulu an
Historica y, It
-colonial Philippines.
that gave supra-village political structure to pre
16th
the
i
n
was Muslim authority that the Spanish displaced from Manila
a ainst the
spread crusading christianity g
The Spanish aggressively
century.
tier between
fron
Asian variety of the hated Moors (hence Moro). The bloody
..
d Sulu sultanates
an
ao an
Da al-Harb and Dar al-Islam was at the Manguindan r
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Spanish pacification of Mindanao was not accomplished until shortly before
i n
?
The governmen
of the Manila-centric political economy.
tiara Filipinos to the south. Religious violence,
the migration of Chris enetration was
p
i
an
particularly in. the Manguindanao regions where Christ
most felt, was a regular feature of intergroup relations. The violence can
h u h sectarian strife
l
t o g
ized as Muslim - Christian, but a
be easily categor
the underlying structure of social conflict was
was rampant in '50s and '60,
complex than simply a matter of religious antagonisms. sms.
economic grievances festered as the local adminstrations
political- and eChris
staffed by Christian officials seemed to favor the tian Population.
seen as
The application of the national cadastral system in what were
large scale alienation of land held _in customary
Ant__ partisan courts led to heightened by so-called
h
4 ~ _,_ ownership by Muslims. Moro discontent was
ining concessions,
i and m
"development'projects such as-large scale lumberng p Manila middle men manipulating
.often held by foreigners, obtained through the national legal system to Muslims disadvantage.
59
(l`
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U.S. displaced Spain as sovere g
guerilla war. The,
horitywas imposed in the course of a
aut
American in occupation, andthenthrough Christian Filipinos,
U.S., first directly education
lar law,
ht a new kind of colonialism to the Muslims. Secu
brought .
aditional authority.
and tr
ration contradicted the customary law and administration _
f 1T internal self
and moved towards ? u
ime developed
Asp the colonial reg When the
argued for a separate . Muslim state.
government; Muslim leaders arg `.leaders
made, Muslim
unsuccessfully presse
status in the new Philippines nation was
concern about their
Muslim c that
soon translated into fear and hostility towards national 'Policies exaggerated their vulnerabilities as a .small minority. out of the mainstream
actively encouraged
for a separate independentMUsl11LL
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.political Background.
the Muslims. seemed-.less and less
more attractive. The .1968-,Corregidor affair was a wa
of its on and off diplomatic pursuit of a residual
was not a religious movement. Islam was Lne
scientist, ~_~~??~
ideology that was self-consciously nationalist,
60
.subordinating ethnic
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state of Sabah,
always latent appeal: of
the
interests in the-national political system,
tershed
given special warfare training.
capable of defending their
Manila apparently planned
in Sabah itself. Muslims were recruited and
Pay. issues led to a Muslim mutiny in March,=
after which 28. Muslims were summarily executed.
Muslims
This incensed the
A direct, political
1968, w
of. old Muslim Politics. It was established by the
The MIM flowed out
Matalam. The MIM gave som
Cotabato traditional leader. Datu Udtog i n
venerable e
i
the south and sparked outrage in Malaysia.
result was the founding of the Muslim-Independence
hich had military training links to Malaysia.
w
a ne
tradition but of education in the Middle East and Philippine universities.
h it
Muslim elite was emerging whose socialization
i form to what had become
g o ,
endemic violence in the name of rel
systemat
m Meanwhile
ste.
but its goal was reduced to autonomy in a kind of federal sy
was not that of
consciousness and.political expectations were fed by t e
on that
contacts in the wider Muslim world. The political phenomen was
identity and
in the '60s.was the transmogrification of religious
occurring
ethnicity into a modern Islamic nationalism -- that of the Bangsa Moro
olitical goals. This was represented by the Moro
with economic and p
eration Front (MNLF) for which, in a sense, the MIM had prepared
National Lib
the ground.
of the Philippines political
The MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, a University
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M ro identity.---it was
anti-traditional,.nommitted
radically
division to the
ould restructure Moro
that w
ticall to social and economic change programs y The MNLF
f Islamic values of Justice and equity.
name o
in the society full
provided the Moros-, for the first time,aunified leadership with a
dependent state carved
i
n
of an
that demanded the creation political. Program
Sulu, Basilan, and Palawan.
out of 25 provinces in Mindanao;
972 ended any- possibility, of
w in 1
martial la The 'declaration of
The political.field
stem
moderate Muslim bargaining in an open palitical:sy
At its
was left to the MNLF which by 1972 was engaged in a war of secession.
-'70s the MNLF fielded 20,000 30,000 guerillas and
.peak in the mid t side,
y
d Sulu countr
nao an
controled large stretches of the western Minda
some cities. At the height of the bleeding war, up_ to
even threatening in the south.
ere tied
50,000 Philippine Armed Forces troops w down
articularl among civilians, and tales of atrocities
Y
Casualties were high, Particularly
abilities were
from both sides were often heard. The MNLF~s military cap
site,
considerably enhanced by the availability of Sabah as a training
material
co
and sanctuary. Through Malaysia's
resupply center, Sabah state,
from Libya. This strategic vantage was considerably
aid was funneled f
of Sabah's Chief
nation
forced the resig
diminished after Kuala Lumpur
Tun Mustafa, whose had cooperated with the F.
Minister le against
From the outset the MNLF internationalized their struggle
Organization of the. Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Islamic
Manila in the Ostrongly backed
Foreign Ministers Conference (IFMC). The MNLF.s diplomacy,
by threatening
; . I by Libya, 5-61- --- -- - .
dependent
import
ters to constrain
through its Middle East suppor an energy
.'
successful. The
il supplY? The MNLF was only partially
o
I Philippines ..._^,,rPrned about the conditions
1 internationa-L
did lead to some moderation
this
of Filipino Muslims, and their attention to
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0
0
lit ical and military tactics. Importantly for Manila,
in the government's po ted.by.
.e.~essionist goal was not accep
however, was the fact that Lnc'u"" between Manila:
-1 1Pd for direct negotiations
which instead in 1" - "-- Filipino Muslims
11 the IFMC .,. the alight of the
.for a "bus- rit.
and the MNLF integ Y
andterritorial
t
y
framework of. the national sovereign
Ln the
the Philippines." reflects at least in part
The ;relative mildness ~y though.both countries,
sia and Malaysia.
d
one
of In
the mediatory. Toles in the treatment of
n interest
their -Muslim populations have a
given oblems for regional
sion raises pr
s
overnme
courts, internal self-g
foreign policy and national defense left to the central
revenue, etc., with fo g
government. The cease-fire went into effect in January 1977, but broke down
provinces. Autono y
"autonomy" for the Muslims in 13 guaranteed sources of
nt and administration, g
key internal text of ASEAN harmony'
and-the MNLF being pressed for a peaceful resolution
.with both Manila Libya, an
the now compromising
including
by the external Islamic states, providing for a cease
went was reached in Tripoli in December 1976,. agreement settlement called for
fire and proposed terms of a settlement.
m was to include shar_a
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roe's Sabah c
The continued linkage of the Philipp and has been a
Sabah still strains the bilateral relationship
the MnF from
relations were somewhat improved when President
to Sabah. This has not been followed uP.
claim
summit renounced any lenient the renunciation.
r, by constitutional action. in Manila to imp alleged support to
howeve lain and
Filipino Muslims , the prospect of sece
a successful
and order and the ASEAN system.. Furthermore,
or
peace aa spillover
might
Ines
sionist movement -in the Philipp
secessionist have
demonstration effect in their. .own political systems* Malaysia.,- Philippines
Marcos at the 1977 ASEAN
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r.with the collapse. of negotiations on the implementation
later the same yea
proposals. President Marcos then proceeded to unilaterally
of the autonomy " a symbolic
implement the Tripoli agreement in a manner that made "autonomy
two regional assemblies.
In 1979, ..
o
a
were established in Region IX (ZaMboang
Cotabato provinces) covering.13 provinces.
the 1982? elections
Although boycotted by the MNLF,
the regional assemblies and a number
1 ,Qitions on the local, reg
Muslim
level
Tonal, and national
cooptations to offici.a P with the Muslims.
aining
b
arg
the government wider political options in
vernment
gave. In 1982, the go
blished.
esta
Affairs
In 1981, a Ministry of Muslim was
Muslim areas: Educational
would establish shari'a court in
announced that it
provided to traditional Muslim schools (madr~a assistance was By forcing
In an ironic fashion the diplomacy of the MNLF back-fired.
Policy.
ito deal with the international ramifications of its. off
the Manila-regime ortunity to fend in the south; it provided the government with the opP
od faith in its strivings
acts trying to show go
by were
the impatience of the OIC
ace in the south. Promises of -nt. infrastructure development for peace diplomacy
1
s
a v
designed to promote
and Mrs Marcos --for example the 1982 visit of Marcos to
President Marcos from the
tional initiative
Saudi Arabia.-- also helped keep the interna away
de loyment of the
Red militarily by the costly P
The MNLF, c ec ness
constrained by the unwilling
Philippines Armed-Forces and diplomatically
of the- OIC to sanction the Philippines, fell upon hard times. By the early
fighting had considerably diminished. From the large unit
'809 the level of to terror
s of the '70s, the MNLF's tactics turned increasingly
action rabbing but
robin s, kidnappings, extortion, and other headline g
bo g a decade of bloodshed a
strategically inconsequential actions. After nearly
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ion of economic deve or
i
.
t
and Sulu and Region XII (Lanao and
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S
population brutalized by both sides looked for other alternatives
Muslim P the. MNLF. -. Beset
than imply the continuation of violence as presented by
the
divisions its expatriate leadership could 'not control,
by. internal-
crumbled. Mass defections and well publicized surrenders
,F s cohesion
and more Moro secessionist leaders and followers back to thee
brought more onsered Moro
overnment-sp
fold. A,..number were to assume roles-in the new S measures from the south in
com
arative quantitative regional structures. BY
P the government had
it can be asserted that by the end of 1982,
the mid--70s, hand-. The
(BHA) well in
the military situation with the-Bangsa Moro. Army ( .
The issues that drove the MNLF-into armed opposition
Moro. problem remains:.
the situation in the south is no more securd for Manila as-the
and
le s
pers
fought by the Communist Party of the Philippines New Peop
the war being
Army (NPA) expands across Mindanao.
Current Status. at 6-7,000
today
The highest government estimates place BMA forces
laims 30,000
i from his exile headquarters still
on
still hit a patrol, creating new casualties
ings for ransom, including foreigners. By and large,
still carry out kidnapp its
a peaceful Moro front has allowed the government to redeploy
troops o face the more serious insurgent threat presented
however, the south t
in
A in Christian populated eastern and northern Mindanao. . MLF
today by the NPA
commanders continue to come down out of the hill with their followeousand in
co ht out a th
example, Basilan Is "Commander Gerry" [Salapuddin] broug
He will join other MNLF guerilla leaders who have governmental
June, 1984.
strong although Misuar
rate if
The government figure is probably more accu we take into
fighters. Fire
account the current limited numbers of armed contact with the BMA. pall
ccasio
sporadic and scattered. From ambush, the BMA can o
fights are sPo th sides. The insurgents
NOW
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0
[Amelil
tonomous Regions IX and XII like. ''Commander Ronnie"
posts in au
who came out with a thousand men in 1980 to become Chairman
MalaguiokJ , nnr_inues in the
The cooptation process
vTT Executive Council.
ion
the Reg of Marcos-s. one-sided implementation of the-Tripoli ag
framework ency has created
the Moro,insurg
The-government's success in containing
in Moroland resulting from the military exhaustion
a kind.of. negative peace,
failure of
the war weariness. of the people, and the the
of 'the insurgents, While the 01C
cohesion.
-leadership to maintain its
MNLF
expatriate the Philippine
continues to recognize the MNLF as.the.tepresentative of
which "responsible
with justification,
Muslims, the government caf.ask9
dealt with. The inability of the MNLF to give continuity
ld be
"
shou
p
Islam illustrates again the issues of
grou -, .
to a single voice for the politics of
l Muslim political unity that is apparent elsewhere, in
terna
in
creating
olitical factions whose
r Moro p
Southeast Asia. There are at least fou disagreementse
division is based on ethnic cleavage and programmatic
iuari. Long based
Nur
the MNLF continues to be led by
For the OIC, have moved his headquarters to Iran. His armed
.. .1
ar may
u
and other 5utuauo
I supporters were drawn from the Tausugs 5? roes
I ass most of the Philipp
his demand for a Moro state. that would encomp Muslim population,
and which, despite Misuari.s inflated claims of t
south he
which Muslims would be a minority ruling a Christian
.would be one in wh power
socialism base of
the pfrom afar on
majority. His radical Islamic on
influence
Hi
s
traditional Islamic leadership in Moroland.
the south has waned corresponding to his diminished
internal developments in
ort from external supporters.
ability to deliver material.supp al to fundamentalist Hashim
A Cotobato Maguindanaon MNLF faction is Joy
member of the MNLF Central.Committee, who split with
a former
Salamat,
in 1975. Salamat is an Islamic scholar who was educated in Cairo
Misuari.
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Group
and maintains his expatriate base there. The MNLF.Reform is led by
Dimos Pundato whose ethnic support comes from the Maranaoof North Lanao
province. He is reported to be closer to the, Mindanao scene from a. Sabah
P
listic goal of real
base. Pundato advances the more-politically rea autonomy
Finally, there is the Bangsa:Moro Liberation
areas predominantly Muslim.
in..
Organization
led by Jeddah-based RashimLucman,
original MNLF and its-.
The BMLO, like Hashim
conservatism
international support
a Maranao. His- brandof.
constrasts sharply with the
from radical Arab sources.
Salamat's " MNLF faction,
ilippines.
is more sympathetic to traditional Muslim
to -reconcile the expatriate Muslim- factions have been
. to date. The January 1983 Karachi "unity" conference was,
unavailing
m Lucman
boycotted by all-.expatriate groups exceptRashi'.s BMLO group who met
leaders from
then with -a selfproclaimed group of-Muslim community the
Philippines itself. The shredding of unity at the center has had negative
less "revolutionary" (as opposed to Islamic
consequences in the field as the
consciousness) have been the easiest to tempt out of the field.
The internal
Manguindanaons -have provided a number of the defections..
Muslim political opposition obviously facilitate
divisions in organized
Manila's diplomatic and political policies of_divide et imLera?
Overarching the fissure lines that fictionally divide the armed Moro
se aratists are the fissure lines that divide them from the non-insurgent
p
Muslims in the south. In the first place,
there is the traditional Muslim
leaders
leadership in the-dates and village religious . Then there are those
Muslims who have new vested political and economic interests in the success
.of the new regional institutions.
of course, there is the great bulk
of the Muslim population to whom the war was a cruel
human and economic
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burden. Perhaps indicative of the new passivity in the south is.resurgent
interest in government supported Muslim activity in Islamic: education,
'ran study, voluntary self-help organizations,. and other non-(overt)
4u
political activity..
Future Projections.
discussion-of the future of Muslim Politics in the Philippines must
A
first be- set in.the context of the general political and economic crisis.
that afflicts the society. Although President Marcos still wields the
ertainty abounds about-the future. All of the
instruments of power, unc
indicators of political instability are-magnified by the . conjuncture of the
elicaeter in a psychological
maneuverings of succession polio
environment conditioned by repression
and violence. Whether or not Marcos
is "toppled" or there is a "constitutional" succession the status quo ante
will not be recovered. The political. evolution of the Muslim question will
i 11
touched by politics at the center and the availability of crit ca y
scarce economic resources.
Whatever the political' outcome of the current crisis in terms of regime
-- palace coup, military. intervention, democractic opposition, radical
leftist -- we assume that any post-Marcos regime will be resistant to the
ultimate Muslim demand of separatism and will seek to preserve the
territorial and political integrity of the state.
Where they may vary will
be in their willingness to.accommodate demands for regional autonomy.
The relative peace- that has settled
over Moroland is instable,
depending not on a fundamental reorientation of Muslim consciousness, but on-
a continued willingness of the government to accomodate "reasonable"
demands for substantial autonomy in a national framework of peace and
economic development. The government's capabilities will be sorely tested
67
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factors in particular need to be considered: (1)
levels. Three act
at both (2) the impact
done
constraints on how much can be for a minority;
on the
majority Philippines
nar_tonal political disorder in the
of
Moros; and. (3) the CPP and NPA. the Tripoli
The government continues to implement in its own way
agreement. Most recently (April 1985), Marcos finally announced the release
for
long promised sha~ courts
for` the establishment ofthe
of funds, ractice by the general
personal law. Although severely curtailed.in.p
olicy commitment to Muslim equal economic
collapse,, the p
economic
national resources. into Muslim
opportunity in terms of investment of
overnmentsincerity. It
development continues to be wielded as evidence of government
are not the only
should be noted that in the national framework the Muslims
"fair share."
i the
ority may ask, what s
ed. Filipinos. The maj
disadvantaged. can go with
wever, is how far the government
h
o
roblematic,
Most p for. substantial
line demand..
o the "moderate" Muslims' bottom
to
i respect t . tautly -- if at all --
my. The government will move reluc
political autono
the melding of the existing two regional into the single Muslim autonomous
h the 13 provinces
u
h
g
o
region envisioned in the Tripoli agreement. Even t
landChristians are a.
"
home
rcent of the MNLFs claimed Moro
are but 60.pe lemically explained by
o
Moro invocation of Christian immigration into
(leaving democratic theory about one man one vote out
politically ignored
militantly polarized Christian
altogether). The already
of the analysis and with guns on
community would resist politically on the national level,
i Muslim rule. Even in the
t
hic fact, -while. perhaps p
majority. This demographic be'
Moroland, cannot.
y
the local level, the full imposition of minor
in
community that stayed loyal there is some concern about the way
Muslim ositions of authority
h
p
which the MNLF defectors have been welcomed back wit
and allowed to retain their weapons.
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Since .the ending of martial law in 1981, the Muslims have sought to use
crisis as a lever for their interests. In a highly
the national political
Senator Aquino tried to mediate personally the breaches
publicized manner,
d then to draw the MNLF into a united front with thenational -
an
in the-MNLF a
The threat of. renewed separatism has been used as.
opposition forces.
democratic.accomodation by.
i
ng
forc
without success in , ~ .: j -1 1 Pver but , ~ ~ ..,.
olitical turmoil aster acclui.... -
the p
I
n
the.government.. oliticians associated themselves with.Jaime.Cardinal Sin's
non-MNLF Muslim p
justice for all," warning in a kind of
call for "national
October 7,.1983) that if Marcos did not accede to the demands for
manifesto(
human and d to reassert the historic
rights, "we may be constraine
political
identity of the Moro Nation." Ines succession
Philipp
ult to see how in contemporary
ffi
c
di
is It deal can be cut by Muslim autonomists with democratic
I politics anY
the constraints that will be
i Wore
.oppositionists that could realistically g let
government in their dealings with the south,
lace for any central g
k into
i
n p
F bac
the MNL
the kind of guarantees that would bring
them
alone giving
y considered
only the National Democratic Front, generall
In fact, the fold.
urposes) the notion of Muslim
l
p
ctica
a CPP umbrella,
has accepted (for ta While the democratic opposition may wish to enlist the
I self-determination. post-Marcos
in
the
Muslims for electoral purposes a peaceful transition to a their goal -- power at the center only becomes relevant to
era,
1 in as much as it moves them in the direction of a contrary goal
autonomists
if substantive
devolution of power from the center. Such a devolution,
would satisfy the minimal demands
in a kind of "federalizing" structure of
' not the radical elements of the MNLF.
the Muslim moderates but
vantage point of the MNLF, a non-peaceful transition to the
Vrnm the vantage
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-Marcosera, marked by either coup or protracted internal. war might
post
opportunities for autonomy or secession, perhaps in alliance.
provide greater opp
to
able
f
other forces, as a besieged central authority finds itsel
with un
aspect of
this
resources against a resurgent BMA. It is in
contemporary politics that we
the NPA's.
major concern.
The principal armed threat in.the Philippines comes from the Nrt.
alarming growth in the past two years is.well known,. in the words of the
recent Senate staff report,! . Sites on in the Philippines (October 1984),
e is
l
eng
"challenging. .the government in many parts of the country." The chal
For several years NPA activity in its operational.
. in Mindanao.
growing
F A-has-been the Philippine
n
military's
potential
operations
down , the
complementary.
.The
but to date no
Naturally,
joint
as they tie
Manila's authority, their
Moro's struggle is defined'.by
find possibly a future 1.uR ---
shadowed the MR, a
Philippine officials have always worried. about
tactical alliance between the two forces,
or common strategy can be documented
military and erode the legitimacy of
separate wars are
Islam and 'Bangsa Moro nationalism, in. contrast to the
particularistic.
however, at least
We would note,
inism
secular universalism of Marxism-Len.
two-possible future developments which might change the relationship between
the Moro community and the communists.
The N PA has wooed the MNLF.and publicly, through the NDF, has-supported
self-determination. Furthermore, the Misuari faction of the MNLF does have
NLF's basis of
t in traditional ethnicities erodes and the
M
s the
NPA's strength grows,
suppor in
may be a temptation for the Moro radicals to become a partner
there the
enemy.
s . That
against tactically, if not strategically, the common
70
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0
this might be happening is suggested by the January,. 1985 report of a new
MNLF factionthe Phil-ippine-Democratic Revolution (PDR), which plans to
join forces with the NPA in, Mindanao.
The PDR, if it in fact exists, may, on the other hand, represent anew
NPA front organization designed to mobilize elements of the Muslim
-population.to.the communist-led revolutionary struggle. We are reminded of
{n
li
ms
lay Mus
the Communist Party of Malaya's various tactics to engage Ma
their revolution. However that may be, certainly the kinds of. socio-
repression that have mobilized.
y
essesof militar
Christians
in the
nd exc
south to the NPA exist-as well in the Muslim
for the CPM, the environment in Mindanao
'Unlike the situation
racially divided.
provides
Christian and Muslim alike are, Filipino,
an ethnically neutral structure for-both to cooperate
region.
is not
.and the NPA
on the basis
of secular interest and with the promise of confessional equality.
large measures of autonomy should be granted
h ^ the Muslim
?
wit
Even if
to Muslims, the perception of
community as economic modernization
spreads andthe penetration of global capitalism creates new wealth'unevenly
r of recruits
might lead to a greater numbes for the NPA,
ros who today are physically or affectively caught
particularly from those Mo
up in a losing MNLF struggle. If the one future possibility is an NPA.- MNLF
NPA
alliance, the other is an NPA - MNLF rivalry. In either case, the seems
to be doubted that
It is
to have more to win in the long run than the MNLF?
any
a communist or communist influenced regime in the Philippines would be
less jealous of the integrity of the state then its predecessors.
Polic Implications.
The policy problems presented by the problem of Muslims separatism
ernal developments in that troubled nation
the Philippines relate both to int
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?.
and its relations with its friends and allies.
-i
To the degree to which
Muslim* insurgency in the . south,.either_autonomously or more worrisome
alliance with the NPA, aggravates general insecurity and contributes to the
U political and securityinterests
incremental collapse of the regime, .S. :
various
are involved. It is not necessary here to outline the with with respect to the U.S. bases that. might eventuate if an unfriendly.
overnmen
government: should.succeed Marcos.
There is no reason to be sanguine about the situation. even. if a
peaceful transition to a democratic=centrist government can be managed.-Such
t will still be faced, with the problem of. revolutionary
a g
insurgency. If resurgent Moslem warriors, even in alliance with the NPA,
successfully cast their appeal in terms of self-determination,. there will be.
renewed international pressures on Manila.. Furthermore, U.S. assistance to
Manila will be opposed by domestic opponents of Manila as-aiding the
"genocidal" suppression of a minority.
The status of the Muslims in the south will continue to be a factor in.
the Philippines relations with Malaysia and Indonesia. -As previously noted
ia remain on the agenda of
A
s
Southeast
the problems of Muslim minorities in Islamic. organizations in It is quite possible that as-Islamic consciousness
I continues to be raised in those countries, governments might seek to deflect
some of the domestic impact by focussing attention on external Islamic
causes. In such a case there would be a negative impact on ASEAN solidarity
and harmony. Moreover, the restraining influence which both Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur seem to have exercised. in international Islamic organizations
with respect to the Philippines would be less. forthcoming.
Even in the more likely event that the broader framework of Indonesian
and Malaysian noninterference remains intact, the Sabah Moroland
connection will continue to plague Philippines - Malaysian bilateral
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relations. . Kuala Lumpur's
restraint
in this regard is tested by the
been
inconstancy of-the Philippines'. position on'sovereignty._ There has no
constitutional follow-through on. the Marcos .1977. renunciatory pledge.
Manila's ambivalence in.this regard was again demonstrated.. in 1984, when
Philippine Foreign .,Minister Tolentino. said that. the government's
renunciation. did . not.. prejudice any propriatory rights of the Sultan of Sulu
to Sabah:' Assuming that the issue of Sabah's sovereignty could be put
there still remains the problem. of more than
ely behind them,
population
a burden
an
,,slim Filipino "immigrants" (refugees): in saoan.
is a source of-support for Muslim insurgency in the Philippines ,
on the social services of Sabah, anew internal security threat,
irritant in Sabah - Kuala Lumpur relations. In Sabah itself, Malay
are a domestic minority population advantaged by the .Islamicization
policies of the. federal government. A possible "internationalization" of
the refugee issue through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
may take some of the heat out of the domestic and bilateral exchanges.
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