SOUTH YEMEN-USSR: OUTLOOK FOR THE RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R001001340006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 30, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Roots of Soviet-South Yemeni Tension ........................................... 7
Evidence of Moderation ................................................................... 8
Soviet-South Yemeni Relationship .................................................. 8
Soviet Assistance and Influence in South Yemen....................... 8
Benefits to the Soviets ................................................................... 9
Domestic Influences on Hasani's Policies ....................................... 13
South Yemen's Economic Deficiencies ....................................... 13
Domestic Unrest ............................................................................ 14
Hasani's Goals, Strategy, and Style .............................................. 15
Hasani's Rivals .............................................................................. 15
Current Power Struggle ................................................................ 15
Foreign Influences on Hasani's Policies .......................................... 16
Relations With Saudi Arabia and Oman .................................... 16
North Yemeni Issues ..................................................................... 16
Relations With Western States ..................................................... 17
Prospects for Soviet-South Yemeni Relations ................................. 18
Likely Soviet Reactions to Hasani's Moderation ........................ 18
Implications for the United States ............................................... 18
SOUTH YEMEN-USSR: OUTLOOK FOR
THE RELATIONSHIP
NIE 36.9/11-84
Information available as of
30 March 1984 was used in the
preparation of this Estimate
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate focuses on frictions in South Yemen-Soviet relations,
their probable intensity and significance over the next two to three
years, and what the implications might be for US interests.
The reader is cautioned that available sources of reliable informa-
tion on South Yemen are limited. Data on economic subjects is
particularly scarce, as well as information dealing with the extent and
nature of Soviet assets in South Yemen.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Aden's dependency on the Soviets for security will almost certainly
prevent drastic changes in the relationship from developing over at least
the next two to three years. Recent bilateral exchanges have exhibited
greater warmth than was the case a year ago, and there-are no reliable
indications that South Yemen's leaders are considering a significant shift
away from Moscow. Still, frictions will continue intermittently to mark
the relationship between South Yemen and the Soviet Union as a result
of Chairman Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani's quest for expanded
economic and development assistance from wealthy neighbors and the
West and his resistance to reported Soviet efforts to expand Moscow's
access to South Yemeni military facilities.
The USSR's leaders will almost certainly maintain and attempt to
expand Soviet access to facilities in South Yemen. Moscow probably
finds South Yemen a more stable client than Ethiopia, with its ongoing
civil war and weaker central institutions. Increased Soviet access to
South Yemeni facilities would probably focus on improving the naval
reconnaissance capability-perhaps substituting TU-95 aircraft for IL-
38s. However, Aden is unlikely to grant Moscow autonomous use of
naval and air facilities or sign a formal access agreement as the Soviets
desire.
The extent to which the US expands its military presence in the
Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area will have a significant influence both
on the urgency with which the Soviets seek expanded access to South
Yemen's military facilities and on Aden's readiness to grant such
expanded access.
South Yemen's ties to the Soviets concern the United States for four
- Aden provides the Soviets a position from which to expand their
influence in the Red Sea/Arabian Sea/Horn of Africa area and
to enhance their capacity to monitor US and Allied activities in
the Middle East.
- The Soviet presence provides a security shield if, however
unlikely in the near term, the Aden government resumes efforts
to destabilize the governments of Saudi Arabia, North Yemen,
Oman, and the smaller Gulf states or renews its support for
international terrorist groups.
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- South Yemen's dependence on the Soviets works against US
efforts to open a diplomatic dialogue with Aden.
- Soviet policy encourages South Yemen to work together with
Ethiopia, Libya, Syria, and other pro-Soviet regimes against US
policy interests in the Middle East.
Over the near term, the Soviets are likely to tolerate Hasani's
improved ties with the moderate Arab states and the West:
- Hasani is a known quantity and able to manage volatile
domestic political factions, ensuring a stable climate for Soviet
activity.
- Moscow may believe that a strong reaction to Hasani's policies
would jeopardize opportunities for diplomatic exchanges with
the Saudis and the Omanis which Moscow has long sought.
- Western and Arab financial aid, which constitutes the bulk of
economic assistance to South Yemen over the past decade, tends
to reduce Aden's dissatisfaction with Moscow's failure to pro-
vide urgently needed economic assistance.
We do not believe that Moscow is likely to attempt to sponsor a
coup against Hasani during the time frame of this Estimate. The
chances would be greatest if Moscow concludes that Hasani is moving
decisively against key Soviet interests in South Yemen. Any such move,
however, would be difficult and costly; Hasani has tightened his control
over the security and military apparatus and has purged many of the
leading party members who support former Yemeni Socialist Party
leader Abd al-Fattah Ismail, a pro-Soviet hardliner now resident in
Moscow. Some analysts believe that this control is substantial enough to
blunt any coup attempt. Others believe that Moscow could mobilize
sufficient assets in South Yemen to bring off a successful coup.
Hasani has successfully consolidated his domestic position as chief
of party and government by controlling volatile intraparty factionalism,
preparing the ground carefully in advance of major political moves, and
working to generate a popular base of support.
Hasani's present course indicates that he and his supporters accord
economic development a higher priority than the export of revolution-
a preoccupation of previous regimes. Current evidence suggests that
Aden has curtailed its support for international terrorists. Its ties with
Iran are limited to mutual economic interests. We judge that Hasani
will continue these policies if moderation succeeds in attracting the
desired aid, and if he can keep his rivals under control.
Hasani's ability to attract additional outside economic aid will
depend in part on maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia, Oman,
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and North Yemen as measured by continued restraint from destabiliz-
ing activities on the Peninsula. Border disputes with all three may flare
up occasionally, but all parties will probably work to keep these
localized.
Even while attempting to diversify aid patrons, South Yemen will
continue to oppose US political and military influence in the region.
Nonetheless, the Hasani regime offers decided advantages for US
interests compared with previous South Yemeni regimes:
- It has played down destabilizing activities on the Arabian
Peninsula.
- It has reined in the most radical domestic forces and neutralized
many pro-Soviet sympathizers,
- It has focused government attention and resources on domestic
economic developments that require Western technical and
financial assistance.
- It has built a strong domestic power base that gives it leverage
against Soviet demands.
The extent of Soviet influence in any successor regime will depend
in part on the Soviet role in bringing that regime to power-greater if
the successor is politically indebted to Moscow, less if a succession takes
place without Soviet meddling. A successor regime is likely to conciliate
the Soviets at least initially.
Even if a successor regime were not politically indebted to the
USSR for its accession to power, its new leaders would still be faced with
a desperately poor country and very grim choices:
- To suppress rising economic needs and expectations.
- To invite substantially expanded aid from conservative Arab
sources and the West at the risk of provoking Soviet retaliation.
- To again try for substantially expanded Soviet and East Bloc
economic aid, which, if forthcoming, would only be delivered at
the cost of much-increased Soviet influence.
Alternative developments severely affecting either US or Soviet
interests, while not likely, deserve consideration.
Worst Case for the United States. Should a successor come to
power more determined to promote radical change and less concerned
about economic priorities, he could refocus South Yemeni goals by:
- Undermining moderate Peninsula regimes.
- Participating in international terrorism.
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- Strengthening ties with Libya, Syria, and Iran.
- Granting increased access to the Soviets.
Worst Case for the Soviets. Some reporting indicates that Hasani
may be considering loosening ties with Moscow. Should sufficient
additional non-Communist economic and technical assistance become
available, and the South Yemeni leadership determine to make a clean
break with the Soviets, Moscow could:
- Lose access to all South Yemeni facilities.
- Suffer a serious reversal in the Arab state thought to be the
Soviets' most devoted client.
- Lose an important means of exercising political leverage against
Saudi Arabia and other moderate Gulf states.
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DISCUSSION
1. Given the past reputation of South Yemen as a
Soviet client and a radical state, Ali Nasir Muhammad
al-Hasani, the current leader of that impoverished and
resource-poor state, has since 1982 demonstrated a
considerable amount of independence and modera-
tion. He has replaced key personnel sympathetic to the
Soviets with his own loyalists; expanded commercial
and diplomatic ties with his Arab neighbors, the West,
and the Japanese; and withdrawn support for insur-
gents threatening neighboring states.
2. Hasani's policies, which reflect his commitment
to addressing long-repressed popular desires for eco-
nomic development, initially created some frictions in
ties between Aden and Moscow. The Soviets resisted
his requests for more economic aid, bargained hard on
loan terms, and treated him coolly during visits to
Moscow in late 1982 . More recently, however, rela-
tions have improved. The late Soviet Chairman Yuri
Andropov met with Hasani during the latter's Septem-
ber 1983 visit to the USSR.
3. Moscow seems determined to hold on to its
position on the Peninsula, relying on Aden's military
and technical assistance dependency and Soviet sym-
pathizers in South Yemen to protect its interests. Along
with those available in Ethiopia, naval and air facili-
ties in South Yemen are important elements in Mos-
cow's efforts to compete with US influence in the
Middle East and Africa, to expand its influence and
military presence in the area, and to protect its own
interests there:
- Politically, Moscow's position in South Yemen
allows it to pressure Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the
Gulf states.
- Militarily, South Yemen enables the Soviets to
reconnoiter US and Allied naval and maritime
activity in the region, and provides limited logis-
tic support to the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron.
Aden provides transit rights for Soviet aircraft en
route to Ethiopia and other African points. From
South Yemen, the Soviets also support their
heavy regional merchant and fishing traffic.
- South Yemen has value for Moscow as one of the
few Soviet clients in the Third World with a
governing "vanguard" party whose institutions
are modeled along Soviet lines. More than once
the Soviets have pointed to South Yemen as a
model for Third World states.
4. South Yemen's ties to the Soviets concern the
United States for four reasons:
- Aden provides the Soviets a position from which
to expand their influence in the Red Sea/Arabian
Sea/Horn of Africa area and to enhance their
capacity to monitor US and Allied activities in
the Middle East.
The Soviet presence provides a security shield if,
however unlikely in the near term, the Aden
government resumes efforts to destabilize the
governments of Saudi Arabia, North Yemen,
Oman, and the smaller Gulf states or renews its
support for international terrorist groups.
South Yemen's dependence on the Soviets works
against US efforts to open a diplomatic dialogue
with Aden.
Soviet policy encourages South Yemen to work
together with Ethiopia, Libya, Syria, and other
pro-Soviet regimes against US policy interests in
the Middle East.
Roots of Soviet-South Yemeni Tension
5. South Yemeni-Soviet frictions reflect a tension
between Aden's security dependency and longstanding
political and ideological ties with Moscow, on the one
hand, and Yemeni national priorities for economic
development, on the other. This balancing process is
ensnared in the competition for power within the
ruling group, some of whose members rely on Soviet
support.
6. South Yemeni unhappiness with the Soviets stems
particularly from:
- Dissatisfaction with the negligible amounts of
Soviet economic aid. Soviet unwillingness or in-
ability to meet much of South Yemen's economic
assistance requirements, delays in delivery, and
ineffective project administration constitute the
most important reasons for the stresses between
Moscow and Aden.
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- Doubts as to the Soviets' ability or desire to find
oil on exclusive concessions they have worked for
over 10 years. An Italian firm's 1983 discovery of
a potentially productive well raised the issue, and
reportedly provoked a Soviet demand for a
monopoly on oil contracts. The South Yemeni
ruling party's central committee reportedly op-
posed the Soviet position on this issue. It ulti-
mately granted some promising concessions to
the Soviets.
- Complaints about Soviet stinginess in granting
emergency aid. When the devastating floods of
spring 1982 destroyed much of South Yemen's
agricultural, livestock, and transportation re-
sources in the most productive western region-
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sur-
veys estimated the loss at $1 billion-the Soviets
offered only minimal aid, while the Saudis sent
$30 million, and international organizations
made substantial contributions.
- Concerns that unrestricted Soviet fishing in South
Yemeni waters has dangerously depleted vital
fish resources.
- Concern about Soviet meddling in South Yemeni
leadership struggles. Moscow has given refuge to
Hasani's hardline Marxist predecessor as party
leader and head of state, Abd al-Fattah Ismail.
Over the last two years, two reported coup
attempts against Hasani may have involved
Ismail loyalists still in South Yemen.
- Concern about reported Soviet demands to ex-
pand access to South Yemeni facilities, and begin
construction on autonomous facilities near Aden.
During a visit to Aden by Soviet naval chief
Adm. Sergei Gorshkov in the spring of 1983,
Hasani reportedly deflected demands for greater
access.
Evidence of Moderation
7. When efforts failed to gain new economic aid
from the radical Arab camp (Libya in particular) and
the Soviets in 1982, Hasani was further convinced to
turn to wealthier Arab neighbors. Aden also began
looking to Western Europe for more advanced techni-
cal and development assistance. Since that time, South
Yemen has largely ended its support for antiregime
activities in neighboring states to qualify for this
critically needed assistance:
- In addition to normalizing diplomatic relations
with Saudi Arabia and Oman, diplomatic and
bilateral aid relations have been established with
France, Canada, and other Western countries. In
addition, the two Yemens appear to be engaging
in close consultations.
- South Yemen has withdrawn support for military
activities of the National Democratic Front
(NDF) in North Yemen and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). Both organi-
zations are based in Aden and continue some
political activities.
- Aden has curtailed its support for international
terrorism.
- Domestically, Hasani has reduced the repressive-
ness of the regime, promoted greater-though
still limited-Islamic expression, and allowed
some private investment activity.
8. These initiatives have had a price tag: Libya has
agitated openly against them, and domestic supporters
of the NDF and PFLO have had to be dealt with.
Soviet-South Yemeni Relationship
Soviet Assistance and Influence in South Yemen
9. The Soviets use their military and other assist-
ance programs to bolster their influence in Aden and
enlarge their political following. The large number of
Soviet training programs has facilitated the expansion
of Soviet sympathizers in the ranks of bureaucracy,
party, and military. Soviets and East Europeans serve
as instructors in schools run by the ruling Yemeni
Socialist Party (YSP). South Yemen's political leader-
ship, comprising members of the YSP Central Com-
mittee and the Presidium, together with leading mili-
tary figures and Ministers, includes a number of
10. From the South Yemeni perspective, many
aspects of the client relationship with the Soviet Union
are troublesome: the Soviets are unpopular, they are
seen as not providing enough economic assistance,
their offers carry stringent terms, they are attempting
to Sovietize South Yemeni education and otherwise
interfere in domestic affairs. Nonetheless, there are no
reliable indications that the possibility of a major shift
away from the Soviets is under consideration within
the political and military leadership. Most South Ye-
meni leaders recognize the value of Soviet security and
technical assistance to the nation and the serious
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The Origins of the Soviet-South Yemeni Relationship
Although the Soviet Union encouraged the South
Yemenis in their successful fight against British rule in
the mid-1960s, Moscow did not offer significant support
to the fledgling state until 1970, when the immediate
prospects for expanding its influence in North Yemen
dimmed. By 1972 Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Chinese
assistance helped South Yemeni leaders to unify for the
first time what had been a collection of tribal shaykh-
doms, to quell internal opposition, and to begin building
modern political and economic institutions. A strong
state security apparatus was constructed with East
German and Soviet help.
The Soviet loss of access to military facilities in
Somalia in 1977, which heightened the value of less-
used facilities in South Yemen, together with the rise to
power of Abd al-Fattah Ismail-a doctrinaire Marxist-
created a watershed in Yemeni-Soviet relations. During
Ismail's leadership tenure from 1978-79, South Yemen
moved much closer to the Soviet Union in the following
ways:
- Ismail consolidated the leading political parties
into one centralized "vanguard" organization, the
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), modeled after and
with close ties to the Communist Party of the
USSR.
- The Soviets gained expanded access to some of
South Yemen's military facilities in exchange for
major arms sales.
- South Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the USSR.
A coalition of nationalists from the YSP and the
military deposed Ismail in mid-1980: in his preoccupa-
tion with North Yemen, he had allowed the economic
situation at home to deteriorate dangerously; he had
allowed the Soviets too much visibility and influence in
an Islamic country only recently emerged from colonial
status; and he had allowed South Yemen to become a
pariah within the Arab world, costing millions of dollars
in potential Gulf financial assistance. He was replaced
by Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, former Defense
Minister, Prime Minister under the two previous re-
gimes, who was identified with the southern, nationalist
faction within the YSP. The Soviets acquiesced in
Ismail's removal, and allowed him to take refuge in the
Soviet Union.
12. The USSR's access to South Yemen provides
Moscow with both military and political benefits in a
region of critical importance to the United States and
the West. Soviet access to facilities in South Yemen
and Ethiopia supports the USSR's efforts to monitor
and potentially threaten Western sea lines of commu-
nications through the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait
and the Arabian Sea.
13. Military Advantages. Soviet interests in secur-
ing their own lines of shipping and fishing comple-
ment the broader strategic objective of extending
influence into the Middle East. The conviction of
Soviet leaders that the United States intends to expand
and make permanent its Indian Ocean military pres-
ence has increased their appreciation of the military
importance of the Yemens, for they see Soviet access
to air and naval facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia
as a partial political counter to US use of facilities in
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Although we
know of no formal basing agreement, the USSR's
access to Yemeni facilities has aided their effort to
conduct reconnaissance and intelligence gathering ac-
tivities in the region, and has provided helpful logistic
support for their Indian Ocean Squadron, In the
future, IL-38 reconnaissance aircraft currently sta-
tioned in South Yemen may be replaced by the longer
range TU-95.
14. Political Advantages. The South Yemeni re-
gime also supports Soviet foreign policy goals, such as
rejection of US-identified proposals to resolve the
Arab-Israeli dispute, opposition to the US CENTCOM,
and continuation of the Soviet presence in Afghani-
stan.
15. In 1981 Aden signed a mutual defense pact with
Libya and Ethiopia-the Tripartite or Aden Pact-
engineered by Libyan leader Qadhafi to counter US-
sponsored agreements with Kenya, Oman, and Soma-
lia. Libyan failure to follow through on promised aid
to Aden and Ethiopia, and Libyan-Ethiopian rivalry
over leadership of the Organization for African Unity
have rendered the pact moribund, although Ethiopi-
an-South Yemeni ties remain close.
consequences should it be withdrawn, Any leader
whose actions were perceived as seriously jeopardizing
that assistance would face strong internal opposition on
those grounds.
11. In any case, Moscow probably would learn of
any such plan in advance and would attempt to head
it off by inter alia threatening to withhold military
support and technical assistance, or, in the most
extreme case, by supporting one of Hasani's rivals in a
coup effort.
16. The Soviets welcomed this display of unity
among their supporters. But they were also concerned
that it would aggravate divisions between moderate
and radical Arabs, thus complicating Soviet efforts to
forge a united opposition to Israel.
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Soviet Military Use of South Yemeni Facilities
Elements of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron use
Aden for replenishment, crew rest, mail pickup, and
minor maintenance. Visiting Soviet ships normally use
mooring berths near the naval base at Aden. The Soviets
also use anchorages in international waters off Socotra
Island for various self-maintenance tasks. The Soviets
have no facilities on Socotra Island itself.
The Soviet philosophy of naval logistics relies heavily
on afloat support and minimizes the use of large-scale
facilities ashore that can be expensive. When refueling
in Aden, for example, Soviet ships use their own oiler
rather than the available bunkering berths. A floating
drydock, towed to Aden from Somalia in 1977, was
moved to Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in 1978, where it is
used for minor repair of Soviet submarines and surface
combatants. Overall Soviet use of Ethiopian ports has
increased since 1978, while the number of Soviet
combatant visits to Aden has declined.
Soviet and South Yemeni vessels exercised together in
the Arabian Sea in the spring of 1983 with an emphasis
on antisubmarine warfare and maritime reconnais-
sance. This was the first combined exercise since 1980
and was presumably intended as a response to US and
Allied forces' Bright Star and Jade Tiger exercises of
recent years. The South Yemeni Navy routinely cooper-
ates with the USSR in patrolling the Bab el-Mandeb
Strait.
The Soviets have two IL-38 (May) reconnaissance
aircraft stationed at al-Anad airfield, north of Aden.
(Figure 1 is a map showing the radius of IL-38 flights
from Aden and the Ethiopian field at Asmera into the
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.) In addition, they
exercise transit rights for civilian and military cargo
planes en route to Ethiopia, Mozambique, and else-
where in the region. While the Soviets have not yet
deployed TU-95s to South Yemen, these longer range
reconnaissance aircraft could reach the US base at
Diego Garcia, which is outside the range of Soviet
aircraft currently stationed in South Yemen or Ethiopia.
17. Aden has also served as a conduit to radical
Third World movements whose activities often serve
Soviet purposes. The recent gathering of Arab Com-
munist parties in Aden is a case in point.
18. Soviet Military Assistance. Since 1968, South
Yemen has been dependent on the Soviets and the East
Bloc for major military equipment, spare parts, and
Table 1
South Yemen: Active Inventory of Soviet-Supplied
Military Equipment, 1 February 1984 a
255
125
training. Aden has also looked to Moscow for a security
guarantee against outside threats.
19. Table 1 shows current inventories of major
Soviet-supplied military equipment. The only signifi-
cant new weapon system shipped to South Yemen in
1982 consisted of advanced models of the SU-22
fighter-bomber that will upgrade ground attack capa-
bilities. In 1983 the Soviets delivered_VIIG-21s, 25X1
a few Antonov cargo aircraft, and some SA-6 missiles.
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Figure 1
Radius of IL-38 Flights From Aden and Asmera
Syria
Damascus
(North
Yemen)
Saudi Arabia
*Riyadh
afar
Doha
Ahu
Dhehi
1~
United Arab
Emirates
P.D.R.Y.
(South Yemen)
Oman
Mediterranean Sea
Leban
Beirut/
AJrnrn,,I,ah,e
\ J~J
isra
si Aviv-Yata
i~.38 ra~.. Aden)
from
(1,300 nm
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0 300
i
NAUTICAL MILES
Y.A.R. (Yemen Arab Republic)
P.D.R.Y. (People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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NOFORN,
Figure 2
Soviet Military Assistance Deliveries to North and South Yemen, 1979-83
Secret
NOFORN
20. Figure 2 shows Communist (predominantly So-
viet) deliveries of military equipment to both North
and South Yemen. The figure indicates that 1982
deliveries of Communist weapons and support materi-
als to Aden dropped by more than half from the 1981
leve s shipments under arms agree-
ments signed in the late 1970s wound down. Large
Soviet deliveries to North Yemen since 1978 marked a
greatly expanded Soviet effort to gain influence there,
while much of South Yemen's modern Soviet equip-
ment had been delivered in previous years not shown
in the figure. The surge in Soviet assistance to North
Yemen since 1979 brings total Soviet aid to both
Yemens (whose military forces are about the same size)
to a rough equivalency. We believe that new agree-
ments for Soviet arms to North and South Yemen,
were signed in 1982.
21. Advisers. During South Yemen's early years,
Soviet and East Bloc personnel assisted in structuring
party organs, the internal security apparatus, and
government ministries in South Yemen. Currently,
they continue to perform a variety of training and
support tasks in military, educational, economic, and
bureaucratic fields. Sources disagree about the exact
number of Soviet personnel in South Yemen: estimates
range from 1,500 to 3,000. Some Soviet military
personnel act as advisers to the regular South Yemeni
military in the training, maintenance, and logistic
support functions; Soviet technicians help with eco-
nomic projects, and still others solely support Soviet
activities at facilities such as Aden harbor and Salah al-
Din. Cuba supplies 500 trainers for the militia, and 25X1
East Germany has 75 people training internal security
functionaries. Additional small numbers of Cuban and
East Bloc personnel assist in agricultural, construction,
and public health projects.
22. Economic Assistance. Because Aden's devel-
opment plans-indeed its economic viability-depend
heavily on external aid, Soviet economic assistance has
been an important contribution, though not at levels
the South Yemenis would prefer. Communist aid
totaled about 20 percent of all economic assistance
commitments to South Yemen from 1974 to the 25X1
present. Soviet and East Bloc projects account for
much of South Yemen's light manufacturing industry.
Although not always well planned or thought out,
these projects have helped expand domestic produc-
tion capabilities.
23. Many South Yemeni civilian and military offi-
cials receive education and/or training in the Soviet
Union or Bloc countries, or by Soviet or Bloc instruc-
tors in country. Thousands of South Yemenis have
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Figure 3
Communist and Non-Communist Economic Assistance, 1975-82
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NOFORN
Non-Communist
(Arab, OPEC, West)
Communist
(Soviet, Eastern Bloc, China)
82
acquired much-needed skills in these training pro-
grams. Given the low level of education of the popula-
tion, South Yemen benefits greatly from these oppor-
tunities. At the same time, the Soviets are presumably
recruiting sympathizers and agents from these groups,
both in the civilian and military ranks, in order to
enhance Soviet influence in South Yemen.
Domestic Influences on Hasani's Policies
South Yemen's Economic Deficiencies
24. South Yemen's grave economic situation pro-
vides the driving force behind Hasani's efforts to
improve ties to his neighbors. Aden depended on
external sources for 75 percent of the funding of the
first Five Year Plan (1974-1978); it sought at least 60
percent (about $250 million) of the 1983 development
budget-and two-thirds of its food-from outside.
25. The barren nature of the land-only 1 percent
is arable-and the absence of significant natural re-
sources make South Yemen one of the world's poorest
countries. The annual per capita income is now
around $500 for the population of about 2 million.
Much of the wealth is concentrated in Aden, leaving
the rural areas, where over 60 percent of the popula-
tion still resides, with poor health care, insufficient
means of transportation, inadequate housing, and, in
some cases, not enough to eat. Life expectancy is 45
years.
26. Nonetheless, GNP grew at a surprisingly high
average annual rate of 7 percent from 1976 to 1982,
primarily because of remittances from South Yemenis
working abroad and foreign economic assistance. Fig-
ures vary, but anywhere from 100,000 to 200,000
South Yemenis (20 to 40 percent of the work force)
work abroad, mostly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
The IMF estimates that worker remittances accounted
for 20 percent of GNP in 1982. Without worker
remittances and foreign assistance, the balance of
payments would have been negative.
27. Given their own apparent constraints on foreign
aid resources, the Soviets have not considered South
Yemen's relatively small economic assistance needs of
sufficient priority to accommodate them fully. (Figure
3 compares Communist with non-Communist devel-
opment assistance.) Since 1974, only during the regime
of Abd al-Fattah Ismail did Communist donors pro-
vide more economic assistance than non-Communists;
by 1981, Soviet economic assistance to Aden had
declined to virtually zero, while non-Communist aid
stood at $139 million. The Soviets have offered no
significant economic aid since 1978. Non-Communist
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Figure 4
South Yemeni Imports From Western Industrialized Countries
and Communist Countries, 1975-81
Western industrialized
1- I I I I I I
0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81
Secret
NOFORN
302444 4-84
aid has come largely from multilateral sources, includ-
ing World Bank, IMF, and Arab multilateral funds,
with some bilateral aid coming from OPEC countries.
(There is reason to believe, though we cannot confirm,
that the Soviets have provided some additional eco-
nomic assistance in the form of subsidies for Aden's
budget deficits.)
28. Nor has the Soviet Bloc been a major trading
partner for South Yemen: imports from Communist
countries have remained relatively low, with a slight
increase under Ismail. Imports from Western industri-
alized countries and Japan, however, have climbed
since 1974, except for a decline under Ismail. (Figure 4
shows South Yemeni imports from Western industrial-
ized countries and the Bloc.) By 1981, imports from
Western countries had climbed to $429 million, while
imports from the Communist Bloc amounted to $134
million.
29. Hasani has increased imports of consumer
goods, subsidized basic necessities, and devoted more
of the development budget to human services and
infrastructure projects. He has also allowed some
limited private investment of capital.
Domestic Unrest
30. Although it is difficult to determine the precise
nature and extent of popular opposition to the current
regime or the extent of repression needed to maintain
order, we believe that the South Yemen Government
faces no significant threat of internal rebellion. In fact,
Hasani's popularity is due in part to his efforts to
reduce the government repressiveness that prevailed
under Ismail. The internal security apparatus is tough,
effective, and loyal to Hasani.
31. The practice in Aden of selecting members of
key political bodies with an eye to representing the
major tribes probably neutralizes some concerns, as do
party efforts to hold public meetings in the provinces
and keep tabs on issues that could become trouble-
some. Moreover, Hasani has responded to another
popular concern by showing more tolerance-even
encouragement-for Islam than have previous, more
doctrinaire leaders.
32. Although jockeying for position within the lead-
ership elite creates chronic problems for continuity at
the top, Hasani is gambling that his efforts to promote
economic growth will shore up his claim to leadership.
He believes sustained Arab aid will bolster his popular
support, undercut his opponents, and help him
strengthen his grip on the party and bureaucracy.
33. Hasani's opponents have political reasons for
sabotaging his policies, and have already attempted to
do so. The policy of South Yemeni "moderation" is
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therefore tangled in domestic political rivalries whose
outcome will determine its eventual continuation or
abandonment. Hasani's abilities to handle his rivals in
the ongoing power struggle will be a critical factor.
Hasani's Goals, Strategy, and Style
34. Hasani has been referred to as a pragmatist, a
nationalist, and an adroit, skilled politician who knows
how to survive domestic political wars. The Chairman
has demonstrated an ability to effectively manage his
domestic political rivals and will probably be able to
survive their challenges to his authority.
35. He is strengthened by his strong Dathina tribal
identification-despite official efforts to "detribalize"
the society, tribal divisions still retain social and
political significance-and his ability to avoid becom-
ing the object of personal animus. In addition, he has
for years held strategic positions in the government
and party, enabling him to cultivate followers in the
Defense Ministry, the Supreme People's Council, and
the YSP Central Committee. His followers control the
security services. He has demonstrated organizational
skills and now holds three key offices of Prime
Minister, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
People's Council, and Secretary-General of the YSP.
is the NDF. He strongly favored the use of regular
South Yemen troops to back NDF forays into North
Yemen-a policy rejected by the YSP Central Com-
mittee in the spring of 1982. Qasim is known for his
ties to Libyan leader Qadhafi.
39. But the NDF's star has waned in recent months,
and so has Qasim's, although as Defense Minister he
still has a basis of support in the regular military, and
he must be considered Hasani's most serious rival.
Qasim, who holds the rank of Brigadier General, was
removed from the Politburo in 1980, and is eager to
40. Ali Antar, also a Brigadier General, has his own
following within the military which he oversaw as
Defense Minister for some years before Hasani re-
moved him in 1981. Antar's support helped Ismail
take power, and he himself was presumably a candi-
date for leadership after Ismail's removal.
41. An important Antar ally is Ali Salim al-Bidh,
currently Minister of Local Government. This position
has enabled both Antar and al-Bidh to build up local
37. Hasani's two main rivals for power, Deputy
Prime Minister Ali (Antar) Bishi and Defense Minister
dal lih
well have e w well developed domestic power bases,
guerrilla struggle against the British from 1963-67,F-
September of 1981, is a
42. Both Antar and Qasim have aspirations for
power; both are known to solicit Soviet support to
further their ambitions
Current Power Struggle
43. The ongoing power struggle among these three
was exacerbated in December 1982: with Hasani out
of the country, Ali Antar acted to send regular South
25X1
LOA-1
agreement that had been worked out with North
Yemen. Hasani reportedly determined that such fla-
grant insubordination could not be tolerated, and
vowed to get rid of both Antar and al-Bidh at the next
Central Committee meeting. Antar's reported backing
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of the Soviet request in late March 1983 for autono-
mous military facilities may reflect an attempt to gain
Soviet favor and to translate this into support against
Hasani.
44. Getting rid of Antar and al-Bidh was more
difficult than anticipated: after postponing the spring
1983 meeting for several weeks, Hasani reportedly
failed to get enough support to oust Antar.
owever,
Hasani successfully undercut Antar's support from the
northerner faction by releasing two of their number
from prison and giving wide play to the death of
another.
45. Hasani's rivals can create difficulties for him by
agitating among various factions within the YSP. But
they probably will not be able to sidetrack the Chair-
man's policies in the foreseeable future unless the
country suffers a dramatic economic setback or a
major political defeat attributable to Hasani's leader-
ship. Backed by a loyal and effective security service,
strong support in the ranks of party, military, and
government and among the population, Ali Nasir
Muhammad al-Hasani will be very difficult for any
local rivals, acting alone, to bring down.
Foreign Influences on Hasani's Policies
Relations With Saudi Arabia and Oman
46. Saudi willingness to go along with Hasani's
appeals for financial assistance is critical to the success
of his policies. The Saudis harbor profound hostility to
the brand of Soviet-dominated radicalism that pre-
vailed especially during South Yemen's early years of
independence and again during the Ismail period
(1978-79.) Should Riyadh decide that Hasani is insin-
cere or that Aden is pursuing policies elsewhere
inimical to Saudi interests, it could pressure other Gulf
states to cut off assistance to Aden. Even if only partly
successful, the loss of aid from moderate Arabs would
provide ammunition for domestic critics of Hasani's
policies, especially those who already distrust the
Saudis because of old disputes.
The Saudis also recognize that
d
economic aid can mo
erate Aden's radical policies,
and have pledged assistance for projects that have
maximum popular appeal, such as flood relief and
housing assistance. Riyadh is cautiously improving
relations with South Yemen, but the Saudis remain
suspicious that Aden's moderation may be merely a
tactic to obtain Saudi financial assistance.
48. Arab aid pledged so far reinforces Hasani's
position: Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide $70
million for housing construction (to replace Libyan aid
withdrawn by Qadhafi); Algeria is offering $35 million
and about 250,000 tons of oil annually as an interest
free loan over two years; the Kuwait Development
Fund has disbursed $12.5 million. In September 1983,
the Gulf Cooperation Council approved a committee
report favorable to Aden's appeal for aid from that
body.
49. South Yemeni-Omani relations will constitute a
litmus test of Hasani's ability to restore normal ties
with neighboring states. The prospects are good that
he will be able to manage this issue, although it is
likely to be a long-term effort. The resolution of old
border disputes is more likely to create problems
between the two countries than any residual South
Yemen support for the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Oman.
50. Both sides have been scrupulously careful about
observing the provisions of the normalization agree-
ment signed in December 1982: Muscat has ceased its
anti-Aden propaganda; Aden has officially withdrawn
support for the remnants of the PFLO in Oman, and
toned down its verbal attacks on Muscat. In public
speeches, Hasani has repeatedly emphasized the bene-
fits to South Yemen in transferring funds from sup-
porting military forces in the eastern province to
projects designed to upgrade the country's standard of
living. The two announced formal diplomatic relations
in October 1983.
North Yemeni Issues
51. Sustaining amicable relations with North
Yemen will be more difficult for Hasani to accom-
plish, given the recent history of conflict and the
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The Two Yemens: Similar People, Divergent Systems
The revolutions in North and South Yemen which
began in 1962 and 1964, respectively, started off with
similar principles and goals: replacing old regimes (one,
monarchical/religious, the other, colonial) with Arab
socialist governments that would revamp traditional
society and create modern, secular states. As events
transpired, the southern revolutionaries succeeded be-
yond expectations in achieving their initial goals. In the
north, Saudi support for the strong Zaidi tribes who
supported the Imamate, coupled with the Egyptian
pullout after 1967, stalemated the revolution and forced
a compromise solution that allowed both sides to play a
role in government, a not altogether ideologically tidy
outcome.
South Yemen became isolated, radicalized, and de-
pendent on Soviet and Chinese support, combative in
foreign posture on the premise that enemies surrounded
it who could not accept a true anticolonialist and social
revolution. The North, after four years of a republican
government, devolved into a military oligarchy where a
multitude of competing forces had to be carefully
balanced by the current leader. A surprising degree of
radicalist thinking pervades the rhetoric of North
Yemeni political activists.
Both countries are desperately poor, with divergent
economic systems-the South, centrally planned and
controlled, the North, a free-wheeling capitalist system
that provides some consumer goods to those who can
afford them. They have different political structures;
the one, a dominant Marxist civilian party in tight
control of government and military; the other, a loose
amalgamation of forces, military dominant, with strong
tribal component.
strong rivalry between the two for Saudi financial and
Soviet military assistance. Although the two Yemens
currently enjoy a period of detente, border problems
and efforts of emigre groups from both North and
South to regain a foothold in their homelands remain
live issues. North Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih
is sponsoring a coalition of South Yemeni emigres in
the National Grouping of Patriotic Forces (NGPF) as a
counter to the NDF. A major outbreak of violence
along the border, whether due to old tribal land
disputes or activities of the NDF or NGPF could
revive South Yemen's domestic support for the NDF
and also arouse Saudi suspicions.
52. Yemeni unity is a goal to which both Aden and
Sanaa claim to aspire. Both Yemens use it to threaten
the other at the same time as they use it as the
framework for discussions of matters of mutual inter-
est, such as border demarcation, trade relations, and
Soviet Ties. The Soviet Union provides considerable
amounts of military assistance to both North and South
Yemen:
- North Yemen. The Soviet Union first signed a
friendship treaty with the Imam of (North) Yemen
in 1928; it offered aid in 1938, and signed a new
treaty of cooperation in 1955 which still governs
mutual relations. Since 1979, over $1 billion in
Soviet arms have flowed into the North.
- South Yemen. The Soviet Bloc countries have
been the sole supplier of military assistance to
South Yemen. South Yemen has also received over
$1 billion in Soviet military aid.
In order to expand its influence on the Arabian
Peninsula and in the Red Sea area, Moscow is reported-
ly trying to broaden its presence in North Yemen. It has
recently upgraded the quality of personnel involved in
the military assistance program, and sent one of its
better Arabists to the Embassy position. For the short
term, Moscow probably believes it can assist both
Yemens without major problems, working to expand its
political influence with leftist groups in the North, and
thereby increase its potential for pressuring Saudi Ara-
bia. However, conflict between regular military forces
of the two Yemens could create serious problems for
Moscow.
Trade-Offs. Objectively, the geopolitical value of
North Yemen to the Soviets probably exceeds that of
South Yemen, and would offer Moscow many benefits
should it succeed in consolidating its position there.
However, because of its greater dependency on the
Soviets for security and longtime Soviet ties, and its
stronger central government, Aden offers advantages in
manageability unmatched in North Yemen where
fiercely independent tribes still dominate the political
scene.
travel regulations. Despite the ongoing contacts, we
believe neither country wants to see unification unless
it can dominate.
Relations With Western States
53. Hasani has already carried his policy of diversi-
fying foreign economic partners beyond the level
attained by President Salim Rubayyi Ali before he was
deposed. Although aid ties to Western multilateral
organizations have continued since 1978, direct bilat-
eral aid ties to major Western states have not been
developed until now. Aden has recently reestablished
full diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom and
France and has a nonresident Canadian ambassador.
54. Although it is not unusual for certain of Mos-
cow's clients to have good relations with Western
countries, several aspects of South Yemen's current
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initiatives probably concern Moscow in spite of the
presumed Soviet willingness to have other countries
foot the economic aid bill for South Yemen: some
contracts for development projects that used to go to
the Soviets are now going to Western countries; West-
ern technology upstages that of the East Bloc; and the
presence of Western personnel in South Yemen brings
the danger that influence could follow.
55. While the YSP is likely to support ties with
West European countries that bring economic bene-
fits, distrust and fear of the United States will make
the opening of US relations a more difficult issue for
the South Yemeni leader. US military presence in the
Indian Ocean is viewed as a direct threat to Aden. If
any steps toward normalization with Washington were
to occur without adequate party consensus or prior
consultations with Moscow, strong opposition could
develop within the party and would probably be
supported by the Soviets. Hasani can be expected to
proceed with extreme caution in this area, and pros-
pects for initiatives to the United States are slim.
Prospects for Soviet-South Yemeni Relations
Likely Soviet Reactions to Hasani's Moderation
56. Over the near term, Moscow is unlikely to
oppose Aden's efforts to obtain new sources of devel-
opment assistance and improve ties with Arab moder-
ates. At the same time, the Soviets will carefully
monitor the expansion of ties with Western and pro-
Western states as well as South Yemeni contacts with
European socialists and Beijing. Hasani appears to
have successfully reassured the Soviets-at least for
the time being-that his approaches to moderate Arab
states and the West do not endanger ties with Moscow.
57. Nevertheless, this situation could change if Mos-
cow finds its major interests threatened, or decides
that Aden is in danger of slipping away; a change in
the region that threatens Moscow's access to other
points around the Horn of Africa would strengthen
Moscow's determination to hold onto South Yemen.
58. Hasani's openings to Western countries will
probably be a particular focus of Moscow's attention.
ThevSoviets' response is likely to depend in part upon
the atmospherics of developments: whether they were
consulted in advance, and whether events are accom-
panied by significant anti-Soviet moves such as the
introduction of additional restrictions on their use of
Aden's facilities or requests for reduction of their
presence in South Yemen. Moscow would view any
South Yemeni requests for Western arms as a signifi-
cant danger sign.
59. Over the long term, Moscow reportedly plans to
indoctrinate more South Yemenis through education
and training programs, and emplace its supporters in
key government and party positions.
60. Short of actively seeking Hasani's ouster, Soviet
options for countering unfavorable South Yemeni poli-
cies include various strategies for applying domestic
pressure for policy changes more to Moscow's liking,
through direct urging as well as working through
domestic South Yemeni sympathizers. This sort of
pressure might include offers of significant additional
military and economic aid, or threats to cut back
existing economic aid or slow delivery of spare parts
and weapons support. If these efforts should fail,
Moscow might attempt to depose Hasani:
61. We do not believe that Moscow is likely to
attempt to sponsor a coup against Hasani during the
time frame of this Estimate. The chances would be
greatest if Moscow concludes that Hasani is moving
decisively against key Soviet interests in South Yemen.
Any such move, however, would be difficult and
costly; Hasani has tightened his control over the
security and military apparatus and has purged many
of the leading party members who support former
YSP leader Abd al-Fattah Ismail, a pro-Soviet hard-
liner now resident in Moscow. Some analysts believe
that this control is substantial enough to blunt any
coup attempt. Others believe that Moscow could mo-
bilize sufficient assets in South Yemen to bring off a
successful coup.
62. A serious erosion of South Yemeni/Soviet ties is
unlikely in the foreseeable future despite Hasani's
pursuit of independent policies. South Yemeni leaders
would have to become convinced that they no longer
require Soviet security and technical assistance.
Implications for the United States
63. The continuation of Hasani's moderate policies,
coupled with a reduced subversive threat from South
Yemen, would substantially benefit US regional clients
who could be threatened by South Yemeni-supported
insurgencies. Better relations with moderate Arab
states and Western Europe, however, probably will not
lead to improved ties with the United States, and Aden
probably will not respond to US overtures over the
next several years. South Yemen's gradual disengage-
ment from the USSR, though unlikely at present,
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would weaken Moscow's position on the Arabian
Peninsula and in the Middle East.
64. Alternative developments severely affecting ei-
ther US or Soviet interests, while not likely, deserve
consideration.
65. Worst Case for the United States. Should a
successor come to power more determined to promote
radical change and less concerned about economic
priorities, he could refocus South Yemeni goals by:
- Undermining moderate Peninsula regimes.
- Participating in international terrorism.
- Strengthening ties with Libya, Syria, and Iran.
- Granting increased access to the Soviets.
66. Worst Case for the Soviets. Some reporting
indicates that Hasani may be considering loosening
ties with Moscow. Should sufficient additional non-
Communist economic and technical assistance become
available, and the South Yemeni leadership determine
to make a clean break with the Soviets, Moscow could:
- Witness a serious reversal in the Arab state
thought to be the Soviets' most devoted client.
- Lose an important means of exercising political
leverage against Saudi Arabia and other moder-
ate Gulf states.
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