EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010031-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: April 30, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
WashingunaCAMM
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #02190-85
30 April 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 17 April 1985
to consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on
22 May 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Recommendations
for discussions/warning topics should be forwarded to this office
by 7 May 1985.
3. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early to avoid
parking problems created by construction work. For your convenience, please
enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123 entrance. Please phone
attendance intentions to _ and have your clearances
_
verified to us by your security office by COB 20 May 1985.
Carl W. Ford, 1Jr.
Attachment:
17 April 1985 Warning and Forecast Report
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02190-85/1
30 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Carl W. Ford., Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT:
17 April 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
Sino-Soviet Relations:
Following opening remarks by the NIO, OEA presented a
review of Sino-Soviet relations from the Chinese perspective. He addressed
three key points.
1-- We regard the Chinese gestures to Gorbachev as symbolically
important, but they do not represent any narrowing of the strategic
gulf that still separates the two. As a result, we do not expect
relations to rapidly improve.
2-- The Chinese probably were more conciliatory toward Gorbachev than
his two predecessors because they expect him to be around much
longer and hence eventually in a stronger position to change Soviet
policy toward China. Their overtures were intended to probe for
new Soviet flexibility, but they may also have been motivated by
domestic considerations. A time-honored tactic of Deng Xiaoping
has been to give ground on some issues in order to get his way on
important party personnel changes. We know he wants to make
significant changes in key party organs this fall. It is possible,
therefore, that he has decided to accommodate members of the old
guard (Chen Yun, Peng Zhen), who favor a more balanced policy
toward the superpowers, in order to gain their acquiescence to the
changes he wants.
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3-- We doubt, in any event, that the Chinese expect any immediate
change in Soviet policy, but at least some within the Chinese
leadership probably hope to build on China's overtures to improve
relations with Moscow. The two sides have already agreed to raise
the level of their political dialogue--Foreign Ministers Wu and
Gromyko probably will meet somewhere before next fall. The Chinese
might also be wiling to resume the long suspended border talks in
Moscow. They may even initiate party-to-party contacts at some
point this year, but neither side seems in any hurry at present to
restore formal party ties.
SOVA then commented on the Soviet perspective. He
explained a new, younger leader like Gorbachev might be inclined to
introduce a more active China policy, but cautioned that as long as older
leaders such as Gromyko remained in top advisory positions, we are more
likely to see incremental changes rather than hold new initiatives. He
indicated that he thought the Soviets might be considering a range of policy
options to improve Sino-Soviet relations, but saw no signs that the
leadership felt any pressure to take a major new initiative right now.
FORECAST:
No dramatic improvements in Sino-Soviet relations unless Gorbachev were
to assert himself more rapidly and authoritatively than we now perceive to
be likely.
Nakasone's 9 April Statement on Next Trade Package and 11 April OECD
Ministerial:
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OEA, presented an analysis of Japan's latest trade 25X1
package.
The trade package contained no real surprises. It recapped measures
already taken to address US trade demands but was vague about new steps
Japan will take to trim its annual trade surplus. Efforts to liberalize
control of telecommunications, elections and pharmaceutical imports are
likely in the coming months and Tokyo's fear of protectionist sentiment in
the US may lead to other substantial measures to reduce trade surplus.
Tokyo has promised to develop by July a three-year plan of action for
internationalizing its domestic markets although details remain vague.
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Prospects for Cambodian Resistance:
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DIA, reviewed the present state of and prospects for the
resistance forces in Cambodia. The resistance appears to have reached a
critical turning point in the war. Both communist and non-communist forces
face greater obstacles to battlefield success during the coming rainy season
than at any other time since the formation of the coalition (1982). The
resistance strategy and performance over the next 6 to 8 months may be
affected by several external and internal factors.
External Factors:
Every major communist and non-communist resistance stronghold along
Thai-Cambodia border has been overrun by PAVN and PRK forces; the KPNLF,
ANS, and Democratic Kampuchea forces have lost their staging bases and the
Vietnamese intend to remain at the border throughout the rainy season to
prevent the resistance from reoccupying their bases and to interdict
infiltration teams. PAVN units of regimental size continue to occupy
several of the camps. They have employed Cambodian civilians to construct
new two-lane roads connecting Vietnamese units at the border with supply
depots and base camps in the interior. This will make it more difficult for
the resistance to encircle and isolate PAVN troops near the border during
coming months. Conscripted laborers have been engaged in constructing
barbed-wire and slit-trench barriers. PAVN units are beginning to control
population centers by scaling off smaller villages with bamboo fences. This
will deny safe-haven to the resistance.
Internal Factors:
In addition to the external obstacles posed by the tactical situation,
the resistance faces serious internal obstacles. The non-communists suffer
from poor leadership, factionalism, lethargy and a lack of know-how.
FORECAST:
The setback along the border this year may serve as a catalyst to move
the non-communists toward a change in strategy from conventional to
guerrilla tactics--and toward resolution of their other internal problems.
However, even with more weapons and a guerrilla strategy, their prospects
remain dim, given the increased Vietnamese presence and infiltration
countermeasures. Communist DK forces remain active in the interior and will
probably continue to be the most aggressive anti-SRV force in the
foreseeable future.
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Carl W. Ford,'Jr.
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National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. DC.20505
NIC# 01875-85
9 April 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for the 17 April 1985 East Asia
Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. The monthly Warning and Forecast Meeting is scheduled for
Wednesday, 17 April 1985, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA
Headquarters.
2. Participants should be prepared to discuss the following
topics. Keep in mind that our objective is to identify collection
gaps and make forecasts rather than review current intelligence.
3. At this meeting we will discuss and make forecasts concerning
the following topics:
1400 - 1405
China:
1405-1415
1415-1420
Japan:
1420-1430
Opening Remarks
Sino-Soviet Relation
Discussion - Forecast
Nakasone's 9 April Statement
on next Trade Package and
11 April OECD Ministerial 0EA
1430-1445 Discussion - Forecast
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1435-1445
1445-1450
1450-1500
Prospects for Cambodian Resistance
Discussion - Forecast
Open Discussion - Closing Remarks
OIA
4. Following the Warning and Forecast Meeting, a special Interagency
Philippines Analytic Group will hold its first meeting. Topics for discussion
are:
5. Please phone your attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by your security office by COB 15.
April 1985. Seating in 7E62 is limited, therefore, timely arrival is
suggested. Visitor parking is a premium and participants are enocuraged to
use the shuttle buses or carpool to the meeting.
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Carl W. or , Jr.
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1 he Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #01535-85
27 March 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on
20 March 1985 to consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on
17 April 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Recom-
mendations for discussions/warning topics should be forwarded to
this office by COB 5 April 1985.
3. Immediately following the warning meeting, a special
Interagency Philippines Analytic Group will hold its first meeting.
Subsequent meetings of this group also will follow immediately the
monthly East Asia warning meeting.
4. This scheduling is intended to minimize inconveniences and
lost time (to travel) for analysts attending both meetings.
5. Topics for discussion during the first Analytic Group
meeting include:
Philippine Tasking Team, status report-
Update on the moderate opposition--INR and,
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411 SECRET 411
6. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early
to avoid parking problems created by construction work. For your
convenience, please enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123
Please phone attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by your security
ice by COB 15 April 1985.
Attachment:
20 March 1985 Warning Report
73LfreJ/
Carl W. Ford, .
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