SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R000400450001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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Soviet Global Military Reach
Key Judgments
Secret
NIE 11-6-84
13 September 1984
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N I E 11-6-84
SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate is
being published separately with regular distribution.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
Soviet capabilities to project military power in the areas around the
immediate periphery of the USSR are far superior to Soviet military
capabilities in more distant areas. Formidable Soviet forces have long
existed for operations in areas of Europe, the Far East, and Southwest
Asia that are contiguous to the USSR. Beyond this zone, Soviet military
activities have traditionally been limited principally to military assist-
ance and support for foreign forces. Over the last 20 years, however, So-
viet foreign military involvement abroad has increased significantly.
Soviet forces have made greater use of support facilities overseas, Soviet
naval and air presence at longer ranges from the USSR has been more
frequent, and on a f ew occasions Soviet forces have become directly
involved in combat overseas. This Estimate is concerned with Soviet
military capabilities in those more distant areas over the next five to 10
years.
This Estimate distinguishes between what we term "global military
reach" and the more common notion of military "power projection."
The essential distinction between military reach and power projection
in this Estimate is the nature and scope of military operations envi-
sioned under each concept. Military reach is associated with smaller
scale operations, often in the context of supporting an ally in a regional
crisis. Power projection envisions the deployment of major combined-
arins formations, usually against substantial opposition. Whereas the
projection of US military power, especially to Europe, is vital to US se-
curity, Soviet defense does not require the deployment of substantial
military forces abroad. Indeed, for the United States all major wars in
the last century have been fought beyond American shores. Soviet
wartime experience has been just the opposite. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the two armed forces have been developed with
differing requirements. By our definition, the forces and operational
concepts usually associated with power projection include pre-posi-
tioned equipment, rapid deployment and amphibious forces, foreign
staging and logistic bases, aircraft carriers, and aerial refueling capabili-
ties. These characteristics have generally been lacking in Soviet forces.
Instead we note growing Soviet military involvement abroad of a
different nature, not closely associated with the NATO contingency.
This involvement-which we call global reach-includes provision of
arms, dispatch of military advisers, acquisition of air and sea access
abroad, and small-scale deployment of Soviet forces.
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The military significance of Soviet access to foreign facilities is the
key issue addressed in this Estimate. More generally, this Estimate:
- Examines Soviet military involvement in areas beyond the
range of tactical aircraft based in the USSR.
- Describes trends in Soviet access to foreign facilities over the
past t~vo decades.
- Examines new Soviet military developments that affect capabil-
ities for distant military operations.
- Identifies the roles of client governments in Soviet foreign
military involvement.
- In conclusion, discusses the type of military threats that Soviet
forces operating from foreign facilities are likely to pose for US
and friendly forces during the next five to 10 years.
A companion Estimate, NIE 11-10/2-84, The USSR and the Third
World, provides the broad political context of Soviet involvement
abroad. The reader may also wish to consult the National HUMINT
Collection Plan: No. 58, Soviet Power Projection Capabilities.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The steady increase in size, capability, range of operations, and
scope of activity of Soviet f orces abroad over the last 20 years provides a
global military reach that Moscow did not previously possess. The
military significance of Soviet forces beyond the periphery of the USSR
already has been demonstrated in a variety of ways. In peacetime and
during regional crises Soviet forces abroad have:
- Intervened in Middle East conflicts in defense of allies.
- Supported the intervention of Cuban forces in Africa.
- Directed foreign forces in combat operations.
- Collected intelligence and conducted reconnaissance and sur-
veillance missions.
- Provided support to Soviet allies, including arms, advice, train-
ing, and demonstrations of force.
- Protected the Soviet fishing fleet and other interests abroad.
- Resupplied or provided new military equipment rapidly to
Soviet allies involved in hostilities.
- Evacuated Soviet personnel.
- Established a military presence in new areas and, at times,
increased an already existing military presence, thus complicat-
ing the military planning of adversaries.
In all of these regional activities, however, the Soviets have been
careful not to challenge directly either the United States or other strong
regional powers. This is because, beyond the range of its land-based
airpower, Moscow would have difficulty in rapidly mounting or
sustaining a distant power projection effort in the face of limited Third
World opposition. Soviet forces deployed abroad are thinly spread, are
vulnerable, and lack offensive punch. In particular, they lack adequate
air defenses, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, at-sea logistics, staging
rights, aerial refueling capabilities, and tactical air support.
Despite these weaknesses, Soviet forces abroad are becoming more
significant factors in a possible military confrontation with the United
States, particularly just prior to hostilities and during the early stages of
a conflict. For example, they could:
- Attack Western naval targets at the onset of hostilities.
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- Provide targeting information and intelligence.
- Delay some reinforcements.
- Divert some US military resources.
- Disrupt some shipping and air routes.
For the next five to 10 years, Soviet military deployments abroad
will not overextend the USSR, but may stretch the United States. In par-
ticular, US military planners will be faced with the problem of how best
to deal with hostile forces operating well beyond the Soviet periphery.
As detailed below, this problem will be compounded by three persisting
developments: first, Soviet capabilities for distant military operations
will improve, although Soviet forces are not likely to be deployed in
substantially larger numbers; second, Soviet use of current foreign
facilities is likely to be more extensive even though there probably will
not be a significant expansion in Soviet military access abroad and
perhaps it will even decline; third, Soviet regional allies that act in
support of Moscow's interests abroad will become increasingly capable
as they are provided with modern Soviet arms.
Soviet Capabilities
Several new developments over the next five to 10 years will
improve Soviet capabilities for distant military operations, including:
- Introduction of aerial refueling for fighter and transport
aircraft.
-Improvements in airlift and sealift capabilities.
- Establishment of a global command and control system incorpo-
rating anew airborne warning and control system aircraft,
along with space-based communications, intelligence, and navi-
gation systems.
- Deployment of more capable submarines and surface combat-
ants, especially the large, nuclear-powered carrier for conven-
tional-takeoff-and-landing aircraft.
Even with these improvements, however, Soviet forces abroad will
continue to have serious limitations. They probably will remain modest
in numbers, including only about 15 percent of the Soviet Navy. Transit
delays and other factors could limit the rapid augmentation of naval
formations. In addition, many of the foreign facilities used by Soviet
forces will lack adequate repair, refueling, and storage capabilities.
Also, Soviet airlifts to distant areas will encounter problems in overflight
clearances, landing rights, and refueling.
Over the next decade, Soviet military forces still will not be able to
carry out substantial combined-arms operations against major military
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opposition in areas distant from the USSR. Soviet intervention in Third
World conflicts probably will be restricted to situations where the risk
of escalation to a war with the West is judged to be small and Soviet ca-
pabilities to perform higher priority strategic missions would not be
seriously degraded. In general, Soviet military intervention would most
likely involve naval maneuvers, or the dispatch of pilots, air defense
knits, or small contingents of ground forces to bolster local defenses.
Such intervention is most likely in the Middle East, where the stakes are
high and the region close to the USSR.
We do not believe that Soviet forces abroad currently play a major
role in Soviet military doctrine for general war, which remains focused
on the traditional mission of strategic defense of the homeland. Soviet
forces routinely deployed abroad are now, and will remain for the
period of this Estimate, too few and too weak to allow the Soviets to en-
gage in distant power projection.
Soviet Use of Foreign Facilities
Soviet capabilities for distant military operations have generally
improved with increased access to foreign facilities, although the Soviet
Navy continues to rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for logistic
support The USSR now has a military presence in most major regions of
the world. Soviet naval forces now maintain a continuous presence in
the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic off the coast of
West Afi-ica, and the South China Sea. Access in Vietnam has grown to
the point where the Soviets have established a naval and air operations
and logistics base at Cam Ranh Bay. (See figure 1.)
Even though much of the past Soviet success in gaining access has
been due to circumstances that are not likely to be repeated, instabilities
in the Third World are likely to provide a few additional opportunities
for Soviet exploitation, and Moscow will continue widespread probing
for additional access. The Middle East region will remain the top-
priority target In addition to those countries where the USSR already
enjoys routine military access, others may permit more extensive Soviet
access, most notably Seychelles or some countries in Wcst Africa. On the
other hand, Moscow could also lose military access, as for example in
Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia.
Regardless of these gains or losses, increasing use of foreign
facilities to which the Soviets already have access can be expected,
particularly in Vietnam. A South China Sea naval squadron has
probably been established. The number of submarines, surface combat-
ants, and naval aircraft deployed to Cam Ranh Bay will continue to
grow. Soviet fighter aircraft also are likely to be deployed to Cam Ranh
I3ay. In the Caribbean, Soviet aircraft and ships probably will make
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more frequent deployments, but we do not anticipate the introduction
of any new Soviet-manned offensive weapons in Cuba.'
Soviet Allies
Soviet arms transfers will continue to improve substantially the
military capabilities of several Soviet allies. Moscow will export modern
weapons to selected Third World allies, in some cases before they are
made available to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. In addition, joint
military exercises could improve the potential for coordinating com-
bined military operations.
Certain Soviet allies, most notably Cuba, will be willing to act in
support of Soviet interests short of direct confrontation with the United
States. By funneling military supplies and providing troops and advisers,
Cuba can mask the full extent of Soviet involvement abroad.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel(ige~ace, Department of the Army, believes that, although it is
currently unlikely that the Soviets would place SS-20s in Cuba in the near future, the possibility still exists
and, because of the great danger it poses, toarrants continutng consideration.
Figure 1
Soviet Military Presence Abroad
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^ Naval aviation
,- ~ Military communications
~ SIGINT
O Airlift detachment
? Air defense units
?Combat brigade
Naval operating areas
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