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Central Intelligence South Africa and Its Regional Policies Through the 1980s NIE 73-84 November 1984 copy 340 Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP87T00126R001101640002-5 SECRET SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS REGIONAL POLICIES THROUGH THE 1980s Information available as of 21 Novemlxr 1984 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date. Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP87T00126R001101640002-5 SECRET THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also Participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps The Department of Commerce Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP87T00126R001101640002-5 SECRET Page SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... v KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5 The Setting ........................................................................................ 5 South Africa's Perceptions and Goals .............................................. 7 The Regional Military Situation ...................................................... 9 The South African Defense Force (SADF) ................................. 9 Military Capabilities of the Neighboring States ......................... 11 Regional Economic Considerations ................................................. 12 South Africa's Internal Economic Situation ........... .................... 12 South Africa's Economic Options ............................................ 13 Prospects for Economic Growth in the 1980s ......................... 13 The Regional Economic Situation ............................................... 13 Prospects for the Regional Economies ................. ....... ............... 16 South African Internal Politics .........................................._............. 17 Outlook and Implications ................................................................. 21 Outlook .................................................... _.................................... 21 Implications ................................................................................... 22 For Black Africa ....................................................................... 22 For the Soviets .......................................................................... 23 For the United States ................................................................ 23 For the West .................._......................................................... 23 Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP87TOO126R001101640002-5 SECRET This Estimate assesses the major changes in South Africa and the southern African region in recent years, such as: -The growth of South Africa's military and economic strength. -The corresponding political, economic, and military weaknesses of the black neighboring states. -The determination of South Africa to project its power regional- ly. using military and economic threats and incentives, to deprive South African insurgents of bases and safehavens in the neighboring states. -The negotiation of a series of arrangements between Pretoria and individual black African regimes to solidify South African regional hegemony. -The new constitutional changes in South Africa that bring Coloreds and Indians into limited partnership with whites. The paper also addresses factors that may inhibit South Africa's power projections, including: -Political divisions within the Afrikaner community. -Continued racial discrimination and sporadic violence in South Africa. -An international embargo of arms to South Africa and its effect on the military. -The long-term decline of gold production in the Republic. -The continued provision of Soviet weapons and advisers to .-Angola and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique. -The presence of Cuban combat forces in Angola. The purpose of this paper is to assess the nature of South Africa's regional accommodations and their durability for the remainder of the 19SOs. The Estimate also addresses in general terms the likely implica- tions of these developments for the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and its allies, and the rest of black Africa. Although the pa- per discusses the probable South African relationship with an independ- ent Namibia, it does not examine the processes by which Namibia may reach independence, nor does it deal with the intricacies of a Cuban V SECRET withdrawal from Angola or the disengagement of South African forces from Angola. vi SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP87T00126R001101640002-5 Jtl.KtI Since the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in southern Africa in the mid-1970s-and the resultant projection of Soviet and Cuban power into the region-South Africa has attempted to shape the regional political environment to meet its own security needs. Pretoria has already compelled some of its black-ruled neighbors to accept bilateral security agreements through which it is attempting to impose a "Pax Pretoriana" throughout southern Africa.' Although there may be periods of tension between South Africa and its neighbors, we do riot en- visage a scenario developing during the rest of the 1980s in which South African hegemony declines to the point that neighboring countries would feel less threatened by South Africa. South Africa is the dominant military power in southern Africa. Its forces are not only larger and more efficient than those of any of the neighboring black states, but are also highly motivated, well disciplined, and thoroughly- trained. Because of the international arms embargo against South Africa, Pretoria has fostered an extensive indigenous arms production capability and has procured some foreign equipment and technology by both open and clandestine means. Although South Africa lacks the capability to produce high-performance aircraft and helicop- ters, it will preserve its regional military dominance through the period of this Estimate. The armed forces of the neighboring black states suffer from poor training, low pay, inadequate housing, a lack of technical skills, severe maintenance and supply problems, and general demoralization. Con- tinuing flows of Communist military equipment to the neighboring states have not compensated for these inherent deficiencies of the black armies, but they- are a source of concern to South Africa, even though the military systems delivered so far are primarily defensive. South African regional economic predominance is even more striking. South Africa will experience only slow economic growth for the rest of the 1980s as a result of the static production in its dominant gold industry. But its economic power is so great in comparison with the fal- tering economies of its neighbors that the migrant labor, trade, invest- ment, and transportation dependence of the neighbors on South Africa will prevail for many- years to come. Whether South Africa will be The term "Pax Pretoriana` is used in this paper to mean the South African policy of forcing or persuading neighboring governments, preferably through formal agreements, to cooperate with South African authorities to eliminate the physical presence of suspected anti-South African terrorists on their territories. 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/12/11: CIA-RDP87T00126R001101640002-5 JCLICI either willing or able to provide the considerable financial investments that the neighboring states need is more doubtful. Pretoria is already seeking Western commitments of aid to Mozambique and to an independent Namibia, and will try to draw the West more deeply into its regional schemes. South Africa's pursuit of a Pax Pretoriana throughout the 1980s has serious implications for African and non-African states. Although Pretoria's black neighbors are too weak to challenge South African hegemony, their weakness will not stop their support for Namibian independence, political support for black liberation groups, and major- ity rule in South Africa. Moreover, Pretoria's goal of a "constellation of states" held together by security agreements and South African econom- ic dominance runs counter to black southern Africa's own hopes of distancing itself from Pretoria. Thus, the black-ruled states of southern Africa will resist South Africa's efforts to dictate their domestic and foreign policy priorities. As they come to realize that they cannot tend off South Africa by themselves, they will seek, even more intensely than they have in the past, the help of Communist and Western states to bring pressure on Pretoria, although they will seek to keep Moscow at arm's length while doing so. At the moment, Moscow is especially apprehensive that South Africa's recent security agreement with Mozambique and bilateral talks with Angola could diminish the need of those states for Soviet military assistance. Moreover, reverses for Moscow in these two countries undermine Soviet efforts to support the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC). Despite Moscow's concern, the Soviets are restrained by the very weaknesses that beset their black African clients, and they lack the leverage to push those clients beyond the political and military bounds the clients have set for themselves. While Moscow may have suffered some setbacks, there are no indications that it believes the game has been lost. The Soviets believe they can count on South African intransigence on Namibia's independ- ence and on the growing effectiveness of the Angolan insurgents to demonstrate the need for continued Soviet assistance in Angola. They could also profit in the long run from the disenchantment of the region with its subservience to South Africa. Moscow will also continue to portray the West, particularly the United States, as collaborating with South Africa. The protracted diplomacy of the United States on southern African issues over the last several years has great potential for advancing US in- terests. On the other hand, there is a risk of reinforcing the widespread 2 SECRET perception among Africans that the United States is acquiescing in the South African-imposed order. Also. as South Africa perceives itself stronger, it will become less vulnerable to pressure. Thus. (S influence in both the Republic of South Africa and black Africa nwy suffer. Pretoria's aid for insurgencies it the region will fluctuate according to overall South African military and political strategy. Until the South Africans can be confident that a Pax Pretoriana has taken hold. they will be reluctant to abandon the leverage that the insurgencies provide. Pretoria hopes that continuing pressures will force the regimes in :Angola and \lozaurbique to come to terms with their internal oppo- nents.:Any resultant governments of national unity presumably would reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence in both countries. South Africa now admits that SWAPO cannot be excluded from participating in an eventual independent government in Namibia. Pretoria will nonetheless try to ensure that important posts go to non- S\\ APO parties and that constitutional guarantees preclude a one-party or Marxist state. Such arrangements would help to retain strong South African influence in the country. As for the ANC, its military capabili- ties will continue to diminish in the wake of the Nkomati Accord with \lozauuhiquc. South African security forces will probably he able to handle the military challenge from the AN(: without too much difficulty for the rest of the 1980s. But the ongoing violence ill South Africa. which increased sharply in August 1984, demonstrates once again that the white regime still laces serious internal security problems. South African security forces are likely to become increasingly preoccupied with random urban terrorism and spontaneous outbreaks of violence. although the govern- ment is not likely to face a serious threat to its stability for the period of this Intimate, South Africa's efforts to impose a Pax Pretoriana stem in large part from its desire to remove its perceived external threat in order to buy time to work out its oven solutions to its domestic problems. President Botha has restructured national political institutions and strengthened the positions of the President and the few senior National Part associates who share his commitment to limited constitutional and economic reforms as well as to an aggressive foreign policy. By this means Botha is creating the institutional framework for making himself the most powerful leader in 20th-century South Africa. For the next few years at least he will dominate the political scene. Botha's only potential political threat lies to the right, but even that threat is manageable, because the National Part base nos includes more of the English-speaking electorate. Botha seems well placed to 3 SECRET enact his programs during the remainder of his scheduled term in office, vwhich corresponds roughly with the period of this Estimate. During the next five years. South Africa will institutionalize limited constitutional reforms. co-opting as many Coloreds and Indians as possible, and blacks residing in white areas, into a system that will give them only limited political rights but will hold out hope of lunch greater economic and social advantages. As more blacks are assigned citizenship in the homelands. South Africa's long-term political strategy will be to find a method to link the homelands permanently to a white republic through some federal or confederal arrangement-a domestic version of the concept of a constellation of states. Botha would like to see such a system created be- fore he leaves office. Efforts to create that system will be hampered. however, by black resistance, stemming from the governments inability or unwillingness to meet black needs and aspirations. Government efforts to buy off blacks swill be stalled by slow economic growth. If black expectations are not met. blacks will turn increasingly to violence. Black abilities to challenge government policies are limited, but they do exist. Black dissatisfaction during the remainder of this decade will not be sufficiently articulated. however, to bring about major changes. But it may lead to enough unrest to force the govern- ment into a steadily escalating use of force, which would add to its pari- ah status in the international community and seriously complicate I. S and Western efforts to bring about peaceful social change in South Africa. 4 SECRET The Setting I The southern African region is in a state of flux.' A turbulent period that began in the mid-1970s with the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire is evolving in new directions, currently highlighted by Pretoria s efforts to erect a structure of bilateral agreements between the region's dominant poster, white-ruled South Africa, and its black-ruled neigh- bors. Through these arrangements, South Africa hopes to regulate the intricate strategic relationships of the region I. Many factors contributed to the turmoil that the southern :African states have experienced during the last several years- These factors include, Mat vist regimes sw ith Soviet Bloc support came to power in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 fol- lowing Portugal's precipitate withdrawal from :Africa In Angola, the liberation movements that were excluded from power, particularly the Na- tional Cnion for the Total Independence of Angola t( MTV, mounted what has become a serious insurgent challenge to the authority of the nest Popular A tovernent for the I .iberation of Angola IA1PLA) government. l'be B6odesian civil war, growing in intensity throughout the 1970s. finally- forced the white regime to accept a negotiated end to the war and the installation of a black majority government. The restive black townships of South Africa erupted violently in June 1976. In the subsequent brutal crackdown by South African security forces, many young blacks fled into exile in neighboring countries where many were recruit- ed into the principal South African liberation movements. the African National Congress :AA(:) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The AVC began to mount sporadic cross-border Fort IT I' purnIles of this Estimate. southern Africa includes South Si rirn_ Leuriho. Rotsscana, Sscazilaad. Zimbabwe. Atozambigue. Vogola. Zambia. Aanribta, and Malawi. Zaire, particularly its mineral-rich prm tnce of Shaba. is connected to the South Afriean- domtnated regional rail ss stera and is, therefore, treated as part of the oothe,, African economic scene Tanzania is not in the sunticrti Africa region. but is involved in regional political affairs as a I 'Qualm,' State guerrilla operations into South Africa from bases in neighboring countries The United Nations imposed a mandatory anus embargo against South Africa in late 19T. T., ton- ing South Africa to accelerate its efforts to become militarily and economically sell - su ffi cent 3. South African anxiety about these deselopnlents was heightened by the eagerness of the Soviet union and its allies to exploit them. By the time Pieter Willem (P. W.) Botha became Prime Minister in 1975. South Africa's increasing isolation seas apparent Botha's government attempted to fomtulate domestic policies to deal with the overriding question of race relationships within the country. however, the govern- ment appeared during its first years in office to he devoting most of its time, resources, and energy to meeting the "total onslaught" that it argued ssas lacing South Africa on all borders-hostility from black Africa carefully nurtured by the Soviet tpion and its allies. As the 19,Os ended, South Africa watched with concern the increasing sophistication of the Sosit t- supplied weapon systems of its neighboring countries and the growing military capabilities of the Soviet - supported insurgent movements, particularly the South-West Africa Peoples Organization tSW AP01 and the ANC. d. Pretoria was also concerned by efforts of its black neighbors to decrease their economic (dependence on the Republic. The emergence of organizations such as the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADC:C:)' dill not in Pretoria's view bode well for the South African concept of regional eco- nomic cooperation, which in the candy days of ill( Botha era took form as a call for a ''constellation of states" with South Africa as the nucleus au(I the lilac k states as satellites. 5. In attempting to mold the southern :Alricon political environment to its liking over the last several years. Pretoria has used a variable mix of political, economic, and military pressures. which has had some success. Some black African states, even those that ' The members of x,000 are Angola, liotsuana, I....olhn \talaswi. \Urzanabique, Swaziland. 'f:utzania- Z;unbia. aid Zimbabwe 5 SECRET 6 SECRET F,onu~~o Srntm ? Nalirnai i~ tai n'ceived economic and military assistance from either Fasters or AAeste'rn countries, have not been c,Ipal,It of resisting South African pressure. While South Africa has become stronger over the last decade, its ucighhnrx (aye' heen unable to cope effectively with their growing economic and security problems. Thus, one by one, the states of southern :Africa have begun to is to stork out an acconmiodation with South Africa. South Africa's Perceptions and Goals ti south -Afric;I sees itself as the dominant power in southern Africa. whose needs most be taken into account. and is an African state that has wrongly been evcluded from continental affairs South Africa also considers itself e gcostr tegic actor in southern Africa with an important role to play in the East-West global cnufroutalion South Africa is not interested in per- suading others ill adopt its ideology or in acquiring ,edditional territory but it is determined to retain economic and militars preeminence in southern rice South \frica s regional goals are in large part deism in its domestic political situation- Its leaders hale sought to cosine continuing Afrikaner domina- tion_ despite x irtualb universal condemnation of its political and social order In formulating its regional policies. Pretoria is motivated In the need to buy tune to put its domestic affairs in order and to blunt the attacks of both its internal and external critics- To holste while units. Pretoria takes a hard line against the AA(. and those countries that, bV giving the ANC aid and sanctuarA . (nave enabled it to engage in cross- boideI' terrorism against South Africa. Pretoria also smuts to ensure that all independent Namibia will be goserned by a regime at least not overtly hostile to South Africa. But Pretoria also wants to change the nature of its relations with neighboring states, hoping that in time these states will come to accept South VIrica's right to manage its internal affairs. S Inunediate Goals and Tactics. South Africa's innneeliale goal is to reduce or eliminate the capability of neighboring states to support antiregime movements operating lit and out of South Africa and to force them to cooperate' with South African authorities to elimi- nate the physical presence of suspected terrorists on their territories. The South Africans want these and any future conunitr n'tnts codified in treaties, which would also sere to give the appearance of closer bilateral relations with South Africa. The model for these' agreements seems to be the recently concluded \knmati Accord with Mozambique. No change of regime or immediate thawing of relations with the Republic have so far been demanded of neighboring governor en ts. 9- In connection with these nonaggression treaties. South Africa will offer various inducements. tioulh Africa has revealed the existence of a treat). similar to the Nkomati accord, that was made two years ago with Swaziland (under which Swaziland may ultim;tcls receive some South African territory to which it has longstanding tribal claini) Botswana and Lesotho are resisting strong pressures to conclude similar accords If these arrangements fall into place. Zimbabwe nlav find itself under the gun to join the others. although we doubt that President Mugabe would enter into a formal agreement 10. The economic, political, and niilitar~ weakucsc- es of the neighboring states provide South Africa with easily exploitable opportunities to pursue its goals. Economic difficulties have increased I innaticalb over the past I0 to 13 scars through it combination of factors. Declining terms of trade for primary producers Incompetent state intervention or inept social- ist" policies, particularly in agriculture Destruction. during civil wars. of transport and other infrastructure. Shortages of technical and managerial expertise. Corruption in government burcaucracics Natural disasters. including the drought now entering its third year The dependence of the other states of the region on South African supply routes is also exploitable Fur example, in 1981 Pretoria threatened to L'rorinac a trade agreement with Zimbabwe that includes prefer- ential customs duties and some quota gnurmtees ()It Zimbabwe's exports to the Republic. and also threat- ened to send home 41),000 Zinbabwe'an workers then in South Africa- Pretoria than precipitated a transport crisis b\ threatening to withdraw rolling stock oil loam to the Zimbabwe' railroad, but backed off a result of outside pressure. I 1. The political turmoil in neighboring ,states has also provided fertile ground for South African nrcd- clling. For example, Zimbabwe has alleged that Pre- toria has recruited and supplied some of tIn' dissidents operating in the troubled Matabeleland Province that abuts South Africa. While there is evidence of snow South African involvement, the ethnic discord in Zimbabwe and the interparty battle's that reflect it ire 7 SECRET a longstanding problem of indigenous origin. Zimba- bwe's failure to resolve its internecine conflict swill continue to provide the Republic with opportunities to destabilize the Mugabe government if South Africa deems such action necessary to fulfill its regional goals. 12. South Africa has been provided opportunities for intervention by the military weakness of its neigh- bors. Minimal amounts of aid to dissident groups can create havoc for states such as Lesotho or Mozam- biquc. lf6ese states are also open to direct attacks in Pretoria's anti-AN(: campaign. illustrated dramatical- ly in South African raids on Maseru in December 1982 and the bombing of ANC facilities in Maputo in May 1983.) Only Angola, with massive Soviet and Cuban support, has made a major effort to defend its territory against South African military incursions. 13- South Africa's neighbors are politically fragile. Many political structures are overly dependent upon a single leader and have yet to work out mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power. Many- of these leaders have failed to develop effective security systems, and because of their incompetence, particularly their in- ability to develop adequate economic policies, now face increasing disaffection. 14 South African policy tossard exploitation of its neighbors' weaknesses is ambivalent. While Pretoria holds it useful to keep these states off balance, too much pressure could be coon terp rod uctive. South Africa does not want to be surrounded by excessively feeble states. Chaotic states cannot buy the Republics goods and would offer little prospect for South African investors. Such states cannot enforce the terms of the nonaggression treaties South Africa is demanding and would provide a favorable environnient for anti-South African movements. We believe the Republic will. therefore, keep the pressure on but will try to calibrate it carefully: to the extent that these countries cooper- ate with South African regional plans, they will gener- ally be left alone to work out their internal political arrangements. 15- The Long-Range Objective. The long-term South African objective remains the formal establish- ment of the constellation of states that Botha has advocated since lie cane to power. The constellation is intended to replace the "cordon sanitaire" of Europe- an white-controlled territories (Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia) that collapsed in the mid-1970s. Pre- toria has periodically raised the concept for public attention. The constellation of states would be codified by economic and political agreements that would create a regional bloc essentially controlled by the Republic. Among the advantages to Pretoria would be at least indirect regional recognition of the indepen- dent homelands, which would form part of the con- stellation, by the other states that South Africa would like to have associated with it, namely, Mozambique. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Bo- tswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and perhaps Zaire Pre- toria probably assumes that the creation of such a system would make it much more difficult for other African states, or any other power, to intervene in the region's affairs. 16. Pretoria's views of the Marxist states in the region will affect its plans for regional cooperation. Many South African deeisionmakers would argue that mutually cooperative arrangements can be worked out regardless of the political systems prevailing in the black-ruled states. Other South African leaders are more ideologically oriented and would prefer a consis- tent policy of hostility toward Marxist or socialist regimes. The South African public has been condition- ed by years of official rhetoric to regard Marxism as a direct and total threat to South African stability and survival. It would therefore seem difficult for Pretoria to associate freely with Marxist regimes. The results of bilateral cooperation under the nest security agree- ments may help to modify South African perceptions, but the long-range South African expectation is that continuing pressures will force such regimes to modify their composition by including non-Marxist political groups, such as UN11 :A or the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). 17. Although South Africa now- seems swilling to become more closely associated with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELINIO) government of Mozambique, its long-range goal of a constellation of states probably envisages modifications in the cony position of regimes currently Marxist. In Angola, where South Africa has been deeply committed to LNITA for years, Pretoria no doubt wants reconcilia- tion between UNITA and the MPLA govern ntent. Although South Africa's relationship with and conuuit- ment to RENAMO in Mozambique is less significant, Pretoria is actively- promoting talks between Maputo and the insurgents. In Namibia, on the northwest border. a SWAPO government would also pose sync bolic problems for the Republic. The granting of independence, in Pretoria's view, can include a possi- bly dominant role for SWAPO; but Pretoria swill try to ensure that important posts go to other indigenous parties, and that constitutional guarantees preclude a one-party or Marxist state. In other countries-Mala- wi, Lesotho, and Botswana-Pretoria continues to favor the more conservative elements in the society, whether or not they hold power. 8 SECRET IS. Angola is the major policy problem for South Vf rica s regional planners. The Marxist AIPI.A govern- ment has over 30,000 Cuban troops and military advisers as well as several thousand Cuban civilian tccbnjcians assisting it in maintaining purser. Their presence is it problem for it regime that aims at total dominance of the region, civil though they pose no immediate threat to the Republic (Cuban troops per- form basically defensive functions in Angola). Should the Cubans be invited by a SWAPO-led Namibia to assist it in its security operations. however, they would he seen by Pretoria as a much more immediate threat. Pretoria is intent upon managing Namibian independ- ence in such a way as to present this In the meantime, so long as the Cubans keep to their current posture, their presence serves a useful purpose for Pretoria by attracting CS involvement in developments in south- cool Africa and by justifying South African arguments of a Soviet-Cuban military threat to the region. 19 South African regional policies are based on pragmatic self-interest and are supported by most of the white cone nunits For the period of this Estimate, the nonaggression pacts resulting from these policies are likcls to hold. The neighboring states are bitterly aware of the risk then run in permitting the ANC to use their territory. because then would not be able to defend themselves against South African military ac- tion if then engage in behavior Pretoria feels is hostile to its interests, and because they desperately need Snulh :African trade, aid, and investment - The South African Defense Force (SADF) 20 South Africa is the dominant militars power in southern :Africa. Its military forces are not only larger and more efficient than ails of the neighboring black states. but are also highly motivated, well disciplined, and thoroughly trained. The active-duty force num- bers over 94.000: if needed. Pretoria could muster an estimated 300,000 men in 30 clays through a general mobilization. 'hhe South African Defense Force is capable of mounting an aggressive and coordinated militars response to perceived threats. 2 I. Most SADF personnel are white South Africans, but because of competing demands from the military and civilian sectors. increased use of nonwhite person- nel oil a voluntary basis is taking place. Only white males, however. are presently subject to draft and reserve obligations- The current system drafts about 25,000 white males and accepts a few thousand volun- teers white males and females, and it few black, Colored, and Indian males) each scar Only about 5,000 nonwhites are now in the S\Dl ranks: but, should Coloreds and Indians become subject to the draft as a consequence of the limited political partici- pation for their communities under the new Constitu- tion, these numbers could increase sharply- Simile Colored and black troops have already seen combat and may assume more of the burden in the future as an alternative to additional increases in for militars obligation of whites. These troops will also prohahb receive more equitable treatment within the armed forces than nonwhites normally enjoy ill civilian life: - the SADF's pragmatic interest in improved perlorin ance has already led it to adopt policies designed to promote greater racial tolerance anlong its troops 22. Despite the increased importance of nonwhites in the military. the defense of the country will ulti- mately remain the responsibility of the NOW,, popula- tion. Nil, hire males are now liable for hvo years of active service followed by 12 years of reserve dull. during which 720 days must be spent on active Juts Whites must then fulfill it continuing reserve obliga tion until the age of 55. 23 . Despite budgetary increases, there it, problems facing the SADF, among them the spotty quality of leadership at the small-milt level. Career odiccrs and noncommissioned officers are seldom assigned below the company level, even though counterinsurgi'ncs warfare is fought at the section, team, squad. and platoon levels. Thus, in Namibian and Angolan field operations, the SADF has experienced incidents of faulty mapreading, disregard of authority, false som- hat reports, and the like. 24. Another leadership problem comes from South Africa's military- isolation- which has meant that al- most all military training must be done in couutn. In recent years, the lack of contact with other military establishments and stall colleges has resulted in gaps in S:ADF knowledge about new concepts and methodolo- gies, Training, particularly at the staff College level and above, has suffered. The system is now producing senior officers with parochial vision and little or no appreciation of the world beyond South Africa's borders. 25. Nonetheless, by Western standards, the quality of SADF military training is at least adequate I'he training available is carefully planned and thorough. with heavy emphasis on field work. The large reserve force (the Citizen Force-CF) is organized for conven- tional warfare, while both the standing arms- (Perma- nent Force-PF) and the reserves are trained for counterinsurgency operations svbere the govenuneut 9 SECRET believes the greatest near-term threat to its security ,% ill arise. 26. The SADF remains equipped largely rcith obso- lescent but serviceable equipment that is adequate to meet the military threat it nosy faces. While most of the active units are equipped kith modern weapons, the basic rnachinegun remains the Browning 30 cali- ber. and its main antitank gun is a Ion-velocity 90- millimeter gun. The SADF lacks modern antiaircraft defense systems. except for a few Soviet systems aptured in Angola. 27. Deficiencies in its arms inventory are the conse- quences of the international isolation inflicted by two L sited Nations amts embargoes. voluntary in 1963 and mandatory in 1977 In the mid-1960s. South :African defense planners initiated policies designed to reduce the country's dependence on foreign equip- ment. They have since developed channels to foreign countries and international armaments dealers in an effort to circumvent the embargo by covert procure- ment of weapons and technology. South Africa has also developed the largest indigenous arras industry in Africa. The government-controlled Armaments Cor- poration of South Africa iARVISCOR1 has become one of the country s largest industrial conglomerates. Tasked specifically to develop and procure weapons. ammunition. and technology based on the needs of the SADP. ARV1SCOR covers the entire process of sycap- ons production from research through manufacture, servicing, and repair, and currently meets the bulk of the military's requirements for ground force equip- ment. It also procures weapons from private firms. 2R. South African efforts to circunnvent the embar- go have had mixed results. South Africa is able to produce a vast range of weaponry, much of which- small arms, ammunition, and armored vehicles-is important for counterinsurgency operations. AWith the help of foreign technology, it has produced such sophisticated items as the extended range G-5 155-min gun and missile-carrying patrol boats- The SAI)F extends the life of its aging equipment by fabrication and by paying high prices for spare parts on the clandestine international arms market. 29. But these actions do riot entirely compensate for South African inadequacies. The SADF lacks snare state-of-the-art military equipment. particularly high- performance jet aircraft and helicopters. It has no replacements for its lust-retired Shackleton long-range reconnaissance aircraft. South Africa also believes it needs to develop a submarine production capability. Even the present level of self-sufficiency- in arms production has been costly- The research and deyelop- ment and production costs of house-produced items has led AR\ISCOR to begin an intensive search for foreign partners and customers to help sustain produc- tion lines. 30. For the period of this Fstim ate, South Africa will continue to develop all indigenous arms produc- tion capability and to procure foreign equipment or technology through open or clandestine nicans. Much of this effort will be directed toward Western coun- tries, particularly the L noted States. Some South Afri- can weapon systems already have lost their qualitative advantages over Soviet-supplied weapons in the neigh- boring black-ruled states- 31. South Africa"s defense policy also has a nuclear dimension. Pretoria's sense of isolation kind perception of the military threat in southern Africa in the niid- 1970s induced Pretoria to accelerate the nuclear explo- sives research and development program that it had formally launched in 1973- By 1977, South Africa had constructed a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert and appeared well on the scar toward testing a nuclear explosives device. The international outcry that fol- lowed the discovery of the Kalahari site forced Pre- toria to back off, however- A mysterious flash in the South Atlantic Ocean in September 1979 spurred further fears in the international community that South Africa finally had carried out a test, even though the available evidence was not conclusive. Nevertheless. the existence of the Kalahari site and the flash were enough to raise concerns abroad about South Africa's nuclear capability. Since then, Pretoria has followed a policy of calculated ambiguity bus intimating that it has a nuclear weapons capability while disavowing any interest in producing or testing a nuclear device. 32. South Africa's aid to insurgencies for the re- mainder of the decade will fluctuate, depending on Pretoria's perceptions of the advantages to be gained front cooperation with the regimes in power and on its coon coverall regional strategy- For the next few years at least, Pretoria will be reluctant to abandon the leverage that involvement with opposition groups pro- vides South Africa probably will continue to aid 1 NITA, but is unlikely to renew its large-scale aid to HENANIO as long as the Mozambican Goyernment lives up to its side of the Nkoniati agreements. 33. As the AN(:'s sanctuaries in the region are closed out, one South African motive for waging cross- border counterinsurgency campaigns will diminish. although counterinsurgency training will continue to 10 SECRET have a high priority The South African Police and the Commandos local Iv based militia groups reported to number 200,000 members) will probably be able to handlr the :ANC externally based challenge without much difficulty for the rest of the 1980s. But the South :African military may increasingly be forced to con- (entrate on internal security matters. Turmoil result- ing from rising black expectations may be more difficult to control. The threat from random urban t errorisni will grow as both left- and right-wing groups may decide that violent confrontation is the hest means to focus government attention on their drnlands But the regime is unlikely to face a serious threat to its stability from such groups for the period of this Fstlllurte. Military Capabilities of the Neighboring States 31. None of the neighboring states, individually or collectively, can challenge South African military dominance. Nonetheless, the South Africans are seri- ously concerned by the continuing deliveries of Com- munist military equipment to neighboring states and the presence of foreign troops and advisers in those countries The systems so far acquired by these coun- tries. though. are for the most part defensive. 35. At present, Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia. Lesotho. and Angola have Soviet Bloc mili- tary equipment. The major recipients have been An- s ola and Mozambique. Angola has received initial shipments of SI -22 (Fitters) and MIC-23 (Floggers) jet aircraft and A1I 23.25 (Ilind) helicopters. Mozam- bique has been supplied with MIG-21 (Fishbed) jets and V11 24 2.5 helicopters. 36. South Africa is concerned about the improved Air defenses in both countries, and the vulnerability of its irreplaceable aircraft to missile systems now in place- particularly in Angola. In addition, in its De- ermber 1953 incursion into Angola, SADF leaders found that their armored cars were ineffective against Soviet tanks. The Cuban presence in Angola, m ore- over, restrains South Africa's ability to project its force Lar into that country. 3-. But although South Africa's regional dominance is not in danger of being challenged for the course of this lstinlate, the SADF is not a juggernaut- If the .arms embargo holds, with South Africa continuing to In, denied access to state-of-the-art equipment and technology-particularly with regard to advanced jet aircraft-amid, if additional large-scale deliveries of modern euuiprnent improve further defensive capa- bilities of neighboring states. South African cross- Table 1 Armed Forces Personnel in Southern Africa Country Frontline States Army Navy Air Army Air Force Total Angola 35.000 L500 2,0400 38,511) Botswana 3,15(1b 50 3,21K) Mozambique 32,000 700 1,(X0) 33]01 Tanzania 39,8(X) 800 1000) 41,60() Zambia 12,500 1.8(10 14,304) Zimbabwe 40.200 e 800 11,000 Total Other States e 172,300 Lesotho 21)00 20 2.020 Malawi 6,000 100 55 Ii. 155 Swaziland 2,700 Unknown 2,7015 Total 10.875+ South Africa r 76.566 6,600 11,300 94,1(X) T These figures do not include either paramilitary forces (gendar- merie, pence, militia, and border guard---except where nnlah or reserve strength. e Botswana Defense Force is made up of five infantry tongranies. Includes border guard- , Includes 50 personnel in Arrny Patrol Boat Squadron. I Although Zaire is addressed in other sections of this paper, it is not considered part of the military composition identified will) southern Africa. r Includes 12,000 South African Defense Force person ntI inside Namibia; but does not include an estimated 1001(X) tx'rsonnel in the South-West Africa Territory Force border operations could be hampered- St nth Africa does not face a serious conventional threat from adversaries on its borders. 38. The combined manpower strength of the neigh- boring states' armies far outnumbers the troops South Africa can muster (see table 1), but these forces are ineffective. Tile African armies are poorly trained. supported, housed, and paid. They lack technical skills, and, not surprisingly, are often demoralized These armies are also riven by tribal rivalries and, in many instances, cannot comprehend the concept of a national interest that transcends tribal boundaries None of these deficiencies is likely to disappear during the next decade. 39. But this imbalance between South Africa and its neighbors is double edged If South Africa is able to persuade its neighbors that its intentions are peaceful, the past trends of escalating violence and arms build 11 SECRET ups could be halted or reversed Much gill depend oil South Africa's future policies toward support of insur- gent movements in neighboring countries If it were to cease to provide assistance to them-as it seems now to have clone to RENAVlO-the prospects are good. 7 et ideology plays all important part in South African policy. I V CPA and RE\AVlO may appear, to some South African leaders, as more attractive than the Marxist regimes now in power in ternis of the kind of regional political enyirunmeut that South Africa be- lieves would be most beneficial for its interests. Table 2 South Africa: Gold Holdings, Production and Sales, 1970-83 South Africa's Internal Economic Situation 40. South Africa is likely to experience continued low economic growth through the 1980s. The effect of this trend on domestic and foreign policy will be gradual, as economic constraints will not halt the ruling National Party's determination to protect the country's security and to retain Afrikaner political control. The financial pinch, however, will engender a sense of insecurity among Afrikaners, perhaps demon- strated in increased aggressiveness both at home and in the region. 41. Budgetary constraints, moreover. already have had sonic impact and no doubt contributed to the South African decision to accelerate the Namibian independence process and to work out an accommoda- tion with Angola. The budgetary drain will continue to be a factor in South African planning for Naruibia_ but we do not believe that financial considerations alone will determine South Africa's policy on Namibia. 42 Economic growth projections will be unreliable indicators for predicting the timing or magnitude of racial unrest in South Africa. Pretoria's economic policy makers are unlikely to interpret incidents of racial unrest as a compelling inducement to ease growth constraints as a way of dampening black unemployment. Pretoria will continue to make deci- sions with an eye primarily to maintaining the econo- my 's solvency, with lower priority for political and social conse( uences. 43. The Importance of Gold. Gold has been the key to South African economic growth. paying for half of total annual imports, including those capital goods critical to economic growth But gold production, as a result of an apparentis irreversible decline in the richest ore reserves, has declined fairly steadily for more than a decade, slipping from a high of 1.000 metric tons in 1970 to about 655 tons in 1981. Lower gold output has shrunk the contribution of overall mining receipts to real GI)P from 18 percent in 1970 Gold in (;"Id Cold Sulu G over n agent I'rod action I' ron 1970 592 1000 1,399 399 1971 365 976 1.2(1.3 227 1972 558 910 717 0 197.3 591 855 822 0 1974 568 759 782 23 1975 552 713 729 16 1976 394 713 571 I Ss 1977 302 -(N7 792 92 1978 304 704 702 0 1979 312 703 695 0 1980 378 673 507 11 1981 289 656 743 n9 1982 235 662 706 14 to 11 percent in 1983. even though production of minerals other than gold increased by about 7.5 per- cent. (See table 2.) 44. Foreign exchange shortages would haw been much more severe had there not been steep, specula- tive increases in the price of gold in the mid-197th and in 1980. Increaser) earnings from gold sales-from all average of $1.8 billion a year in 1970-73 to over $10 billion a year in the 1980s thus fa -offset slightly more than half of the increase in the average annual cost of imports and net services (front $5 billion in 1970-73 to nearly $21 billion in 1980-8:3). 45. Foreign exchange constraints have led periodi- cally to fiscal and monetary policies that deliberately sacrifice economic growth to stifle import demand This tight-fisted approach was the principal cause for the decline in the average rate of economic growth from 5.7 percent in the 1960s to 2.8 percent since 1970. Even if figures for the past three years of severe drought and worldwide recession were to be factored out, the average annual rate of South African econom- ic growth (1971-80) still would be less than 4 percent 46. Slight increases in gold production have oc- curred since 1981. Output will continue to be largely static, with perhaps a slight increase up to the late 1980s. 12 SECRET South Africa's Economic Options 47 . 1mess gold prices again rise, Pretoria will not be able to amid future balance-of-payments predica- mctrts that still lead it to constrict growth. Apart from hoping for nest gold discoveries or for large, sustained price increases, South Africa has essentially- only two alternatives to periodic clampdowns on growth. 4S. 't'he first option-substantial increases in public arid private borrowing from Western banks-probably aireadl troubles economic decision makers in Pretoria; Siud1 Africa's foreign debt has increased from about ST billion in 1980 to more than $15 billion in 1984. Further increases on any major scale are unlikely because Thee would mark it significant departure from the pattern of economic fine-tuning in effect since the beginning of the decline in gold production. They would provide a potential point of leverage to foreign critics of the South African racial c stenr- They would clash with Calvinist-based Afrikaner w iews of heavy debt as inunoral. -19- Policy rakers in Pretoria hate long recognized that their more desirable option would be to increase nongold exports. The long-term performance of these exports has been good. Nongold exports grew by a respectable average of 20 percent annually during the period 1971-80. but have declined by one-fifth since 19.80 see table 3) This decline-the first in 25 years- resulted front. Reduced demand resulting from economic reces- sion in the principal markets: Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. Severe drought in 1983 and 1984, which halted corn exports. This coulbinatloll of factors has kept the growth of nongold exports from offsetting the rise in the cost of imports Prospects for Economic Growth in the 1980s 50. "1-he South African Government will continue to restrict economic growth periodically to minimize current account deficits, timed largely by speculative swings in gold prices. An increase of $100 an ounce in gold prices, for example, would raise the value of annual gold production by $2.1 billion at the current rate of output I-Ile chances for a significant increase Table 3 Sitllta 1 t : $ South Africa: Major Exports 1970 1980 1163 Total 3,651 24,455 I S,72-) Gold 1,617 II9112 5,926 nongold 2,034 Of which. Coal 16 932 1.1182 Diamonds 274 1.62_2 1.184 Platinum group metals" NA" 9410 71141 Metallic ores 132 71f, 46:3 Ferroalloys -18 503 :358 Corn 75 538 104 a Estimated Not available. in gold prices-back to the $800 to $9(1(1 levels of 1980-are poor, however, without an inflationary surge in the United States and other industrial nations, or some other unpredictable factor such as it major intensification of conflict in the Middle East- default by one or more of the principal debtor nations, or faltering of the US economic recovery. Given the unpredictability of gold prices, South Africa's annual rate of real economic growth in 1984-90 is likely to average only about 2.5 to 3.0 percent. The Regional Economic Situation 51. Despite the limitations for sustained growth predicted. South Africa's economic growth during 1978-83 averaged more than four times the pace of the combined average rate of its 10 nearest regional neighbors-Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi- Mo- zambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zaire. Zambia, and Zimbabwe (see table 4). South African GDP accounted for three-fourths of the regional total in 198:3 Zinlha- bwe was second, with a GDP less than one-tenth of South Africa's total, and only one-third as large on it per capita basis. South African GDP, moreover, to- taled three and a half times the combined output of the members of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, the regional grouping of nine of South Africa's neighbors-excluding Zairc- that was designed to reduce their economic depend- ence on South Africa, and this gap will not narrow significantly during the period of this Estimate. 52. Regional Economic Linkages. Business initia- tives by South African companies and public torpors 13 SECRET Table 4 Selected Economic Comparisons of Southern African Countries GDP 1953 (Billion C'S Si GDP per Capita. 1953 Acrrnge.Annual Real Growth in Total Trade, 1982 (Billion Employ mcnt in Alanufacturing Populaliuus Iqs' Wrillmn preven ('S5) GDP. 19T8-fib Fe roe" US SI 3 7musand e(rsone SouthAl rita -90 2.600 1,474 309 Ol her soul here Africa 26.6 290 549 91 7 Of wlach Angela 3.6 470 0 2-8 10 Botswana 0.9 9(X) 12.1 .1 4 I.0 Lesotho 0-4 a 290 100 0..5 4 I.- Malawi I3 200 3.3 05 42 00 Mozambique I5 120 :30' 0.1 10 I$1l Swaziland 0- 1,170. :3 5 0 14 06 1anzaniu 4.6 220 -04 1(10 20.5 Zaire 3.6 120 0 100 31 2 Zambia 3.4 540 06 80 0.3 Zimbabwe fi 5 SIX) 42 177) 51 SADCC.1 2J9 380 1) 7 449 00 3 f stimated Data arc for 1981. SAD(t. includes all of Zaire Lions and the attraction of job and marketing opportu- pities in South Africa have created a web of economic ties het ecn South Africa and most southern African black states. Athile the regional economic ties are beneficial to both South Africa and its neighbors, the vast difference in size and degree of self-sufficiency between the formers economy and the collective economies of the others makes the ties much more important to the smaller countries. 53. Transport Ties. All of the southern African nations except Lesotho are linked by rail to eight ports in South Africa and Namibia. Lesotho, an enclave within South Africa. uses truck routes from South African ports. The five landlocked countries on the rail system-Botswana, Malawi, Sr'aziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-and the Shaba Region of Zaire are forced to rely mainly on South African ports, because guerril- la activity and poor maintenance on the rail links to the Angolan port of Lobito and to Mozambique's three ports seriously reduce the capacity of these alternative outlets. Zaire's port at Matadi, and Tanzania's at Dar es Salaam, which is connected to the common rail system, could not handle more than their present Traffic without substantial upgrading of facilities. 5-4. Nontransport Ties. The three major nontran- sport ties-trade, investment, and migrant labor-arc net earners of foreign exchange for South Africa. In 1980. South Africa netted $1 S billion from thew relationships (see table 5). South Africa is the source of about one-third of the regions imports, including practically all of the imports of Rotsvana. Lesotho, and Swaziland, although most of the neighboring stales have their largest export market overseas. 55. Remittances to the black states by more than 200,000 migrant workers in South Africa totaled ?$-100- 500 million in 198:3. Such remittances are major sources of foreign exchange for Botswana. Lesotho. \lalasci, Mozambique, and Swaziland- For South Afri- ca, access to foreign migrants provides a umch larc- er-and thus cheaper-pool of labor than would otherwise be available. This is particularly- important to the mining sector, which relies on migrants for slightly rrrore than one-fourth of its black labor force. (See table 6.) 56. South ;Africa is also the major source of capital investment in the region, taking in more from divi- dends and profits on the operation of the branches and subsidiaries of South African companies in these 14 SECRET Fable 5 South Africa: Trade with Selected Neighboring States i llillinn (S $) Share of Partner- Countrs Trade P(rcenry -fo .~ntl hrm 1lrica Il wlncl~ Vngnla 25 2 lints..ui,i 61N1 91 ~znt 1511 97 VI.Ila,si 162 3- VI"rembiq ur! 5)1 20 Sn .'I"I11 561 97 1 "T11,111, 14 1 /.Iirr a n'e I+ 7..un hla ^ 81 I l /.imbahwr 435 27 hntn,rts Penn e,u them Afnca )f ,r hit IT V1121'1( 104) Rut wan.' 33 24 Vlalawl 9 \tkvanrhiquc I5 10 S.. enlmul 106 30 "I ,uieenm 12 2 Ldr~ .aa Vea /amhin 5 1EC1. /imbohsse 299 22 halim.ded " Data err for 1979 uala ure for 1951 ?1 Ant .n,Iilahle Table 6 South Africa: Origin of Foreign Mine Workers 1983 19711 1975 196)) 196S (sfllllon ('S S) Total 303 262 215 213 Of which: A nKola - ^ - - Botswana 16 17 C Is Lesotho 71 105 1^_1 I17 \lalawl 90 5' 14 111 Mozambique 113 11s 78 45 Swaziland 5 7 I8 19 Tanzania Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe neighboring states than is returned in the form of new funding for capital investmcnt- 57 Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are the most dependent. Botstana for investment and technical and managerial inputs to mining (one-fourth of GDP), Lmothu for remittances from migrant labor (three- fourths of ( ' DP), and Su:aailand for revenues from tourism and for investment (probably more than three- Since 1950, mine workers hate nmde up about hco-t hints of t lu? total number of migrant ,orkev, in South Africa from the southern .African region, ac-cording to our estinlates h Dashes indicate less than 5,000 worker, r LitImated fourths of GDP). South Africa also provides an clement of grant aid to all three through the Southern African Customs Lnion (SACL), an organization created to promote regional trade during the colonial period Allocations from SACC, including the grant aid, make up more than half of the total government revenues of Lesotho and Swaziland and about one-third of Botswana's. 58. Mozambique's experience since independence in 1975 illustrates the importance of South Africa to the smaller regional economies. Before independence, fees from port and rail shipments, remittances fronn migrant labor (including a large element of grant aid), and tourist spending totaled it South African Iran,der to Mozambique of more than $200 million annually in foreign exchange, roughly offsetting the latter's chron- ic overseas trade deficit After independence, mutual political distrust and it steep decline in the reliabilits of Mozambican transportation facilities (fo.loscing the 1975-76 departure of Portuguese techni(-ians) induced South Africa to reduce its trade shipments through Maputo, cut hiring of migrant labor, and virtualh end tourist travel. The severing of these revenues was it major factor in Mozambique's subsequent di.uutrolls economic performance. Renewal of economic ties with South Africa was thus one of the principal incentives for Maputo to sign the Nkonmti mutual security agreement in March 1984. 15 SECRET 59. The Zimbabwean economy is the most sensitive in the region to swings in South African consumer spending, as sales of manufactured goods in the rela- tively large South African rnarket account for more than one-fourth of total Zimbabwean exports. This linkage. and the similarity of South African and Zimbabwean mineral exports and weather patterns, tend to result in tandem economic growth trends for the two economies. 60. Among the other states, Malawi. Zaire, and Zambia import South African manufactured goods and look to South African companies for technical expertise, investment capital, and entrepreneurial ini- tiatives. Angola and 'T'anzania disclaim any significant economic relations with South Africa. but scattered reporting indicates that South African canned foods and other processed goods appear from time to time on their store shelves and on black markets. Angola relies on DeBeers Corporation of South Africa to operate its diamond mines. Prospects for the Regional Economies 61. Average economic growth by South Africa's regional neighbors probably will rise marginally dur- ing the last half of the 1980s, but it is unlikely to match or exceed the expected 2.5- to 3.0-percent growth rate in South Africa. The entire region will suffer from the impact of stagnant gold production in South Africa. decline in expansion of South African demand for migrant labor and imported commodities, and a re- duced availability of South African venture funds for capital investment. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland will be hurt because the rate of growth of customs revenues will fall as South Africa cuts imports. 62 Although Zimbabwe and Mozambique can look forward with fair confidence to improved growth, these prospects are derived from the likely end of the three-year drought rather than any surge in develop- ment. Mozambique also may benefit to some extent front the N1