NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100230001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of EE Cwt
Intelligence MASTER FILE co
Y
00 NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
A 2-
Near East and
South Asia Review
c ct -
NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
Copy 41 1
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Fatah's Security and Intelligence Organizations: Operational 1
Fatah, the largest component of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, will probably order its security and intelligence
organizations to strike back at Israeli targets in response to the
bombing of PLO headquarters near Tunis even though PLO and
Fatah chief Arafat will continue to argue that terrorism undermines
efforts to achieve a Palestinian state.
After 10 years of intermittent civil war, Lebanon's economy is
probably operating at about 50 percent of its prewar level, and,
despite some progress in rebuilding foreign exchange reserves and
reviving agricultural production, extensive rebuilding will not begin
until an overall political settlement is reached.
Sagging oil sales and low foreign exchange reserves have forced
drastic reductions in imports since the beginning of the year and
have led to both a bitter debate within the government over the
control of foreign trade and increased discontent within key interest
groups.
The morale of both the Iraqis and Iranians is sagging as the war
drags into its sixth year, and, although poor morale does not appear
to be an immediate threat to either regime, each is probably
concerned over the trend it observes at home even while it takes
encouragement from deteriorating morale across the border.
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Iraq: The RCC and Collegial Decisionmaking
The Revolutionary Command Council is Iraq's supreme
decisionmaking body, and, although President Saddam Husayn
dominates its proceedings, considerable consultation occurs,
facilitated by the body's homogeneous composition.
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and the Bath Party Bureaus
The secretaries who run the eight bureaus of the Bath Party are
among the most powerful officials in Iraqi politics, but they depend
for their survival on the favor of President Saddam Husayn, and the
precariousness of their position was demonstrated this summer when
Saddam stripped Samir Muhammad al-Wahhab al-Shaykhli of his
two bureau posts
Iraq-North Yemen: Hands Across the Peninsula
Relations between North Yemen and Iraq have been improving as
North Yemen seeks a counterweight to Saudi influence. Baghdad's
leadership aspirations in the region will motivate it to provide
military training and technical assistance when the Iran-Iraq war
ends and strengthen its Ba'thist network in North Yemen.
The government of President Zia ul-Haq probably has been testing
the intentions of the new Soviet leadership in the recently concluded
fifth round of talks on Afghanistan, but it shows no sign of
weakening its demand that the Soviets set a firm timetable for the
withdrawal of their forces.
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Growing Risks for Western Travelers in Afghanistan
Although Western journalists and medical personnel have operated
relatively easily inside Afghanistan in the past, better Soviet
intelligence and more frequent military operations are increasing the
Afghanistan: Soviet Aggressiveness and Regime Ineptitude
Large Soviet operations in Afghanistan between June and October
were prompted primarily by Soviet efforts to compensate for the
inability of regime forces to maintain even a facade of control rather
than by a Soviet effort to dramatically escalate the war, and the
Soviets will probably have to carry an even heavier burden of the
fighting over the coming months.
The Afghan Air Force: Moscow's Unreliable Ally
The Afghan Air Force suffers from a lack of will and internal unrest
because of improved insurgent military performance, Soviet
domination, and feuding between the two factions of the Afghan
ruling party, and, with its prospects for improvement poor, the
Soviets will continue to assume the lion's share of the air war
India: Naval Power and Regional Dominance
New Delhi has made controlling the Indian Ocean a central if long-
term goal of its regional strategy, but, although it already has the
largest fleet of the littoral states, it has neither sufficient naval
assets nor prowess to deny US or Soviet access to the Indian Ocean.
India's Role in Sri Lankan Party Politics
India's four-month-old effort to broker a negotiated settlement
between the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil separatists has
drawn New Delhi into the heart of Sri Lankan party politics,
strengthening the ruling United National Party at the expense of the
Sri Lanka Freedom Party, New Delhi's traditional ally.
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Bangladesh: Ershad's Hectic Autumn) 43
President Ershad faces important challenges this fall as he prepares
for a gradual relaxation of martial law and national elections-
tentatively scheduled for early 1986-while continuing to suppress
opposition and leftist agitation and retaining the support of the
military, and these tasks may prove too much for him.
Religion and Identity: Highlights of an International Congress I I 47
Many societies worldwide are turning to religion to find more well-
defined and psychologically comforting identities, and, despite the
wide variety of beliefs and practices, the most fruitful research lies
in the analysis of the underlying commonalities of religious belief
and behavior.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
authors,
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Fatah's Security and
Intelligence Organizations:
Operational Capabilities
We believe Fatah, the largest component of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), will order
its security and intelligence organizations to strike
back at Israeli targets in response to the bombing of
PLO headquarters near Tunis. PLO and Fatah leader
Arafat's chief security aides have in the past voiced
the need for a more demonstrative "strategy" as a
reminder that Fatah retains its revolutionary
credentials, and Fatah hardliners are likely to call for
an end to Arafat's 1974 ban on international
terrorism. A collapse in the Washington-Amman
Middle East peace initiative would provide Fatah
hardliners with more ammunition to support their
views. We believe Arafat will continue to try to
prevent his followers from engaging in international
terrorism, arguing that it undermines PLO efforts to
achieve a Palestinian state, but we do not rule out the
possibility that militant Fatah elements might
attempt an attack on Western interests. F__1
Israel has charged the Western Sector and Force 17,
two of Fatah's key security organizations, with
responsibility for recent increased terrorist activity in
on 25 September of three Israeli yachtsmen at
Larnaca, Cyprus. Both Force 17 and the Western
Sector have main offices in Amman and would be
major targets should Israel carry out its threat to
bomb PLO facilities in Jordan.
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Arafat maintains control over the various leaders of
the security groups by cultivating the internal rivalry
and jockeying for power that exists among his subor-
dinates who head these organizations. Arafat's style
of management may contribute to a lack of cohesion
in the security organizations, but it also promotes
competition among them to claim responsibility for
certain operations. In some cases this practice has led
to exaggerated or false claims. We believe that such
rivalries probably have been a factor in the recently
increased Fatah-directed terrorism against Israelis on
the West Bank.
The Organizations
Western Sector. The Western Sector, led by Deputy
Commander Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), is the
primary Fatah body responsible for military opera-
tions in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Several
"committees," located in the West Bank, are responsi-
ble for recruiting operatives and maintaining specific
prompted recent attacks. Israel's release last May of
1,150 Palestinian prisoners, including some 600 that
Israel allowed to stay in the West Bank, may have
contributed to recent attacks by supplying experi-
enced manpower.
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are some 100 activists in the Western Sector infra-
structure in Amman; de-
scribes the Western Sector apparatus in Jordan as
consisting of 150 "loosely organized followers." F_
Israel charges that the Western Sector's increased
presence in Jordan is directly responsible for recent
terrorist attacks inside Israel and the Occupied Terri-
tories. Abu Jihad has taken credit for two abortive sea
attacks the Israelis stopped last March and April.
Abu Jihad also has claimed his group was responsible
for two attacks in August on Israeli citizens living in
the West Bank in which one was killed and another
In spite of what we believe to be stringent Jordanian
efforts to monitor the activities of the Western Sector,
it is possible that Sector operatives may have
United Security Organization (USO). Controlled by
the PLO but staffed primarily with Fatah personnel,
The status an duties of the USO
have evolved largely from the influence of its head,
senior PLO/Fatah official Salah Khalaf (Abu lyad).
Abu lyad's BSO terrorist heritage, a legend that he
has neither encouraged nor dispelled, may color some
of the information about him and the USO.
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Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad),
Chief, PLO United Security
Abu Iyad has opened a "center" for the
We have no further
information on the plans and activities of the Amman
USO office and believe that its purpose is more
prestigious than operational. In early 1982 the USO
had a military headquarters in the Beirut area which
we assume closed when Arafat departed Lebanon.
We cannot verify that Abu Iyad intended to
circumvent Arafat's international terrorist ban and
independently order terrorist operations against US or
other international interests. If Abu Iyad directed his
personnel to plan such operations, he may have sought
to remind Arafat of his independence and political
differences and Arafat's limited capabilities to
discipline subordinates. Arafat transferred many of
Abu Iyad's followers to Abu Jihad's Western Sector
last December, rationalizing the order as a move to
centralize military operations against Israel,
activities.
Force 17. Force 17, headed by Mahmud Ahmad al-
Natur (Abu Tayyib), evolved during the mid-1970s
into a security organization to protect senior-level
PLO and Fatah officials. We judge that over the last
few years it has grown into an elite, tightly knit corps
that may sometimes act as a strike force against
opponents of Arafat and other senior PLO officials. In
1982, Force 17 was believed to have approximately
120 members. We do not believe this group suffered
much from Arafat's departure from Lebanon, and the
organization may even have grown in the last three
years to accommodate its broader operational
Abu Tayyib's new headquarters are in Amman,
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Recently, Force 17 has been linked with attempts
against Syrian interests in Western Europe, including
an unsuccessful operation in West Berlin last January
and another in May in which two Palestinians were
arrested in Madrid for planning an attack on the
Syrian ambassador to Spain. Both men arrested in
Madrid claimed to be members of Force 17,
Force 17 was responsible for the
attack on 25 September in Cyprus in which three
Israeli yachtsmen were killed.
Abu Tayyib may
be the most prone of Arafat's aides to boasting, but
the competition for power and credibility within
Fatah was probably a major factor in Abu Tayyib's
motives for carrying out the Larnaca attack.F--]
Outlook
Arafat's security chiefs will press for reprisals against
Israel's airstrike on PLO headquarters. Stronger
warnings by King Hussein against conducting
terrorist operations from Jordan may cause Arafat to
urge restraint until Fatah operatives can carry out an
operation against Israeli targets that cannot be traced
to Fatah operatives in Jordan.
Looking ahead, Arafat cannot, and will not, renounce
terrorism and still retain leadership over the PLO and
the loyalty of Fatah members, his first priority; nor
does he have unlimited time to demonstrate progress
on the diplomatic track. We believe that Arafat will
argue against a return by Fatah to international
terrorism in the belief that it undermines PLO
political efforts. He may approve contingency
planning or permit limited terrorist action to let Fatah
militants blow off steam. In our judgment, Fatah
operatives would be quite capable of carrying out acts
of terrorism against what Fatah considered hostile
international interests, including those of the United
States.
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Lebanese Economy:
Down But Not Out
After 10 years of intermittent civil war, the Lebanese
economy is probably operating at about 50 percent of
its prewar level. Much of Lebanon's economic
infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, many
of its most skilled people have emigrated, and the
country is cut up into sectarian zones of influence.
The government still provides some services, bankrolls
a bloated payroll, and collects limited taxes and fees,
but it cannot rule the country: The health of the
economy remains dependent upon the security
situation, and extensive rebuilding probably will not
begin until an overall political settlement is reached.
of what was needed to meet the budget. Nonetheless,
expenditures, originally budgeted at 11.4 billion
pounds ($600 million) for 1985, were increased at
midyear to 12.4 billion ($650 million)-and could go
higher.
the overall
government deficit amounted to 6.4 billion pounds in
1982, 8 billion pounds in 1983, and 9.2 billion pounds
in 1984. The 1984 deficit equaled over one-third of
Lebanon's estimated GNP, one of the highest shares
in the world. The deficit for 1985 will probably again
set a record, well over 10 billion pounds
In the last year, inflation has jumped to about
75 percent, the Lebanese pound has depreciated by
60 percent, and government debt has grown by over
one-third. On the plus side, the Central Bank has been
able to partially rebuild its foreign exchange reserves,
and agricultural production is beginning to recover
from the disruptions caused by the Israeli invasion in
1982.
Borrowing To Stay Alive
In Lebanon, government spending not only primes the
pump, but also provides much of the fuel to keep the
economy running. According to the US Embassy,
government spending, through its payroll and a few
public works projects, is one of the main reasons the
economy remains afloat. Unfortunately, spending has
continued to grow, while revenues have dropped to
practically nothing.
Revenue from customs receipts, formerly the main
source of government funds, was budgeted at about
3 billion pounds ($160 million) for 1985, 35 percent of
total revenues.' The government's plan to take over
illegal ports last fall was largely a failure. Customs
duties for the first half of 1985 totaled only
200 million pounds ($10 million), less than 15 percent
($530 million).
The government has had to borrow extensively to
make up its budget shortfall. Government debt grew
from 30.5 billion pounds ($1.6 billion) at the end of
1984 to 40.7 billion pounds ($2.1 billion) at the end of
July, and debt service now accounts for about one-
fourth of total government expenditure. So far, the
government has had no problem funding its deficit
because Lebanese banks have few local investment
alternatives. The cost of borrowing has risen steadily,
however, with average rates on treasury bills now
around 17 to 18 percent.
Typical of the straits in which the government finds
itself, the Ministry of Finance is attempting to stop
paying for imported crude and petroleum products to
force the Cabinet to cut petroleum subsidies. The
Director General of the Ministry stated that the
petroleum budgetary deficit will probably exceed 11
billion pounds ($580 million) this year and that about
25 percent of locally produced and imported
petroleum products were illegally reexported to other
Mediterranean countries. According to official
statistics, the port of Beirut alone imported enough
petroleum in 1984 to satisfy Lebanon's total domestic
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Lebanon: Selected Financial Data, 1981-85
Official Foreign Exchange
Reserves a
Billion US $
Lebanese Pound Exchange
Rate
US cents per pound
Domestic Public Debt
Billion Lebanese pounds
- Total
- Bank of Lebanon share
0 1981 82 83 84 85 0
Jun
I I I I I I I I
81 82 82 83 83 84 84 85 85
Dec Jun Dec Jun Dec Jun Dec Jun Aug
demand. At the same time, there have been stories of
entire shiploads of Lebanese products going abroad.
Although the Ministry hopes to force the Cabinet to
double petroleum prices, the Central Bank apparently
tried similar tactics several months ago and failed.
The Ministry's efforts are likely to boost petroleum
prices sharply but will also cause considerable
confusion and petroleum shortages. In addition,
renewed sectarian clashes may result if the Muslim
militias perceive the fuel shortages as a Christian plot.
The Economy Hangs On
According to the US Embassy, industry continues to
function, albeit at a very low level. The unstable
security situation keeps industrialists from expanding
capacity, maintaining large inventories, or even
anticipating future sales. In addition, the fighting
keeps workers from their jobs and holds down the
number of shifts during calm times because workers
can get to and from their jobs only during daylight
hours. Credit limitations and the drop in the value of
the pound have hurt manufacturers' ability to import
raw materials. Tax-free goods brought in through
illegal ports also make many domestic products
uncompetitive. Despite these adverse conditions, some
industries have prospered by adapting to existing
conditions. Profitable industries include ready-to-
wear clothing, electrical fixtures, publishing, wine,
fruit juices, and jewelry.
Commercial activity has been hurt by the contraction
of local demand, credit limitations, and fear of
damage to stocks. On the other hand, it has been
helped by a lively trade in smuggled goods going to
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Syria. Although the extent of this trade is not known,
it has been variously estimated to be at least
$50 million and possibly as high as $75 million a
Lebanon:
Balance of Payments, 1981-84
month.
Agriculture probably has the brightest prospects of
any of Lebanon's economic sectors. Agricultural sales
suffered considerably following Israel's invasion of
Lebanon in 1982. Orchards were destroyed and land
was taken out of production for security reasons. In
addition, transportation difficulties and boycotts by
some Arab countries caused domestic sales and
exports to fall. With the Israeli withdrawal, most of
the marketing bottlenecks probably will be reduced
and more land put into production. The fall of the
pound also makes Lebanese farm products more
competitive in export markets.
External Accounts May Actually Improve
Before 1983, Lebanon ran large trade deficits that
were offset by remittances from abroad and by
surpluses in the service sector. In the last couple of
years, however, remittances, which once totaled more
than $2 billion a year, have fallen off considerably as
the growing number of Lebanese living outside the
country have kept their money abroad. Accurate
statistics are unavailable, but
estimates that the country's overall foreign payments
position went from a $360 million surplus in 1982 to a
deficit of nearly $1 billion in 1983, and to nearly $1.5
billion last year.
This year, Lebanon's foreign payments position may
improve. The 60-percent fall in the pound's value
against the dollar since last September should cut into
import demand and help exports of both agricultural
and manufactured products
There have also been numerous reports of the renewed
flow of funds from abroad to militias in Lebanon. This
has been especially attributed to efforts by the PLO to
reestablish its position within the country. According
to a US Embassy report, the consensus in the Beirut
financial community is that the Palestinians brought
in some $400 million during April, May, and June but
nothing during July and August. If true, this helps
explain the partial strengthening of the pound at
midsummer. Another Embassy report estimates
average monthly flows to Muslim militias of at least
Trade balance
-2,404
-2,413
-2,699
-2,117
Exports (f.o.b.) a
836
727
691
595
Imports (f.o.b.) a
3,240
3,140
3,390
2,712
Overall balance b
NA
360
-933
-1,475
a Trade partner data.
b Estimated from financial flows.
The amount of capital fleeing the country is also
likely to decline. Most of the money that could be
taken out has probably already left the country. The
rapid depreciation of the pound will also discourage
further flows. The main factor that would cause
renewed capital outflows would be an all-out push by
the Muslim militias against the Christian heartland,
which seems unlikely at the moment.
Unusual Sources of Income
Although Lebanon's economic picture is gloomy, this
does not mean that people are without food or that
there is not considerable money in circulation. The
Lebanese are enterprising and still have sources of
funds:
? The overseas money flowing to the various militias
may total as much as $100 million a month, and
both Muslim and Christian groups provide
employment for otherwise unemployed youth.
? Illegal trade with Syria increases commercial
activity and provides income.
? Remittances from Lebanese workers and
businessmen abroad still continue, perhaps on the
order of $60-90 million a month.
Finally, there is the lucrative drug trade. Hashish
cultivation in the Bekaa Valley has been
unencumbered by government control or Syrian
interference for the past several years. The hashish
trade has been estimated to be worth $600 million to
$50 million a month
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$1 billion a year to Lebanon, and some press sources
put the total as high as $2 billion a year. Lebanon is
also a transit point for cocaine and heroin.
Outlook
The Lebanese economy cannot rebound until the
security situation is brought under control. This,
however, would require a political accommodation
between the various factions that is unlikely in the
near future. The government will have to continue to
finance its spending through borrowing, which will
eventually generate greater inflation. If the civil war
remains relatively calm-a precarious assumption-
the pound will depreciate at a slower rate than it did
over the past 12 months. Although this year's foreign
payments position may improve, infusions of foreign
aid needed for rebuilding will remain minimal until
Lebanon's political situation is resolved.
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Iran: Political Debate Over
Foreign Exchange Crisis
Sagging oil sales and low foreign exchange reserves
have forced drastic reductions in imports since the
beginning of the year and have led to a bitter debate
within the government over the control of foreign
trade. The shortage of hard currency has caused
depressed industrial output to fall even further and
threatens more cuts in an already austere
development program. Prime Minister Musavi's
government, made up largely of radicals, has been
blamed for mismanagement and corruption by the
more conservative Consultative Assembly (Majles)
and by the Iranian press. General discontent over the
economy remains high within the Revolutionary
Guard and the merchant class-both key interest
groups. Tehran's concern over the vulnerability of its
oil exports has spurred efforts to raise foreign
exchange reserves, and this is likely to aggravate
problems in the near term.
Imports Slashed
Iran has slashed imports in the face of low oil
revenues to avoid drawing on its limited foreign
exchange reserves. Imports in the first three months
of 1985 from OECD countries-about two-thirds of
total imports-were down 46 percent from the same
period in 1984. The trend has continued into the
summer. Numerous press reports indicate rising
complaints by Iranian importers about the difficulties
of obtaining government permission to import goods.
Foreign exchange shortages have even forced Tehran
to restrict cash purchases of some items it considers
high priority.
=in June, for the first time, Iran requested delayed
payment terms on purchases of medical supplies.
Moreover, Western banks have tightened letter of
credit procedures for customers dealing with Iran,
Press
reports indicate many firms stayed away from the
Tehran International Trade Fair in early September
because they believed business opportunities did not
justify the expense and personal hazards involved.
Foreign firms in Iran report that Tehran has clamped
down hard on remaining imports and currency
transfers abroad. The firms describe the current
foreign exchange crisis as the most severe since the
revolution.
Tehran's difficulties over the past several months are
directly linked to the soft oil market. Iranian exports
to OECD countries in the first quarter of this year
were down 47 percent from the first quarter last year.
We estimate that oil exports-about 95 percent of
foreign exchange earnings-averaged only about 1.5
million barrels per day (b/d) during the first six
months of the year compared with about 2 million b/d
in the same period last year. Oil prices also have
dipped, with spot prices of Iranian light falling from
around $27 per barrel in June 1984 to about $25 this
June. Iraq's current bombing campaign against 25X1
Khark Island has made a bad situation worse.
oil exports have been
reduced by more than half as a result of recent
attacks on Khark, and Tehran is increasingly
frustrated over its inability to defend the island.
Shoring Up Revenues
The attacks on Khark Island have highlighted Iran's
need to maintain its dwindling foreign exchange
reserves. We estimate that Iran's foreign exchange
reserves currently stand at $4-5 billion, but only about
$2 billion is readily accessible. At least $1 billion is 25X1
tied up in negotiations over the fate of a loan made by
the former Shah to the French Government. Another
$1.5 billion is illiquid or in the form of uncollectable
loans to Third World countries. Readily accessible 25X1
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of imports for two to three months if revenues are
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Since the beginning of this year, Tehran has sought to
limit the drain on its foreign exchange reserves to
avoid turning to foreign credit or cutting essential
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NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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imports in an emergency. The Majles had hoped to
bolster reserves though a provision in the recently
passed Foreign Exchange Budget Bill requiring
10 percent of all foreign exchange receipts to be set
aside in a Special Emergency Reserve Account with
the Central Bank. At current revenues, however, this
measure would increase import coverage by only
about three weeks in the first six months.
Efforts to boost nonoil exports have foundered. An
overvalued rial has been a major obstacle. The
government pays exporters at the official exchange
rate for foreign currency; they would earn six or seven
times more at black-market rates. Preferential
exchange rates on nonoil exports and other incentives
were included in the Majles's foreign exchange bill
passed this summer, but the bill is still awaiting
approval by the Council of Guardians. Nevertheless,
the Central Bank, which would oversee
implementation, is unwilling to offer exchange rates
near market rates for fear of increasing inflation. At
any rate, because nonoil exports are only a small share
of the total, any boost probably would not add
significantly to Iran's revenues.
Economic Impact
Reduced imports have lowered domestic production,
aggravated a general scarcity of consumer goods, and
slowed development. most
goods are available only at high black-market prices.
Shortages of raw materials and spare parts have cut
production or caused outright closings in many
industries. In July, Heavy Industries Minister Nabavi
said that lack of foreign exchange caused average
monthly production for March through June to fall
24 percent compared with the same period a year
earlier, according to the Iranian press. Articles and
editorials in the Iranian papers are especially critical
of the many layers of bureaucracy created to conserve
foreign currency
Development programs are being cut further at a time
when some public services are already at a
postrevolutionary low. Prime Minister Musavi has
admitted that slower development is inevitable
because of low oil revenues. The Iranian press reports
that power cuts in Tehran and other large cities occur
for periods of five or six hours a day, the longest since
1979. In addition, many cities and parts of Tehran
face water shortages. Press reports indicate that large
sections of Shiraz have access to water for only one
hour a day. Iranian officials regularly call for
voluntary restraints on water and electricity use, but
with little apparent success.
Industrial development has been particularly hard hit.
This is sparking increasing criticism from proponents
of industrial growth and, ironically, frustrating plans
for greater self-sufficiency. Minister of Industries
Shafei recently complained in a report to the Majles
that meager foreign exchange allocations to the
industrial sector are to blame for the failure of his
Ministry's plans. The Minister warned that current
allocation rates provided only 10 percent of the
foreign currency needed for this year's planned
projects.
Political Repercussions
Conservatives blame mismanagement and corruption
for many of Iran's foreign exchange problems, and
they have used these charges to discredit their radical
opponents in Musavi's government. During debate on
this summer's foreign exchange bill, members of the
Majles criticized the government for deviating from
official import priorities. They cited examples such as
a letter of credit for vital oil industry equipment that
took months while one for television components took
only a few weeks. Press reports indicate that political
clout, bribes, and outright mistakes have resulted in
some commodities being overordered while critical
components have not been ordered in time.
The more conservative Majles has capitalized on the
government's inability to manage the economy by
seeking a greater role, especially in foreign trade. In
August the Majles passed bills requiring that
representatives of the Assembly be admitted to
sessions of the Foreign Exchange Appropriations
Committee and that the government publicly disclose
details of foreign exchange expenditures. In addition,
the legislature recently directed the Petroleum
Ministry to report oil revenues monthly and forecast
receipts three months in advance. Most government
officials oppose this interference. They are concerned
that, if ratified by the Council of Guardians, these
and other actions by the Majles would impair the
Cabinet's ability to act decisively.
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The government's public image has suffered from
poor management and corruption. Efforts to conserve
currency and the resulting depression of economic
activity have increased dissatisfaction with the regime
among key interest groups.
some Revolutionary Guard members have
been critical of the clerics and other high-ranking
government officials, and the powerful merchant class
is chafing under strict limitations on travel and
transfers of foreign currency and confiscation of
profits from sales abroad.
Outlook
Low foreign exchange reserves, combined with a weak
oil market, will keep Tehran's economic margin thin.
A lengthy shutdown of Khark Island would reduce oil
exports by at least 75 percent and would be
economically debilitating, especially if combined with
hoarding, renewed strikes, or a poor fall harvest.
people in Tehran are
already hording basic food items in response to
rumors and foreign radio reports of attacks on Khark.
The economy is by far the most divisive issue facing
the government, and increased political infighting
over distribution of the shrinking economic pie is
likely to open wider rifts between opposing factions.
Radicals will probably bear most of the political heat,
and the Majles will be able to further expand its
power. Moreover, government mismanagement and
lower revenues will increase reliance on the private
sector, thwarting radicals' plans to increase
centralized planning and direction.
Reduced operations at factories could lead to renewed
labor unrest if leaders emerge to organize workers.
workers' purchasing
power has already fallen by at least 35 percent since
the revolution. The regime remains wary of a repeat
of the strikes that occurred earlier this year. The
Minister of Labor recently expressed concern over
acts of sabotage in Iran's production units and warned
workers against political activities.
General discontent over lower levels of imports and
the state of the economy will probably increase.
Moreover, attacks on Khark Island and Tehran's
drive to at least maintain foreign exchange reserves
will spur Iran's program to cut imports. Prime
Minister Musavi recently announced that taxes and
government-controlled prices are likely to rise,
according to the Iranian press. Stricter government
controls on trade will open even greater opportunities
for corruption and will spur black-market activity.
These factors are likely to further erode popular
confidence in the government 0
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Iran-Iraq:
A Contest of Morale
Fighting on the battlefront in the Iran-Iraq war has
tended to obscure an equally serious test of morale.
the morale of
both Iraqis and Iranians is sagging as the war drags
into its sixth year. There are signs the Iranian
populace resents years of austerity and futile
casualties. If Iraqi strikes against Khark Island
produce a sustained reduction of Iranian oil revenues,
the resulting economic hardships will probably cause
new unrest among the lower classes, which have been
a bulwark of the Khomeini regime.
On the Iraqi side, we believe the regime of Saddam
Husayn is not immediately threatened, but the will to
resist Iran is weaker than a year ago. Baghdad's
recent war decisions suggest that its concern over low
morale is leading it to make greater efforts to bring
Iran to the bargaining table.F_~
Falling Morale in Iraq
Baghdad observes that last month's Babylon Festival
had noticeably less spirit than the 1984 affair.
Representation from the ruling Bath Party was low,
the speeches were shorter and less bombastic, the
claque was more obviously staged, and the obligatory
applause-whenever President Saddam Husayn's
name was mentioned-more nerfunctory.
noted an increase in
antiregime jokes and finds civilian morale at its lowest
point in two years. This drop has occurred despite the
regime's successful efforts to maintain the supply of
consumer goods
Iraq's mood has plunged from the high point reached
after the defeat of a major Iranian ground offensive in
the Hawz al-Huwayzah marshes in March. The
government's proclamation of a decisive victory in a
battle that it described as the largest of the war and
its organization of "spontaneous" public celebrations
probably created unrealistic expectations among the
populace and officialdom alike. We believe that spirits
sagged when Iraqis became aware of the victory's
high cost in casualties and of Iranian preparations for
further offensives. Moreover, US officials report that
morale in Baghdad suffered further in June when Iran
launched Scud missile attacks on the capital, which
had largely escaped the physical effects of war for
over two years.
The spirits of Iraq's Shias-who comprise 55 percent
of the population and 80 percent of the enlisted ranks
of the military-are of particular concern.
generation of sympathizers of the Islamic Call Party,
or Da'wa, the Iran-based organization of largely
exiled Iraqi Shia dissidents. The sympathizers share
the party's goal of an Islamic regime in Iraq. The US
Embassy believes, however, that they are unlikely to
act unless the grip of the Bath Party and its ruthless
and effective security services seems to be slipping.
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Sagging Iranian Morale 25X1
Iranian morale shows even more serious signs of
weakness. many 25X1
Iranians oppose the regime because of the war,
financial hardships, and governmental corruption and
repression. Tehran's
urban poor, one of the mainstays of Khomeini's
support, are showing signs of antiregime sentiment.
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spontaneous
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demonstrations broke out in the lower-class districts
of southern Tehran after Iraqi bombing raids last
The Iranians have suffered considerably more
economic hardship than have the Iraqis. Reduced oil
revenues and imports have slowed development,
lowered production, and aggravated the general
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-022
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scarcity of consumer goods. We estimate that imports
dropped at least 40 percent in the first half of 1985.
most goods are in short
supply or unavailable at official prices, forcing buyers
to pay black-market rates. Inflation and the Iranian
Government's mismanagement of the economy have
led to further suffering, particularly among the urban
lower classes.
lead Baghdad to maintain pressure on Iran and to
extend attacks to economic targets in the interior if
military successes do not bolster the Iraqi popular
mood. In short, the Iraqis will feel a new urgency to
press the offensive, without abandoning the caution
that has characterized their approach to the war. If
Iran thwarts Iraqi attacks by downing more Iraqi
aircraft or finding new ways to export its oil, the
Iraqis are likely to escalate further without the
lengthy delays that have taken place between earlier
escalations.)
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Prospects
Poor morale does not appear to be an immediate
threat to either regime, but each government probably
is concerned over the trend it observes at home even
while it takes encouragement from deteriorating
morale across the border. Neither side is likely to view
time as being on its side. Iraqi attacks against Khark
Island, through which over 80 percent of Iran's oil
exports had been shipped, have reduced Iran's exports
from the island by more than half. We believe that
discontent will mount sharply if oil income remains
significantly below its former levels for more than a
few weeks.
For its part, Iraq is likely to pursue all the harder its
efforts-especially attacks against Khark-to force
Iran to the bargaining table. Concern over morale will
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Iraq: The RCC and
Collegial Decisionmaking
The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is Iraq's
supreme decisionmaking body. Its membership
includes President Saddam Husayn and the leaders of
Iraq's ruling Bath Party, such as First Deputy Prime
Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan. For years, diplomats
have speculated about how the RCC conducts
business in its secret sessions. Does it debate
important questions and reach decisions by consensus,
or does it merely rubberstamp Saddam's views? We
believe considerable consultation occurs and that the
RCC's homogeneous composition facilitates the
decisionmaking process.
Background
In 1982 the leaders of the ruling Bath Party convened
a long-postponed party congress in Baghdad-the
first such meeting since Saddam took power in 1979.
At the congress, the party leaders took several far-
reaching decisions. In particular, they reduced the
size of the RCC from 17 to nine members. US
diplomats reported that this was done at the behest of
Saddam, who mistrusted the loyalty of eight RCC
members who were holdovers from the regime of his
predecessor, Ahmad Hasan Bakr. By removing
doubtful elements from the RCC, the party leaders
strengthened the President's authority.
At the same time, however, the party leaders
tempered the President's victory by publicly
reaffirming their support for the principle of collegial
that decisions in the RCC are to be arrived at
collegially. The President is expected to consult with
other members of the RCC, and afterwards a vote is
supposed to be taken. The resulting decision is binding
and may not be criticized, under threat of severe
penalty.
Nevertheless, almost from the moment he took over as
President, Saddam rejected collegial decisionmaking
in the RCC. In 1979, when a number of RCC
members suggested he follow this procedure, he
reacted violently. According to US diplomats,
Saddam accused the members and their supporters of
plotting against him and executed 21 of them.
Saddam's harsh action appeared to lay to rest the
issue of collegiality, and US diplomats were surprised
when it reappeared at the party congress in 1982. The
diplomats commented that the party leaders seemed
determined to check Saddam's arbitrary style of
decisionmaking.
Saddam's Vulnerability
In 1982, according to US diplomats, Saddam's
position was "shaky." Two years earlier he had taken
Iraq to war with Iran in expectation of a quick
victory. Instead, the war had gone badly. By June
1982-when the party congress was held-Iran's
forces were poised to invade Iraq at Al Basrah.
According to press reports, the President could not
hope to maintain himself in power except through
repression.
US diplomatic reporting suggests that the party
leaders exploited Saddam's weak position. They
exacted promises from him to consult on all major and
some minor questions, in return for which they agreed
to remove from the RCC elements whose loyalty
Saddam doubted.
The Case of Barzan Tikriti
The removal of Saddam's half brother, Barzan
Tikriti, as director of Iraq's internal security service,
the Mukhabarat, supports the hypothesis that party
leaders began asserting their autonomy in 1982.
a number of
RCC members in 1983 accused Barzan of usurping
functions that were reserved for the party and
interfering in all areas of Iraqi public life. They
claimed they did not feel safe with him as head of the
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Secret
Barzan Tikriti had been a pillar of Saddam's regime.
Under his direction, the Mukhabarat had suppressed
unrest among Iraq's Shia population in the early days
of the war. Barzan also had been a principal supporter
of Saddam in 1979 when party leaders first raised the
collegiality issue. Nonetheless, Saddam gave in to the
RCC members' demands that he dismiss Barzan.
Since the dismissal in October 1983, Barzan's access
to the regime has been practically cut off, according
to US diplomats in Baghdad.
Party leaders apparently have asserted themselves on
other important issues. For example,
a faction of the RCC was responsible for
getting Saddam to scuttle truce talks with rebel
Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani in 1984.
The RCC's Current Role
We believe Saddam dominates the RCC but consults
with colleagues on that body. Saddam could not run
Iraq without the active participation of such men as
Ramadan, RCC Vice Chairman Izzat Ibrahim, and
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, who oversee much of the
government's day-to-day operations.'
We also believe that the homogeneous composition
and small size of the RCC facilitates the
decisionmaking process. Most members joined the
party in the early 1950s and took part in the bloody
street battles that marked its rise to power. They have
similar experiences of living underground and being in
prison. As a result, the members understand each
other well. In addition, they have a vested interest in
cooperating with each other because they know that
Iraq's enemies will exploit visible differences among
them.
' The remaining RCC members are Trade Minister Hassan Ali,
Defense Minister Adnan Khayrallah, Speaker of Parliament Naim
Haddad, Interior Minister Sa'dun Shakir, and Vice President Taha
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Iraq: Samir Muhammad
al-Wahhab al-Shaykhli and
the Bath Party Bureaus
The eight bureaus of the Bath Party are among the
most influential bodies in Iraqi politics. They look out
for corruption in the bureaucracy and are responsible
for ensuring that the regime's policies are rigidly
applied. The secretaries who run the bureaus are
powerful but depend for their survival on the favor of
Iraq's President Saddam Husayn. The precariousness
of the secretaries' position was demonstrated this
summer when Samir Muhammad al-Wahhab al-
Shaykhli was stripped of his two bureau posts by
Saddam.
The Bureaus
The most important of the party bureaus-the
Military Bureau-is headed by Izzat Ibrahim, Vice
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council,
Iraq's highest governing body. The other seven are the
Student and Youth, Baghdad, Vocational, Popular
Organization, Northern, Southern, and Middle
Euphrates Bureaus. US diplomats say that Saddam
regards the bureaus as his bridge to the party and the
by party stalwarts and do not act contrary to the
regime's wishes.
Saddam's People
According to US diplomats in Baghdad, Saddam
selects the secretaries to head the bureaus on the basis
of their personal loyalty to him and their
organizational talents. Muhammad Hamza al-
Zubaydi, as secretary of the Southern Bureau,
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dominated city of Al Basrah during the early days of 25X1
the war with Iran. Al-Zubaydi recruited party
members from among the Shias and directed the
security services to arrest members of the outlawed
Da'wa Party. The secretary of the Popular
Organization Bureau, Abd al-Ghani Abd al-Ghafur,
headed an RCC investigating committee that
uncovered politically and ideologically "unorthodox"
elements in the government.
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bureaucracy
The bureaus, working through 1 million party
members, maintain surveillance over practically all
areas of Iraqi society.' Party members are expected to
report to the bureaus on the manner in which the
regime's policies are carried out. The bureaus are
particularly on the lookout for ministers who modify
or reinter ret the regime's policies.
In effect, the secretaries are Saddam's hatchetmen. In
this capacity, he uses them even against other
elements of the party. According to US diplomats, in
a minister who
tries to modify one of Saddam's directives may lose
his post or his life, depending on the seriousness of the
offense. F__1
The bureaus also monitor groups outside the
bureaucracy. For example, the Military Bureau
passes on the eligibility of officers for promotion. The
Vocational Bureau watches labor unions and
professional societies to make sure they are dominated
1982 al-Shaykhli purged the party's student 25X1
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As watchdogs of the regime, the bureau secretaries
are largely isolated within Iraqi society. They have no
support groups on which they can rely-not even
within their religious or tribal communities. Five of
the six current secretaries are Shias (al-Shaykhli is a
Sunni), and,
they are anathema to their coreligionists, who rarely
receive political or economic patronage from their
"representatives" in the regime.
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Al-Shaykhli's Career
Samir Muhammad al-Wahhab al-Shaykhli
distinguished himself in 1979-80 when elements of
Iraq's Shia community rioted in support of
Khomeini's Islamic Republic of Iran. Al-Shaykhli,
who was secretary of the party's Baghdad Bureau,
suppressed demonstrations in the capital. He later
implemented a modernization campaign that restored
the decayed Al Thawrah quarter of Baghdad, one of
the largest Shia ghettos in the Middle East. Largely
because of al-Shaykhli's efforts, Al Thawrah today is
considered a bastion of support for the regime.
In July 1982, at the ninth congress of the Bath Party,
Saddam appointed al-Shaykhli secretary of the
Student and Youth Bureau, while allowing him to
remain secretary of the Baghdad Bureau. US
diplomats in Baghdad interpreted this as evidence of
Saddam's extraordinary confidence in him.
This summer, however, Saddam appointed al-
Shaykhli Minister of Higher Education and Research.
US diplomats in Baghdad speculated that he had been
assigned to clean up the Ministry, which had been
without a head for a year and a half. Shortly
afterward, it was announced that al-Shaykhli had lost
his bureau posts, leading to the conclusion he had
been kicked upstairs. In Iraq, a ministry is not nearly
as powerful as the bureaus.
Implications
A1-Shaykhli's downgrading is puzzling. US diplomats
in Baghdad previously described him as Saddam's
protege and assumed he would move up to a seat on
the RCC. Al-Shaykhli does not appear to have
disgraced himself; had he proved incompetent or
corrupt, the Baghdad rumor mills would have
reported this.
The most likely explanation is that al-Shaykhli had
become too successful. Of all the secretaries, he alone
appears to have a political following. US diplomats in
Baghdad believe he retains wide support in Al
Thawrah, where, as the former "mayor of Baghdad,"
he is a "hero" to poor Shias.
By assigning al-Shaykhli to a ministry, Saddam has
reduced his public exposure and substantially reduced
his influence, while continuing to exploit his
organizational skills. Nevertheless, we do not believe
Saddam has permanently downgraded al-Shaykhli.
Saddam's regime is short of good administrators, and
al-Shaykhli is one of the best, making it likely he will
be rehabilitated and returned to a high post in the
party.
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Iraq-North Yemen: Hands
Across the Peninsula
Relations between North Yemen and Iraq have been
improving since 1979. North Yemen wants an Arab
counterweight to Saudi influence and has provided
combat troops to assist Iraq in its war with Iran. Iraq
cannot help North Yemen financially, but Baghdad's
leadership aspirations will motivate it to provide
military training and technical assistance when the
Iran-Iraq war ends. Iraq is also likely to step up
efforts to strengthen its Ba'thist network in North
Yemen.
Background
Iraqi-North Yemeni relations hit bottom in 1974
when Baghdad was implicated in a plot to overthrow
the regime in Sanaa, and North Yemen's Foreign
Minister was killed by Palestinian gunmen of the
Iraqi-controlled Arab Liberation Front. Relations
began improving in 1979 when a more pragmatic
Iraq, seeking to establish itself as a leader in the
region, played a major role in persuading South
Yemen to abandon its border war against North
Yemen. Baghdad also became a major source of
foreign aid. President Salih, who came to power
following the assassination of his predecessor in 1978,
looked to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn as a
political father figure because of the aid he had
provided at a crucial time. Since then, Sanaa has
come to view Baghdad as a valuable ally for three
reasons:
? As an oil-producing state Iraq is a potential source
of development and budgetary assistance.
? Iraq offers at least a partial counterbalance to Saudi
political and economic influence.
? Iraq's relations with South Yemen-a longtime
adversary of North Yemen-are generally hostile,
in part because of the ill treatment of the local Bath
Party by the Marxist regime in Aden. F__1
Growing Military Ties
Cooperation between North Yemen and Iraq has been
chiefly military. North Yemen shipped some Soviet
munitions and spare parts to Iraq during the Soviet-
imposed arms embargo early in the Iran-Iraq war,
and its "Arabism Brigade" has participated in the
war against Iran. Although North Yemen has not
publicized its involvement, Sanaa rotates a full
combat brigade to Iraq every six months and has
sustained casualties. We estimate that there are about
1,000 Yemeni troops in Iraq and that the number is
increasing. Even though this is only a token
contingent compared with the large forces Iran and
Iraq have fielded, Sanaa almost certainly regards its
support as a bargaining chip for Iraqi economic and
military aid when the war winds down. F___]
providing training for scores of North Yemeni
students and officers. At least two Iraqi brigadiers
have been helping North Yemen plan a
reorganization and modernization of its military
forces, and frequent visits to Sanaa by senior Iraqi
military officers have helped solidify ties. The Iraqis
also seem interested in a unique Yemeni weapons
platform that combines a US-origin Vulcan air
defense gun and a Soviet BTR- 152 armored personnel
carrier
Once the war ends, Sanaa will probably seek greater
economic and military assistance from Baghdad as
compensation for sending its "Arabism" brigades.
Iraq is likely to view expanded economic and military
ties to Sanaa as a way of bolstering its claim to
regional leadership. Iraq may also believe that ties to
North Yemen will give Baghdad greater potential
leverage in dealings with Saudi Arabia.
Baghdad probably will offer to increase military
training for North Yemeni officers and send more
Iraqi military advisers to North Yemen. Soviet-origin
weapons constitute the bulk of the Iraqi and Yemeni
inventories. As Iraq upgrades its equipment, it might
be willing to supply some older Soviet equipment,
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such as tank transporters, tanks, and armored
personnel carriers, which the Yemenis could integrate
with relative ease into their arsenal. If Baghdad
becomes a source of military equipment and training
for North Yemen, it could help reduce Sanaa's
dependence on the Soviet Union and might erode
Moscow's political influence
Sanaa Remains Wary
Despite these affinities, a North Yemeni Foreign
Ministry official has indicated to US officials that
North Yemen will move carefully in strengthening
relations with Iraq. Sanaa wants to keep the
relationship on a state-to-state level and avoid
allowing pro-Iraqi Yemeni Ba'thists to gain influence.
This suspicion of foreign influence is shared by most
Yemenis and may hinder additional strengthening of
Yemeni politicians have a long tradition of receiving
subsidies from other Arab states, and Yemen wishes
to avoid an expansion of such activities by Iraq.
Deputy Prime Minister Mujahid Abu Shawarib, the
brother-in-law of the leader of the Hashid tribal
confederation, Shaykh Abdallah al-Ahmar, has such
an Iraqi connection. The Abu Luhum clan, which
includes the paramount shaykh of the Bakil tribal
confederation and the former prime minister and now
ambassador to the United States, Muhsin al-Ayni, is
another group with ties to Baghdad.
Baghdad Builds the Bath
Iraq has long tried to build a Ba'thist organization in
North Yemen. Iraq's ambassador to Sanaa during the
late 1970s was charged with reviving the Bath Party
in Yemen. Competition with Syria for influence
among North Yemeni Ba'thists was a major spur to
Iraqi efforts at that time,
Iraq has preserved its ties to North Yemeni Ba'thists
since the Iran-Iraq war bean.
President Salih sent
troops to fight for Iraq partly to strengthen his
support among a growing number of pro-Ba'thist
middle-ranking officers.
officials are pro-Iraqi Ba'thists.
the Iraqi Bath
organization in North Yemen has grown recently.
many of the new members are
Democratic Front.
Iraq almost certainly will step up its support for
Ba'thists in North Yemen after the war. At a
minimum, Iraq will want to ensure that it can thwart
Syrian efforts to build influence among North
Yemeni Ba'thists. The presence of North Yemeni
troops in Iraq, moreover, provides an opportunity for
Ba'thist indoctrination that the Iraqis are likely to
find irresistible. Baghdad has over the past several
years proselytized Sudanese troops sent to Iraq. The
rustic Yemeni soldiers are poor targets for Ba'thist
propaganda, but better educated elements in Sanaa's
military leadership are likely to be more receptive.
Iraq also will exploit its ties to North Yemen to
undercut South Yemen. Baghdad has long provided
financial support to South Yemeni opposition groups
and wants Sanaa to allow South Yemeni exiles to
conduct operations against Aden from North Yemeni
territory.
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Proximity Talks
on Afghanistan:
Pakistan's Objectives
The government of President Zia ul-Haq probably has
been testing the intentions of the new Soviet
leadership in the recently concluded fifth round of
talks on Afghanistan, but it shows no sign of
weakening its demand that the Soviets set a firm
timetable for the withdrawal of their forces.
Pakistan's domestic and international situation,
however, is in a period of flux, and Islamabad could
seek a compromise with Moscow should it feel
abandoned by its allies, the Afghan resistance
collapse, or a neutralist-minded government take over.
The View From Islamabad
The present regime in Islamabad believes that a
Soviet-occupied Afghanistan permanently threatens
Pakistan's future. Zia and most of his senior generals
fear Moscow eventually will exploit both its military
supremacy and Pakistan's deep ethnic divisions to
gain leverage over Islamabad. The current rulers
worry most about a breakup of Pakistan along ethnic
lines, but we believe they also do not want to become a
hostage state, beholden to Moscow on foreign policy
matters and forced into a web of trade and transit
obligations that give the Soviets access to the Arabian
Sea or India.
Pakistan under Zia has consistently backed the
Afghan resistance, permitting it sufficient support to
prevent the Soviets from consolidating their hold on
Afghanistan, but not enough to expose Pakistan to
major Soviet reprisals. It has used the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan to quiet domestic
opposition, strengthen security relations with key
supporters such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the
United States, and gain widespread diplomatic
support in the Islamic Conference, the United
Nations, and the Nonaligned Movement. The massive
Afghan refugee problem, though unavoidable, is
considered an acceptable cost, and the cross-border
attacks by Soviet and Afghan forces, while
worrisome, have not threatened vital Pakistani
interests.
According to our analysis, Pakistan has two objectives
in any Afghan settlement: to permanently reduce
Afghanistan as a base for Soviet military power and
to gain the repatriation of the more than 3 million
Afghan refugees on its soil. Islamabad knows these
two objectives are closely linked. The Afghan refugees
will not return until Soviet troops begin to leave. Any
settlement, therefore, requires a cease-fire honored by
both sides and a Soviet pullback from specific areas
before refugees return. Pakistan wants a rapid Soviet
withdrawal over six months to reduce the number of
incidents and reassure the Afghans that Soviet
airmobile troops will not strike as they return to their
villages. Some experts believe Islamabad reluctantly
would go along with a two-year withdrawal timetable,
the retention of a Soviet "training contingent" to
protect Soviet installations in Kabul, and an
international force to police the cease-fire and
monitor the withdrawal.
Islamabad openly accepts the reality that any
government in Kabul must be neutral and amenable
to Soviet strategic concerns. It would share an interest
in seeing that the transition to a post-Babrak regime is
as smooth as possible and will work to limit fighting
between resistance groups while Soviet troops remain
in the country.
The Pakistanis hope that any new government will be
friendly and not raise the Pashtunistan issue. Just in
case, however, it will insist that guarantees of
noninterference across the Pakistani-Afghan border
be reciprocal, thus gaining a measure of recognition
for the Durand Line in Kabul and Moscow. The long
residence of Afghan tribal and political leaders in
Pakistan has given Pakistani officials extensive access
to a post-Soviet generation of leaders. The Pakistanis
probably will mount a long-term program using
Islamic, tribal, economic, and personal ties to extend
their influence into areas long closed to them.
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Islamabad agrees with the United States that the
Soviets are using the UN-sponsored proximity talks
on Afghanistan to gain time while consolidating their
hold on Afghanistan, divert attention from their role
in the crisis, gain at least tacit recognition for the
Babrak Karmal regime, and eventually draw Pakistan
into direct negotiations. Pakistani negotiators
probably would agree that the talks have benefited
the Soviets by conveying the impression that serious
negotiations between Pakistan and a seemingly
independent Afghanistan are under way. The talks
also enable Moscow and Kabul, as well as Islamabad,
to argue before world public opinion that they are
seeking a peaceful solution.
Gains for Pakistan
For its part, Pakistan also gains significantly from the
negotiations. The process:
? Enables Pakistan to deflect Soviet frustration over
the conflict and makes it more difficult for Moscow
to mount major reprisals while Pakistan appears
open to a negotiated settlement.
? Provides a means to keep the issue before world
public opinion that also enhances the legitimacy of
Pakistan's position and highlights the Soviet
military occupation of Afghanistan as the key
sticking point.
? Keeps a channel open through which Islamabad can
test Soviet intentions.
? Reassures domestic elites who believe Zia has
unnecessarily exposed Pakistan to Soviet pressures
and identified the country too closely with US
interests.
? Enhances Islamabad's leverage with its allies by
periodically reconfirming Pakistan's critical role in
keeping the Soviets under pressure in Afghanistan.
Pakistan so far appears to have held firm in the latest
round of talks. There are no indications it has
retreated from its insistence that Moscow set a firm
timetable for its troop withdrawal before international
guarantees and pledges of noninterference can be
completed. According to press reports, the Pakistanis
also have refused Soviet/Afghan efforts at the most
recent round to turn the proximity talks into bilateral
negotiations, citing resolutions of the Islamic
Conference forbidding bilateral negotiations as long
as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan. Islamabad
has worked to ensure that the settlement includes a
pledge of noninterference in Pakistan's internal
affairs, thereby gaining de facto Soviet/Afghan
recognition of the disputed Pakistani-Afghan border.
Implications of Changing International Relationships
Islamabad undoubtedly is carefully watching the
current diplomatic initiatives between the United
States and India and between China and the Soviet
Union, either or both of which could affect its resolve
on Afghanistan. Although there is considerable
paranoia where India is concerned, we believe the
Pakistanis may not automatically assume that either
initiative will have negative implications for them. Zia
and his Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan,
are sufficiently shrewd to look for opportunities as
well as constraints in these possible new relationships.
The United States is critically important to
Islamabad, not simply for its substantial economic
and military assistance, but because of its long
security relationship with Pakistan. Although
Pakistani leaders are skeptical about the
durability of US commitments and doubt that
Washington has either the will or the capability to
protect them against a Soviet thrust into South Asia,
they believe the US-Pakistan security connection
should give pause to Soviet planners contemplating a
major strike against Pakistan.
Some Pakistanis have long worried that the United
States and Soviet Union will come to an
understanding on Afghanistan, possibly as part of an
arms control deal, and leave them holding the bag.
The Zia regime probably is confident that this would
not happen under the current administration, but
Pakistanis will nevertheless be watching carefully for
indications of US resolve on Afghanistan at the
coming summit talks. Any perception in Islamabad
that the United States wishes to remove Afghanistan
as a key agenda item and is reevaluating its
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commitment to Pakistan would undermine Pakistan's
confidence and could lead it to compromise on Soviet
troop levels in Afghanistan.
From the Pakistani perspective, better US-Indian
relations need not be harmful and could help,
provided they are founded on a new appreciation in
New Delhi of the danger posed to the subcontinent by
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and lead to a
significant cooling in New Delhi's ties to Moscow.
Islamabad will go along with the US initiative if it
aims at these objectives, at encouraging India to press
the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan, and at
improving the atmosphere for Indian-Pakistani
negotiations. Since 1982, Pakistan has been pressing
its own initiative to improve the climate between
Islamabad and New Delhi. This has been aimed at
reducing pressure on its eastern border while it faces
the Soviet threat in the west, and at forestalling any
thought in New Delhi of cooperating with Moscow
against Pakistan.
If, however, the United States substantially reduces
its commitment to Pakistan as a way of courting
India, we believe Islamabad will again feel betrayed.
It will oppose improved Indian-US ties both directly
and through the Saudis and the Chinese. It will feel
extremely exposed to Soviet pressures on Afghanistan,
and it probably will intensify its crash program to
develop nuclear weapons. If it survived such a turn of
events, the Zia government probably would consider
testing a nuclear device to restore its credibility at
home and demonstrate a capability to protect
Pakistan's vital interests. Islamabad probably will
regard US attitudes in the forthcoming preliminary
negotiations on a follow-on economic-military aid
package as a key test of US intentions.
Pakistan has long regarded China as a key ally in
countering both Indian and Soviet pressures.
Islamabad trusts China more because the geopolitical
positions of both countries make them natural allies
and because Beijing's diplomacy is less susceptible to
special interest pressures. The Pakistanis highly value
Beijing's constancy and probably believe China is
better than the United States at pursuing apparently
conflicting policies. Islamabad probably does not
initiate any major diplomatic moves that would affect
its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union,
or India without at least consulting with Beijing. The
latter, for example, strongly endorsed Islamabad's
effort to improve relations with India, undoubtedly
agreeing that any diminution of Soviet influence in
the region would be a positive development.
Any perception in Islamabad that the Chinese were
substantially reducing their support for Pakistan,
particularly on Afghanistan, very likely would have
major psychological and diplomatic repercussions and
probably would lead to a complete reevaluation by
Pakistan of its policies and options. Without China,
Pakistan would be much more susceptible to Soviet
and Indian pressures and probably would soon adopt a
more flexible position on Afghanistan. Islamabad
undoubtedly has sought reassurances from China on
the latter's talks with the Soviets, and a recent strong
Chinese restatement on Afghanistan may have been
an attempt to quiet Pakistani fears. Pakistani leaders
probably would regard the extent and level of
consultations with China and the levels of bilateral
military assistance and of weapons supplies to the
Afghan resistance as key indicators of China's
intentions.
Implications of Domestic Change
Pakistan currently is undergoing a carefully
controlled process of internal political change that
could bring to the fore leaders who want a more
flexible policy on Afghanistan. There has long been a
substantial body of opinion in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the universities, among intellectuals, and to a
lesser extent the military that believes President Zia's
policy on Afghanistan has unnecessarily exposed
Pakistan to Soviet pressures and burdened the country
with a refugee problem that is expensive, intractable,
and ultimately dangerous. This view holds that, even
if the United States could be trusted, Pakistan has
neither the resources nor the internal political solidity
to play the role of a "frontline state." Rather than
becoming involved in superpower conflicts, this view
supports the idea of a neutral Pakistan that can
function as a buffer state and devote more of its
attention and resources to its own political and
economic development.
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This view could gain ground in Pakistani councils as
new civilian leaders give voice to the widespread
unease among educated Pakistanis over the country's
policy on Afghanistan. The issue is emerging more
frequently in National Assembly debates, pressed
both by government supporters and an emerging
opposition group. In our view, however, as long as
Zia-and behind him the senior Army leadership-
retains control over the process of civilianization, and
implicitly over the formation of national security
policy, this kind of political pressure alone probably
will not lead to substantial changes in Pakistan's
position on Afghanistan.
On the other hand, should Zia and the senior generals
lose control of the transition process and a mass
opposition movement led by the Pakistan People's
Party (PPP) emerge to demand more rapid and
thorough civilianization, we believe the country's
Afghanistan policy would change, although probably
not until a successor military regime to Zia gave way
through free elections to a PPP government. The
People's Party maintains it would deal directly with
the present regime in Kabul and find a way to send
the more than 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan
back across the border.
Even a PPP government, however, would face major
constraints in seeking a deal with the Soviets. In our
view, a civilian government that ignored the military's
interests and policy preferences could find itself
replaced by another general. Further, no government
in Pakistan can afford to alienate such key allies as
the Saudis or the Chinese, who undoubtedly would
disapprove of any settlement that gave Moscow too
much in Afghanistan. Nor is the refugee problem an
easy one to solve, given the fact that among the
refugees are large groups of armed, battle-hardened
guerrillas who would desperately oppose a mass
return to Afghanistan except on their own terms.
Pakistan might try to split the various armed groups,
but here again difficulties arise from the fact that the
strongest and best armed of the resistance groups are
also the most Islamic and the most opposed to a
compromise.
demand that something must be done about the
Afghan refugees is driving Islamabad to a settlement
on Afghanistan on Moscow's terms. This view holds
that stepped-up Soviet military pressure on the
border, growing military tensions with India in
Kashmir, and a perception that Pakistan's key allies
are pursuing initiatives that could pull the rug from
under its positions have led to a reassessment of
Islamabad's Afghan policy. In addition, according to
this analysis, President Zia is losing ground politically
in Pakistan and will need to compromise with
politicians who favor a quick settlement with Moscow.
Should this scenario be the case, Islamabad will have
to turn against the Afghan resistance, closing camps
along the border and interrupting the flow of weapons
to the Afghan insurgents. The Pakistanis know they
cannot entirely halt the resistance, but their actions
could reduce it to a level manageable by the Soviets.
Such actions would require a broad public consensus
inside Pakistan and a willingness to use Pakistan's
armed forces against the Afghan resistance.
Outlook
We do not expect the negotiating process to be over
any time soon. According to press reports, the
proximity talks have reached agreement on the basic
principles of a settlement, but they await a specific
timetable from the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of
its forces. Moscow is demanding prior guarantees of
noninterference and may announce a long departure
period (three to five years) to begin only after an
effective cease-fire. In addition, further talks will be
required to implement any settlement, an
extraordinarily complex and potentially divisive
process.
In time we believe there will be a settlement on
Afghanistan. In our view, the form it will take
depends more on Moscow than on Islamabad. For
now, Pakistan apparently believes its interests can
best be preserved by supporting a healthy resistance
inside Afghanistan and holding out for a settlement
acceptable to most of the exiled Afghan leadership, to
its own Islamic constituency, and to its most
important outside supporters.
Alternative Scenario
Some experts believe that a growing sense of
international isolation coupled with a strong public
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Although we believe Islamabad might compromise on
some of the details of a settlement, such as on the
length of a Soviet withdrawal and the retention of a
Soviet training contingent, we do not foresee an
outright collapse of Pakistani resolve. The domestic
and international consequences would be too severe,
even for a post-Zia civilian regime.
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Growing Risks for Western
Travelers in Afghanistan
Although Western journalists and medical personnel
have operated relatively easily inside Afghanistan in
the past, better Soviet intelligence and more frequent
military operations are increasing the risks. The
recent death of a US journalist during an apparent
Soviet attack underscores these dangers
Afghanistan. The director of Medecins Sans
Frontieres, a private French voluntary agency
providing medical care inside Afghanistan, says that
Soviet intelligence began to improve in 1984 and that
the Soviets, using local informers and reconnaissance
aircraft, can often quickly locate French clinics. (In
one incident in 1981, Soviet aircraft destroyed a
French clinic, although its red cross was clearly visible
Soviet Attitudes Toward Westerners
We believe the Soviets place a high priority on
preventing Westerners from visiting or working inside
Afghanistan without the Afghan Government's
permission. Soviet commanders sent an airborne unit
to capture French journalist Jacques Abouchar in
1984 and apparently assigned a unit to capture
French doctor Philippe Augoyard during a major
military operation in Paktia Province in 1983,
Both men were
incarceration and regime-staged show trials.
The Soviets oppose the presence of Westerners,
including doctors and journalists, because credible
eyewitness reports often contradict Soviet and Afghan
claims that the war is being won and that the
insurgency has no local support. By capturing
Western infiltrators, the Soviets probably also hope to
reinforce their charges in the international media of
massive outside support for the insurgents.
Despite the hostile Soviet attitude, Westerners have
operated relatively easily inside Afghanistan. Since
1980 the Soviets has captured only one of the
approximately 300 European doctors who have
worked clandestinely in Afghanistan and only one of
the many Western journalists and scholars who have
traveled there. Soviet and Afghan attacks caused the
death of only one journalist-in October 1985.
Another was killed, probably inadvertently, during a
Soviet or Afghan bombing attack in 1982.
Increasing Dangers
Nevertheless, many observers believe, and we agree,
that the dangers are increasing for Westerners inside
from the air.)
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must move their clinics more frequently because of
better Soviet intelligence.
would invite Soviet attacks.
movement inside Afghanistan
has become more dangerous because the Soviets are
bombing the main infiltration routes more frequently.
The large number of Soviet and Afghan air violations
of Pakistan-190 so far this year-reflects more
aggressive military operations near the border.
We believe Westerners entering southern Afghanistan
from Pakistan face particular danger because of the
area's flat terrain. The Soviets captured Abouchar
during his first day in southern Afghanistan, and the
US journalist was killed near Qandahar City.
Abouchar says the Soviets captured him easily
because he could not find any hills in which to hide. In
contrast, Augoyard was captured in Paktia
Province-in southeastern Afghanistan-after
spending several months there.
In the most recent incident, on the night of
19 September as many as four helicopters attacked a
truck 12 kilometers north of Qandahar City that was
carrying four Americans and about 12 insurgents,
killing newsman Charles Thornton and probably
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wounding another American. The helicopters left soon
after the attack, allowing the survivors to escape and
bury Thornton's body. Two of the Americans decided
to continue their travels in Afghanistan, and one
returned to Pakistan. Arrangements are being made
for the removal of Thornton's body, according to a US
member of his party
Outlook
We believe that the Soviets will continue to improve
their intelligence capabilities against Western
travelers. Stepped-up Soviet sweeps along insurgent
infiltration routes from Pakistan suggest that Western
travelers will inevitably be affected. We believe that
the Soviets view Westerners traveling with insurgent
bands as fair game and make a special effort to attack
or capture them if they become aware of their
presence.
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Afghanistan:
Soviet Aggressiveness
and Regime Ineptitude
We believe that large Soviet operations in
Afghanistan between June and October were
prompted primarily by Soviet efforts to compensate
for the inability of regime forces to maintain even a
facade of control rather than by a Soviet effort to
dramatically escalate the war. Fighting this summer
and fall has been intense, with the insurgents gaining
against the Afghan military in several areas
Reaction to Regime Failings
The Soviet summer campaign was designed largely to
relieve Afghan regime garrisons that were in danger
of falling to the insurgents:
? Insurgents had besieged the Afghan Army's
garrison at Barikowt for almost a year, overrun
several smaller posts in the area, and prevented the
regime from resupplying its troops. The Afghan
military conducted several operations in early spring
to free their positions, but their efforts failed
dismally.
? Improved cooperation among insurgent groups in
Helmand Province increased their ability to
successfully attack regime posts and enabled them
to pose a serious threat to the regime's hold on the
Kajaki Dam.
? Fighting between insurgent and regime forces
intensified this spring in the Panjsher Valley, and,
all of the static
positions of the Afghan 444th Commando
Brigade-the Afghan unit assigned to the
Panjsher-were besieged to some extent by June.
Insurgent ambushes prevented the regime from
reinforcing its units, and guerrilla antiaircraft fire
hindered Af han Air Force efforts to provide
support.
One of its
greatest defeats of the war occurred in mid-June
when its garrison at Peshghowr was overrun by
insurgents.
regime
control of Herat-already poor-slipped even more
this past spring and summer. A Soviet and Afghan
sweep in May failed, and officials in the Ministry of
Defense believed the situation was out of
government control. In August,
insurgent leader Ismail Khan's forces
had turned down the offer of a truce and controlled
most of the city.
? Despite large operations in Paktia Province late last
fall and early this year, regime forces have been
unable to improve their chronically poor showing
there. The government's garrison at Khowst
.apparently was again in danger of falling in August.
A large Soviet operation in the Ali Khel area, and
assistance to regime forces around Khowst, may
temporarily relieve Afghan garrisons, but the
insurgents, as they have in the Panjsher and Konar
Valleys, probably will resume attacking posts after
the Soviets leave.
Soviet Activity
The Soviets launched large operations during the
summer and early this fall in the Konar, Panjsher,
and Helmand Valleys and in Herat and Paktia
Provinces to maintain regime positions. As such, the
efforts, though probably planned well in advance of
actual combat, were more reactive than preemptive
and, we believe, do not signal a substantial change in
Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. Because their
objectives were limited and short term, the Soviets
probably believed their summer operations produced
satisfactory results. In none of the large operations did
the Soviets leave substantial numbers of troops behind
to maintain control of the areas and thus preempt or
suppress new insurgent activity.
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The Soviets appeared to focus on reducing resistance
pressure in the areas of operation by killing as many
insurgents as possible, capturing arms depots, and
closing resistance escape routes. Another goal also
may have been to train and observe the performance
of their troops using new weapons and ordnance in
combat. Although they devoted an unusually large
amount of air and artillery assets to the fighting, in
general the Soviets continued to use stereotyped
tactics
An Unreliable Ally
We believe the Soviets will have to carry an even
heavier burden of the fighting over the coming
months. Despite Moscow's hopes, the Afghan military
is becoming an even more unreliable ally than during
the first few years of the war.
Soviet and Afghan troops fought
each other during the Helmand Valley offensive after
the Soviets assaulted some civilians in the area.
fears for their personal
safety caused the Soviets to announce in March that
all Afghans visiting Soviet advisers must be disarmed.
The regime, despite prodigious efforts, remains
unable to build its forces.
desertions and defections in recent months have
caused a decline in the military's already low
in May the urgent need or
additional forces prompted the regime to broaden the
category of young men required to serve in the
military, effectively drafting all high school graduates
in Afghanistan, though few high schools function
outside Kabul. US Embassy sources in Kabul
reported in July, however, that the regime continued
to face serious manpower shortages, especially in the
Panjsher Valley, as a result of heavy casualties and
desertions.
Implications for the Soviets
If the Soviets intend to keep the insurgents from
taking the initiative in the war, they will have to
launch many more preemptive as well as reactive
operations, switching from a defensive to an offensive
role. Moscow might also consider augmenting the
number of its forces in country and adding to its
logistic infrastructure. In addition, the Soviets will
need to improve their chronically poor intelligence,
rigid command and control, and the health and
morale of their troops.
We doubt that the Soviets, who are willing to commit
only limited resources to Afghanistan, will make
quick changes in the way they are conducting the war.
So far they have done little more than increase
security in areas where they anticipate strong
resistance or which they consider too valuable to lose
to the insurgents.
Implications for the Insurgents
Over the coming months, guerrilla attacks against
Afghan units and vulnerable regime garrisons will
continue to yield more tangible results-casualties
and captured arms-than assaults on Soviet forces.
Because regime troops often sympathize with the
resistance and are poorly trained and motivated, they
are less likely than Soviet soldiers to try to hold posts
under adverse conditions. Afghan forces also are more
likely than Soviet troops to abandon their arms or
defect with their weapons to the insurgents.
Outlook
Successful resistance attacks against Afghan military
posts will continue to thwart Soviet objectives in
several significant ways:
? They will provide propaganda gains for the
resistance, clearly demonstrating that the Afghan
military is incapable of assuming a major combat
role.
? The Soviets will have to replace losses of Afghan
vehicles and equipment to the insurgents.
? Heavy resistance pressure on regime forces will
prompt the Soviets to come to the Afghans'
assistance, putting Moscow in the position to react
rather than take the initiative in the war.
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The Afghan Air Force:
Moscow's Unreliable Ally
The Afghan Air Force remains an unreliable Soviet
ally that suffers from both a lack of will and internal
unrest. These problems are largely caused by
improved insurgent military performance, Soviet
domination, Muslim sympathy for the insurgents, and
feuding between the two factions of the Afghan ruling
party. Although the Air Force's unreliability has
limited its participation in the war, the Soviets believe
the Air Force can play an important role over the
longer term. Because prospects for improved
performance are poor, however, we expect the Soviets
will continue to assume the lion's share of the air war.
Reasons for Poor Performance
We believe that improved insurgent military
performance, Soviet domination, sympathy for the
insurgents, and rivalry between the Afghan ruling
party's two factions largely explain the Air Force's
unreliability. Afghan pilots
are reluctant to close in on insurgent bases because
insurgents have more heavy machineguns and SA-7
antiaircraft missiles than they have had in the past.
Soviet domination of the
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to fire at the upper surfaces of helicopters, which are
less heavily armored than the lower surfaces.
Reliability Problems
The Afghan Air Force suffers from a lack of will,
sabotage, and defections. Soviet
advisers often fly with Afghan fighter pilots to prevent
them from jettisoning their bombs before they reach
insurgent targets. pilots try to
avoid closely approaching heavily armed insurgent
bands even when Soviet advisers are present.
fir Force saboteurs destroyed two
MIG-17s at an airfield in Mazar-e Sharif in
September. Air Force
officers blew up 21 Afghan planes at Shindand
Airbase in June 1985, nearly succeeded in carrying
out a similar action at Bagram Airbase, and tried
twice to sabotage the aircraft of General Abdul
Fatah, the second in command of the Air Force]
the Afghan secret police
executed four Air Force personnel in 1983 for
removing bomb fuses
Defections also plague the Air Force. Air Force pilots
and crews defected to Pakistan with two MI-25
helicopters in 1985, and pilots defected with an AN-
26 transport plane in 1984, an SU-22 fighter in 1983,
and an MI-8 helicopter in 1981.
Afghan Air Force has also caused widespread
resentment among Afghan airmen
only a third of the pilots are pro-Soviet.
Soviet advisers must approve all Air Force operations,
and the Soviets control operations unilaterally in the
northern provinces, The
advisers choose all bombing targets and brief Afghan
pilots only an hour before bombing missions, giving
only the takeoff time, target coordinates, and a
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We believe that sympathy for the insurgents
contributes to the Air Force's unreliability. Many
support personnel who do not face insurgents in
combat probably sympathize with the guerrillas, and
even Air Force pilots are generally apolitical, in our 25X1
view. Soviet mechanics ',25X1
closely monitor Afghan mechanics and never allow
them to work on Soviet aircraft.
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Political infighting between the Khalq and Parcham
factions of the ruling party also promotes poor morale.
each faction blamed 25X1
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NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Secret
Afghan Air Force Order of Battle
main Afghan airbases: Kabul, Bagram, Qandahar,
Shindand, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat. Most
helicopters are based at Kabul, but most fighter-
bombers are based at Bagram-reflecting the
relatively greater strategic importance of eastern
Afghanistan. The Air Force is commanded by Major
General Abdul Qadr, an engineer who has been a
member of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan since its inception 20 years ago.
Helicopters
MI-8
76
MI-25
20
Fighter-bombers
MIG-21
62
MIG-15/17
58
SU-7
20
SU-22
10
IL-28
14
Transports
AN-26
34
Trainers
L-39
have also criticized the two factions for their lack of
cooperation and periodic clashes. We believe these
tensions are worsened by the imbalance between the
Parchami-dominated Air Force high command and
the rank and file, where Khalqis outnumber
Parchamis by two to one.
Implications
The Afghan Air Force's unreliability impedes the
Soviet war effort, in our view. The lack of reliable
pilots largely explains, for example, why the number
of Afghan aircraft has increased only by about 20
percent since 1979.
the Air Force never participates in combat operations
involving Soviet troops or combined Soviet-Afghan
Army operations because Soviet officials consider
Afghan pilots unreliable and are afraid they might
Despite these problems, Moscow apparently still
hopes the Air Force can play an important role in the
war over the longer term.
the Soviets are continuing their relatively large
training program for Afghan pilots. They know a
more loyal Afghan Air Force would ease the burden
on their own Air Force.
the Soviets are replacing Afghan air losses
relatively uickly; the aircraft destroyed at Shindand
bear the brunt of the air war.
Airbase in June were replaced shortly after the
incident. Because substantial improvements in
Afghan Air Force performance are unlikely any time
soon, however, we believe the Soviets will continue to
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Secret
Regional Dominance
New Delhi has made controlling the Indian Ocean a
central if long-term goal of its regional strategy. India
already has the largest fleet of the littoral states and is
continuing its naval buildup. This force gives India a
relative advantage over Pakistan, its most likely
opponent in a future naval conflict. The Indians have
neither sufficient naval assets nor prowess to deny US
or Soviet access to the Indian Ocean, but a
determined effort on their part could hinder
superpower naval movement, particularly near the
Indian coast
Indian Naval Modernization and Expansion
The Indian Navy's principal offensive power lies in a
World War II-era aircraft carrier acquired from the
United Kingdom; some 1950s- and 1960s-vintage
Soviet-built destroyers, frigates, missile boats, and
submarines; and a few frigates indigenously produced
over the past 13 years from British designs. Most of
the surface ships carry surface-to-surface and/or
surface-to-air missiles.
India's aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, underwent an
extensive overhaul in 1981 and has recently been
fitted with a new "ski jump" flight deck. Although
the refurbishing has increased its fighting capabilities,
the Vikrant is over 40 years old and suffers from
chronic maintenance problems that frequently keep it
in drydock. Because the Vikrant is stationed with the
Western Naval Command in the Arabian Sea, the
Eastern Naval Command is short handed in covering
the Bay of Bengal.
The Indian Government recently completed a deal to
purchase another 1940s-vintage aircraft carrier, the
Hermes, from the United Kingdom. This addition will
help India keep at least one carrier operational at all
times and allow it to station an aircraft carrier with
each of the two major naval commands. The Hermes
will undergo a thorough refitting before its delivery to
India in three years, but, like the Vikrant, it is fast
approaching the end of its operational life. The Indian
Navy hopes to replace both ships with indigenously
produced aircraft carriers sometime in the 1990s.
The carrier force's striking power is provided by eight
Sea Harrier V/STOL jets assigned to the Vikrant.
This fighter-bomber force was increased by the
purchase of 11 additional Harriers to provide a
squadron for the Hermes when it arrives. The new
Harrier purchase includes 26 more Sea Eagle
missiles, bringing the fleet's arsenal of this effective
antiship weapon to 46. In combat, the Harriers will
probably be reinforced by the Indian Air Force's two
land-based Jaguar squadrons (39 aircraft), which are
capable of assuming naval air warfare missions, as
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Secret
The Indian Navy is also improving the rest of its
surface warfare force. All three of the fleet's
destroyers are modified Soviet-built Kashin-class
guided-missile destroyers. A fourth has recently been
launched at the Black Sea Nikolayev shipyards,
where a fifth is under construction. The Indians are
fitting out the second of three indigenously designed
Godavari-class guided-missile frigates, essentially
stretched versions of their six Leander-class frigates
built under license from the United Kingdom. They
have also modernized their two British-built Whitby-
class frigates by installing missile launchers removed
from two Soviet-built Osa-class attack boats and
building a helicopter flight deck on one. The Navy
also has three Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol
boats and 13 Osa-class guided-missile attack boats,
all purchased from the Soviets, which significantly
enhance its antiship capabilities.
Because of maintenance problems with their eight
Soviet-built Foxtrot submarines (now about 20 years
old), the Indians plan to purchase more submarines
from the USSR and four to six Type 1500 submarines
from West Germany. The first two of the Type 1500
submarines will be built in West Germany; the
remainder will be assembled in India with West
German assistance.
India's surface warships, except for the patrol and
attack boats, provide the Navy with most of its
antisubmarine warfare capability. They are
complemented by 10 Soviet-built Petya-class frigates,
which the Indians hope to replace soon with newer
Koni-class frigates. Three old British-built Leopard-
class frigates in the training squadron could also be
deployed in antisubmarine warfare.
The most effective antisubmarine assets are the
Indian Navy air arm's one fixed-wing and five
helicopter antisubmarine squadrons, assisted by the
three maritime reconnaissance squadrons. Soviet Bear
F aircraft, on order and scheduled to begin arriving by
1986, will enhance the Indian Navy's maritime
reconnaissance and antisubmarine abilities. In
addition to these aircraft, the Kashins, Leanders, and
one of the Whitbys carry one helicopter each; the
addition to these aircraft, the Kashins, Leanders, and
one of the Whitbys carry one helicopter each; the
Godivari, two.
The Indian fleet is looking to expand its amphibious
and mine countermeasures capabilities. The recent
acquisition of the eighth of 12 planned Polish-built
Polnocny-class landing ships, along with five
indigenously produced craft, brings India's lift
capacity to approximately 2,000 troops in a single
amphibious operation. The fleet is replacing its
outdated ex-British minesweepers with Soviet-built
Natya- and Yevgenya-class minesweepers, giving it a
total of 15 mine warfare craft. India may also buy
modern mine countermeasures ships from West
European countries.
The Indians are increasing construction of naval
facilities. The Navy is expanding its base at Cochin so
that the Southern Naval Command can assume more
than its present training role when it begins to acquire
more ships. Docks and airfields at Port Blair in the
Andaman Islands, strategically located near the
Indian Ocean's eastern approaches, are also being
improved.
New Delhi envisions a wider role for its fleet in
regional affairs. Because of its comprehensive annual
training cycle, the Indian Navy usually has a task
force undergoing sea exercises monthly. The fleet also
conducts port calls regularly in the Indian Ocean,
helping to maintain regional ties. So far this year a
five-ship squadron has visited Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Brunei; a two-ship force
called at Djibouti, Oman, and Ethiopia; and another
two-ship force cruised to Madagascar and Mauritius.
New Delhi
may be interested in leasing the Crozet Islands, about
1,600 nautical miles south of Mauritius, from France.
Though this tiny archipelago is too underdeveloped
and remote to serve any practical military purpose,
such a lease would give the Indians a support facility
for their Antarctic expeditions and the chance to
establish a presence at the Indian Ocean's southwest
approaches. 0
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Godivari, two.
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Weaknesses and Threats
The Indian Navy still suffers from major handicaps.
Equipment weaknesses, such as insufficient antiair
assets, lack of modern secure voice communications,
few modern port facilities, and the more general and
pervasive problems of foreign dependency and
relatively low technical capabilities may diminish as
India's acquisition and construction programs expand
and its scientific and technical expertise increases.
Weaknesses in other areas, such as personnel, tactics,
and intelligence, however, will remain serious for the
foreseeable future.
The Navy has a severe personnel shortage, perhaps as
high as 25 percent. The other armed services and
private industry compete in drawing on the national
manpower pool, especially among those people with
the education and training necessary for the fleet's
increasingly sophisticated needs. As a result, India's
naval expansion programs are likely to continue to
outpace its manning capabilities.
Moreover, India's policy against joint training
exercises and information sharing with other
countries' navies greatly hinders two critical areas of
naval operations-tactics and intelligence. Western
observers characterize Indian naval tactics and
doctrine as about 20 years behind most modern
standards and Indian naval intelligence as severely
hampered by inaccurate information, prejudice, and
suspicion. The fleet still relies on grease-pencil boards
and sound phones for acquiring and engaging targets.
Given the hostility in the two countries' relations, the
Pakistani Navy poses a serious threat to New Delhi's
fleet and requires the Indians to keep their Arabian
Sea flotilla strong at the expense of other commands.
The Pakistani Navy's six French-built submarines,
eight Chinese-built guided-missile patrol boats, and
six Sea King helicopters capable of carrying Exocet
missiles, augmented by the Pakistani Air Force's
Exocet-equipped Mirage V aircraft, present a credible
threat to the Indian fleet. Bottling the Pakistanis up in
Karachi or seizing the port in an amphibious
assault-likely Indian wartime goals-would require
nearly all of India's naval assets.
Still, the Pakistani Navy's severe weaknesses would
put it at a great disadvantage in certain scenarios. If
the Indians struck first and mined Karachi's harbor,
the Pakistani fleet's lack of mine countermeasure
assets would be a critical handicap. If neither side
achieved initial surprise, the Pakistani Navy's relative
inferiorities in numbers and capabilities would
hamper it severely. But, if the Pakistanis could deploy
undetected, they could either try a bold strike at an
unprepared Indian fleet, where their submarines,
missile attack boats, and Exocets could cause
considerable damage, or send their Navy west, either
to their smaller port at Gwadar or even to cooperating
Arab countries close by, to keep it intact to harass the
Indians with small, quick strikes.
neighbors.
Indian naval planners would also have to consider the
possibility that another Indo-Pakistani war could
draw in other regional powers on Pakistan's side.
Pakistan has close military, including naval, ties with
Saudi Arabia. Substantial numbers of Saudi officer
candidates train in Pakistan, comprising up to 25
percent of recent Pakistani naval academy classes.
Saudi naval forces conducted their first major
exercise with the Pakistani Navy off Karachi last
March. Although we have no evidence that suggests
planning for such a contingency, this relationship
could conceivably be extended into some degree of
wartime cooperation-most likely providing haven for
a withdrawing Pakistani fleet. India closely monitors
Pakistani military cooperation with its Muslim
Moreover, the Indians have not forgotten the dispatch
of the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal during
the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war-interference that the
Indian Navy was powerless to counter. New Delhi is
still receptive to rumors of US-Pakistani military
cooperation, particularly joint naval exercises and US
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Secret
An Indian Attack on Diego Garcia?
Unlikely and Unfruitful
We have no information suggesting Indian military
contingency plans for an attack on Diego Garcia,
some 1,000 nautical miles south of India. Any such
operation would have to be mounted as a preemptive
strike using antiship missiles probably missile
attack boats, carrier-based aircraft, and possibly, but
not necessarily, some ships to protect the carrier. If
New Delhi should want to seize and occupy the
island, nearly all of its Navy would be needed. This
would include all major combatants-to attack the
defending naval force-as well as a sizable portion of
its amphibious lift capability. The Indian Army has
dedicated a mechanized infantry brigade to
amphibious operations and rotates its subunits
annually for training with the Navy. The fleet's
amphibious force can currently lift most of this
brigade, which would provide the combined-arms
landing force that a full-scale assault would require.
basing rights in Karachi. Although New Delhi knows
it cannot prevent US naval access to the Indian Ocean
or even to areas contiguous to the Indian coast, it
undoubtedly calculates that a stronger Indian Navy
would make the United States think harder about
repeating the USS Enterprise deployment. The
Indians are also aware that the Soviet naval presence
in the Indian Ocean has increased since the 1971 war
and that potential Soviet reaction to a future Indo-
Pakistani conflict has become an important factor in
US regional naval planning and operations.
fleet its planners and leaders envision.
Outlook
The Indian Navy will continue to increase in size and
ability, providing New Delhi a valuable tool with
which to pursue its regional strategy and goals in the
Indian Ocean. Given its current expansion program,
the fleet will be able to dominate any fleet of the
littoral powers. It does not have nor is it likely to have
the capability in the near future to challenge the US
or Soviet Indian Ocean squadrons, although an
increased Indian naval presence in the waters near
India will make it more difficult for either superpower
to conduct missions against New Delhi's wishes. For
the foreseeable future, Indian naval growth faces
significant hurdles, most importantly in manpower
and technical capabilities, that will have to be
overcome if the Navy is to become the "blue water"
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India's Role in
Sri Lankan Party Politics
India's four-month-old effort to broker a negotiated
settlement between the Sri Lankan Government and
Tamil separatists has drawn New Delhi into the heart
of Sri Lankan party politics. Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi's personal intervention has strengthened
Sri Lanka's ruling United National Party (UNP) at
the expense of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP),
New Delhi's traditional ally. It has also eased
pressures on President Jayewardene to hold a popular
referendum, demanded by the SLFP, on the
communal conflict. Although the Sri Lankan
Government and the opposition have welcomed
India's sponsorship of peace talks, both are cautious
about granting New Delhi too strong a role in Sri
Lankan affairs.
India and the Major Sri Lankan Parties
Indian involvement in negotiating an end to Sri
Lanka's communal conflict is driven by foreign policy
considerations. Increased fighting in Sri Lanka, a
possible resurgence of separatism in Tamil-
dominated south India, and the desire to repatriate
more than 100,000 Sri Lankan refugees have led New
Delhi to seek a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka.
Gandhi and Indian Foreign Secretary Bhandari are
eager to promote India's good neighbor policy through
a diplomatic success in Sri Lanka.
New Delhi's role has had the effect of changing the
fortunes of Sri Lanka's major political parties. In
pursuing peace in Sri Lanka, India has, out of
necessity, forged a close working relationship with the
ruling UNP. After more than eight years of cool
relations with New Delhi, the UNP enjoys
unprecedented access to the Indian leadership.
New Delhi's close cooperation with Jayewardene's
UNP government reflects India's commitment to a
political solution more than a desire to favor one party
over another. With India's consent, the UNP has kept
the talks largely secret; the opposition Sri Lanka
Freedom Party was not formally represented at this
summer's negotiations in Bhutan. In addition, the
SLFP has been excluded from current proximity talks
in New Delhi.
India's new relationship with the UNP reverses a
decade-old trend of strong ties between the SLFP and
New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and
Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike of
the SLFP were personal friends and political allies
throughout the early 1970s. Ties between India and
Sri Lanka worsened after the election in 1977 of the
UNP government of J. R. Jayewardene, with whom
Indira Gandhi's relations were more distant.
Indo-Sri Lankan relations became further strained by
Indira Gandhi's decision in 1983 to allow Tamil
militants to operate from bases in south India. Rajiv
Gandhi's crackdown on the militants and his bid for a
settlement in Sri Lanka, however, have led to a
marriage of convenience between New Delhi and the
UNP.
The Effect on the UNP
One of the important side effects of the relationship
between New Delhi and the UNP government is that
leading UNP figures are beginning to find it more
politically useful to play up the Indian connection.
Jayewardene's decision to accept Indian mediation
and, by so doing, to nurture his ties to New Delhi has
undermined the opposition and strengthened his
position within the UNP. In July, Sirimavo
Bandaranaike publicly admitted that Jayewardene's
growing ties to New Delhi served the interests of all
Sri Lankans. By the same token, Jayewardene has
used the talks to win the support of the two major
factions within the UNP and to reassure the UNP-
dominated upper echelons of the military that he is
serious about improved ties with India.
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NESA NESAR 85-022
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Secret
India's support for the UNP coincides with a decline
of SLFP strength in Sri Lankan politics. The loss of
Sirimavo Bandaranaike's civil rights in 1980 and the
postponement of general elections until 1989 have left
the SLFP with only nine seats in Sri Lanka's 168-
member Parliament, despite having won 39 percent of
the popular vote in the 1982 presidential election.
Until 1989, when Sri Lanka expects to change to a
system of proportional representation, party
representation in Parliament will not reflect the
popular vote.
National Security Minister Athulathmudali,
considered a possible successor to Jayewardene, also
appears determined to harness the communal issue
and the UNP's Indian connection for his political
advantage. He has publicly claimed credit for
initiating the government's dialogue with Rajiv
Gandhi during a visit in February to New Delhi. We
believe Athulathmudali will continue to stress his role
in improving Indo-Sri Lankan relations to enhance
his political prestige both nationally and within the
UNP.
A key factor that draws the UNP and New Delhi
closer together on settling the communal conflict is
the desire in both capitals to avoid a protracted
domestic debate in Sri Lanka on granting autonomy
to Tamils. Both are wary that the SLFP and
Sinhalese hardliners in the Buddhist clergy might try
to scuttle a negotiated settlement, particularly if it
had to go before the electorate. Therefore, both have a
stake in seeking a settlement that requires ratification
only by the Sri Lankan Parliament. Moreover, New
Delhi has the added incentive of avoiding a public
debate that would permit Indian diplomacy and
political prestige to become hostage to the details of a
settlement.
SLFP Response
Despite its close working relationship with the UNP,
New Delhi has been careful to keep open its lines to
the SLFP. Although a scheduled meeting between
Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Rajiv Gandhi in July was
canceled at the last minute, press reports suggest the
SLFP has kept her and her son, the SLFP's leader in
Parliament, informed of Indian contacts with both the
militants and the UNP. This occasional contact with
the SLFP suggests New Delhi recognizes that a
political solution will require at least tacit approval
from Sirimavo Bandaranaike and that too much
partisan support of Jayewardene could block a
successful settlement.
Despite its weak standing in Parliament and internal
divisions, the SLFP remains a major force in Sri
Lankan politics and appears prepared to try to use its
influence among Sinhalese voters to block any
settlement that threatens Sinhalese interests. The
four-month-old cease-fire has helped deflate SLFP
charges after the May guerrilla attack in
Anuradhapura, in which 150 Sinhalese were killed,
that the government was mishandling the communal
issue. The formation in August by the SLFP, the
Buddhist clergy, and a leftist splinter party of a
National Front to take a hard line against a
settlement has also had little impact on the
government.
The UNP has been successful in defining the
communal conflict as a problem of national security
and arguing that SLFP partisanship on the Tamil
question is divisive and aids the militants. So far,
Jayewardene's combined military and political
strategy has appeased most Sinhalese demands for a
solution and has left the SLFP little opportunity for
political gain.
Outlook
If a lasting communal settlement is reached, we
believe Rajiv Gandhi will revert to a more balanced
approach toward the two major parties. So far, India's
neighbors have sanctioned or at least acquiesced in
New Delhi's bid to broker a peace in Sri Lanka. It is
likely, however, that Gandhi will be sensitive to the
potential for charges of unnecessary meddling if
India's increased role in Sri Lankan affairs lingers. In
our view, Nepal and Bangladesh, in particular, will be
watching closely to see if Gandhi overstays his
welcome.
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On the other hand, a failure at the negotiating table
and a new round of heavy fighting could cause New
Delhi to reevaluate its backing of the UNP and shift
attention to the SLFP. Tamil attacks would probably
be aimed at creating more Sinhalese refugees that
would, in turn, provide grist to SLFP charges that the
government was mishandling the communal conflict.
Full-scale fighting would help the SLFP arouse
Sinhalese chauvinism among the electorate and
increase pressures on Jayewardene to hold general
elections. Under such circumstances, Sinhalese
discontent with Jayewardene and his UNP Cabinet
could prompt India to include the SLFP more fully in
future negotiations and to restore Sirimavo
Bandaranaike's traditionally close ties to New Delhi.
For the near term, Jayewardene is likely to continue
to play up his Indian connection to buttress his own
political base and improve his leverage over
Bandaranaike and the SLFP. As talks progress,
Bandaranaike is likely to seek consultations from New
Delhi on the details of any settlement and may hope
to cast herself as a key representative of Sinhalese
interests. A lasting settlement would represent a
major political victory for Jayewardene and dim
SLFP hopes for new elections and a return to power.
Although India's current political role has met with
little domestic opposition in Sri Lanka, both the UNP
and SLFP know that they must respond to deeply held
fears among the Sinhalese electorate that India might
try to undermine Sri Lanka's independence. Even if
India produces a settlement, the Sinhalese electorate
will not approve further intervention in Sri Lankan
affairs.
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Bangladesh:
Ershad's Hectic Autumn
President Ershad faces important challenges this fall
as he prepares for a gradual relaxation of martial law
and national elections, tentatively scheduled for early
1986. A wide range of antiregime groups is gearing up
for protest actions, while the Bangladesh Army is
expressing dissatisfaction with Ershad's performance.
We believe that Ershad has a slightly better-than-
even chance of staying in power for the next six
months, but his prospects have dimmed recently.
Ershad's Strategy
Ershad, building on passage of the successful
referendum to continue his leadership until a civilian
regime takes over as well as on victories in local
elections last spring, is planning to gradually relax
martial law, allow political activity, and build a new
progovernment political party. "Indoor politics" were
allowed beginning 1 October, but outdoor rallies are
still prohibited under martial law
According to I US Embassy
reporting, Ershad intends eventually to lift all bans on
political activity and hold national elections sometime
between January and April 1986. Ershad told the
local press that he will not cancel or postpone these
elections. Opposition agitation forced the cancellation
of the three previous elections. He has not announced
whether he will hold the parliamentary and
presidential elections simultaneously or consecutively.
The President spent most of this past summer
building a new proregime political coalition. He
wooed several prominent opposition politicians away
from their parties by giving them Cabinet portfolios.
He also successfully enticed several small parties,
formerly aligned with the opposition, into forming a
political front with his own Janadal Party. This new
front, called the Jatiya, is regarded by most observers
as the base for a progovernment party that will run in
Ershad's current strategy is to have his forces run
against the Awami League-a leftist, pro-Indian
opposition party-while excluding the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP)-a more centrist opposition
party-from competing. According to US Embassy
reporting, Ershad fears that the inclusion of the BNP
in national elections would split the moderate vote and
result in a victory for the Awami League.
Over the longer term, Ershad plans to schedule
elections, resign from the Army, and be elected
president with progovernment forces forming a
majority in Parliament. He wants to legitimize his
presidency and remove the stigma of martial law.
Ershad is also trying to burnish his reputation at
home and abroad by acting as host to the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
summit meeting scheduled for December in Dhaka.
Bangladesh is one of the founders of SAARC, and
Ershad is concerned about projecting a positive image
of his country. Antiregime groups, on the other hand,
will probably use the opportunity to stage disruptions
to embarrass Ershad.
Ershad may reimpose full martial law to prevent
leftist labor and
student groups, as well as Islamic fundamentalist
parties, are planning to resume antiregime agitation
now that the ban on political activity has been
relaxed. for
example, that the leader of a pro-Iranian Islamic
party has called for a holy war against Ershad's
regime. leftist labor
groups are planning a "Hartel"-national strike-
the proposed national elections next year.
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against the regime in late October unless Ershad
agrees to their demands for higher wages and other
reforms.
The centrist BNP is playing into Ershad's hands by
continuing its intransigence toward his regime. The
BNP will refuse to participate in any elections unless
parliamentary polls are held first and Ershad
promises not to run for president and steps down from
power once elections are completed
The Awami League is posing bigger problems for
Ershad than the BNP. The league is already
negotiating with Ershad's regime over possible
participation in the parliamentary election next year,
Wazed is making demands that Ershad and his Army
backers would probably refuse-immediate lifting of
martial law and scheduling the parliamentary election
before the presidential poll.
Grumbling in the Military
In our view, Ershad is losing some of his support in
the military. Although the Army, the chief arbiter of
Bangladesh politics, supported his reimposition of full
martial law in March as well as the referendum, there
has recently been an increase in Army discontent.
One source of grumbling is changes in the military
wage scale, which resulted in a decrease in take-home
several Army cronies of Ershad's are
The most serious complaint the Army has about
Ershad, however, is the suspicion that he is trying to
cut a deal with opposition parties, particularly the
Awami League, on the proposed parliamentary
election.
Army generals are concerned that Ershad may
agree to the Awami League's demand to hold the
parliamentary election first and that this might give
too much power to the league. (In addition to
negotiating with the Awami League, the US Embassy
reports that Ershad has offered to help finance the
league's election campaign.) One Army general fears
that Ershad may be trying to create a new,
independent power base with the Awami League and
leave the Army out in the cold; this general said that,
because of growing Army discontent, Ershad would
not remain in power for more than six months. F_
Outlook
The President is entering what is probably the most
crucial stage of his three-and-a-half-year presidency.
We believe that he has an only slightly better-than-
even chance at staying in power over the next six
months. The job of relaxing martial law, suppressing
opposition and leftist agitation, holding elections, and
retaining the support of the military may prove too
much for him.
that does not threaten the Army's position
Nevertheless, Ershad is a tenacious survivor of
Bangladesh politics, and, for now, there is no military
rival for his job. Senior generals are probably willing
to give Ershad more time to negotiate an election deal
Ershad would probably take the Army's interests into
account before concluding an election deal with the
Awami League. He might, for example, agree to
appoint a National Security Council, composed of
military officers, that would act as a watchdog over a
future civilian government. A senior Army general
told US diplomats that the Army would welcome the
creation of such a body.
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It is likely, in our view, that both the Awami League
and the BNP will refuse to participate in regime-
mandated elections. Ershad may then decide to follow
the lead of Pakistan's President Zia and hold
parliamentary and presidential elections on a
nonparty basis. Nonparty elections would probably be
acceptable to the military and entice enough
individual politicians to participate to make such
elections credible
If Ershad were to make a deal with the Awami
League that gives it substantial political power, then
the Army would probably seek to remove him from
power. The Army may also move against Ershad if
opposition violence forces him once again to cancel or
postpone elections.
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Religion and Identity: Highlights
of an International Congress
Religion and identity was the theme of the congress of
the International Association for the History of
Religions held in Sydney, Australia, on 18-31 August.
Three concepts bearing on the religious, social, and
political issues in the Middle East and South Asia
emerged from the sessions on Islam, Indian religions,
psychology, philosophy, and anthropology. Congress
participants believe that many societies worldwide are
turning to religion to find more well-defined and
psychologically comforting identities. Other
participants developed a cross-cultural model of
religious fundamentalism, and psychologists
examined the persistent allegiance to charismatic
leaders. Scholars at the congress argued that, despite
the wide variety of beliefs and practices, the most
fruitful research lies in the analysis of the underlying
commonalities of religious belief and behavior. They
stressed the building of theoretical models to analyze
religious movements.
Building Discrete Identities
Christians, Muslims, and Jews are using religion to
overcome secularization and loss of traditional values.
An identity based on religion turns away from the
challenges of scientific rationality in favor of more
transcendental values of faith, loyalty, and
commitment. For example, Christian fundamentalists
have developed a pseudoscience-creationism-that
uses the Bible to disprove the discoveries of modern
geology and biology.
Religious rituals, such as the five daily prayers of
Islam, reinforce group identity. These rituals produce
a clear line between those who follow the ritual
(believers) and those who do not (nonbelievers). In
Egypt, for example, young fundamentalists who want
to show their piety artificially induce-with a hot
iron-the callus (zabiba) on their foreheads that
normally develops only after many years of putting
one's forehead to the ground during prayer. The callus
becomes the marker identifying one's religious zeal.
Other rituals provide an avenue for orderly change in
identity. The hajj (pilgrimage) represents a break in a
Muslim's life in which part of Islamic history is
reenacted. It offers an opportunity for Muslims to
return from the hajj with a new identity based on
greater devotion to Islamic beliefs. Several observers
commented that many women who have adopted
conservative Islamic dress did so after completing the
hajj.
Religious Fundamentalism
Several scholars developed a cross-cultural model of
religious fundamentalism. They stressed that the
understanding of religious behavior has been limited
by the overemphasis on cultural uniqueness. They
believe that the worldwide rise of fundamentalism has
developed in the wake of broadly based social and
cultural disintegration. Under the pressure of
economic deterioration, political instability, and other
changes induced by the forces of science and
secularism, many societies are seeking to find
concrete values and simple answers for their
problems. Common features of religious
fundamentalism in the Middle East and elsewhere
include:
? Reduction of theology to a simplistic form.
Scriptural passages are accepted as literal truth
without consideration of their scriptural or historical
context. Scripture has no symbolic meaning.
? Believers have limited knowledge of religious and
cultural history and have a truncated view of
mythology, rituals, and traditions.
? Believers hunger for authority and are intolerant of
nontraditional lifestyles.
? Movements tend to fragment because no dissent is
tolerated.
Fundamentalist movements are no longer quiescent.
Their political aim is to build God's place on Earth.
Although they reject the secular science that produces
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modern technology, they use the products of science-
television, computers, cassettes-when it suits their
purposes. They rationalize that technology is a
weapon to achieve their divinely inspired goal.
Charismatic Allegiance
Another central theme of the congress was the
emergence of charismatic leaders. In times of social
confusion and anxiety, a charismatic figure frequently
appears with a vision that promises to overcome
contemporary problems. According to the
psychologists at the congress, members of many
religious sects or groups will maintain belief in a
messianic or charismatic leader even if the leader's
prophecy fails.
The psychologists believe that the rules governing
group behavior-called social grammar-give
meaning to events and a sense of purpose for the
group led by a charismatic figure. Being accepted by
the sect or cult justifies and legitimizes behavior that
may be intelligible only in the eyes of the members
and in the social context of the cult or sect. Group-
specific rules are designed to influence and coordinate
group behavior and often involve learning a special
language; redefining standard words, charging words
with a special emotion ("secular humanism" in
Christian fundamentalism); and wearing special
clothing (Islamic garb among Muslim
fundamentalists).
The rules are predicated on maintaining belief in the
charismatic leader's teachings. To acknowledge the
failure of the leader's teaching is to risk the
destruction of the social and emotional support that
being a member of the group brings to an individual.
Followers of a charismatic protect their beliefs with
absolute faith to prevent a breach in the rules of
behavior that would cause the group to crumble.
Members who do not conform to the group's social
expectations are labeled enemies of the group's
religious ideals. Aberrant members are frequently
ostracized and lose their group identity and its support
system.
According to the psychologists, individuals become
cult or sect members by going through a rite of
passage. Membership in cults or sects may not be
formal, but there are still entrance rituals. These
rituals usually include three stages:
? Individuals show interest in a movement or
charismatic leader.
? A novice begins a sequence of actions such as study,
contemplation, or isolation that aids him or her to
abandon old ways and adopt the beliefs and
behavior of the new group.
? Formal ceremonies, which may include chanting,
weeping, embracing older members, or the donning
of special apparel, provide the novice with a new
identity as a member of the sect or cult.
Relevance to the Middle East and South Asia
The themes of the conference have implications for
social and political developments in the Middle East
and South Asia. The search for identity, which stems
from the hunt for a comforting self-image in a
turbulent region, is not likely to abate in the near
future. Religious-based nationalist movements, such
as the Sikhs' quest for an independent state of
Khalistan, will probably increase. Religious
fundamentalism will be an important force as long as
political, economic, and social problems in the Middle
East proliferate. Once established, these
fundamentalist movements are likely to live on
because the failure of the leader's prophecy does not
alter the fundamentalists' beliefs.
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