HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00869R000200330001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: MISC

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United States Department of State
Hostage
Negotiation
A Matter of Life and Death
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Hostage
Negotiation
A Matter of Life and Death
A publication of the
Office of Security
Department of State
Any suggestions for changes or
additions in future publications
should be submitted to the
Policy and Training Staff,
Office of Security, Department
of State, Washington, D. C.
20520.
Released October 1983
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This is a general review of the principles of hostage negotiation, and of
necessity is geared to a broad audience. For those experienced
negotiators, this is intended to serve as a handy reference to reinforce ex-
isting knowledge and experience. The inexperienced negotiator should
use this booklet as a basic statement of the dynamics of hostage negotia-
tion. For a more extensive study of the subject, see the bibliography at
the end of this booklet.
This was written with the senior officer in mind and, in the interest of
brevity, in an expanded outline format.
We have not distinguished between actual negotiators and senior officers
who, although probably making the decisions, should not be the prime
negotiators in face-to-face negotiations with the hostage-takers. The prin-
ciples covered in this pamphlet apply to both "players."
This pamphlet does not attempt to cover techniques and tactics that are
beyond the control of the hostage negotiator (or senior post official), e.g.,
use of military force, SWAT team, host country actions, etc.
Hostage negotiation, like any other study involving human behavior, is
an inexact science, and one that is constantly evolving. There are many
viewpoints on this issue, some of which are contradictory. What we have
tried to offer here is a review of those tactics that seem most appropriate
to the types of incidents that might involve Foreign Service personnel, an
area that in the past has not received adequate attention from the
experts.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
U.S. Government Policy
Why Negotiation
Discussion of Tactics
Stalling for Time
2
Obtaining Information
5
Calming a Hostage-Taker
6
Establishing Rapport
7
Persuading
8
Choice of Negotiator
9
Stockholm Syndrome
10
Personality Types
12
Quick Recognition Points
13
Negotiating Tactics
13
Terrorist Demands
16
What is Negotiable
17
The Bargaining Process
18
Structure of Negotiation
20
Interests and Issues
21
Summary
22
Helpful Hints
23
Bibliography
25
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HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION
U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY
U.S. Government policy regarding the payment of ransom and negotia-
tion with terrorists is clear ...
"The U.S. Government has made clear that it will make no concessions
to terrorist blackmail. We will not pay ransom or release prisoners. We
support other governments that take a similar stance since concessions
encourage further attacks and put more people at risk. When Americans
are abducted, we look to the host government to exercise its
responsibility under international law to protect all persons within its ter-
ritory. Governments, corporations, and private individuals have a
common interest in maintaining a policy of not submitting to terrorist
demands. Should official American personnel be taken hostage as the
result of an act committed or condoned by a foreign government, we will
act promptly and effectively, choosing from the range of political,
economic, and military sanctions appropriate to the circumstances."'
There are, however, many actions which can and must be taken to
preserve life that fall short of those prohibited by the above-stated
policy.
Overall goals are:
? To preserve life
? To secure the release of the hostages in a manner consist-
ent with U.S. Government policy
The tactics are to:
? Establish and maintain communications
? Stall for time
? Obtain information
? Calm the hostage-takers
? Establish rapport
? Persuade
"'International Terrorism." GIST, June 1981. Department of State
Publication, Bureau of Public Affairs.
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A variety of alternatives is available to crisis management officers in
dealing with a hostage-taking incident, including:
1. Containment and negotiation
2. ntainment and the demand of surrender
3. Use of chemical agents
4. Use of sharpshooters
5. Assault
Some problems are associated with alternatives 2 through 5. Twelve per-
cent of those who have died in a hostage-taking incident died during the
assault. The chances of loss of life in an assault are great. Sharpshooters
may hit the wrong individual or an explosive device could detonate
automatically. Chemical agents are too slow, and with some dispensers
there is the threat of fire. Simply demanding surrender results in more
casualties and takes much more time.
Above all, once you have resorted to an assault, teargas, or sharp-
shooters, it may be difficult or impossible to return to negotiations, but
by beginning with negotiations you still have all the other options open
to you.
Therefore, the authorities should be encouraged not to take any
precipitous action since the passage of time is considered to be to the
advantage of the police, and the immediate use of violent tactics only
reduces or eliminates the opportunity for a negotiated settlement that
might be to the negotiators' advantage.
Stalling for Time - The Main Tactic
The first order of business is to stall for time, which is needed for
several reasons:
? To reduce the stress environment
? To allow for negotiations external to the conflict zone
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? To permit the implementation of active crisis-resolution
measures (i.e., hostage rescue efforts)
The Pa me of time increases all basic human needs, both biological and
psychological. While we tend to focus on our own problems, hostage-
takers also have a large number of problems to deal with, and these
problems multiply and become more complex as time passes.
The important point is that you are probably in a position to satisfy
some of these needs and may even able to create some that ~Wlater
need satisfying. When you are in a negotiation, set aside some time to
consider from your opponents' point of view their position and the prob-
lems that they might be facing. This gives you an important new
perspective concerning the problem and how to deal with it.
Another factor that is always present and directly related to time is
stress. Studies have shown that = le become more rational as they
become less emotional. We are capable of dealing with seven (plus or
minus two separate chunks of information in our short-term memory or
working memory. If we are to add something to short-term memory,
then something has to go. It appears, however, that some chunks take
up more space in short-term memory than others. Any stimulus that is
particularly vivid or emotional in content takes up more space than other
chunks, therefore decreasing our ability to deal with other information.
This means then that to t your message across to someone who is very
emotional you should first do something to reduce his or her emotional
level. Time alone will reduce it, but you may able to speed up the
process by using some of the techniques that are discussed elsewhere in
this booklet.
The body reacts to stress in the following way (referred to as general
adaptation syndrome):
? During the shock phase there is an increase in adrenalin
in the blood, a quickening of the pulse and respiration,
and an increase in blood sugar levels.
? The countershock phase is characterized by a feeling of
hyperactivity-a feeling that you can't sit still and that
you have to keep moving or doing something. This is by
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far the most dangerous phase in this cycle.
? In resistance/adaptation the body begins to adapt to the
situation, starts to repair damages, and the stress symp-
toms start to disappear.
? Finally, in exhaustion all adaptive mechanisms begin to
collapse and the body's functions start to slow down.
Individuals can't maintain a high level of resistance. Eventually they will
reach the exhaustion stage. The length of time it takes them to reach
this stage, however, can vary because of particular differences, as with
the use of drugs or alcohol.
In a hostage situation, however, or in any situation that is not resolved
immediately, people go through a series of shocks that create a wave-like
pattern. It's up to the negotiator to manipulate the level of stress of the
hostage-taker and to recognize at what point the hostage-taker is on the
curve. Unfortunately, the negotiator is going through a similar curve.
Learn to recognize when you have reached exhaustion and need a
replacement. Beyond that point you simply won't be effective.
In the United States, 90 percent of the hostage-taking incidents were
negotiated in less than 10 hours with the majority lasting about 8 or 9
hours. Terrorist situations will undoubtedly take longer than this for the
following reasons: (1) They use drugs to maintain their alertness over
longer periods of time; (2) they relieve each other when they become
tired; (3) they can bolster each other's confidence; (4) they are more
dedicated than the average criminal; (5) they have prepared for this
event and are anticipating difficulties; and (6) they have an organization
that is expecting them to perform in a certain way. So, in negotiating
with professional terrorists, make sure you have made arrangements for
relief.
In summation, the passage of time can have the following effects:
1. Increasing basic human needs
2. Reducing anxiety, stress, or emotion
3. Increasing rationality
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4. Allowing time for intelligence gathering
5. Permitting the development of rapport and trust
6. Reducing expectations
Time is on your side, so don't rush into the negotiations unprepared.
When you do contact the hostage-takers,
? Establish a problem-solving climate by showing a desire to
understand and a willingness to help, and
? Establish a climate of compromise by adopting a give-
and-take attitude and by showing a willingness to bargain
and yield when necessary.
Obtaining Information
The techniques used for gathering information are the same as those
used in conducting an interview, only you use them a bit more subtly.
First, you have to know the difference between open-ended and closed-
ended questions. Open-ended questions provide a person with a chance
to give a long answer, while closed-ended questions call for a "yes" or
"no" or a brief response. Generally open-ended questions are better
unless you aren't getting the types of responses you want. With someone
who is reticent you might want to start with closed-ended questions until
you have established rapport and the person feels like talking more
spontaneously.
One technique that psychologists use to gather information is called
active listenin . John Burton, in a book titled Conflict and Communica-
tion, states that the resolution of conflict is a process of testing whether
information is received as transmitted and whether what is transmitted
has been sent deliberately and contains accurate information. In active
listening you use two techniques to confirm the accuracy of information
received. These techniques are called restatement of content and reflec-
tion of feeling.
In restatement of content you repeat back in your own words what you
think you have hear oing this shows an interest on your part in effec-
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tive communication; it shows that you paid attention; and it shows that
you understand what has been said. It also gives a person an oppor-
tunity to correct any errors that you may have made.
In reflection of feeling you pay attention to what is said and how it is
said. You listen specifically for the strength, tone, and pace of the voice
to look for hidden messages. In this case you refer to feelings you think
the other person is experiencing. Once again, it shows interest and
understanding, and it encourages people to talk.
Obtain as much information as you can and insure that it is recorded
and passed on to those who might need it. This information will assist
you in developing a bargaining position and in responding to the position
of the hostage-takers. Your information will also be useful and may, in
fact, save lives if it becomes necessary to make an assault.
Calming a Hostage-Taker
To calm a hostage-taker you can use modeling, ventilation, and
distraction.
? Modeling-respond in a calm and controlled way, using a
very conversational tone. If you speak slowly and
deliberately, after a while the hostage-taker begins to
speak more slowly and to feel more calm.
? Ventilation-give the hostage-taker time to talk without
interrupting him or her when talking.
? Distraction-use distraction to draw the attention of the
hostage-taker away from whatever is bothering him or
her. You can distract in a variety of ways such as keeping
the hostage-taker constantly making decisions or by
making noise. During the Prince's Gate incident in Lon-
don, for example, during which Arabs from the
Khuzestan province in Iran assaulted and held hostages in
the Iranian Embassy, the police made road construction
noises in the street outside the Embassy, and they kept
the negotiator for the terrorists busy making decisions as
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to where to put the escape vehicle so that he wouldn't
notice that an assault had begun.
Establishing Rapport
You can gain rapport by considering the issues seriously, using self-
disclosure; expressing empathy; helping the hostage-takers to save face;
avoiding criticism, threats, and impatience; and being consistent.
Show that you take the hostage-takers seriously and are genuinely willing
to work toward a satisfactory agreement.
Self-disclosure helps the hostage-takers to relate more quickly to the
negotiator. It is important that they see you as an individual who has
problems just as they do.
You express ,empathy by showing that you understand their feelings and
their point o vif iew. To do this you have to concentrate on what they say
and what they do so that you can find out what their true motivation is,
that is, what their underlying assumptions are. Don't try to empathize
unless you are sure you can do it convincingly.
The best negotiators recognize the importance of helping the hostage-
takers to save face. Sometimes the only thing keeping the hostage--takers
from ma ing concessions is the fear of losing face in front of the people
who are important to them. Allow them to retreat gracefully, control the
pace of concession-giving, and provide the hostage-takers with relevant,
face-saving rationalizations to show why they should concede in a certain
area. Do not underestimate the importance of face-saving. When
bargainers are made to look weak and foolish before a significant
audience, they are more likely to retaliate in some way than if their
failure has not led to the public loss of face.
Do not express criticism, threats, or in atience, because time is on your
side, and a problem-solving climate wor s in your favor. Studies have
consistently shown that threats reduce the levels of cooperation in dyadic
interaction.
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Be consistent and responsive in your behavior. Any hint of randomness,
inconsistency, or unpredictability on your part will reduce cooperation.
Whenever possible emphasize your similarity with the hostage-takers. We
are more inclined to cooperate with those whom we perceive to be
similar to us than with those who are different in some way. Also, try to
break down any ingroup/outgroup distinctions. Studies have shown that
cooperation is at least twice as high with an ingroup as it is with an
outgroup, even if the relationships in the ingroup are tenuous and newly
formed. It might be effective, for example, to show that you have had
similar experiences in life and that you perhaps come from a similar
social background.
Persuading
The last major negotiation technique is persuading the hostage-takers,
which consists of the following techniques:
? Agree in part with their
views. ecreases
their resistance to later
arguments.
? Then deal with the
small issues first,
creating a climate of
success and putting off
the major problems
until later when the
subject has invested
more time and has a
greater interest in
reaching an agreement.
? Fractionate the big
problems by breaking
them down into a
number of smaller
problems that are each
easier to handle.
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? If you aren't making any progress, initiate issues to be
negotiated and then give in on these in exchange for
some concessions.
? Studies have shown that when trying to convince a person
of a particular point, it is much more effective to use
episodic information such as specific examples or case
histories rather than statistical information, because
episodic information remains more vivid in the mind and
has a greater influence on behavior than isolated "facts."
? Above all, make sure you constantly s est surrender. It
just may be that the hostage-takers simply haven t con-
sidered this as an option, and as things become more
complex, they may we it as a more attractive alternative.
? Maintain nonthreatening communications. Studies indicate
at communications (both verbal an nonverbal) can im-
prove cooperation and that threatening communications
usually reduce cooperation.
? Agree with obvious reluctance to any demands that might
to your tactical a vanta , perhaps in exchange for
immediate or future concessions on the part of the
hostage-takers. If the demands are to the advantage of the
hostage-takers or fall in the area of nonnegotiable items,
stall for time an express a willingness to seek alternati
solutions at may be acceptable to and meet the interests
of both sides.
While you may have had extensive experience in negotiations of various
sorts, that does not necessarily make you the best choice as a hostage
negotiator.
First of all, assess the ssibiiit of your being considered as an advocate
for one party and the effect of that upon the negotiation process. You
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will not be considered as neutral unless you have low or no power over
the parties, enjoy high credibility with both parties, focus on process
rather than outcome, and recognize the importance of rationality and
good information in achieving a settlement. In some situations it may be
useful or necessary to find someone who can intervene as a mediator to
facilitate the negotiation process (if the hostage-takers refuse to deal with
you).
Secondly, decisionmakers should not be negotiators for a variety of
reasons, the most important of which are:
1. Using the decisionmaker as the negotiator weakens the
tactic of stalling for time. Your claim that you must get
approval for each minor step is less plausible.
2. As the negotiator you tend to lose objectivity.
3. You are incapable of maintaining control over the entire
situation.
Anyone who is going to become a negotiator or teach people to survive
hostage situations has to have a good understanding of the Stockholm
Syndrome. This syndrome was discovered as a result of a bank robbery
that took place in Stockholm, Sweden on August 23, 1973, during which
four hostages were held in a bank vault for 131 hours. After their
release, the hostages were confused as to what their feelings were while
being held hostage and what their feelings were after the crisis was
resolved. There are three aspects of the Stockholm Syndrome:
1. Positive feelings of the victim toward the hostage-taker
2. Negative feelings of the victim toward the authorities
3. Positive feelings of the hostage-taker toward the victim.
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While the negotiator must live with the first two aspects, he or she has
to work toward encouraging the last aspect. You foster these positive
feelings toward the victim by:
? Emphasizing the hostages' human qualities
? Asking the hostage-taker to check on the health of the
hostages
? Giving the hostage-takers and hostages things to be done
as a group. (For example, if they demand food, send in
bulk items such as unsliced meat, unsliced bread, and
unsliced cheese or things that require cooperation and
group activities.)
In the past, it was thought that time was the only important factor in
developing the Stockholm Syndrome, but it is now known that it is only
one factor and probably not the most important.
The development of these positive feelings depends upon the nature of
the contacts between the hostage-takers and the hostages. If there are
positive contacts, then the bond is more likely to form. If the contacts
are negative or there are no contacts, then the syndrome may not
develop.
The Stockholm Syndrome has other important impacts on the negotia-
tion process. On occasion, such as at Prince's Gate, the hostages helped
or at least did nothing to prevent the possible escape of one of the
hostage-takers. On some occasions, during an assault the hostages fol-
lowed the instructions of the hostage-takers rather than the police who
were trying to rescue them. Hostages who have been released early have
provided false or inaccurate information concerning the situation when
questioned by the police in an apparent effort to protect the hostage-
takers. The only way you can protect yourself from these effects is to be
prepared for them and even to expect them.
We don't want to overplay the Stockholm Syndrome because it is a
phenomenon that still is inadequately understood and not consistently
evident in hostage-taking incidents. We know very little about what
exact processes lead to its development, and we know little about what
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types of people might be more susceptible to its effects. The syndrome
is, nevertheless, an important phenomenon which must always be con-
sidered in hostage-taking situations, because to ignore it could bring
disastrous results.
According to statistics available from the FBI, in the average population
70 percent of the people are normal, 10 percent are neurotic, 2 percent
are psychotic, and 18 percent have some sort of personality disorder. Of
the 10 classifiable disorders, 2 are most commonly involved in hostage-
taking incidents in the United States: psychotics and personality
disorders. It must be reemphasized that statistics are based pri-
marily on criminal incidents and not on incidents of terrorism. Political
terrorists are the most difficult group to deal with because they are
generally rational, have a sense of right and wrong, and form strong
loyalties. The personality types referred to below, while perhaps more
common in hostage-taking incidents that are not political in motivation,
have still been found on many occasions to be involved in terrorist
groups, particularly the antisocial personality whose criminal background
and experience would prove useful for a terrorist organization.
The two types of psychotics seen in 50 percent of the
hostage-taking incidents in the United States are the
paranoid schizophrenic and the psychotic depressive.
? Paranoid schizophrenics are characterized by
persistent false mental-perceptions or beliefs
such as delusions of persecution. Thinking
often is loose and makes no sense.
Schizophrenics can appear normal at some
moments and psychotic at others.
? Psychotic depressives experience extreme
sadness, hopelessness, feelings of inadequacy
and worthlessness, slow thinking and speech,
and indecisiveness. They have a decreased con-
centration and are prone to suicide.
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? The two personality disorders most commonly encountered
are the antisocial personality and the inadequate
personality.
? Antisocial personalities are repeatedly in con-
flict with society. They are incapable of loyalty
and are grossly selfish, callous, and irrespon-
sible. They feel no guilt and have a low
frustration tolerance. They tend to blame
others no matter what the circumstances. In
general, they are probably the most difficult
personality type to deal with.
? Inade uate personalities are unable to respond
effectively to emotional, social, intellectual,
and physical demands. They are inept, show
poor judgment and social instability, and they
lack physical and emotional stamina.
Quick Recognition Points
? If a person's behavior strikes one as "weird," he or she is
probably a paranoid schizophrenic;
? If the response is something similar to "Go away and
leave me alone," he or she is probably a psychotic
depressive;
? If the demands of a hostage-taker are fairly realistic, he
or she may be an antisocial personality; and
? If he or she is totally unrealistic, then that person is most
likely an inadequate personality.
Negotiating Tactics
The tactics that you use in negotiating with these personality types are
different.
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Paranoid Schizophrenic
? Find out if they have been on medication and, if so, if
they have their medication with them. If you can get
them to take their medication you may see an improve-
ment in their behavior over a period of time.
? Do not try to get too close to them physically because of
their need for extended protective body space.
? Keep your hands where they can see them. If you have
your hands in your pockets or behind your back, they will
wonder what you are hiding there.
? Do not agree, but do not try to argue, with them about
their delusions because these delusions seem to have a
protective function for them. You might simply tell them
that you understand that they are seeing things but that
you don't see them.
? Consider the use and exploitation of the media publicity
because it may satisfy their real needs.
Psychotic Depressive
? Expect slow responses and provide them with the time
they need to answer your questions.
? Don't try to rush them.
? Don't bring any friends or relatives to the scene.
? If you want them to do something, be very explicit and
directive.
? Be alert to any sudden change in mood. A sudden
improvement in mood may indicate that the person has
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decided that suicide is his/her only solution and feels
better only because he/she has arrived at that solution.
? Repeat assurance constantly. Be confident and positive
that his or her problems can be solved.
Antisocial Personality
? You shouldn't bring any family members to the scene. A
high correlation seems to exist between child abuse and
antisocial behavior. In most cases the relationship between
an antisocial and family members is not good.
? Antisocials require a great deal of stimulation. If they
aren't getting enough from their environment, they will
create some, probably in the form of violent behavior. If
you think they aren't being adequately stimulated, provide
stimulation in the form of distractions.
? Don't challenge or threaten their ego.
? Don't appear indecisive or ambivalent.
? Don't show force.
? Don't talk of punishment.
? Above all do not engage in face-to-face negotiations with
these persons. The only way you can convince these per-
sons to take a certain action is to convince them that it is
to their advantage to do it. They won't do it otherwise.
Inadequate Personality
? For the inadequate personality, most of the usual negotia-
tion tactics are effective. You must, however, be alert to
t
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the possibility of suicide and go heavy on the ego support
and face-saving techniques.
? Make them think they have no choice but to surrender
and that they are giving up in the face of overwhelming
odds, that anyone would do the same thing in their
position.
TERRORIST DEMANDS
Be aware of the characteristics of initial demands.
This is a very stressful time, and people are often shocked by how much
the other side is asking.
You immediately think that you're fighting a losing battle.
Professional negotiators realize that the outcome of the negotiation
depends to a large extent on the initial position that they establish.
The hostage-takers' initial position is based not only on the strength or
weakness of their position or on their interests, but also on strategic con-
siderations. Hostage-takers will try to find a position that maximizes
their own advantage and that is barely acceptable to the other side.
They will try to support their position by a process of education that
might include the facts as they perceive them, statistics, a showing of
emotion, and reason and logic.
The negotiator's job is to respond to their initial position with skepticism
and critical objections.
Both sides will then try to pierce through the exaggerations and decep-
tions to establish what is, in fact, a realistic initial position.
Only after this process takes place can you start effective bargaining. In
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hostage negotiations the demands are almost always presented as follows:
1. They are not open to negotiation.
2. All demands must be met.
3. A specific time limit by which the demands must be met
is set.
4. Specific consequences for failure to meet those demands
are enumerated.
Generally this initial process leads to what is called a functional impasse
at which point both sides may want to break off communications tem-
porarily to consider each other's position in more detail.
In a negotiation, some things, in addition to those items referred to in
the U.S. Government policy, are considered nonnegotiable. Among these
things are weapons, alcohol, narcotics, and the exchanging of hostages.
Some negotiators make an exception of alcohol under very rare cir-
cumstances when the hostage-taker has consulted a psychiatrist or
psychologist and the negotiator has the opportunity to consult him or her
about how the individual would be likely to react to alcohol. While some
people become passive, others become violent. Unless you are certain
about the response, do not provide alcohol.
Some negotiators have tried drugging hostage-takers by putting
something in food or beverages. Once again the effects may be
unpredictable, and it is possible that the food will be tested on the
hostages before being consumed.
Exchanging hostages is dangerous because it raises the emotional
involvement of the negotiator and other authorities. You may also be
improving the bargaining position of the hostage-takers.
Those items that may be considered as negotiable are:
? Food
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? Nonalcoholic beverages
? Transportation [Do not let the hostage-takers move unless
it is to your tactical advantage. Many problems are
associated with mobile situations such as command and
jurisdictional difficulties, communications difficulties, and
loss of control.]
? Media coverage
? Other basic human needs such
as toilet facilities, climate needs
(heating and air-conditioning),
and medication
You may well be an experienced negotiator, but it is useful to review the
principles that apply and to reflect on the fact that hostage negotiation is
usually done under the pressure of high stress and requires time-
compressed decisions with an immediate effect on life and property.
Hostage negotiations are also much more complex because of the con-
straints placed upon you by U.S. Government policy. A 1976 study
indicates the effect of the strong expectation of matched concessions. In
negotiations where the negotiator matched the concessions of the oppo-
nent, an agreement was reached in 90 percent of the cases. Where the
negotiator took a hard bargaining position, agreement was reached in
only 20 percent of the cases. Although the hard bargaining strategy
results in a higher payoff if agreement is reached, the chances of an
agreement are drastically reduced.
Tom Colosi of the American Arbitration Association says that the
essence of negotiations is an exchange of promises. In most cases, at the
end of a negotiation what you have is an agreement on a set of promises
as to what both of you are going to do. You cannot make an exchange
of promises, however, unless there is a certain level of trust established
between the two parties.
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Without trust you won't have any effective communications taking lace
an you won't have the opportunity to educate the other side as to the
logic of your position or the weaknesses of theirs.
Your main job as a negotiator is to create doubts in the minds of the
other side as to the viability of its position. You have to take every op-
portunity to plant doubts and constantly ask yourself what else you
might say or do that would cause the other side to doubt its position
even more. Creating these doubts depends once again on establishing
trust between the two parties. Ex ectations are also important. If your
expectations are high, then you are less likely to be satisfied with an
agreement. If you reduce the expectations of the other side, you increase
the chances that they will be satisfied with what they get. This can be a
difficult process because bargainers who possess a threat capability, as
do hostage-takers, have higher aspiration levels than bargainers who do
not have threats. Creating doubts is one effective way of reducing
expectations.
Negotiation is an educational process coupled with the use of
various forms of power (in hostage negotiation coercive power
is most commonly used) in an effort to satisfy the essential
self-interests of the disputants through an exchange of
promises.
Most negotiations have three stages, and they always occur in the same
order. They are:
1. Establishing positions
The first stage is one of long speechmaking as both sides lay
out the details of their positions. Each position is stated with
conviction and the contrasting arguments are treated as not
being worth consideration. There is an apparent unwillingness
to retreat and apparent irreconcilable differences that will
never be resolved. Quite often antagonisms begin to emerge
at this stage, but it serves a very essential function in that it
sets the negotiating range-we now know that the final settle-
ment will have to fall somewhere in between these two
initially established positions.
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2. Exploring strengths and weaknesses of positions
In the second stage we begin to probe for weakness in the
other side's position. We engage in critical questioning in
order to sense which elements in their proposal offer the
greatest room for compromise. This is a time for expressing
skepticism and looking for ways of creating doubts. You have
to listen carefully for any indirect communications such as
tone and phrasing that might indicate an opening. Eventually
one side will show a willingness to discuss certain points in
their proposal, and that is when you move into the third
stage. The greatest virtue in this second stage is patience.
This process is going to take time.
3. Reaching a conclusion
In the third stage new compromise proposals are presented
and they are followed by counterproposals. Tradeoffs are
made on certain issues as both sides work on reducing the
bargaining range. If you are working under a deadline you
will notice a tremendous increase in intensity and hectic
activity just before the deadline arrives. Sometimes there will
be an impasse, but in general both sides gain more from a
settlement than from a breakdown in negotiations. Otherwise,
why would they have negotiated in the first place.
According to Tom Colosi, the structure of a negotiation is complex and
multilayered.
It initially consists of horizontal negotiation or the Hollywood view of
negotiations. Across the table you can give speeches, you can notify the
other side of your decisions, you can show emotion and the intensity of
your feelings, you can signal intentions, and you can educate and be
educated. All of these functions are essential to the process of negotia-
tion, but this isn't where the majority of the negotiation actually goes on.
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The intrateam dynamics can be more important. Every negotiating team
has a certain kind of makeup. There are stabilizers who understand that
the negotiation process is a stabilization process and see it as a good
alternative to less satisfactory forms of conflict resolution. Some of them
will settle at any price while others need to be convinced a little more.
Then there are the nonstabilizers who don't like the negotiation process
and don't want to settle at t any price. And in the middle you find the
quasi-mediators whose job it is to harmonize the differences between the
stabilizers an the nonstabilizers. Most of the negotiation goes on within
the team, and these negotiations are referred to as internal negotiations.
It is here that the team attempts to make the decisions that are
necessary for the negotiation process. This is happening on both sides.
Then there are negotiations with the vertical hierarchies. Both sides have
constituents that ey re representing. They win either-have to report
back regularly what is taking place in the negotiation and get approval
for the next step, or they have come to the negotiation with specific
instructions from their vertical hierarchies telling them what outcome will
be acceptable.
So in each negotiation there are in reality five negotiations going on:
? One horizontal
? Two internal
? Two vertical
An effective negotiator will be aware of this and provide the quasi-
mediators on the other side the types of information and support they
need to Create doubts in the minds of their nonstabilizers and to con-
vince their vertical hierarchies that the settlement they are reaching is
the best one possible under the circumstances.
Bill Lincoln, a nationally known expert who presents workshops on
mediation and negotiation, makes an important distinction between
interests and issues.
? He describes interests as being intangible and incapable of
being meas quantitatively or qualitatively. Interests
are closely related to our basic human needs such as those
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spelled out by Abraham Maslow in Motivation and
Personality (1954), but, whereas the list of basic human
needs is static, our interests tend to change over time as
some needs are met and others remain unsatisfied. In
some cases, people do not know what their interests are,
so it is up to you to help them identify them.
? Issues, on the other hand, are tangible and can be
measured. If we are trying to negotiate a raise of 50 cents
an hour, then that raise of a certain sum of money is an
issue.
The fact that issues are measurable leads to the trap of evaluating an
outcome by some arbitrary values and causes us to think in terms of
winning or losing in a negotiation.
In a negotiation we tend to focus on issues and ignore interests when in
reality it's the interests that must be satisfied.
The effective negotiator must transfer issues into interests and seek to
satisfy these interests. This gives much greater flexibility and it avoids
the tendency to evaluate the outcome.
When presented with an issue, ask the person with whom you are
negotiating what goal would be satisfied by winning that particular issue.
If for example the raise of 50 cents would help to satisfy a physiological
interest, then you might explore alternative means of meeting the interest
and come up with some innovative solutions that meet the needs of both
sides more effectively.
? Stall for time by explaining that you do not have the
authority to make decisions on these important matters
and, therefore, must obtain approval from higher
authorities.
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? Concentrate on the signs of stress and work toward reduc-
ing its effects.
? Be aware of the three aspects of the Stockholm Syndrome.
? Look for the personality types and vary your negotiation
strategy as necessary.
? The essence of negotiation is an exchange of promises,
and therefore trust is essential to this process.
? Take the opportunity to educate the other side and to
create doubts as to the viability of its position.
? Convert issues into interests and look for innovative solu-
tions to the problem.
While it is tempting to seize upon a specific set of tactics and cling to
them no matter what the circumstances, that is not an effective pro-
cedure for hostage negotiations, which are very context dependent. It is
far more beneficial to have a variety of techniques and tactics that you
can call upon to suit the situation in which you find yourself. Having
said that, we realize that people want and perhaps need a set of helpful
hints that will at least serve them well in the initial stages of a negotia-
tion. The FBI has prepared such a list which we offer with the strong
recommendation that you do not use it slavishly.
1. Use open-ended questions that require a narrative
response and encourage the hostage-taker to talk.
2. Make an assessment of the hostage-taker's mental health
and adjust your style accordingly.
3. Assess the hostage-takers' dedication to their cause.
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4. Make the negotiation as personal as possible, depending
of course on cultural considerations.
5. Avoid flat, negative responses. Stall on these items in-
dicating that you must consult with others. You may
state that it will be a difficult issue to resolve, thus
reducing expectations.
6. Place the hostage-taker in a position in which he/she
must constantly make decisions.
7. Always bargain. Try to get something for any conces-
sions made.
8. Downplay the seriousness of past events so that the
hostage-takers never feel that they have committed
themselves irrevocably.
9. Always hold out hope for a successful conclusion. Avoid
provoking feelings of despair.
10. When appropriate, give the impression that progress is
being made.
11. Avoid tricks which will probably fail and dash hopes of
successful negotiation.
12. Avoid deadlines. Use distraction or make minor conces-
sions to pass deadlines.
14. While you should be interested in the hostages, do not
dwell upon them during negotiations because this could
emphasize the importance of the hostages for the
hostage-takers.
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15. Work toward early release of sick or injured hostages.
16. Never negotiate alone.
17. Keep a log of all incidents, threats, demands, and
agreements made.
Your selection of tactics should be determined by the needs of the situa-
tion. If what you are trying is not working, try something new,
something that will either alter the situation or your approach to it. It
might even be necessary to find another negotiator, one who has a per-
sonality that seems to suit the needs of the situation. Above all, be
flexible.
Arenberg, Gerald. Hostage. Washington, D.C.: American Police
Academy.
Bolz, Frank, and Hershey, Edward. Hostage Cop. New York, NY:
Rawson Wade Publishers, Inc., 1979.
Burton, John W. Conflict and Communication. New York, NY: The
Free Press, 1969.
Burton, John W. Deviance, Terrorism, and War. New York, NY: St.
Martin's Press, 1979.
Cooper, H. H. A. Hostage-takers. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1981.
Crelinsten, R. D., and Szabo, D. Hostage-taking. Lexington, MA:
Heath Lexington Books, 1979.
Culley, J.A. "Hostage Negotiations." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
October, 1974, pp. 10-14.
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Deutsch, Morton. The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1973.
Fuselier, G. W. "A Practical Overview of Hostage Negotiations (Part
1)." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, June, 1981,
pp. 2-6.
Fuselier, G. W. "A Practical Overview of Hostage Negotiations (Conclu-
sion)." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July, 1981,
pp. 10-15.
Goldaber, I. "Typology of Hostage-takers." Police Chief, June, 1979,
pp. 21-23.
Lanceley, F. J. "Antisocial Personality as a Hostage-taker." Journal of
Police Science and Administration, March, 1981,
pp. 28-34.
Laue, James H. "Ethical Considerations in Choosing Intervention
Roles." Peace and Chance, Summer, 1982, pp. 29-39.
Maher, George F. Hostage: A Police Approach to a Contemporary
Crisis. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1977.
Miller, A. H. Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, Inc., 1980.
Miron, Murray, and Goldstein, Arnold P. Hostage. New York, NY:
Pergamon Press, 1979.
Schlossberg, H. Police Response to Hostage Situations. Elmsford, NY:
Pergamon Press, Inc., 1979.
Schlossberg, H. "Values and Organization in Hostage and Crisis
Negotiation Teams." Annals of the New York Academy
Of Sciences, June 20, 1980, pp. 113-116.
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Stratton, J.G. "Terrorist Act of Hostage-taking-A View of Violence
and the Perpetrators." Journal of Police Science and
Administration, March, 1978, pp. 1-9.
Strentz, T. "Law Enforcement Policy and Ego Defenses of the
Hostage." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April, 1979,
pp. 2-12.
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