CUBAN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG TRAFFICKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence'
Secret
MI LLM 84-10010
December 1984
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NI JIM 84-10010
CUBAN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
IN DRUG TRAFFICKING
Information available as of 23 November 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Havana's Involvement in Drug Trafficking .................................... 7
Official Support ............................................................................. 7
Cuban Motives .............................................................................. 8
The Trafficking Network Associated With Cuba ........................... 8
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Logistics Support to Drug Traffickers ............................................. 11
Use of Cuban Airspace ................................................................. 11
Use of Cuban Waters and Ports .................................................. 11
Activity Associated With Cuban-Supported Drug Trafficking...... 12
Money Laundering ....................................................................... 12
Shipments of Embargoed Goods .................................................. 14
Arms Smuggling ............................................................................ 14
The Nicaraguan-Cuban Drug Connection ...................................... 17
Implications for US Policy ............................................................... 17
........... 21
ANNEX B: Cuban Drug Policy ........................................................... 25
.......... 29
ANNEX D: Chronology ....................................................................... 31
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum addresses Cuban Government
involvement in drug trafficking, explores Cuban motives, and discusses
the implications for US policy. It represents a joint effort of members of
the Intelligence Community, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the US Customs Service, and the US Coast Guard
It is important to bear in mind that Cuban support to drug
trafficking has not had a major impact on the total amount of drugs
smuggled into the United States annually. Cuban involvement, howev-
er, has implications for US drug law-enforcement efforts and policy
interests in the Western Hemisphere.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
some of which could help to finance subversive activities
Cuban involvement in drug trafficking may help to promote
Cuban political objectives in the Western Hemisphere. Cuban intelli-
gence officers have developed links to drug traffickers that enable them
to promote intelligence operations and subversive activities. A Cuban-
supported drug trafficker may have already provided financial backing
for General Directorate for Intelligence political action goals in the
United States. The effectiveness of gunrunners and professional smug-
glers in supplying arms to the Sandinistas in 1979 apparently persuaded
Havana that such connections would be useful in its efforts to arm other
insurgent and terrorist groups. It is likely that Cuba will continue to use
established smuggling networks to transport arms to subversive organi-
zations, and this will enable Cuba to support their operations in the
region while maintaining plausible denial. Also, Havana probably is
counting on continuing to receive hard currency from drug traffickers,
hard currency, and to obtain embargoed goods.
We believe that Havana's objectives for supporting the drug trade
are to promote Cuban subversive activities and political goals, to earn
rather than an arrangement for personal gain
The key Cuban participants in drug trafficking are officers of the
Interior Ministry or of the America Department of the Cuban Commu-
nist Party's Central Committee who are responsible for intelligence
activities and for promoting subversive activities in Latin America.
Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy,
condemnation of traffickers.
We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the
drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban
officials, despite Havana's puritanical stance on drug use and its official
assistance from Cuba.
Cuba currently is supporting drug trafficking, and we believe that
this support will continue during the next few years. Although Havana
is sensitive to US evidence of Cuban involvement in drug trafficking, it
realizes it can benefit from continued participation in the drug trade as
long as it can plausibly deny its support. Furthermore, drug traffickers,
faced with improving enforcement efforts and growing competition
from other emerging trafficking groups, probably will continue to seek
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To minimize the risk of exposure, Havana probably will continue
to deal with selected drug traffickers who are less likely to be
apprehended and who have at their disposal resources and international
connections that Cuba can use to serve its interests. 25X1
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We believe that Cuban involvement in trafficking drugs to the
United States has resulted in serious implications for US drug law
enforcement and foreign policy. For example, recent evidence of
Nicaraguan Government involvement in the drug trade indicated a
strong Cuban connection. Other countries in the region could be
similarly influenced.
Cuban support to drug trafficking probably will make US-spon-
sored drug-interdiction efforts in Latin America more difficult, but will
not significantly increase the number of vessels or aircraft carrying
drugs to the United States because Cuba will continue to support only
selected traffickers. The sanctuary that Cuba provides to drug traffick-
ers
complicates drug-enforcement efforts in the Caribbean:
- Vessels carrying drugs from South America to the United States
frequently use Cuban waters to avoid interdiction, with and
without official Cuban sanction. Cuba has allowed selected
drug-trafficking vessels safe harbor in Cuban ports. We are
aware of suspect vessels that have transited Cuban
waters since 1976. This use of Cuban waters as a safehaven
continues to be a problem for US interdiction efforts.
- Available evidence indicates that Cuba is used as a transship-
ment point for some Colombian drugs bound for the United
States in an effort to circumvent US maritime drug-interdiction
efforts.
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Despite Cuba's strict drug laws, Havana probably will continue to
adapt its drug policy to suit its purposes. Although Havana will continue
to reiterate its record of stringent domestic drug control and occasional-
ly arrest drug traffickers entering its waters and airspace, we judge it
highly unlikely that Havana will cooperate with international drug-
We believe that Havana will remain sensitive to international
accounts of its involvement in drug trafficking. Additional public
pressure, which exposes Havana's direct links to the drug trade, will
help to contain Cuban involvement, but it is unlikely that such publicity
will deter it significantly. Havana will continue to rely on plausible
denial to negate the effect of US accusations while taking greater pains
interdiction efforts.
to mask its activities.
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 DISCUSSION
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Havana's Involvement in Drug Trafficking
Official Support
1. Traditionally, Havana has taken a puritanical
stance on drug abuse, claiming it is symptomatic of
moral weakness and capitalistic decadence. Since the
late 1970s, however, the Cubans have developed a
dual approach to illicit drug traffic: it is still con-
demned in theory and suppressed within Cuba, but it
is condoned in certain circumstances where it can be
used to further Cuban goals. Despite official govern-
ment condemnation of drug trafficking,
aiding selected traffickers engaged in shipping drugs
to the United States. The degree of involvement of
these officials, the coordination their activities require,
and the monolithic nature of the Cuban power struc-
ture strongly suggest that their drug-related activities
are based on sanctioned government policy rather
than personal arrangements with traffickers. We be-
lieve that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and
condones the drug-related activity that is taking place
high-level Cuban officials are
Guillot Lara ' during 1980 and 1981 clearly documents
the high degree of coordination within the Cuban
2. Information concerning drug trafficking by Jaime
with the support of Cuban officials.
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5. Cuban Embassy officials and intelligence officers
also reportedly have facilitated drug trafficking. Offi-
cials of the Cuban Embassies in Bogota and Mexico
City are believed to have assisted Guillot.
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6. We believe that Havana's objectives for support-
ing the drug trade are to promote Cuban subversive
activities and political goals, to earn hard currency,
and to obtain embargoed goods. This judgment is
based on the fact that the key Cuban officials involved
in facilitating trafficking are officers of the MININT
or of the America Department of the Cuban Commu-
nist Party's Central Committee who are responsible
for intelligence activities and for promoting subversive
activities in Latin America.3
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ment, and the overall incentive for drug profits that is
brought about by capitalistic ideology.
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The Trafficking Network Associated With Cuba
10. The MININT oversees drug operations in Cuba,
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7. Havana may perceive support to drug traffickers
as a way to take advantage of the growing US market
for illicit drugs to obtain hard currency. Although we
have been unable to quantify the amount of money
Cuba derives from supporting drug trafficking, we do
not believe it does much to mitigate Cuba's serious
economic problems, if indeed that is their intent.
Instead, these revenues might be used to create slush
funds for intelligence operations or subversive activi-
ties.
8.I important Cuban
motive for supporting drug trafficking in one major
case was to facilitate arms shipments to insurgent and
terrorist groups. Following the fallout from the Guillot
Cuban involvement was not primarily
intended to facilitate drug trafficking, but to use the
established Colombian drug-smuggling networks to
supply the M-19 terrorist group. At that time, the
Cubans apparently figured that trafficking in drugs
was simply a cost incurred as part of the arms trade.F_
9. Havana may attempt to aggravate the US drug
problem to embarrass and corrupt the United States;
however, we have no reliable evidence that indicates
Cuban involvement is intended to demoralize US
society. Cuba does make use of the US drug problem
in its propaganda against the US Government. The
major themes in Cuban commentaries are the duplici-
ty in US drug policy, corruption in US law enforce-
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13. The supply of drugs flowing from South Ameri-
ca is virtually controlled by several groups of major
Colombian traffickers, including Carlos Enrique
Lehder Rivas, who has supplied cocaine to the known
drug trafficker that facilitates Cuba's drug deals.
Lehder, who is under US indictment for cocaine-
trafficking and drug-conspiracy charges, is believed to
be one of the largest suppliers of cocaine to the United
Logistics Support to Drug Traffickers
15.
drug traffickers fly regularly through
Cuban airspace and that vessels carrying drugs from
South America to the United States frequently use
Cuban waters to avoid interdiction.
Use of Cuban Airspace
16. The two Cuban air corridors are part of the
international airways system used daily by commercial
and private aircraft. Some drug traffickers use these
airways because they offer a shorter, safer route to
their destinations, thereby enabling their aircraft to
carry more drugs and to avoid air-interdiction efforts.
Other drug traffickers, however, choose to avoid Cu-
ban airspace rather than risk detection by Cuban
authorities. We believe that most drug flights that
cross Cuba probably originate and terminate in Jamai-
ca. Frequently, they drop their cargo to vessels waiting
in The Bahama The
Cubans realize that these aircraft are involved in illicit
activity because the frequent, nonstop, round trip
flights are made without filing flight plans with air
traffic control authorities.s We are not aware of any
effective effort by Havana to prevent such flights,
although it has the right to do so.6
Use of Cuban Waters and Ports
19. The US Coast Guard has documented several
instances of suspect vessels traveling right at the edge
of Cuban territorial waters in the three-mile-wide
"buffer zone" that pursuing US Coast Guard cutters
are prohibited from entering. We are aware of
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vessels that have transited Cuban works to transport arms and supplies to subversive
safehaven continues to be a problem for US interdic-
tion efforts
20. On occasion, drug-trafficking vessels enter Cu-
ban waters and are seized by Cuban patrol boats. Most
of these vessels are towed to Cuban ports where their
crews are detained pending a decision by Havana to
jail or release them. Although
Cuba may be willing to accept money to release
seized drug-trafficking vessels, enabling them to deliv-
er their loads to the United States, we believe that
bribes may be accepted infrequently by low-level
Cuban officials; Havana is probably unaware of these
arrangements. Most likely, Havana would deal only
with selected drug traffickers whose vessels would be
allowed to use Cuban waters only when arrangements
were made prior to drug shipments.
Activity Associated With Cuban-Supported
Drug Trafficking
23. Cuba has in the past and may continue to assist
selected traffickers by laundering drug profits. In
return for Cuban support, drug traffickers may pro-
vide Cuba with embargoed goods from the United
States and may use their smuggling vessels and net-
Money Laundering
27. In most drug-money-laundering operations, a
financier acts as an intermediary between the drug
dealers and the commercial bank. This financier usu-
ally is experienced in international money flows and
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33. We believe that the Cubans probably will con-
tinue to use traffickers to smuggle weapons to subver-
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33. We believe that the Cubans probably will con-
tinue to use traffickers to smuggle weapons to subver-
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sive groups. In addition, it also is conceivable that a
portion of the hard currency that Cuba obtains from
facilitating drug trafficking also may be used to fund
Cuban purchases of munitions and equipment for
bases of operation in Panama and Nicaragua
indicates that some major
these groups.
The Nicaraguan-Cuban Drug Connection
34. high-level officials of
the Nicaraguan Government approved a plan to assist
traffickers moving drugs between South America and
the United States. Managua had hoped to realize a
This development has the potentia to
make Nicaragua a significant producer of cocaine
hydrochloride in addition to its drug-transit role. F_
38. We believe that Havana's continued support to
selected drug traffickers will complicate US drug-
enforcement policy. Although Havana is sensitive to
US evidence of Cuban involvement in drug traffick-
ing, it realizes it can benefit from continued participa-
tion in the drug trade as long as it can plausibly deny
its support. Furthermore, drug traffickers, faced with
improving enforcement efforts and growing competi-
tion from other emerging trafficking groups, probably
will continue to seek assistance from Cuba. 0
39. It is likely that Havana will take advantage of
continued involvement in drug trafficking to promote
Cuban subversive activities and political goals, to earn
hard currency, and to obtain embargoed goods. To
minimize the risk of exposure, Havana probably will
prefer to deal with selected drug traffickers who are
less likely to be apprehended and who have enormous
amounts of resources and international connections
that Cuba can use to serve its interests. We see little
reason why traffickers will hesitate to comply with
Havana's requirements.
40. We believe that Cuban involvement in drug
trafficking may help to promote Cuban political objec-
tives in the Western Hemisphere. Cuban intelligence
officers have developed links to drug traffickers,
which enable them to promote intelligence operations
and subversive activities. A Cuban-supported drug
trafficker may have already provided financial back-
ing for DGI political action goals in the United States.
The effectiveness of gunrunners and professional
smugglers in supplying arms to the Sandinistas in 1979
apparently persuaded Havana that such connections
would be useful in its efforts to arm other insurgent
and terrorist groups. It is likely that Cuba will con-
tinue to use smuggling networks to transport arms to
subversive organizations, and this will enable it to
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support their operations in the region while maintain-
ing plausible denial. Also, Havana is probably counting
on continuing to receive hard currency from drug
traffickers, some of which could help to finance
subversive activities.)
41. We believe that Havana will remain sensitive to
international accounts of its involvement in drug
trafficking. Additional public pressure, which exposes
Havana's direct links to the drug trade, will help to
contain Cuban involvement, but it is unlikely that such
publicity will deter it significantly. Havana will con-
tinue to rely on plausible denial to negate the effect of
US accusations while taking greater pains to mask its
activities.
42. Despite Cuba's strict drug laws, Havana proba-
bly will continue to adapt its drug policy to suit its
purposes. Although Havana will continue to reiterate
its record of stringent domestic drug control and
occasionally arrest drug traffickers entering its waters
and airspace, we judge it highly unlikely that Havana
will coo erate with international drug-interdiction ef-
forts."
43. We believe that Cuban support to drug traffick-
ing will make US-sponsored drug-interdiction efforts
in Latin America more difficult, but will not signifi-
cantly increase the number of vessels or aircraft
carrying drugs to the United States because Cuba will
continue to support only selected traffickers. The
sanctuary that Cuba provides to drug traffickers com-
" Annex B discusses Cuban drug policy and provides additional
insight into pros ects for Cuban cooperation with US efforts to curb
the drug trade
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plicates drug-enforcement efforts in the Caribbean: 25X1
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- Drug traffickers can use Cuban waters and air-
space as a buffer zone to avoid US interdiction
efforts in the Windward Passage and the Yucatan
Channel.
- Cuban-supported drug traffickers have access to
a variety of sophisticated methods of shipping
drugs, such as expensive yachts or executive jets,
which do not match the profile of a traditional
suspect smuggler.
- Traffickers can refuel their vessels and aircraft in
Cuba, enabling them to travel farther north
beyond the traditional offloading sites in the
United States.
44. We believe that Cuban involvement in traffick-
ing drugs to the United States has resulted in serious
implications for US drug law enforcement and foreign
policy. For example, recent evidence of Nicaraguan
Government involvement in the drug trade indicated
a strong Cuban connection. Other countries in the
region could be similarly influenced.
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ANNEX B
Cuban Drug Policy
1. Havana views the domestic use of illicit drugs
as an ideological, unacceptable moral weakness. Cuba
has a repressive enforcement system aimed at viola-
tions of its strict drug laws and maintains that it does
not have a significant domestic drug problem. Al-
though Cuba's domestic drug policy appears rigid,
Havana has been known to bend the rules to suit its
purposes.
Domestic Drug Policy
2. Illicit drugs do not constitute a major domestic
law enforcement problem for the Cuban police. The
authorities, for example, have made no effort to
marshal public opinion against illegal drug use, a
standard tactic used to counter other types of "antiso-
cial behavior." Lack of evidence is not a problem with
prosecution in most drug cases. Jail sentences are
usually stiff, ranging from three to 20 years for drug-
related offenses. At the same time, it is clear that drugs
are available to those Cubans who have the money and
the appropriate contacts, and there have been cases in
which the Cuban courts have passed more lenient
sentences.
3. Cuban Drug Seizures. The Cuban Border
Guard routinely discovers floating marijuana bales
which they turn over to the National Revolutionary
Police for incineration. Additionally, Cuban authori-
ties seize drugs on board international vessels or
aircraft that are forced to land in Cuba for reasons
such as mechanical problems, navigational
4. Cuban Drug Cultivation and Production.
There have been isolated reports of small-scale mari-
juana cultivation by Cuban farmers since the mid-
1970s. The only report of Cuban Government-sanc-
tioned cultivation came during the May 1983
testimony before a Congessional panel in Miami.
Mario Esteves Gonzales, a Cuban arrested for marijua-
na trafficking who claims to have been a Cuban
intelligence agent, said that marijuana was grown by
the DGI at two locations in Cuba during 1977-78.
5. There have also been re-
ports of cocaine laboratories in Cuba an o unrefined
coca being flown from South America to Cuba for
further processing. Additionally, large quantities of
ether were shipped from Mexico to Cuba in Novem-
ber 1983. Available information does not indicate
whether this ether was used for the processing of
cocaine or for legitimate industrial purposes.
Drug Policy Regarding Foreigners
6. Foreigners are occasionally arrested by the Cu-
bans on drug-trafficking charges. Some of these, even
though innocent, have been jailed simply on the
suspicion that they were transporting illicit cargoes. It
appears that the Cubans are harder on American
suspects than those of other nationalities. For example,
in May 1983, Cuban authorities arrested three foreign-
ers and charged them with illegal entry and drug
trafficking. The two Americans were detained, while
the Japanese woman who accompanied them was
released and expelled from Cuba.F----]
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7. Most of the American prisoners who were re-
leased from Cuban prison in June 1984 during a US
presidential aspirant's visit were arrested on drug-
trafficking charges. Prior to this, Cuba had stopped
turning over the custody of US citizens to the US
Interests Section, apparently out of the growing ten-
sion that evolved from US allegations of Cuban sup-
port to drug traffickers. There has been one uncon-
firmed report that an American drug trafficker was
released from a Cuban prison because relatives paid a
$2 million ransom to the Cubans. We do not believe
that this is a common practice of the Cuban Govern-
ment.
8. In late 1983, Havana initiated the only dialogue
with the US Government on a drug-related issue since
the Guillot case. According to the Cubans, their
military officials had detected an unprecedented num-
ber of unidentified aircraft, suspected of being used by
drug traffickers, on flights through their air corridors
to and from the United States. Havana requested that
the US Government take all possible measures to warn
pilots of small aircraft to avoid Cuban airspace viola-
tions
planes are likely to be piloted by drug traffickers, as
the Cubans acknowledged, the United States would be
unable to force them to comply with Cuban regula-
tions. Also, there was no mention of any effort on the
part of the Cubans to identify or communicate with
11. Impact of the Guillot Case. The Cuban Gov-
ernment was not seriously harmed by the revelations
made in the Guillot case because it was able to
plausibly deny its involvement by claiming it had no
knowledge of Guillot's activity and later admitting to
having dealt with him only to provide support for
Colombian guerrillas. Havana also was able to hide
behind its record of stringent domestic drug control
and occasional cooperation with US enforcement ef-
forts. At the same time the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
was attempting to secure Guillot's release, the Cuban
press called on the United States to produce evidence
of the alleged involvement of Cuban officials, assuring
the Cuban people that the trial was ludicrous, fraudu-
lent, and based on the flimsy testimony of Cuban-born
traffickers residing in the United States.
12. Indictment of Cuban Officials. In November
1982, based on evidence presented in the Guillot case,
a US district court indicted four Cuban officials: Rene
Rodriguez Cruz, ICAP President; Fernando Ravelo
Renedo, former Cuban Ambassador to Colombia;
Gonzalo Bassols Suarez, Cuban Communist Party offi-
cial; and Vice Adm. Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado, then
Vice Minister and Chief of the Cuban Navy. Follow-
ing the indictments, Cuba protested in an official
memo to the US Interests Section couched in shrill,
undiplomatic language and replete with unfounded
charges against US officials and institutions. Most of
the memo was reprinted in a massive front page
editorial in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper.
Of those indicted:)
- Rodriguez remains in his position as the Presi-
of the original Cuban diplomatic note leads us to
believe that it was not intended as an initiative for
joint policy to stop the flights but rather as a tactic to
appear concerned or cooperative about drug traffick-
ing in preparation for a US Congressional visit.
Reactions to US Allegations
10. Havana continues to strongly deny US charges
of its involvement in drug trafficking, although Cuban
press reports suggest that the US threat to Cuba would
justify such involvement. Cuban commentaries often
focus on the US drug problem, in order to convince
the Cuban people that the growing use of drugs is
another facet of the decadence of the American way
of life.)
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Ravelo called the charges infamy and claimed
that serving as godfather to a Colombian drug
trafficker's daughter was part of his diplomatic
duty. He also stated that support to the M-19 was
consistent with the Cuban sympathy for revolu-
tionary causes abroad. Ravelo's career does not
appear to have been affected by the indictment.
In March 1984, he was identified in the Cuban
press as the deputy chief responsible for Central
American affairs for the America Department of
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- Bassols, also a high-ranking official of the
PCC/AD, probably was not hurt by the indict-
Santamaria no longer holds the position of vice
minister and chief of the Cuban Navy, but we do
not believe his dismissal was connected in any
way with the indictment. He maintained his
official capacity as Commander of the Cuban
Revolutionary Navy in public appearances until
June 1984 when he was replaced, probably be-
cause of his age and failing eyesight. He now
met to discuss the possibility of joint initiatives on drug
control. The Cubans expressed a willingness to cooper-
ate with the US Coast Guard both in the exchange of
information and in conducting parallel enforcement
efforts to stem the flow of drugs north. Cuban officials
expressed total aversion to drug trafficking, which in
part reflected their concern that Cuban exile drug
traffickers may have been helpin to finance anti-
Cuban political/ terrorist activities
15. Havana announced its termination of this agree-
ment in November 1982 following the indictment of
the Cuban officials. According to the US Coast Guard,
this cooperation effectively ended in the summer of
1980 with the Mariel Boatlift, which coincided with
the initial arrangement that the Cubans made to assist
Guillot. The Cubans may have believed the termina-
tion of this agreement would be a domestic embarrass-
ment for the US Government.
16. Rhetorical Backlash. Since January 1984, the
Cuban media have intensified efforts to discredit life
in the United States partly in an apparent attempt to
prepare Cubans for broadcasts by US Radio Marti.
Recent commentaries in Granma, the official party
organ, have commented on the US drug problem in a
counterattack against US allegations of Cuban involve-
14. Termination of the Agreement To Cooper-
ate. In January 1978, the US and Cuban Governments
ment in drug trafficking
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ANNEX D
Chronology
31
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June 1980: According to Juan Lazaro "Johnny"
Crump, a Colombian drug trafficker and informant in
the Jaime Guillot Lara investigation, he was contacted
by Cuban officials who had approved a plan to refuel
his drug-trafficking aircraft in Camaguey, Cuba.n
August 1980: Various reliable sources reported that
Guillot began his trafficking activities under official
Cuban protection during the summer of 1980. Under
his arrangement with Cuban officials, vessels loaded
with drugs traveled from Colombia to Cuban waters,
where they transferred their loads to smaller boats and
then docked at a Cuban port. Crump indicated that
during 1980-81 Guillot's vessels made monthly ship-
ments to the United States. A total of 2.5 million
pounds of marijuana, 25 million methaqualone tablets,
and 80 pounds of cocaine were documented as having
been sent to the United States by Guillot from 1979-
81. In return for using Cuban ports as a safehaven,
Guillot reportedly was charged between $500,000 and
$800,000 per stop in Cuba. Because most of his drug
shipments were seized by US authorities, by October
1981, Guillot owed the Cuban Government $8 million.
Also on Cuba's behalf, Guillot purchased weapons and
used his smuggling networks to ship them to the
Colombian terrorist group, the M-19. One of his
vessels, the Karina, carrying weapons for the terrorists,
was sunk by the Colombian Navy in November 1981.
There has been substantial testimony and other evi-
dence verifying this information.)
November 1980: Mario Esteves Gonzalez, a Cuban
arrested in Florida in November 1981, testified that he
had been attached to the Guillot operation in late 1980
and assisted in the offloading of drugs from mother
ships receiving safe harbor in Cuban ports. Esteves
claims to be a trained Cuban intelligence agent who
came to the United States during the Mariel Boatlift
and that his chief mission in Florida was the distribu-
tion of illicit drugs. He allegedly returned $5 million
in drug profits to the CubansQ
32
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 I 9?
85?
i
ucatan
Channel
84`
Gulf of
McXICo
f Pinar
del Rio
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Gerona
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Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ)(Cuban-monitored airspace)
+ La Gloria Airfield
-?-?--Provincia-level boundary
- Railroad
- Road
Scale 12,500,000
20 40 BD Bp i0 Kilometer,
20
4P ? lOOStatute Miles
Ciudad de
La Habana
l
HAVA -- r
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. (The Bahamas)
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m a g'u e y 1 chaparre
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18
Long
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m8n1einj'
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Salvador
Barecos
a it3nam' I
Wiidwa,d
Pas9e
- 19?
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
703726 IAOSOBO) 12-84
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Secret
80
39
Secret
: Dog Rocks
(The Bahamas)
'South Riding Rock
(The Bahamas)
Lrange ray
(The Bahamas)
Andros
Island
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NASSAu
New Providence
77? 76?
'Norman Cay
Eleuthera
Fhe
Bahama\
Great
Exuma
-c;app,Ver`de
(The Bahamas)
? Ca Santo Domingo
(The Bahannas)
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Crooked Island
Acklrns
island
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