NEWSWEEK ARTICLE ENTITLED THE SOVIETS DIRTY-TRICKS SQUAD OF 23 NOVEMBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00869R000200250003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 18, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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2 3 DEC 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Newsweek Article Entitled "The Soviets' Dirty-
Tricks Squad" of 23 November 1981
1. This two-page article (See Tab A) by Melinda Beck and
David C. Martin discussed the impact of KGB forgeries on world
opinion regarding the United States. The article was part of
a larger Newsweek effort (See Tab B) of five pages in the same
issue on KGB iac vt ities in the United States. On page two of
the "Dirty Tricks" article, a CIA operations officer named
Martin Portman is quoted as saying that through forgeries "they
are convincing a lot of people, not only in the Third World,
but in some Western countries." The quotation and the accom-
panying text were prepared in such a manner that the reader is led 25X1
to believe that Newsweek actually interviewed a CIA employee.
2. Directorate of Operations (DO), 25X1
International Affairs Division, informed the Office of Security
on 17 November that the "Dirty Tricks" article was based almost
entirely on opening hearings on Soviet covert action before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on
6 and 19 February 1980. added that he is the Martin 25X1
Portman noted in the article an t a the words quoted in the
article were lifted from the HPSCI hearings (See Tab C). As the
purpose of the HPSCI hearing was to inform the public of Soviet
ants
artici
f CIA
p
p
activities in the United States, the true name o
could not be entered into the Congressional Record. Therefore,
d ee ohe
1.111 a. v
an
names by the HPSCI staff for inclusion in the official record. (S)
3. David C. Martin, co-author of the "Dirty Tricks" article,
has covered the intelligence beat for Newsweek for the past two
years. He is the author of Wilderness of Mirrors which high-
lighted the CIA careers of former Directorate of Operations
officers James J. Angleton and William Harvey. Martin is a
OS 1 2580
l
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tenacious, hard-working reporter who specializes in conveying
the impression his information was obtained from interviews,
when in reality it was obtained from open sources.
Attachments
Distribution
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Addressee
1 -
DCI
1 -
DDA
1 -
ER
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D/Sec
- OS Registry
2 - SAG
OS/PSI/SAG/JLC:slc (18 Nov 1981)
2
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011 ~ PtA E
IMF WSWEEK
23 rT0V-E7-MER 1931
h, e S oviets' D ty- Tr3~ks Squad
^ he Russian word is dezinform-atsiya
and a KGB manual defines it as "mis-
leading the adversary." In fact, as currently
practiced by the KGB, disinformation is far
more.-encompasving any forged docu-
ment, planted news article or whispered
rumor designed to discredit its enemies, es-
pecially the United States. Directed by
"ServiceA" ofthe KG B's First ChiefDirec-
torate, disinformation is a key weapon in
Moscow's running warofwords with Wash-
ington. According to CIA estimates, the
KGB's dirty-tricks squad commands 50
full-time agents and abudget ofS50 million a
year. But that is only a small part of a S3
billion propaganda apparatus that employs
every conceivable Soviet "asset"-from
Leonid Brezhnevand Tasstoshadowy front
organizations around the world.
Much ofMoscow's anti-American propa-
ganda is overt. Statements by Brezhnev de-
crying U.S. weapons policies, for example,
can be judged by their source and swiftly
denied. But disinformation is more subtle
and difricul t to combat. In 1979 Sovi et diplo-
mats spread rumors that the United States
had orchestrated the seizure of the Grand
Mosque in Mecca and that the Pakistani Ar-
my had engineered the burning of the U.S.
Embassy in Islamabad. The goals: to stir
anti-Americanism in Islam, and to sow ten-
sionbetween the Carter Administration and
Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-
Haq. Other disinformation is spread by So-
viet-controlled radio stations in Third
World countries. During the Iranian revolu-
tion, the "National Voice of Iran" (actually
broadcasting from the U.S.S.R.) blanketed
Iran with charges that the CIA had assassi-
nated lrsnian religious leaders and was plot-
ting to kill Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Smear: A favorite disinformation ploy is
to plant "news" items in foreign publica-
tions, then repeat the charges in the Soviet
press. A classic case involved veteran U.S.
foreign-service officer George Griffin. As-
signed to the U.S. Embassy in Ceylon (now
Sri Lanka) in the 1960s, Griffin was first
identified falsely-as a CIA agent by
Blitz, a leftist Bombay weekly. In 1963 his
name appeared in "Who's Who in the CIA,"
abogusdirectoryofAmerican agents. More
recently, an Indian news service accused
him of organizing Afghan freedom fighters
and even attempting to sabotage Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's plane-
charges Tass and Pravda trumpeted world-
wide. LastJunea Soviet newspaperprinted a
Mecca mosque undersiege in 1979: Spreading tales that America was responsible
letter allegedly from Griffin threatening an
Indian journalist. Despite repeated U.S.
denials, the smear campaign succeeded. In
July, Gandhi let it be known that Gri in's
scheduled posting to the U.S. Embassy in
New Delhi would be"too contentious," and
his assignment was quietly withdrawn.
. Why the long campaign to get Griffin?
U.S. intelligence officials cannot answer
the question with certainty, but the attacks
may have been triggered during Griffin's
days in Ceylon when he tried-in vain-to
persuade a Soviet couple to defect- Soviet.
propagandists have started a similar cam-
paign to discredit two new U.S. ambassa-
dors-Harry Barnes in India and Frank
Ortiz in Peru. Charges that Ortiz is a CIA !
agent first appeared in a leftist Peruvian
newspaper and almost immediately were
repeated in Izvestia.
Forgeries, such as the letter purportedly
written by Griffin, play a key role in disin-
formation, often providing the "evidence'
for spurious charges. Skilled at duplicating
typefaces and watermarks, the KGB pro-:
duces four or five major forgeries of official
U.S. documents a ',ear, according to the
CIA. One of the most famous is a "top
secret" 1970 U.S. Army field manual, hear-
ing the forged signature of Gen. William
Westmoreland, that orders U.S. troops:
abroad to provoke l : ftist groups into terror
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ist acts that would invite government retali-
ation. The forged manual gained attention
in 1978 when a Spanish journalist-whom
the CIA linked to Soviet intelligence--cited
it as evidence that America was inciting the
Italian Red Brigades. That, in turn, sparked
speculation that the United States was be-
hind the murder of Italian leader Aldo
Moro. An unusually sophisticated effort,
the field manual was flawed only in its top-
secret classification-a designation real
field manuals never bear.
`Convincing': Over the years such forger-
ies have been the basis for scores of disinfor-
mation stories in the foreign press. In 1979 a
Cairo-based Muslim magazine printed a
phony CIA document outlining ways to
bribe members of Islamic groups opposed to
the Camp David peace process. The same
year a Syrian newspaper published a letter
supposedly from Hermann Eilts, then U.S.
ambassador to Egypt, urging CIA director
Stansfield Turner to "repudiate" Anwar Sa-
dat and "get rid of him without hesitation"
unless Sadat did more to advance U.S. inter-
ests in the Mideast. Such fabrications catch
on-particularly when they act to confirm
popular suspicions of U.S. motives in avola-
tile region. "71!y are convincing a lot of
people "Martin Portman, aoperrations
officer, has said, "not only in the Third
World, but in some Western countries."
Are the Western media themselves occa-
Grifn: A diplomatic posting derailed
Terms Iabale-Ne'a York Times
The U.S. Embassy under attack in Pakistan: Sowing new tensions between countries
sionally manipulated by Soviet disinforma-
tion? That theory was advanced by the
1980 best-selling novel, "The Spike," sup-
posedly a roman a clef in which co-authors
Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave
suggest that some Western journalists are
unwitting dupes of Communist propagan-
da, while others are in the pay of the KGB.
In France last year journalist Pierre-
Charles Pathe was sentenced to five years
in prison as a Soviet agent; he had printed
Soviet disinformation in French magazines
and an influential newsletter since 1959. In
the 1950s, longtime CBS correspondent
Winston Burdett admitted taking Soviet
espionage assignments as a newspaper re-
porter for a brief period in the 1940s, and
Soviet defectors have named Australian
journalist Wilfred Burchett and former
CBS and ABC correspondent Sam Jaffe as
Communist operatives. (Both men deny
the charge, and the CIA has officially ex-
onerated Jaffe.)"It would be foolish to con-
tend that the U.S. Government can be pen-
etrated, U.S. defense contractors can be
penetrated and the U.S. press cannot be
penetrated," says Frank Carlucci, the for-
mer deputy CIA director who is now Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense.
Still, most American experts on the KGB
doubt that the Soviets have made any sig-
nificant headway within the American
press. "What could such journalists do for
their Kremlin employer?" asks Harry Ro-
sitzke, who spent 25 years watching the
KGB for the CIA. "Could they pass a pro-
Soviet slant through the hierarchy of news
rooms and editorial boards in metropolitan
newspapers? The insertion of Moscow-tai-
lored items or attitudes would stick out
a red thumb." Some conspiracy buffs argue
that the Western press seems all too eager to
expose excesses by the CIA while making
little effort to expose Soviet infiltration.
American journalists do tend to question
actions and explanations from government
sources-but it is that very freedom and
skepticism that sets the Western press apart
from its Eastern counterparts.
In the end, the question of subtle Soviet
influence in the American media is dwarfed
by the concerted KGB campaigns to defame
career diplomats, destroy trust between na-
tions or incite revolutions. Taken separate-
ly, each of the wounds dezinformatsiya in-
flicts on America's reputation may seem
minor. But the nicks and cuts add up and
promote the ultimate goal of the KGB's
Service A: the undermining of worldwide
goodwill toward the Un i ted States.
MELINDA BECK with DAVID C. MARTIN
in Washington and bureau reports
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t 1 T_ L L22
17K
23 NOVEMBER 1981
0-N P ,.::F,
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0 nce they were the familiar characters
of cloak-and-dagger fiction: brutish,
bull-necked men with heavy fists, gold teeth
and unfashionable, ill-fitting suits. But to-
day's real-life spies of the KGB are a differ-
ent breed-the best and brightest of Soviet
society, schooled in science and language
and social graces. More numerous than ever
in America, they may well be the most im-
portant weapon that Moscow employs in
the endless struggle between the superpow-
ers. "The threat today is significantly great-
er than it was nine or ten years ago," says
Edward J. O'Malley, assistant FBI director
in charge of the intelligence division.
O'Malley says the FBI is better at counter-
espionage than ever before, but other U.S.
intelligence officials admit that Washington
has been painfully slow to recognize the
increasingly sophisticated challeng- of So-
viet spies in the United States.
The KGB's greatest asset in America, of
course, is the nation's open society. Accord-
ing to one FBI estimate, the Soviets get 90
percent of their intelligence from open
sources---everything from nonclassified
documents and educational seminars to in-
dustrial trade shows and technical publica-
tions. So valuable is the magazine Aviation
.Week & Space Technology, for example,
that each new issue is flown immediately to
Moscow and translated en route. But the
other 10 percent, obtained through the
KGB's clandestine activities, is crucially
important to Moscow. As a result, superso-
phisticated electronic equipment at every
Soviet installation in America monitors
countless private telephone calls and radio
Analyzing their mission,
their methods,
their impact-and
the challenge they
pose to an open society.
transmissions, from sensitive political con-
versations to drawings of top-secret weap-
ons systems. NEWSWEEK has learned, for
example, that the Russians once intercepted
a design for part of the new Trident subma-
rine by picking up a telefax transmission
between offices of a major defense
contractor.
Dramatic reminders of the way the KGB
has made off with American secrets have
surfaced in numerous headlined cases over
the last five years. Christopher Boyce and
Andrew Lee were arrested in 1977 for sell-
ing data on a U.S. espionage satellite. For-
mer Army cryptographer Joseph Helmich
was sentenced tolifein prison lastmonth for
selling cipher information. But the Soviets
have developed subtler forms of co-option
as well, spawning a complex web of legal
business enterprises to buy and export com-
puter chips, laser components and other
high-tech gear that constitute the most
sought-after intelligence prize in the United
States today. "We're almost in a [scientific]
race with ourselves," says Edgar Best, head
of the FBI's Los Angeles field office. "We
develop it, and they steal it."
`Loose Lips': The ongoing assault pre-
sents a special challenge to the Reagan Ad-
ministration, whose foreign policy and
world view isbased largelyon the premiseof
a widespread and covert Soviet threat. So ',.
far, the Administration has moved swiftly
in the area of scientific espionage and "tech-
nology transfers"-beefing up export in-
spections and mounting an updated version
of the old "loose lips sink ships" campaign
among the high-technology companies of'
California's Silicon Valley. Many of the
President's conservative supporters would
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Jana Ste` ,tt
Spy chiefAndropov, a memherof the rulingPolitburo, dominates the shadowy world of Soviet espionage from KGB headquarters on Dzer-
zhinsky Square. His agents seek military secrets and technology with sophisticated means, but some still get caught.
prefer a broader crackdown, but Adminis-
tration plans for more CIA surveillance of
U.S. citizens are being withdrawn under
heavy pressure from Congress. Many intel-
ligence veterans say that U.S. agencies re-
sponsible for tracking down spies at home
already have all the authority they need to
fight an undercover enemy with its own
share of human and bureaucratic weak-
nesses. "KGB men are not 16 feet tall,"
insists retired CIA officer Benjamin Pep-
per. "They are our height, weight and com-
plexion-and we do ourselves a disservice
by building them up taller than that."
What is the KGB? The Komitet Gosu-
darstvennoi Bezopasnosti-State Security
Committee--combines the functions of the
FBI, CIA, Secret Service and various
military-intelligence agencies. Americans
might regard themselves as the KGB's
glavny protivnik; or main adversary, but
many Russian citizens would take excep-
tion. Under the current leadership of Polit-
buro member Yuri Andropov, the KGB
assigns about half of its 50,000 operational
staffers to the Fifth Chief Directorate-
responsible for crushing dissent within the
Soviet Union. "Everybody is afraid of the
KGB," says former Russian diplomat Ar-
kady Shevchenko, the highest-ranking So-
viet official to defect to the United States.
In all, the KGB-headquartered at
a~a~'ilTiCffT.9-._ -N Y
Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow-is organ-
ized into four chief directorates, seven inde-
pendent directorates and several independ-
ent departments, most of them engaged in
some form of Soviet internal security. Only
three major arms of the KGB stretch to
America or directly affect U.S. citizens. The
KGB's First Chief Directorate controls
most of its 6,000 spies overseas. Within this
directorate, the First Department runs op-
erations against the United States and Can-
ada, with its service "T" concentrating on
U.S. technology and its service "A" han-
dling "active measures" to covertly under-
mine foreign governments and the NATO
alliance through campaigns of "disinforma-
tion" (page 52). Members of the KGB's
Eighth Directorate operate all the electron-
ic-eavesdropping equipment at Soviet in-
stallations in the United States.
Drugged: The Second Chief Directorate
is assigned to monitor, compromise and re-
cruit American travelers to the Soviet
Union, from tourists and scholars to jour-
nalists and diplomats. Earlier this year, Maj.
James Holbrook, a U.S. Army attache about
to return to Washington to be interviewed
for the job of military assistant to Vice Presi-
dent GeorgeBush, was drugged in the Soviet
city of'Rovno. When he came out of his
stupor, Holbrook found a Russian colonel
he knew holding "interesting and unmistak-
able photographs" of the American soldier
and a woman in compromising circum-
stances. The colonel offered to help-pro-
vided Holbrook gave some information in
return. Holbrook refused.
KGB operations in the United States ac-
celerated dramatically in the Nixon era as
detente permitted a vast increase in diplo-
matic, cultural and commercial exchange
programs. The FBI estimates that 35 per-
-cent of official Soviet representatives work-
ing in the United States-including employ-
ees of organizations such as Aeroflot, the
national airline, and the news service Tass --
are officers of the KGB or GRU (military
intelligence). On that basis, roughly 350 of
the 1,041 Soviet officials currently posted to
this country are spies, the highest number
ever. That figure does not include Soviet
nonspies who do the KGB's bidding. Nor
does it include agents hidden among other
suspect groups-the diplomatic and U.N.
delegations of other Soviet-bloc countries,
the hundreds of East European students at
U.S. universities, the 5,000 Iron Curtain
visitors who travel the countryfreely and the
130,000 immigrants who have fled to Amer-
ica from Eastern Europe in recent year.
The principal areas of KGB activity are
Washington, New York and San Francisco,
with the location of each Soviet installation
chosen to maximize electronic surveil-
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lance. In Washington, one giant high-frr- spies, unconnected with any Iron Curtain ly as "bloody business," reporting to the in-
company or organization, may be much famousThi-'teenthDepartmentincbargeof
quency antenna atop the Soviet Embassy on
the State Depart-harder to trace. Rudolph Herrmann immi- assassinations. But the last suspected KGB
16th Streit points toward tmerit and the Pentagon while another fo-' grated illegally as a German photographer assassination in this country occurred in
's communications facili- and lived in the New York area until his 1941, U.S. officials say, and the last assassi-
careless contact with a KGB man led the nation :earn to visit the United States came-
caes in n on Virginia. CIA's Soviet "recreational
ties
Chesapeake Bay is close to a! FBI to realize he was a Soviet "sleeper". in the early 1970s (in search of a KGB de-
complex" on agent. Herrmann's son Peter, a political- fector).Wet-affairsspecialistsnowplan sab-
major microwave relay station and a large science student at Georgetown University, otaueofkey industrial targets-fuel-storage
military cresidential facility Annap- was also being groomed as a spy-his depots, communications networks and Wa-
verdale, TheS N.Y., , also mmun S bristlees with complex electronic Ri-ronic j fluency in German and Czech making him ter-supplysystems--n tbeevent of war.
erlo
gear, and its location on one of the highest an ideal potential candidate for placement - The KGB doesn't hesitate to start at the
points in the metropolitan area perm. its as a "mole' in the U.S. Foreign Service. top in making "contacts." After Richard
eavesdropping on calls throughout the ! The Soviet Embassy in Washington pro-Nixon was elected President in 1968, KGB
Northeast. In San Francisco, too, the Soviet; vides a rich example of how the KGB organ- man Boris Sedov, masquerading as an em-
Consulate sits on one of the town's highest izes itself to operate in the United States. A bassy counselor, struck up a relationship
lulls, targeting Silicon Valley and the Marc general-operations section handles recruit- with the German-born foreign-policy ex-
Island Naval Base where U.S. nuclear subs ing?with brother GRUofficers haunting the: pertsoontobecome director oftheNational are serviced bars around military posts in the area- KGB i Security Council--and Henry Kissinger
Staffing these outposts for the KGB are agents also make contacts with government knowingly used Sedov to corninuni ate
"the cream of the crop," says Theodore! employees in search of political intelligence Nixon's early interest in an era o, nego ia-
Gardner, special agentin charaeoftheFBi's that comes free over drinks without any' lion with Moscow. During the Carter Ad- '
Washington field office. Dmitry Yakush- attempt at subversion. Theyjoinposh clubs, ministration, approaches were made tosev-
kin, identified as the head KGB man in "troll the singles bars and strike up relation- era] NSC staffers. But U.S. intelligence
Washington, is the grandson of a general of ships," says FBI intelligence chief O'Mal- officers insist that no recruiting efforts cc-
the December revolution, a veteran of a ley. And recently, U.S. intelligeaceofftcials tarred. "It would be bad publicity to get
lengthy tour in New York and onetime chief ! have noticed a number of Soviet lip readers caught and it would close a lot of doors
Of the Third Department (targetedon Great making the rounds. The science and tech- when [information] is available just for the
Britain). Vladimir Kazakov, currently top nology section, meanwhile, includes em- picking," says the FBI's Gardner.
KGB man in New York, once directed all ployees of Amtorg, the Soviet trade organ- There is no evidence of any approach to a
operations against theUnitedStatesasbead zation. "They spend a lot of time in the U.S. congresssrrian, but Congressional aides
of the First Department in Moscow. In a Library of Congress," says Soviet defector are apparently not off-limits. In 1971 Seclov
way, however, the sophisticated experience Vladimir Sakharov, "reading unclassified paid modest fees of S30 and S40 for articles
of KGB men can make them easier to spot. ` financial reports on U.S. industries and [re- written by Jim Kappus, a political-science
They are often older than many of their col-' Ports on) research and development." student working on the staff of Rep. Alvin
leagues in mid-level "cover" slots, and their Rigged: A counterintelligence section in O'Konski of Wisconsin, a member of the
records show an unusual variety of promo- the embassy is assigned to direct any re- House Armed Services Committee at the.
tions and postings. "Transfers from one cruits made in the CIA, FBI or local police time. Claiming to work for the Novosti.
ministry or organization to another," says a but probably spends more time fending off Press Agency, Sedov kept asking for more
classified 1970 U.S. intelligence study, "are the efforts of these organizations to pene- of an "inside angle, ' but got no classified
almost invariably a sign that the[individual] tratetheSoviet Embassy's staff. Anillegal- information because the FBI had coached!
is an intelligence officer taking such posh- support section collects and copies useful Kappus from the start.
bilities as become available for assignment documents including the passports and The Hoolc The Americans targeted by
or travel abroad on clandestine missions." : birth certificates of U.S. citizens seeking the KGB for recruitment are different from
Some spies can be identified simply be- visas to the Soviet Union; these maybe used, what they have been in the past- Gone are
cause they work so hard at evasion. Polish to make forgeries useful in future undercov- the Communist Party idealists who pro-
"businessman" Marian Zacharski, whose; er or blackmail operations. Finally, them vided willing assistance during the 1930s,
espionage trial went to a jury in Los An-! are specialists in bugging, secret writing and "40s, and '50s. The KGB's marks now are,
geles last week, was suspected of being an ' clandestine photography; code clerks who'. mostly "mercenaries and cripples," crar':,~
intelligence agent almost as soon as he work on secret orders and reports, even one Naval intelligence expert. Mcaey has
entered the country in 1977. He called special drivers who are experts at surveil- becomebothtbelureandtile hook forfinan-
attention to himself by running red lights, lance and evasion. For example, the brake, cially hard-pressed raslitary men and h:gh-
changing lanes rapidly as he drove and
doubling back on his route to check for
followers. Surveillance became a game, i
with Zacharski once handing an FBI agent;
two mechanical pencils because, he said, "I',
know you guys take a lot of notes." Other
lights on embassy limousines are rigged to
be disconnected at night-if a KGB case
officer is stopping to pick up an agent.
The Washington embassy also has a"wet
affairs" section, translated more colloquial-
been made, it becomes a club forblackmail.
"The Soviets took pictures of me accepting
cash so that they had a weapon to use
against me," says former target Kappus.
Some KGB- defectors despise the new
rules of the game, denouncing curr ent Sovi-
et operatives as slick cynics for whom KGB .
has come to mean Kontora Grubykh Pan-;.
ditov, or the Office of Crude Bandies. But a
KGB manual cited by former CIA officer
Harry Rositzke provides a Marxist-Lenin-
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/I-
ist rationale for the KGB's new material- relatives still there. The FBI also has uncov-, craft engineer William Holden Bell, enticed
ism. The average American, the manual ered extensive KGB recruiting efforts in ~ and entrapped with large sums of money by
says, "soberly regards money as the sole I Chicago's Polish community. the alleged Polish agent Zacharski, said he
means of ensuring personal freedom and Still, like so much of what the KGB: was shown pictures of his wife and her
independence ... This attitude toward does, efforts in the emigre community seem' young son by a previous marriage. Another
money engenders an indifference to the surprisingly hit-or-miss. Russian "seaman" intelligence officer called `Paul' "told me
means by which it is obtained ... " The Ivan Rogaisky jumped ship and immigrat- that I had a lovely family," Bell said later,
FBI'sO'MaIleyagrees."The worse the ecc>. ed to the United States in 1971 and was "then said that our security depended on
nomicsituation," he says, "the more people, eventually taken into the tightly knit Rus- each other and that if anybody got out
are willing to sell information for money. " sian community around Jackson, N.J. In of line he'd take care of them."
The Soviets thought they had just such a' 1975 he made a cross-country trip with one Recruitment of the debt-ridden
man in 1973, when GRU officer Viktor couple, and found himself at a party given in' Bell, who worked for Hughes outside
' Delnov left the Soviet Embassy in Washing San Francisco for them by a friend named Los Angeles, points up the Soviets'
ton to buy gloves at a Sears store in subur- Paul Nekrasov-an engineer with a secret special interest in California as the
ban Washington. The salesman, he discov- security clearance. They talked nostalgical- capital of U.S. technology. In Silicon
ered, was a moonlighting Air Force ly about Russia and suddenly Rogalsky Valley, near San Francisco, 600 com-
intelligence sergeant named Arne Peden- asked: "Would you like to do your mother-, parries do classified government
son. Delnov kept coming back, trying to get land some good?" Nekrasov told the work. Near Los Angeles, another 350
Pederson to join him for a drink. With the. FBI, and thus began. a fourteen-month cha- , firms have similarly sensitive defense
approval of AirForce authorities,Pederson rade. Rogalsky talked about a KGB diplo- projects. "All the things that are go-
finally did, and mentioned his difficultymat" in New York, tutored Nekrasov in ; ing to close the window of vulnerabil-
paying an auto-repairbill. Delnov gavehim espionage and advised him to prepare for it ity are being developed right here,"
$500on thespot Twomonthslater,Delnov psychologically (first steal blank paper,' says Los Angeles FBI chief Best.
then unclassified information, then real se- The KGB's West Coast headquar-
asked Pederson for `.'a sample of o crets). Rogalsky assured him they would be ters-at the Soviet Consulate in San
work." After consulting with his superiors,. rescued by a Russian submarine if anything Francisco-is staffed accordingly.
Pederson decided not to come across-and went wrong, Nekrasov says, or that they Consul General Aleksandr Chik-
Chik-
Sot pay back the ooOfficers lean. make e simi- could feign insanity. After the FBI vaidze, for example, is no ordinary
Soviet-bloc intelligence diplomat, but a trained engineer who for-
lar approaches to more than 100 U.S. mili- moved in, Rogalsky persuaded
court-appointed specialists that merly served as chairman of the Soviet Un-
to men every year. he was mentally disturbed-and ion's Committee on Science and Technol-
Mistresses: KGB men also look for peo- he remains free on bond while ogy. "The San Francisco consulate
ple in sensitive posts who are disillusioned
regularly checking in with a continues to be staff--d with the creme de la
with i rjo entonlgry at their bosses. "The creme, even more than Washington," says
.
disillusillusionmentonlyhastobetemporary,> a psychiatrist.
former FBI agent points out, "because the On occasion, Soviet espionage defector Sakharov. Of the 100 people asso-
methods can be almost comically ciated with the consulate, he estimates that.
KGB will document the single transgres- t
> straightforward. After striking 50 to 60 are KGB officers, with another
sign to keep the American hooked." Even out with Air Force Sergeant Pe- twenty to 25 working for CiRU.
otherwise-loyal Americans can be maneu- i derson, Washington embassy spy Recently, however, some of the best Sovi-
Sovi-
invodlviing into ex. One oal of the positions--often
ons--'fret ? Delnov took an Air Force-spon- et technical intelligence has been gathered
Soviets' vast
involving One g goal e sored tour of bases with other for- not by the local KGB scientists or the greedy
pick ck ronielephone conyersatioons operation to eign military attaches-and had unfortunates they recruit but by U.S. and
p up telephone convns betweenI to be dragged from the cockpit of European businessmen who serve-some-
men in sensitive jobs and their mistresses. an A-7 jet when he pulled out a times unknowingly-as Moscow's purchas-
ry, routinely aidof obbttaainened d b by Pentagon a KGB phone di man an at at camera and began taking pictures mg agents. These "false flag" operators gain
ry, much information simply through ins ect-
Tass, the Soviets can program their comput- of the controls. At another base, O p
ers to lock into calls to and from specific Delnov walked up to an F-4jetand ing and negotiating for high-technology
numbers. The Soviets do not tap directly brazenly tried to unscrew the nose items that may be legally sold to U.S. or
into telephone lines in the Pentagon's Auto- -cone from a Maverick missile allied enterprises but not to Russia or East-
slung under its wing. In April 1980 a New ern European countries. Once they actually
von system but intercept the growing num- York-based correspondent for the Soviet buy the equipment, which may be critical to
ber of military calls that are carried, like news a er Literaturna a Gazeta received top-secret military gear, they ship it abroad
1 1e974, a "space r"974t e dish" micro- on - State P Department Y approval for a trip to under false labels such as washing machines
weirave. . (Since civilian
weave. a
Denver, then violated his travel permit by and industrial ovens to cooperating West
the Soviet antenna farm outside Ha- leaving the city limits for a firsthand look at Europeans who send it behind the Iron C: _
vanenposic to catch tele- the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where most tarn. "Illegal strategic exports are a critical
phone ne signals bounced ed off communi- problem and should be a major to
cations satellites.) U.S. chemical-warfare weapons are stored. P concern
Soviet agents are perhaps most He was turned away and a protest was thegovernment,"says TheodoreWu,assist-
dispatched to Moscow. ant U.S. attorney in Los Angeles, and other
?g pursuit The darker side of espionage officials estimate the value of smuggled
fain emigrfs. "They never give up "tradecraft" exists as well. Air Force M/ technology at $1.5 billion annually. Two
o- I S Raymond DeChain lain, whose con- fairly typical cases:
who has once been a hope t on titian," anybody says s ex-CIA man Ro-
S
viction on charges of selling secrets to a
sitzke. NEWSWEEK has learned, for . Gr7R'~"JTZ1~D'r
example, that a code clerk named Soviet intelligence officer was later over-
Alexander Jankowski defected last turned on a technicality, said he had been
spring from the Polish mission to the i shown pictures of his home in Connecticut
U.N. andhelpedpinpointanumberof and warned that his family would be
Polish-Americans who have worked harmed if he talked. Similarly, Hughes Air-
with Polish intelligence agents--
either out of lingering loyalty to their
motherlandorfearofreprisalsagainst..
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^ Just last month, Russian-born Anatoli T. Defense Department reports each year.
Maluta, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was con- The government's best hope is to make
victed on charges of illegally exporting $8 high-tech firms themselves more alert. To
mullion to S 10 million worth of computers this end, the FBI has launched a "defensive
and electronic equipment to Eastern Eu- counter-awareness program" around Sili-
rope. The government presented evidence con Valley, including radio and TV spots
that he was acting on instructions from that feature onetime television G-man
Werner Bruchhausen, a high-living, West Efrem Zimbalist Jr. warning about "hostile
German import-export king. Maluta is ap- foreign intelligence services." And there are
pealing the conviction, but prosecutor Wu signs that the industry is growing more
remains convinced that the Bruchhausen- cautious; recently some firms have turned
Maluta ring was "the largest in scope and away technical tour groups that include
most sophisticated in execution of any il-
legal strategic export operation known."
? Volker Nast ofHamburg is another major
trafficker in technology whose name has
turned up in several recent customs cases. cers, identification of their intended recruits
In April 1976, Nast was indicted by a Feder- and transformation of these marks into dou-
al grand jury in San Francisco on charges of ble agents who preoccupy their Soviet hand-
exporting semiconductor manufacturing lets learn their latest interests and methods
isinfor-
t
d
i
ll I '
a sma
on v
equipment to the Soviet uni firms in Canada, Switzerland and West
Germany. Nast remained in Germany, but
three Americans pleaded guilty and were
ordered to pay fines of $25,000 each. Last
May Nast was indicted again by a Federal
grand jury in Baltimore on charges of con-
spiring to smuggle a $47,000 microwave-
surveillance receiver designed primarily for
military use. (It is capable of intercepting
signals to and from government satellites
and sophisticated aircraft such as Air Force
One.) The small, 70-pound device was
seized at Kennedy Airport in New York,
but Nast remains free because smuggling is
not a crime that 'requires extradition.i
Officials believe that many other high
tech smuggling actions go undetected, since
the undermanned U.S. Customs Service
traditionally devotes more attention to im-
ports than exports. But a series of "export
blitzes" has recently begun at key ports in
the Los Angeles area, and Customs Com-
missioner William Von Raab this month
launched "Operation Exodus"-in which'
teams of specially trained Customs agents,
inspectors, patrol officers and accountants'
will focus on exports nationwide.
Beyond that, the Commerce Department
is opening new export offices in San Fran-
cisco and Los Angeles, and the Reagan Ad-
ministration has begun a broad review of
export policy to strike a better balance be-
tween the needs of trade and the danger of
sacrificing technological advantages. "We
may have to tighten strategic trade controls
on goods and technology that can upgrade
Soviet military strength," says Assistant
Commerce Secretary Lawrence J..Brady.
For starters, the Administration has decid-
ed to stop routinely sending the Soviets tens.
of thousands of unclassified Commerce and,
The Senate Intelligence Committee stronb
ly agrees, and under pressure from that
panel the White House last week indicated
that it would withdraw and revise the con-
troversial domestic spying plan. The impor-
tant point is that a nation cannot be protect-
I ed by compromising the democratic
principles that have always provided its
greatest strength. To whatever extent coun-
terespionage may begin to blur distinctions
between an open U.S. society and Soviet
totalitarianism, the KGB will have scored a
in its secret war.
victo
ry
Soviet citizens.
Marks: The broader battle against Soviet DAVID M. ALPERN with DAVID MARTIN and
ELAINE SHANNON in Washington.
espionage continues on more conventional RICHARD SANDZA in San Francisco,
ecs V GR of i- RON LaBRECQ.UE in New York and burou reports
f ..
.sp
o
m
e
and pass on carefully concoc
mation. In 1978, for example, the FBI was
told by Canadian mounties that a disgrun-
tled U.S. nuclear-plant worker had visited
the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa; the bureau
then used him to spoon-feed the Russians for
much of the sixteen months he worked with
them. Even when the Russians discovered
the double cross, they could not be sure
when the disinformation had begun.
Still, the mounties can't always help the
Feds get their man. Most espionage oper-
ations in the United States are broken only
when the recruit tips off authorities (and
officials never publicize 95 percent of these
cases). FBI counter-espionage expert James
Nolan is "impressed by the size of the Soviet
effort ... their knowledge and success,"
although he doubts there is any widespread
penetration of government and industry.
Many intelligence experts say the KGB is
crippled by its own paranoia, duplication of
effort and a tendency to tailor reports to the
party line.
How far should the United States go in
fighting threats of espionage and subver-
sion? Some top officials of the Reagan Ad-
ministration have proposed granting much
broader authority for the surveillance and
infiltration of domestic groups, but many
current intelligence officials think this un-
necessary and, in a larger sense, counterpro- I
ductive. "We have been able to do the job
completely within the [Carter Administra-
tion] guidelines," says the FBI's O'Malley.
CON~1- \T(
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77!e KGB's `ears' at work Listening forserrets-sand sometimes, just plain gossip'
Zacharski (left), target Bell: The money game
Ai pFOto~
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Oil PACE
tTnISWEEK
23 NOV;;:?BEi 1981
The Soviets' Dirty-Trkkks Squad
'"Y' be Russian word is dezinformatsiya. Embassy in Islamabad. The goals: to stir
and a KGB manual defines it as "mis- anti-Americanism in Islam, and to sow ten-
leading the adversary." In fact, as currently' sienbetween the Carter Administration and
practiced by the KGB, disinformation is far Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-
mora-encompassing any forged docu- Haq. Other &Ltformation is spread by So-
ment, planted news article or whispered viet-controlled radio stations in Third
rumor designed to discredit its enemies, es- World countries. During thelranian revolu-
pecially the United States Directed by tion, the" National Voice of Iran" (actually
"ServiceA"oftheKGB'sFustChiefDirec- broadcaetingfrom theU.S.S.R.)blanketed
torate, disinformation is a key weapon in* Iran with charges that the CLA had assassi-
Moscow'srunn,gwarofwordswith Wash- natedlranian religious leaders and wasplot-
ington. According to CIA estimates, the tingtokill Ayatollah RuhollahKhomeini.
KGB's dirty-tricks squad commands 50 Smear A favorite disinformation ploy is
full-tirneagentsandabudgetofS50milliona to plant "news" items in foreign publica-
year. But that is only a small part of a 53 Lions, then repeat the charges in the Soviet
billion propaganda apparatus that employs press. A classic case involved veteran U.S.
every conceivable Soviet "asset"--from foreign-service officer George Griffin. As-
LcoaidBrehnevandTasstoshadowy front signed to the U.S. Embassy in Ceylon (now
organizations around the world. Sri Lanka) in the 1960s, Griffin was first
Much ofMoscow'santi-American propa- identified-falsely-as a CIA agent by
garda is overt. Statements by Brezhnev de- Blitz, a leftist Bombay weekly. In 1968 his
crying U.S. weapons policies, for example, name appearedin"Who's Who intheCIA,"
can be judged by their source and swiftly abogusdirectoryofAmericanagents. More
denied. But disinformation is more subtle recently, an Indian news service accused
and difculttocombat.In1979Sovietdiplo- him of organizing Afghan freedom fighters
mats spread rumors that the United States and even attempting to sabotage Indian
-
had orchestrated the seizure of the Grand Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's plane
Mosque inlvieccaandthat the: Pakistani Ar- charges Tass and Pravda trumpeted world-
my bad engineered the burning of the U.S. w?ide.LastJuneaSoviet newspaperprinteda
Mecca mosque undersieoe in 1979: Spreading tales that America was responsible
UP?
Qrtiz: In Peru, the KCB said he wrs CIA
letter allegedly from Gruen threatening an
Indian journalist. Despite repeated U.S.
denials, the smear campaign succeeded. In
July, Gandhi let it be known that Grif-an's
scheduled posting to the U.S. Embassy in
New Delhi wouldbe "too contentious," and
his assignment was quietly withdrawn.
. Why the long campaign to get Griffin?
U.S. intelligence officials cannot answer :
the question with certainty, but the attacks
may have been triggered during Griffin's
days in Ceylon when he tried-in vain-to
persuade a Soviet couple to defect Soviet.
propagandists have started a similar cam-
paign to discredit two new U.S. ambassa-
dors-Harry Barnes in India and Frank
Ortiz in Peru. Charges that Ortiz is a CIA
agent first appeared in a leftist Peruvian
newspaper and almost immediately were
repeated in Izvestia. -
Forgeries, such as the letter purportedly
written by Griffin, play a key role in disin-
formation, often providing the "evidence'
for spurious charges. Skilled at duplicating;
typefaces and watermarks, the KGB pro-:
duces four or five major forgeries of official
U.S. documents a year, according to the
CIA. One of the most famous is a "top
secret" 1970 U.S. Army field manual, bear-
ing the forged signature of Gen. William
Westmoreland, that orders U.S. troops
abroad to provoke l eftist grpups into terror-
1
'
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ist acts that would invite government retali-
ation. The forged manual gained attention
in 1978 when a Spanish journalist-whom
the CIA linked to Soviet intelligence--cited
it as evidence that America was inciting the
Italian Red Brigades. That, in turn, sparked
speculation that the United States was be-
hind the murder of Italian leader Aldo
Moro. An unusually sophisticated effort,
the field manual was flawed only in its top-
secret classification-a designation real
field manuals never bear.
'Convincing': Oyer the years such forger-
ies havebeen the basis for scores of disinfor-
m ationstories in the foreign press In 1979a
Cairo-based Muslim magazine printed a
phony CIA document outlining ways to
bribe members of Islamic groups opposed to
the Camp David peace process. The same
year a Syrian newspaper published a letter
supposedly from Hermann Eilts, then U.S.
ambassador to Egypt, urging CIA director
Stanfield Turner to "repudiate" Anwar Sa-
dat and "get rid of him without hesitation"
unless Sadat did more to advanceU.S. inter-
ests in the Mideast. Such fabrications catch
on-particularly when they act to confirm
popular suspicions of U.S. motives in a vola-
tile region. "The are convincing a lot of
people," Martin Portman, 3 operations
officer, has said, "not onl in .the Third
World, but in some Western countries."
Are the Western media em! ves occa-
Griffin: A diplomatic posting derailed
Tense 2ab+ts--N " Yort, Times
sionally manipulated by Soviet disinforma-
tion? That theory was advanced by the
1980 best-selling novel, "The Spike," sup-
posedly a roman a clef in which co-authors
Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave
suggest that some Western journalists are
unwitting dupes of Communist propagan-
da, while others are in the pay of the KGB.
In France last year journalist Pierre-
Charles Paths was sentenced to five years
in prison as a Soviet agent; he had printed
Soviet disinformation in French magazines
and an influential newsletter since 1959. In
the 1950s, longtime CBS .correspondent
Winston Burdett admitted taking Soviet
espionage assignments as a newspaper re-
porter for a brief period in the 1940s, and
Soviet defectors have named Australian
journalist Wilfred Burchett and former
CBS and ABC correspondent Sam Jaffe as
Communist operatives. (Both men deny
the charge, and the CIA has officially ex-
onerated Jaffc.)"It would be foolish to con-
tend that the U.S. Government can be pen-
etrated, U.S. defense contractors can be
penetrated and the U.S. press cannot be
penetrated," says Frank Carlucci, the for-
mer deputy CIA director who is now Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense.
Still, most American experts on the KGB
doubt that the Soviets have made any sig-
nificant headway within the American
press. "What could such journalists do for
their Kremlin employer?" asks Harry Ro-
sitzke, who spent 25 years watching the
KGB for the CIA. "Could they pass a pro-
Soviet slant through the hierarchy of news
rooms and editorial boards in metropolitan
newspapers? The insertion of Moscow-tai-
lored items or attitudes would stick out like
a red thumb." Some conspiracy buffs argue
that the Western pr ss seems all too eager to
expose excesses by the CIA while making
little effort to expose Soviet infiltration.
American journalists do tend to question
actions and explanations from government
sources-but it is that very freedom and
skepticism that sets the Western press apart
from its Eastern counterparts.
In the end, the question of subtle Soviet
.influence in the American media is dwarfed
by the concerted KGB campaigns to defame
career diplomats, destroy trust between na-
tions or incite revolutions. Taken separate-
ly, each of the wounds dezinformatsiya in-
flicts on America's reputation may seem
minor. But the nicks and cuts add up and
promote the ultimate goal of the KGB's
Service A: the undermining of worldwide
goodwill toward theUnited States.
MELINDA BECK with DAVID C. MARTIN
in \Vashinxwo and bureau reports
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 ?f.~.na~+-..`'v. -..rn>~~yr. Kf rcwsu':~ a/'-~ r:. ."7L~ `~ .~ xr ;"ifi~' "~*tq ~.r . ~~ .,,f Sur . , ?~ r ,y~! ~+? y ..~. .., ~.~ .
'9'1.zifi~Cyet+Y?:t'
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SOViE ' COVERT AC ON
(THE FORGERY OFFENSIVE)
HEARINGS
BR$ OB T"
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1980
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CONTENTS
f WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1980
Testimony of John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations, Central 1"'
Intelligence Agency---------2------------------------------------ 2
Accompanied by:
Richard H. Ramsdale, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelli-
gence Agency--------------------- 2
Martin C. Portman, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence
Agency----------- 2
James It. Benjamin, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence
Agency----------------- ------------------- 2
Donald Peek, Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intel-
ligence Agency---------------------------------------------- 2
L. Cole Black, Assistant Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative
Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency--------------------------- 2
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1980
Testimony of Ladislav Bittinan, former Deputy Chief of the Di-informa-
tion Department of the Czechoslovakia Intelligence Service-_-_--___-_ 34
APPENDIX
1. CIA study: Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda (including Annex A
and B) ------------------------------------------------------ 59
If. Covert Action Information Bulletin publication of forgery --------- 176
III. U.S. Peace Council agenda-------------------------------------- 186
IV. Forgeries of Time magazine------------------------------------ 190
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SOVIET COVERT ACTION'
WEDNESDAY, E'EBRUABY 6, 1980
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT 00313117 EE ON INTELLIGENCE,
SUBCOMMITTEE o OVERSIGHT, washingtor, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room
11--405, the Capitol, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding. (chairman of
Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland
the full committee), Ashbrook, Young, Whitehurst, and McClory.
Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil,
chief
committee'; and nHerbert Romer tein and Jeannie 3%fcNally,
Elizabeth
iate clerk of counsel,
Keyes, professional staff members.
Mr. ASPIN. The purpose of today's hearings is to apprise the com-
mittee of the Soviet use of propaganda and covert action against the
United States in the formation oo foreign policy, and the particular
focus of today's hearing is going to be on forgeries as part of the use
of Soviet covert action machinery. who is ac
The witnesses today are Mr. John McMahon, the DDO, w
companied by Richard H. Ramsdale and Martin C. Portman. They
are the three at the witness table.
We do need a vote to close the hearings.
Mr. ASHBROOIII. Mr. Chairman, I will move that the meeting be
closed pursuant to the rules.
Mr. AsprN. All right.
Call the roll.
Ms. McNALLY. Mr. Aspin?
Mr. ASPIN. Aye.
Ms. McNALLY. Mr. Boland?
Mr. BoILXNo. A,ye.
Ms. MCNALLY. Mr. Ashbrook?
Mr. ASHBROOK, Aye.
ITS. McNAI.LY. Three yeses, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.
Congressman Ashbrook, would you like to make a statement?
Mfr. Asllnnoorl;. Well, really not a major statement, 1 would just like
to join the chairman in welcoming John McMahon and his associates.
I point out that in recent years we have heard much in the papers,
Con tress and elsewhere about CIA covert action, but rarely do we hear
Edited by Central Intelligence Agency and declassified.
(1)
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I have not looked at the stuff in the folder here, but you have here, for
example the forgeries which, since 1976, fall into three groups, and
I am taking about that single forgery, the bogus U.S. Army field
manual it says here, exploited repeatedly to support unfounded allega-
tions that the United States acts as the agent-provocateur behind the
various foreign terrorists, and particularly the Italian Red Brigades.
I would have thought on the fact that that would be a tough thing to
show. I mean, is that really what they are using the thing for? .re
they convincing anybody of that?
Mr. PORTmAx. JhP.X Fire vincin r a lot of people not only in the
hird World but in some of the Western countries too. Basically t at
forgery tries to show two things. It is a etai a eld manual at a top
secret level that General Westmoreland supposedly was to have as-
signed at the time that the Soviets put it out. One message states that
the military and civilian security intelligence services of the United
States, when they maintain liaisons abroad, use this as a cover to pene-
trate and manipulate the foreign governments. The second big message
states that the United States establishes relationships with what ap-
pear to be leftist or?anizat.ions and manipulates them in order to try
to discredit communism and leftwing organizations. It is on this latter
point that the Soviets then made accusations at the time that Aldo
Moro was murdered in Italy-that the initial response of the Italian
and the IV, estern press was that it was the Red Brigades who murdered
Moro, and the Red Brigades were far leftists who had ties with the
Soviet Union. Stories circulated in Italy at the time that these Red
Brigade members were trained in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets then, in
reaction to this, among other things placed an article in the World
Marxist Review, which is also called the Problems of Peace and So-
cialism, which is their international Communist journal. The Soviets
wrote an article analyzing the situation in which they said that it was
CIA that was secretly manipulating the Red Brigades who murdered
Aldo Moro, the Soviets then cited the phony field manual as proof of
this charge, because this field manual supposedly instructs CIA and
the other services to get out and manipulate leftist organizations. So
in this case the forgery was used to reinforce their allegation. The So-
viet charge was picled up in some of the Italian press; a couple of the
newspapers questioned it, but there were three or four of them that
didn't.
Mr. MCMAHON. Although the manual had some flaws in it, it was a
very professional job and did have the forged signature of General
Westmoreland, so the authenticity of the document was accepted on
face value just because it looked real.
Mr. BENJAMIN. I raised the same question that you did once to an
Italian lawyer I know, and I said, why would a man in Italy be con-
vinced that the CIA might be behind the Red Bridages, because most
people think if they are Red they are left. He said, you miss the point.
He said, many people in Italy believe that the Red Brigades are black,
that is Fascist, that they are controlled and manipulated by extreme
rightwing groups that are supported and funded by CIA. For many
people in Italy, it is a very logical connection between the two. It
only remained for the Soviets to provide some kind of documentary
basis for this.
Mr.
inl Aih
pushin
but tin
Mr.
there?
of fort
States
Hance,
specie
doctnt
reinfo
activil
f role,
appea
Are 115
I tl
see Ito
Mr.
but, lc
extent
the N.
ample
\V rittl
Mr
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/04: CIA-RDP87S00869R000200250003-5