EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87SO0734ROO0100010014-9
?
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #04813-85/1
25 September 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting of
18 September 1985
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 18 September to
consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on Wednesday,
16 October 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters.
Recommendations for discussions/warning topics should be forwarded to this
office by COB 2 October 1985.
3. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to.arrive early to avoid
parking problems created by construction work. Please enter the compound
through Gate 1 the Route 123 entrance. Please telephone attendance
intentions to and have your clearances
verified to us by your security office by COB 14 October 1985.
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
18 September 1985 Warning Report
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87SOO734ROO0100010014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #04813-85
25 September 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: 18 September 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
Debrief and Discussion of POW/MIA Negotiations With Hanoi
1. Richard Childress of the NSC Staff reported on his recent mission to
Hanoi and the POW/MIA issue. He has met four times previously with SRV
Foreign Minister Thach to discuss this issue. On this trip he met with
Deputy FM Vo Dong Jiang. The Vietnamese seemed more anxious than during
previous sessions to achieve a settlement. Childress believes the SRV
Politburo decided, probably in March 1985, that the POW/MIA question should
be resolved in two years. It was about that time that Thach told him he
anticipated success in resolving the question. Childress considers
Vietnam's more forthcoming attitude at the meeting to be a success for US
policy. The US has been trying to convince Vietnam that the POW/MIA issue
should be resolved even before it invaded Cambodia. Subsequently, we have
been hammering home the message that even if there was a settlement on
Cambodia, the US would still not be able to normalize relations with Vietnam
until the POW/MIA question was resolved. The Vietnamese now apparently
accept this and perceive that it is in their interests to get the question
resolved speedily.
2. During the recent meetings, Vietnam did not raise its previous
assertions that the US should give some quid pro quo--moves toward
normalization--in return for greater Vietnamese cooperation in resolving the
POW/MIA question. There was some SRV disinformation after the visit that
claimed the Vietnamese side had raised the normalization question, but in
fact, this did not occur during the meetings.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
? SECRET ?
3. The US proposal called for the inspection of at least 200 crash
sites with joint US-Vietnamese teams, with the US side numbering about 24.
The US would establish a technical presence--not a diplomatic presence--in
Vietnam to assist with the inspections. The Vietnamese side proposed that
they themselves conduct a "unilateral" operation, and that the US provide
"contributions." Childress suspects that the SRV has 400 sets of remains
which it will release in groups periodically as it has done thus far. After
that, the SRV would probably consider "joint" efforts. If the US decides to
agree to go the unilateral route, it will insist on a specific plan with
clear standards. Also, if there is to be US funding and technical
cooperative support, then at least one US observer should be present with
the search teams. Childress will meet again with the SRV Deputy Foreign
Minister at the UN next month to further explore this possibility.
Childress reported making a presentation to the Vietnamese on evidence
concerning live prisoners. In the past, the Vietnamese have always denied
the existence of any live POWs/MIAs or defectors. This time, however, the
Vietnamese admitted that they have also heard "sighting reports." Childress
is uncertain as to exactly what this means. The Vietnamese promised
follow-up investigations of these "reports."
4. Childress believes the Vietnamese hope to achieve normalization
during the Reagan presidency. Several Vietnamese interlocuters have alluded
to the ability of President Nixon as a conservative to move to improve ties
with China, and believe that President Reagan would be in a stronger
position to normalize relations with Vietnam than a potentially more liberal
successor.
5. In response to questions, Mr. Childress stated:
-- He believes Thach did not participate personally because
he is trying to institutionalize regular meetings between the
US and Vietnam rather than continue the current more personalized
contacts. Also, he may be looking for the US to give some ground
on normalization before he continues placing his personal prestige
on the line in pursuing discussions with the US.
-- The Soviet Union would like to see the POW/MIA issue resolved
and would like to see an improvement in US-Vietnamese relations.
This would not threaten the Soviet position in Vietnam but if
Vietnam were to resume some economic ties with the West, it might
alleviate some of its financial burden
-- The US will hold firm on its condition that the POW/MIA issue
not be linked to normalization. The US must retain the
normalization card to have maximum leverage in the resolution
of the Cambodian situation. To normalize now would prematurely
surrender this leverage.
Forecast
6. We can.anticipate increasing turnovers of remains held in Hanoi's
warehouse, and in exhumations of remains of those who died in captivity. We
can also expect that there will be greater Laotian efforts in 1986. The SRV
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
?
SECRET
S
will eventually need US help, and the US has plans to assist in achieving a
final resolution of the POW/MIA question.
New Zealand: Ship Visitations and Palmer Visit to US
1. New Zealand's Prime Minister Lange is proposing a solution to the
ship visit issue between the US and New Zealand. Draft legislation would
form a cabinet committee to establish whether nuclear capable ships are or
are not carrying nuclear weapons. Lange asserts that this will permit a
step-by-step resolution of the problem. FM Palmer is visiting the US to try
to sell New Zealand's approach.
2. Whatever the outcome of the talks, Lange is likely to gain
politically. He can placate some domestic critics by arguing plausibly that
he is trying to seek a solution to the problem and yet assure the left wing
of the Party that he is holding firm on the nuclear question. If Palmer's
talks go well, Lange will argue that the US has backed down; if they fail,
he has already laid the groundwork for New Zealand's media to accuse the US
of trying to bully Wellington, with Lange portrayed as the man who stands up
to the US.
3. There are other factors impinging on Palmer's visit. The "Rainbow
Warrior" incident has tended to draw attention away from the US ship visit
issue and Palmer's visit to the US. Also, Palmer is a potential rival for
leadership in the Labor Party; consequently, the failure of his mission
would not hurt Lange as much as it would hurt Palmer.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9
? SECRET ?
Chinese Party Delegates Conference
1. The opening of the Chinese Communist Party Conference saw the
resignation of 6.4 members of the Central Committee, 10 members of the
Politburo. This was a major victory for Deng Xiaoping in his effort to
promote younger and more expert cadre to senior positions. Of the
resignations, 7 on the Politburo and 29 of the Central Committee were
military officers. Since much of the opposition to Deng's reform program
has come from the military, this is a further victory for Deng.
2. OEA believes that this is only part of a more dramatic package which
will eventually involve the resignation and replacement of the top leaders,
although other intelligence agencies disagree. In OEA's view, this is the
"last hurrah" of the conservative opponents to Deng.
3. The new leaders are likely to be more pragmatic and less ideological
in foreign policy matters. They will want greater rapproachement with the
Soviet Union. They probably overestimate China's influence on and
importance to the US in influencing US-Soviet relations and will probably
expect more concessions from the US than we will be willing to give.
If Peng Zhen is appointed to the Standing Committee, it would be a
significant setback for Deng since he is the principal conservative opponent
of Deng's reforms.
If Hu Yaobang fails to be appointed Chairman of the Military Commission,
it would also be a failure for the reformers.
The resignation of Zhang Aiping is significant since he was one of the
foremost proponents of cooperative relations with the US. Zhang has not yet
resigned as Defense Minister. If he does, his replacement will be a key as
to how much China values the developing military relationship with the US.
ice-
Carl W. Ford,
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/17: CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010014-9