AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100340001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 14, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100340001-1
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OR MARK oil
Africa Review
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54
ALA AR 85-013
14 June 1985
Copy 354
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Articles Nigeria: Urbanization, Food, and Policy
Despite the military regime's decision to make agricultural
development a budget priority, policies that tend to discourage food
production remain in place and production is not keeping up with
Uganda: Military Tensions Increase I 5
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population growth.
Senegal: Political Obstacles to Economic Reform
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Tribal rivalry in the Army is increasingly threatening the stability I
President Banda's recent changes in the Cabinet and senior civil
service positions have altered the lineup of his potential successors.
Gabon: Coup Plot Uncovered
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Kenya: Party Elections Announced
The Gambia: Time Has Run Out
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Secret I
ALA AR 85-013 I
14 June 1985 I
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Nigeria: Urbanization,
Food, and Policy
Food production in Nigeria, as in most of Sub-
Saharan Africa, has not kept pace with population
growth. Although the present military regime has
made agricultural development a budget priority,
policies that in the past that have tended to discourage
food production are still in place. By avoiding
measures that could increase the income of farmers
while providing food imports at prices with which
domestic produce cannot compete, successive
Nigerian governments have favored the needs of city
dwellers over the longer term concerns of agricultural
development, in our judgment
Although Nigerian agriculture appears at first glance
to be doing relatively well compared to the rest of
Sub-Saharan Africa, we believe that statistics on food
production in Nigeria are misleading. According to
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) data, for
example, the average annual growth rate for food
production in Nigeria from 1979 to 1982 was 2.5
percent, compared to only 1.7 percent for Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. Production of staple crops
has been particularly poor, however, and estimated
per capita production of staples in 1984 was below
that of 1972, according to the Nigerian Central Bank.
Furthermore, the FAO production statistics do not
allow for the massive spoilage caused by poor
transport and inadequate storage facilities. The
World Bank estimates that about half of domestic
produce is lost before it even reaches the Nigerian
consumer.
Urbanization and Food
Rapid urbanization has contributed substantially to
the decline of Nigerian agriculture. The urban
population, which had been only 13 percent of the
total in 1960 but reached 21 percent by 1982, is
growing by about 5 percent per year, according to the
World Bank, as people migrate to the towns in search
of jobs or education. Rural income has been
chronically low, providing little incentive for young
people to remain in the countryside.
Urban migration has not only created labor shortages
in some rural areas, but also has yielded large urban
populations that do not produce food and expect
ample food supplies to be available at low prices,
according to academic studies. Domestically produced
food must pass through an inefficient distribution
system that results in shortages and prices in city
markets that often are higher than imported food.
Urban preferences for rice and wheat-considered by
modern urbanites to be more prestigious than the
cassava or millet, for example-have been bolstered
by exchange rate policies that permit prices for these
imported commodities to remain low relative to those
for indigenous staples.
Neither rice nor wheat is a traditional Nigerian staple
and neither can be grown there economically. Wheat
is produced in small quantities in the north, but it is a
temperate crop that can be grown only during the dry
season under irrigation and needs fertilizer equivalent
to one-third the total weight of the output, according
to studies by agronomists. Thanks to the success of an
"Eat Bread" advertising campaign staged by
Nigerian millers over the last several years, however,
the consumption of wheat products has grown rapidly.
The overvalued Nigerian currency has helped to keep
prices down, so that, according to Head of State
Buhari, bread is now the least expensive staple. Rice
production is increasing but its future development
depends on costly irrigation projects. Locally
produced rice in city markets can cost five times as
much as imported rice.
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ALA AR 85-013
14 June 1985
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NIGERIA
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE
0 1050-
z
0
3
1000
Z 950
1982 1983
Policies
The high cost of food produced domestically,
combined with increased consumption of
nonindigenous foods, has led to rapid expansion of
food imports. The amount spent on imported food rose
from $81 million in 1970 to almost $3 billion in 1982,
although lower world prices for grains and Lagos's
success in locating cheaper sources reduced the
amount spent to about $1.5 billion in 1984.
Unlike many African countries, Nigeria does not
control the marketing and prices of locally produced
food. Lagos can affect the prices of imported foods
1984 1985
indirectly by reducing or increasing the supply to the
domestic market. However, food prices have become a
highly charged political issue and Nigerian
governments have been sensitive to the possibility of
unrest in the cities when food costs rise. Attempts to
restrict imports through high tariffs and licensing-
and at times outright prohibition-have been followed
repeatedly by a swing to import liberalization when
shortages occurred and prices rose to politically
intolerable levels.
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NIGERIA
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE
PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES
1983
Shortages and high prices in urban areas were part of
the rationale for the December 1983 coup, and the
regime has followed a liberal food import policy since
coming to power.' The severe shortages caused, in
part, by the drought in 1983 had led to food price
increases of 54 percent between June and December.
Despite mounting discontent, the former Shagari
government decided not to increase food imports
because of the drain on dwindling foreign exchange
reserves. The Buhari regime, probably wary of the
potential explosiveness of rising urban food prices,
gave wheat the highest priority for foreign exchange
allocation in 1985.
1984
Civilian and military governments alike have
acknowledged that agricultural development is
essential if Nigeria is to feed its growing population,
stem urban migration, and create sources of nonoil
income. We believe, however, that the country's
agricultural programs, beginning with the First
Development Plan in 1962 and continuing under the
present military government, have been inconsistent,
ineffective, and often counterproductive.
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Despite the fact that small farms account for over
90 percent of domestic production, the government's
programs have persistently targeted large-scale
projects. Furthermore, these agricultural schemes
typically are business ventures by those with good
political connections but little farming expertise,
according to academic studies. Large-scale, high-cost
projects that establish farms under government
direction for various crops and administer irrigation
schemes are not helping the smallholder, according to
development experts. Small farmers have limited
access to credit; subsidized items like fertilizer, seed,
and equipment; and extension services. There is
currently only one extension worker per 2,500 farmers
in Nigeria, for example, compared to one per 250 in
Kenya.
Outlook
The negative trends in Nigeria's agricultural sector
probably cannot be reversed soon, or even slowed,
given Lagos's desperate financial situation. Although
the Buhari government has assigned top priority to
agriculture, the 1985 austerity budget gives even less
to agriculture than was allocated in 1982. Reduced
government spending on agriculture and the country's
sharply curtailed capacity to purchase fertilizers and
other imports, in our judgment, ensure that per capita
agricultural production will continue to decline.
Lagos's financial problems probably will reduce the
market for US agricultural exports, now totaling
about $350 million annually. Although Nigeria's oil
earnings will continue to provide more hard currency
than is available to other Sub-Saharan nations, Lagos
is likely to favor food producers who are cheaper, are
willing to provide credit, or agree to countertrade or
barter arrangements.
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Uganda:
Military Tensions Increase
A recent flareup of Langi-Acholi tribal rivalry within
the Ugandan Army has put further stress on the
stability of the regime of President Obote, a Langi.
Obote put Langi troops on military alert in May,
suggesting he either feared an Acholi coup, or was
looking for a pretext to rein in senior Acholi officers.
Obote's decision to create a new Langi special
military unit prior to elections scheduled later this
These Acholi tensions are real and widespread, but
the tribe still suffers from serious internal divisions.
year also has contributed to tribal tensions.
Acholi Military Discontent
High-level Acholi military officers long have
expressed disgruntlement with the Obote regime. In
recent months, however, the number and bitterness of
their complaints appear to have increased:
? They claim Langi officers are promoted rapidly to
the detriment of Acholi military careers. The most
powerful positions are held by Langi officers, many
of whom owe personal loyalty to Obote, according to
US Embassy sources.
? Acholi members of the military assert that they are
sent to the front to fight against insurgents from the
National Resistance Army, while Langi enlisted
personnel are given noncombat positions.
Langi Countermoves
Obote clearly is concerned over the potential threat to
his regime from the military and is taking steps to
bolster his support. Embassy sources recently revealed
that he is intensifying military recruitment in Langi
regions. His aim is to create a 5,000-man special
brigade personally loyal to him and composed entirely
of members of the ruling Ugandan People's Congress
party. Embassy sources maintain this brigade will be
used as shock troops to intimidate and assassinate
rivals of the Obote regime, especially during the
upcoming elections. The brigade probably will focus
primarily on the small Democratic and National
Liberal Parties, supported by the Acholi, but, in
addition, will be used to ensure loyalty within the
? Acholi officers favor negotiating with rebel leader
Museveni in order to end the insurgency. According
to Embassy sources, they believe President Obote
and Langi officers oppose negotiations and are
prolonging the fighting at the Acholi's expense.
? According to Embassy sources, the Acholis are
convinced Obote has forgotten that the Army has
been his main source of support since he assumed
office in 1980.
? Lastly, Acholis believe they suffered greatest under
Idi Amin's regime and are now entitled to some sort
of restitution.
ruling party.
Obote is
determined to augment the security services to ensure
stability during the elections, which must be held by
December. Since the survival of the Obote regime
depends largely on military support, we believe Obote
is trying to expand the size and role of the Langi
element to serve as the nucleus of a reliable force.
In one recent incident, Langi troops moved directly
against the Acholi. According to Embassy sources,
while Lieutenant Colonel Langoya-the Acholi
Commander of Engineering and Logistics in the
Army and protege of Okello-was away from his
headquarters office on 19 April, Langi troops
surrounded the building and literally nailed shut his
Secret
ALA AR 85-013
14 June 1985
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random violence against civilians, however, has
served to undermine any existing support for the
regime and has encouraged popular support for the
rebels.
? Tensions are running high in the military, and a
small incident could ignite serious clashes along
tribal lines.
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Army Chief of Staff Smith Opon Acak, a Langi.
We believe that the action against Langoya was part
of a Langi troop alert. Langi troops drawn primarily
from the presidential escort were placed around Army
headquarters and at strategic points in Kampala
without the knowledge of Okello, whose authority
appears to have been circumvented. Langoya, who is
rabidly anti-Obote and has been implicated numerous
times as a coup plotter, is now under arrest and has
been relieved of military duties.
Outlook
The growing polarization of the military, furthered by
Acholi disgruntlement over the new Langi unit and
blatant move against Langoya, increases the potential
for instability in Uganda. President Obote's prospects
appear bleak as tribal and preelection tensions rise:
? Prime Minister Allimadi and Vice President
Muwanga are dissatisfied with Obote's rule and are
maintaining a continuing and regular dialogue with
the insurgent movement,
? Although riddled with corruption, tribalism, and
personal rivalries, the Army has reached a
stalemate in the fighting with the insurgents in
southern and western provinces. The Army's
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Malawi:
Succession Sweepstakes
succeed the 86-year-old President.
President Banda has shaken up his Cabinet and civil
service over allegations of corruption and inefficieny,
changing the lineup of his potential successors. The
move may have been orchestrated by John Tembo to
remove his main rival, John Ngwiri, as a contender to
to Embassy reporting.
An Unexpected Shakeup
In a special meeting of principal advisers and civil
servants on 22 May, Banda accused John Ngwiri,
Secretary to the President and Cabinet, of corruption
and mismanagement and demanded his resignation,
according to US Embassy reporting. Banda also fired
Deputy Secretary for Energy and Transportation
Kingsley Sulamoyo, a protege of Ngwiri. Sulamoyo
was accused of taking kickbacks from South Africa
and siphoning government funds into a private
Zambian account. Shortly after Ngwiri's resignation,
senior civil service employees Gilbert Chirwa and Rex
Magombo were fired because of corruption and
inefficiency in dealing with donor projects, according
replacement.
Although Cabinet changes in Malawi are not unusual,
we concur with US Embassy reports that the
departure of Ngwiri from the President's inner circle
represents a dramatic shakeup in the power structure
and the succession lineup. As Secretary to the
President and Cabinet since 1975, Ngwiri held one of
the most powerful positions in the country. A skilled
politician, he controlled access to Banda and headed
the civil service. Banda has yet to announce Ngwiri's
Although Ngwiri remains free, and, in our view, will
be cleared of corruption charges
supplier for diesel and gasoline because of the erratic
nature of Zambia as an oil supplier.
Succession Prospects
Banda's decision to move against Ngwiri and his
supporters may have been influenced by Tembo,
former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi.
According to Embassy reporting, no one else has the
political clout to turn Banda against Ngwiri. In our
view, Tembo almost certainly considered Ngwiri a
rival to succeed Banda, and may have been concerned
over Ngwiri's greater popular and military support.
Ngwiri's resignation in disgrace leaves Tembo as the
only viable successor to Banda at this time.
Tembo has had no official status since his removal
from the Bank a year ago, but his influence with the
President is great. Tembo occupied a place of honor
when he accompanied Banda to the United Kingdom
in April, and Tembo's niece, official hostess Mama
Kadzamira, remains in high favor with Banda. We
believe Tembo and his niece fully expect to assume
power after Banda leaves office or dies.
Sulamoyo has been jailed. We
believe Sulamoyo was a scapegoat for the rise in retail
oil prices that resulted from the recent devaluation of
the kwacha, a situation which arose while Banda was
in the United Kingdom. As Banda's principal energy
adviser, Sulamoyo dealt skillfully with various
transportation and energy crises faced by Malawi
since the loss of rail links with Mozambique. He
engineered a successful shift toward South Africa as a
Even if Tembo is seeking to gain the presidency by
eliminating other hopefuls, as it is rumored he has
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ALA AR 85-013
14 June 1985
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John Tembo ... former Gover-
nor of the Reserve Bank of Ma-
lawi ... 52 ... probably
President Banda's closest ad-
viser on financial and economic
matters ... closely identifies
with the Presidents-pro- West-
Even if Tembo is seeking to gain the presidency by
eliminating other hopefuls, as it is rumored he has
done in the past, his position is tenuous. Tembo has no
power base, and his political survival is wholly
dependent on Banda's support. Tembo's overtures to
the military have not been successful and he and
Mama Kadzamira remain highly unpopular, casting
doubt on their political survival after Banda dies.
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Africa
Briefs
Coup Plot Uncovered
discovered in its initial stages by Gabon's military intelligence.
The 18-year-old pro-Western regime of President Bongo last month uncovered a
coup plot involving junior military officers and members of the elite Air
Commando regiment. According to the US Embassy, some 200 officers and
enlisted personnel initially were arrested, though few remain in detention. The plot
leader, Captain Mandja-who claimed to have experienced a "vision" calling on
him to oust Bongo-belongs to a small Christian sect that was banned following
his arrest, the US Embassy reports. Embassy officials believe the plot was
The 8,000-man Gabonese military-apart from an abortive coup in 1964 that was
reversed by French military intervention-does not have a history of political
involvement, although grumbling about the quality of its leadership and the poor
treatment of junior officers and enlisted personnel surfaces occasionally. Bongo-
who remains fully in control of the country-does not trust the military, and last
year accused unnamed officers of plotting against him, according to US Embassy
reporting. Bongo's power rests primarily on the 1,600-strong presidential guard,
composed largely of fellow Bateke tribesmen. Bongo relies heavily on French
advisers, who hold key posts in the presidential guard, Army, Gendarmerie,
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Senegal Political Obstacles to Economic Reform
President Diouf has failed to win the support of his ruling Socialist Party for a new
program of economic reforms recommended by the IMF, according to US
Embassy sources. The party still appears demoralized by Diouf's attack on its
entrenched leadership during the first year of his presidency, and by government
austerity measures that have cut sharply into political patronage during the past
year. As a result, party organizations are not functioning at either local or national
levels, and party leaders are
neither willing nor able to do much to support the President.
Diouf has proposed sweeping changes in economic management, government
payroll, public-sector activity, and the tax system in order to address the financial
crisis that has brought the government's popularity to an alltime low. Unless Diouf
can develop internal support for the measures-and the party represents his first
line of attack-his moderate, pro-Western government could be threatened during
the coming year by urban, student, and labor unrest, which would provide
openings for radical opposition groups backed by the Soviets and Libyans.
The Gambia's foreign resources are exhausted and it faces an indefinite shortfall
of food and fuel. Unless Banjul can pay its arrears to the IMF, credit sources will
dry up until the Fund reschedules a standby agreement in the fall, according to
Embassy reporting. Although the United States has promised emergency food aid,
US Embassy sources predict The Gambia's food supplies will be exhausted by the
end of June. The shortage of foreign exchange to purchase fuel will seriously affect
the availability of transport and electricity.
The grim economic situation has stimulated political protest in Parliament and
opposition newspapers. If President Jawara's government is unable to procure
essential goods, we believe it will face food riots and increasing dissident activity
by the Movement for Justice in Africa, the small, socialist-oriented opposition
party. Senegalese troops moved into The Gambia after a leftist coup attempt in
1981, and have remained as a security force. If public disorders ensue and require
the Senegalese to maintain order, the Jawara government may collapse, possibly
speeding the progress of the country's planned union with Senegal in a
Senegambia confederation.
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Kenya Party Elections Announced
Kenyan President Moi recently announced that long-awaited elections for
positions in the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), the country's sole political
party, will be held 22-25 June. The announcement follows a major four-month
KANU recruitment drive. Most of the election results are foregone conclusions as
the majority of the candidates are members of Parliament with strong power bases
in their constituencies. The only real contests will take place at low party levels
that lack established candidates in which Moi will try to ensure that his preferred
candidate is elected. Moi demonstrated his authority over KANU last year by
expelling 15 senior party officials, an action that exacerbated tribal tensions and
political infighting. He clearly has concluded that, despite increasing factionalism,
his control is sufficiently strong to proceed with elections at this time.
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