SURINAME: BOUTERSE'S LEFTWARD DRIFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00217R000500040002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 27, 1984
• Content Type: SNIE

Director of
Central
Intelligence
Suriname: Bouterse's
Leftward Drift
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
Secret
SNIE 87.4-84
27 November 1984
Copy 473
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S N I E 87.4-84
SURINAME: BOUTERSE'S
LEFTWARD DRIFT
Information available as of 21 November
1984 was used in the preparation of this
Estimate, which was approved by the Nation-
al Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
The Current Government ................................................................ 5
Resurgence of the Radicals .............................................................. 6
Weakness of the Moderates .............................................................. 7
Economic Deterioration ................................................................... 8
Brazilian and Dutch Assistance ....................................................... 9
Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union ......................................... 9
Possible Threats to Bouterse ............................................................. 10
Outlook and Implications for US Interests ..................................... 12
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SCOPE NOTE
The possibility that Suriname, a small, sparsely populated country
on the northeastern shoulder of South America, might fall into Havana's
orbit has been a cause for concern since shortly after the military
regime of Desire Bouterse came to power in 1980. The arrival of Cuban
Ambassador Cardenas was followed in short order by an increased
Cuban presence. The Cuban presence was abruptly terminated in late
1983, when diplomatic relations were downgraded in the wake of
Grenada. The Soviets remained active in Suriname, however, and they
Recently, there have been indications that Bouterse would like to
revive the formerly close relationship with Havana, again raising
concerns the country might fall under Castro's influence. This Estimate
examines the chances that Havana will renew its foothold in Suriname,
as well as the prospects for a return to civilian democractic rule and eco-
nomic stability over the next year or so. It also assesses the future of Bra-
zilian and Dutch influence in Suriname as an alternative to an increased
Soviet/Cuban role. Finally, it addresses the implications for the United
may be working to facilitate a return of the Cubans
States of various possible outcomes.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Commander Bouterse appears to be solidly entrenched as the ruler
of Suriname. His regime is not popular but has been passively accepted
out of fear that overt opposition could provoke the military to a
renewed round of violence. Increasing economic hardship and social
unrest over the next three to six months, however, may lead to an open
challenge to his regime. This challenge would probably originate with
organized labor within Suriname, rather than the Netherlands-based
exile groups, which enjoy little public support or credibility=
We believe Bouterse remains unwilling to relinquish any power by
permitting significant movement back toward democracy. The moder-
ates-business and labor leaders-no longer believe a truly democratic
evolution is possible, but they are likely to continue to participate in the
"social partnership" with the military in order to retain some influence
with Bouterse, protect their economic interests, and offset the influence
of Bouterse's radical advisers. Few of the moderates appear bold enough
to challenge Bouterse directly and risk a repetition of the December
1982 massacre of opposition leaders. El
Radical leftist advisers such as Harvey Naarendorp and leaders of
the Revolutionary People's Party (RVP) are using their influence over
Bouterse to undermine the private sector, neutralize prodemocratic
initiatives, and establish an apparatus of control based on the Cuban
model. The ultimate loyalty of these radical advisers is open to question,
but they are willing to cooperate with Bouterse and take advantage of
his leftist tendencies despite his erratic nature. In any event, they do not
have sufficiently good relations with the military to be able to
overthrow Bouterse within the next year or so. ^
Several of Bouterse's key military aides are opposed to leftist
politics and may also harbor ambitions to seize power for themselves. In
addition, members of the rank and file increasingly have voiced their
dissatisfaction to senior officers on a variety of issues. The military are
unlikely to take strong action unless Bouterse appears to be losing
control. We do not, however, have sufficient information to make a
definitive judgment on the reliability of the military in extreme
circumstances.)
The "social partnership" among the military, labor, and business
will probably survive beyond the current government of figurehead
Prime Minister Udenhout as long as Bouterse does not attempt to
impose too many radicals in key ministerial positions. Nevertheless, a
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somewhat less moderate cabinet government probably will replace the
Udenhout team sometime early next year. It may well be given a
mandate to establish some kind of pseudodemocratic institution, such as
an "advisory assembly." It is unlikely, however, that Bouterse will allow
either direct popular election of its members or party-based candida-
cies.
While Bouterse himself is not ideologically sophisticated, we
believe he is emotionally committed to "the revolution." Even substan-
tial Western economic support would be unlikely to alter his basic
orientation. Moreover, leftist ideals and organizational techniques pro-
vide him with the means to perpetuate his position-which is his
overriding goal-while appearing "progressive." The primary factors
limiting Bouterse's ability to pursue his leftist domestic and internation-
al objectives are his fear of possible US intervention and his concern
about a mass uprising.F_~
Brazil continues to keep its military assistance program
alive, but the economic assistance program has been relatively unpro-
ductive. Because the Brazilian opening to Paramaribo was orginally
undertaken to provide an alternative to Cuban military and economic
aid, any return of Cuban diplomats to Suriname would be regarded as a
setback by Brasilia. Whether the Brazilians would respond by terminat-
ing assistance or taking measures to make it more effective is unclear,
but either is more likely than direct Brazilian military intervention.F
We believe there is little or no prospect of a resumption of the
Netherlands' massive aid program within the next year.
Suriname is unlikely to reach an agreement with the IMF to
alleviate its severe financial problems because of business, labor, and
popular opposition to any significant tax increase. The government will
probably attempt to cope with its economic crisis by reducing its
developmental budget, improving collection of existing taxes, attempt-
ing to obtain loans from nontraditional sources, and making efforts to
extract financial concessions from the foreign-owned bauxite industry.
The Soviet Union has increased its level of activity and influence in
Suriname since Cuba's departure.
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Bouterse would like to restore an amicable relationship with Cuba
Castro, for his
part, probably is not anxious to resume relations with Suriname unless
he can do so on his terms, despite possible urgings by the Soviets.
Although the Cubans appear to have accepted, in principle, the
idea of a renewed presence, there probably are still disagreements about
the level of diplomatic representation. Nevertheless, it is possible that a
small, low-profile Cuban mission will be reestablished in Suriname
within the next 12 months.
While Bouterse
wants to move Suriname down a revolutionary path, he does not want
independent challenges to his own power base. Thus, he probably will
not permit the presence of Cuban military advisers in Suriname.
A critical factor in developments over the next year will be the
pace and direction of change that leftist radicals are able to achieve:
- One key indicator will be the extent to which Bouterse's own
political organization, the 25 February Movement, is given a
formal role to play. If the Movement becomes strong enough to
play a major and direct role in government, the pace of
political, social, and economic radicalization could quicken
dramatically. Over the medium and long term, this trend would
be likely to lead to pauperization of the economy, nationaliza-
tion of the bauxite industry, regimentation of political and social
life, and closer ties to Cuba, the Soviet Bloc, and the hardline
wing of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).
- If, on the other hand, organized labor is willing and able to
challenge Bouterse more effectively than it has in the past,
particularly through strikes in the vital bauxite industry, moder-
ate forces may gain greater influence and limit the leftward
drift. Bouterse may then calculate that his best course is to
permit a sufficient democratic opening to attract a renewal of
Dutch economic aid. While he may hope to buy off organized
labor, he probably would still crack down hard if he sees his
own rule in danger.
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DISCUSSION
1. Suriname has experienced continued political
turmoil since 25 February 1980, when a group of
Army sergeants, led by present Commander in Chief
Desire Bouterse, overthrew the elected civilian gov-
ernment less than five years after the Netherlands had
granted independence to its former colony. Bouterse
subsequently proscribed the traditional political par-
ties and banned all opposition to his regime. In
December 1982, Bouterse executed democratic oppo-
sition leaders, and the Dutch responded by terminat-
ing their generous aid program. Cuba's influence
continued to grow despite efforts by Brazil to stem the
tide. In April 1983, Brazil offered economic and
military aid in exchange for a reduction in the Cuban
role, while threatening to intervene if the offer were
refused. Suriname's flirtation with Havana seemed at
an end in October 1983, however, when, in the wake
of Grenada, Bouterse sent home the Cuban Ambassa-
dor. Bouterse greatly admired Maurice Bishop and he
feared that growing Cuban involvement with Suri-
namese radicals threatened his own position. Castro
responded by closing his entire mission.
2. The closure of the Cuban Embassy was a setback
to pro-Cuban radicals in Suriname. It was followed a
few months later by the collapse of the Socialist
government of Prime Minister Alibux, whose cabinet
contained a number of radicals associated with the
pro-Cuban Revolutionary People's Party (RVP). Ali-
bux had ordered taxes increased in December 1983 in
an effort to deal with the country's serious economic
crisis, and workers in the vital bauxite industry re-
sponded by launching a prolonged and crippling
strike. Bouterse demanded that the union leaders bring
their rank and file into line, but the workers rebelled.
Sporadic sympathy strikes broke out in other sectors,
and leaflets circulating demands for a restoration of
democracy began to appear.
force only as a last resort to rea t e auxite union.
However, he feared that a new bloodbath might well
provoke direct US intervention. Rather than take such
a risk, he chose to compromise and widen his base of
support. He discharged the Alibux government, sus-
pended the new taxes, and offered business and labor
a voice in government in exchange for their support.
To gain that support, he was forced to leave the
radicals out of the new cabinet and agree to take steps
to return to democracy.
The Current Government
4. Creation of a new "social partnership" in early
1984 among the military, labor, and business resolved
the immediate political crisis. The workers returned to
their jobs, and after several weeks of negotiations
between the three parties an interim cabinet was
installed. The new cabinet, led by current moderate
Prime Minister Wim Udenhout, was publicly given
two mandates: to make plans to solve the financial and
economic crisis that had followed the suspension of
Dutch aid, and to "propose" future democratic struc-
tures. F__1
5. To satisfy the demands for progress toward
democracy, Bouterse also appointed a "think tank"
containing three Bouterse appointees, two labor repre-
sentatives, and two business representatives. The three
groups were tasked to come up with a proposed new
democratic structure for Suriname. Labor has pro-
posed the holding of elections by December 1986.
Business has proposed that elections be held under a
restructured party system in January 1985. The mili-
tary, which has repeatedly said it will not accept any
version of the old "corrupt" parliamentary democ-
racy, favors some version of "participatory democ-
racy" but has not spelled out what this means. Ulti-
mately, of course, Bouterse will make the decision, and
we do not believe he will grant any real powers to the
new structure.
6. The cabinet itself is composed of five Bouterse
appointees, two labor-appointed ministers, and two
ministers from the business sector. Udenhout, a pleas-
ant and erudite literature teacher with no independent
political base, has attempted to move the new govern-
ment toward closer relations with traditional Western
friends. However, the Bouterse appointees-particu-
larly Fong Poen (Trade) and Tjon Kie Sim (Energy)-
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have tended to dominate cabinet meetings and inter-
fere in the operation of the ministries headed by
representatives of the other "social partners." Finance
Minister Chehin (one of the business representatives)
has found that he is unable to subject the military to
fiscal discipline, and has yet to get agreement on any
budget to deal with the escalating fiscal emergency. E
7. The growing paralysis in government led Bou-
terse to create yet another high-level body in June
1984, the so-called Topberaad or supreme council. It
was initially composed of Bouterse, Capt. Iwan Graan-
oogst, and Lt. Paul Bhagwandas from the military
authority, the leaders of the four major labor federa-
tions, and four business representatives. Its ostensible
purpose is to resolve divisions among cabinet members
and give the cabinet "political guidance." In fact, it
has functioned to exacerbate divisions between the
moderates. Udenhout came close to resigning to pro-
test its creation, because it undermined his cabinet's
authority. However, the issue was resolved by appoint-
ing Udenhout himself to the body.)
Resurgence of the Radicals
8. A number of the RVP radicals who were forced
out of the government in January have since found
new homes in the ministries held by Fong Poen and
Tjon Kie Sim. Lt. Badressein Sital, former Mobiliza-
tion Minister and an ardent supporter of Cuba, re-
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turned from an extended leave in Havana and is now
serving in the Ministry of Health. An RVP Labor
Minister in the Alibux government was appointed a
member of the Advisory Council charged with over-
sight of government operations. Alibux's Minister of
Education (also RVP) has been named an "ambassador
extraordinary and plenipotentiary" with responsibil-
final arbiter of the "revolution," and its written
program-showing a marked preference for authori-
tarian, mass-based political and economic systems, as
well as "participatory" democracy-verges on usurpa-
tion of governmental functions and objectives
ities not specified.
9. Radicals now entrenched in the Ministry of
Transport, Trade, and Industry have used their posi-
tions to obstruct Udenhout's plans to bring Suriname
into the CBI (Caribbean Basin Initiative) and to
propagandize Ministry employees. They are using
their discretion over the granting of foreign exchange
to penalize businessmen who harbor antimilitary or
"antirevolutionary" views and to facilitate the impor-
tation of nonessential imports as favors to political or
personal friends, and for their own profit. Radicals at
the university, with the help of Bouterse's interven-
tion, have crippled a new oversight committee set up
by the moderate Education Minister to restore tradi-
tional academic standards and practices to higher
education. Within the Foreign Ministry (under Uden-
hout) RVP supporters have continued to conduct a
foreign policy that is distinctly "anti-imperialist" in
rhetoric
10. In addition, Bouterse has given new momentum
to the activities of an embryonic radical political
party, the 25 February Movement. This Movement is
apparently the brainchild of Harvey Naarendorp, who
favors a pervasive ruling party on the Cuban model.
The Movement is headed by an executive committee
consisting of Bouterse (president), Lieutenant Bhag-
wandas (treasurer), and Capt. Etienne Boerenveen
(secretary). Subordinate to the executive committee is
a political advisory committee, whose membership
includes Naarendorp as head of the propaganda de-
11. Despite official disclaimers, the 25 February
Movement is a creature of the government, which
pays the salaries of its functionaries, puts government
offices, vehicles, and infrastructure at its disposal for
organizing rallies and demonstrations, and tolerates
absenteeism from assigned duties if the time is spent
working for the Movement. It holds itself up as the
Weakness of the Moderates
14. While labor and business participants have
worked vigorously to moderate the course of the
regime, the results of their efforts so far have been
marginal. Some of the private media organs that were
shut down in December 1982 have been allowed to
reopen, but they remain subject to heavy editorial
interference. Few, if any, incentives have been of-
fered, and the conditions under which local business-
men must operate have become even more restrictive.
The moderates' domination of the ministries they
received in January has been eroded by radicals
within the ministries, bureaucratic subversion carried
out by Bouterse's ministerial appointees, and the in-
creasing pressure exerted by the 25 February Move-
ment
15. Nevertheless, labor and business appear to have
concluded that some influence is better than none.
Labor has apparently been successful in derailing an
unwelcome tax increase, and businessmen at least have
a legitimized channel for communicating their con-
cerns to Bouterse. Moreover, as long as sectoral griev-
ances can be privately aired, the moderates feel there
is less likelihood of a recurrence of the dread events of
December 1982.
16. Labor still has considerable clout with Bouterse,
primarily because the commander fears that labor
unrest could pose a serious threat to his regime. The
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wildcat bauxite strike a year ago demonstrated that
the workers can challenge both the government and
their own leaders. The most influential of the labor
leaders is Fred Derby of the C-47 Union Federation,
who was instrumental in working out the final com-
promises that ended the bauxite strike in January.
Derby, who is highly ambitious but not personally
popular, has taken increasingly combative positions in
recent months in his effort to maintain the loyalty of
his workers. The influence labor wields, however, is
undermined by three other factors-the inability of
the leaders of the rival federations to maintain a
united front against Bouterse, the labor leaders' fear
that Bouterse will hold them responsible if labor unrest
becomes severe, and the imperfect hold the leaders
have on their ill-disciplined rank and file. F_~
Economic Deterioration
17. Under the combined impact of a deteriorating
world market for bauxite, governmental paralysis,
leftist economic meddling, the debilitating bauxite
strike last year, and the continued suspension of Dutch
aid, the Surinamese economy has been rapidly declin-
ing. Foreign exchange reserves declined from approxi-
mately $175 million in December 1982 to about $18
million recently. The government is beginning to sell
gold to meet its financial obligations.
18. The government has been unable to borrow
foreign funds from either governmental or commer-
cial sources, and suppliers frequently must wait at
least three weeks for letters of credit to be honored.
Local bankers say that in the present conditions any
future interruption of bauxite-related exports due to
work stoppages would have catastrophic effects within
two to three weeks on Suriname's ability to pay
foreign creditors. (c)
19. Suriname has failed to meet payments on two
major international loans so far this year. In May the
government failed to make a $1.13 million repayment
of capital and interest to the Amsterdam office of the
ABN Bank on a railroad project. At the end of June
the government stopped payment of the first $1.7
million installment to a Brazilian arms supplier. More-
over, the government has never repaid the $17 million
it borrowed from the Central Bank in early 1984.
Several oil companies may demand advance payment
against future deliveries.
payment delays by increasing the asking price. Fur-
ther evidence of decline is the steady increase in
black-market financing of food imports from neigh-
boring French Guiana. Tires, auto parts, potatoes,
onions, cheese, and other imported food items are
difficult to find. The magnitude of the possible impact
of foreign supplier cutoffs can be gauged from the fact
that Suriname's imports are equivalent to 45 percent
of GDP.
21. The government also faces a serious problem
with domestic expenditures. Finance Minister Chehin,
in a report to the Topberaad in July, estimated that the
government is facing a L
for calendar year 1984.
22.
the government is a so -Privately seeking large loans
from several unusual foreign sources, which are very
unlikely to materialize.
also exploring the possibility of borrowing from un-
specified drug traffickers.
23. Chehin's options in dealing with the deficit and
balance-of-payments problems are tightly restricted
by several factors. First, the military has refused to cut
its own spending excesses, and Bouterse insists that the
Army receive at least 10 percent of the budget.
Second, government is the largest employer in Suriname,
providing nearly 40 percent of all jobs, and the "social
partners" are extremely reluctant to reduce the public
payroll out of fear of generating a new wave of public
unrest. Third, the same fear-combined with the
determined and self-interested opposition of both la-
bor and business-prevents the government from
reaching agreement on any significant new tax in-
creases.
24. The governmental partners have apparently
agreed that the economic measures that the IMF
would require before providing economic assistance
are politically impossible. Influential businessmen and
bankers consider devaluation pointless and unneces-
sary.
foreign suppliers have become
much more cautious about exporting to Suriname.
Offshore suppliers are compensating for anticipated
Thus, no
agreement wig the IMF is likely in the foreseeable
future.
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25. In the meantime, the government's price con-
trol system has predictably resulted in a rash of
commodity shortages, while the ban on laying off of
workers without government consent threatens a num-
ber of firms with bankruptcy. Nevertheless, while
capital flight continues at a steady pace, most of the
private sector is attempting to adapt to the new
conditions. Businessmen who are willing to make
"contributions" to the 25 February Movement or assist
military entrepreneurs to feather their nests find there
is still plenty of money to be made, particularly on the
black market.
26. Scattered labor unrest and wildcat strikes are on
the increase. Labor leadership has generally tried to
convince fractious union locals that wage demands at
this time could cause hard-pressed companies to fold,
resulting in loss of jobs. While these efforts have so far
been reasonably successful, both Bouterse and the
labor leaders believe that unrest may get out of control
if taxes are raised.)
27. The measures Chehin has proposed for reducing
the government's deficit cannot bring it down to
manageable proportions. If the government fails to
find a new source of funds, it may well be forced
within the next several months to print more money to
meet the public payroll. This would further debase the
currency and stimulate a rapid inflationary spiral that
might be difficult to halt.
Brazilian and Dutch Assistance
28. Brazil's effort to displace Cuban influence in
Suriname by forging a strong relationship with the
Bouterse regime met with initial success, but is pro-
ceeding more slowly than expected and has not pro-
gressed much beyond purely military cooperation.
29. Trade relations have been stagnant, primarily
because of Suriname's foreign exchange problems.
Extensive talks have taken place on a Surinamese
purchase of Brazilian telecommunications equipment,
but no contracts have yet been signed. Other current
negotiations, such as a proposed Brazilian purchase of
alumina, involve countertrade rather than hard cur-
rency payment.
30. Brazil will face a difficult decision if the
Cubans return to Suriname. The Foreign Ministry in
Brasilia views the Cuban departure as proof of the
success of its current policy. Thus, any renewed Cuban
presence-even a small one-may take on the appear-
ance of a setback. While it is unlikely that Brazil
would intervene militarily in Suriname
In our view, Brasilia's reaction
to a renewal of Suriname's Cuban ties would be
conditioned by the nature and extent of these new
relations.)
I the Suriname question has remained politically
sensitive for the Dutch, because the various coalition
partners in the Netherlands Government have strongly
opposing views about whether any real dialogue with
the Bouterse government is possible.
32. In a July press conference, Bouterse disclosed
that the talks were taking place. The Dutch Foreign
Ministry
issued a cold statement reaffirming that "full normal-
ization can occur only when concrete measures are
taken on the Surinamese side in the area of the rule of
law and a return to democracy. It has been made clear
once again," the Dutch added, "that development
cooperation cannot be resumed as long as these steps
have not been taken." The Dutch then broke off the
talks.
Whether or not the leak was intentional, the net
resu t of his disclosure, as well as his continued refusal
to take steps to restore democracy, has been to post-
pone the return of Dutch aid indefinitely
Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union
33. Under growing radical influence, Suriname's
erratic foreign policy has once more begun shifting to
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the left. In July 1984, Bouterse made a high-visibility
trip to the revolutionary anniversary celebrations in
Managua. While there, he stated that Nicaragua and
Suriname share a "common enemy" and commended
the Nicaraguan Government for its "fierce fight
against imperialism." Bouterse apparently found com-
mon ground with both Sandinista leader Daniel Orte-
ga and Ghanaian leader Jerry Rawlings, who visited
Bouterse in Suriname several days after the latter's
return.
34. The Nicaraguan trip was made over Brazil's
protest. While Brazilian diplomats made light of the
trip after the fact, calling it a fiasco, it may well
indicate a weakening of Brazil's influence. Neverthe-
less, Bouterse was determined to make the trip to
reestablish his revolutionary credentials.
35. No public mention was made of any talks in
Nicaragua between Bouterse and the Cuban delega-
tion. However, there have been reports that the two
countries have been discussing a normalization of
relations, perhaps as a result of Soviet urgings.
Havana, despite the
humiliation of its October 1983 departure, is in princi-
ple prepared to return to Paramaribo but wants to do
so on its own terms. There reportedly is still disagree-
ment, for example, about the size and level of the new
Cuban mission, with Bouterse apparently insisting that
it be low-level and small. It remains to be seen what
Cuba will be willing to offer Suriname in terms of
much-needed economic assistance, and what Bouterse
will be willing to provide in return.
36. Meanwhile, relations with the Soviet Union
.have been warming gradually. Soviet efforts to culti-
vate organized labor began shortly after the end of the
bauxite workers' strike, when representatives of three
of the four major labor federations attended May Day
37. Soviet technicians arrived in April 1984 to
install donated TASS equipment, and the Suriname
news agency receives six hours a day of TASS service
free of charge. The TASS items are used extensively
both by government media and the privately owned
media, which are pressured to run them. F
38. The Soviets are currently expanding their com-
pound. When the expansion is complete, the Soviets
may be able to increase their staff from the current 10
members to about 20. However, even after such an
expansion, the Soviet mission would still be considera-
bly smaller than the Brazilian Embassy.
39. While most of the Soviet efforts have been low-
key, Bubnov is reportedly becoming involved with the
RVP,
40. Nevertheless, the Soviets have not stepped forth
with substantial economic aid or trade offers. While
there has been some increase in Soviet commercial
activity, trade prospects are limited by Suriname's
critical shortage of foreign exchange. F
41. Suriname is considering upgrading its relations
with North Korea and Libya. In October 1984 the
government disclosed that it plans to accept a nonresi-
dent ambassador from North Korea. This establish-
ment of formal relations may facilitate arms transfers
contemplated in an agreement negotiated with
P'yongyang in 1982. Moreover, a Libyan delegation
visited Suriname later that month, and discussions
were held regarding the opening of a "people's
bureau"-the Libyan equivalent of an embassy-in
Paramaribo.
42. While neither the domestic radicals nor the
moderates currently pose a real threat to Bouterse,
escalating economic problems may worsen the recent
round of wildcat strikes and lead to antigovernment
demonstrations. In the vital bauxite industry, a crisis is
probably inevitable if the government tries to reim-
pose the tax increases that triggered the December
1983 strike. If unrest reaches a critical level, Bouterse's
survival would depend on the loyalty of the military
and other security forces.
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44. Military pay has been raised substantially by
Bouterse, and this has probably had a perceptible
effect on morale. He has also bought the continued
loyalty of key military aides with expensive presents
and opportunities for graft and corruption. And the
surviving active members of the original perpetrators
of the 1980 coup-the so-called "Group of 16"-are
tied to Bouterse by the fear that, if he were ever
overthrown, they would be brought to justice for their
various excesses.
45. Even so, enlisted men still have painful memo-
ries of the dark days after December 1982, when
civilians abused and derided them on the streets, and
many probably would passively refuse to participate
in any violent suppression of a civil insurrection. If
popular unrest appeared to be getting out of control, it
is conceivable that certain members of the military
would attempt to overthrow Bouterse and seize power
for themselves. In the event of such a coup attempt,
most enlisted men would probably support whichever
side appeared likely to prevail.
46. Another longer term threat to the regime is the
radical left, including the RVP extremists who until
last October were working closely with the
Most of these intellectual leftists are
despised by the military, and would pose a danger
only if they were receiving advice and support from
some other quarter, such as the Soviet or Cuban
Embassy. It can be assumed that if the Cubans reopen
an embassy in Paramaribo, the risks of this happening
would be increased. Bouterse is, therefore, likely to
keep any future Cuban presence to a minimum and
maintain close surveillance of its members.
47. A third but relatively minor threat to the
regime is posed by the activities of the Netherlands-
based exiles who have grouped themselves under
Henk Chin A Sen's Council for the Liberation of
Suriname (CLS). This group, which apparently orga-
nized a small, abortive "mercenary invasion" from
neighboring French Guiana last April, has little credi-
bility with Surinamers and no visible in-country net-
work of support. Chin A Sen would not be welcomed
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by most Surinamers, in part because he served as
Bouterse's first Prime Minister.
will attempt to overthrow Bouterse. If economic unrest
reaches the point of massive civil insurrection, how-
ever, Bouterse might not be able to count on solid
Outlook and Implications for US Interests
48. The impact of many coming developments in
Suriname on US interests will depend on whether the
existing "social partnership"-or some comparable
coalition that includes a moderate element-survives
after the end of this year, when Udenhout's mandate is
scheduled to expire. The most probable alternative to
the present arrangement is a less moderate cabinet,
including such elements as RVP officials and members
49. Even if the partnership continues, Bouterse will
continue to wield preeminent power. We do not
believe he will concede real authority to any of the
pseudodemocratic structures he may create in re-
sponse to pressures from the moderates. The radicals
probably will continue to consolidate their penetration
of the bureaucracy, the university, and the media. The
authority of cabinet moderates is likely to be increas-
ingly eroded by pressure from the 25 February Move-
ment
50. As long as moderate leadership elements accept
the current "social partnership" with its opportunity
for limited policy influence, Bouterse is unlikely to
take violent action to eliminate or suppress them.
However, any serious public challenge to the legitima-
cy of the military regime would risk violent repression.
51. The economic crisis is likely to put increasing
strains on the "social partnership," particularly if
bauxite production continues to decline substantially
over the next year. Labor and business interests proba-
bly will collide on potential wage and tax issues. In
addition, while Bouterse will put pressure on labor
leaders to keep their rank-and-file workers in line, the
latter will become increasingly difficult to appease as
their purchasing power declines. Any attempts to deal
with the crisis by wholesale layoffs in the public sector
will be particularly contentious. Moreover, the US-
and Dutch-owned bauxite companies may pull out of
Suriname altogether if another major strike takes
place.
52. As long as the relative political status quo
prevails, it is unlikely that any elements of the military
53. In the event that labor and business withdraw
from the government, the field would be open for a
more dramatic shift to the left. Bouterse would proba-
bly attempt to disguise the radical coloration of the
new government by appointing relatively apolitical
nonentities to ministerial positions, but direction and
guidance would tend to come from his radical advis-
ers. The radicals, if unhindered by opposing influ-
ences, would impose increasingly onerous restrictions
on the private sector, forcing many firms into bank-
ruptcy and exacerbating unemployment. Some of the
RVP activists who participated in the Alibux govern-
ment may continue to advocate nationalization of the
banking and insurance sector, and perhaps even the
bauxite-aluminum sector.
54. Nevertheless, while the US-dominated alumi-
num industry may be subjected to verbal ideological
attacks, we do not anticipate any attempts at expropri-
ation or nationalization in the near term. The local
Alcoa subsidiary enjoys a good working relationship
with the government, in large part because of the
perception that any punitive moves against the com-
pany would be economically counterproductive and
might provoke US intervention. We can expect, how-
ever, that the government will try to extract the
maximum amount of foreign exchange.
55. We believe Surinamese foreign policy will con-
tinue to vacillate, but radicals are likely to play an
increasing role in policy formulation. Suriname proba-
bly will increasingly identify itself with the Non-
aligned Movement, and its rhetoric will remain solidly
anti-imperialist. Cuba may return to establish a rela-
tively small mission, but without military advisers.
Cuba or the Soviet Union might also be willing to
provide a modest amount of economic assistance, and
North Korea may provide some military assistance.
However, Bouterse would be reluctant to accept large
numbers of foreign experts and advisers-particularly
Cubans-because of his security concerns.
56. On the other hand, we believe that Bouterse
may decide to allow some democratic opening in the
hopes of appeasing both Surinamese labor and The
Hague. One of his primary concerns is the high
potential for labor unrest. In our judgment, Bouterse
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Any moves toward liberalization, however, would be hardline position
probably will try to avoid a confrontation with labor, largely cosmetic and would proceed slowly and cau-
fearing that it ultimately might escalate into a serious tiously. At the same time, if such moves were unsuc-
threat to his power and possibly bring US intervention. cessful or backfired, Bouterse would then revert to a
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