AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100350001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100350001-0
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ALA AR 85-014
28 June 1985
Copy 3 5 4
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Secret
Friction between Zambia's labor movement and the government is
likely to continue to increase because Lusaka has agreed to impose
harsh austerity measures sought by the IMF to deal with its
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faltering economy.
Prime Minister Jonathan's government is preparing for the
country's first elections since 1970, but the regime will not allow the
vote until it is confident of a landslide victory for the ruling party.
Seychelles: Delay on Soviet-Built Drydock Facilities
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Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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i Secret
ALA AR 85-014
28 June 1985
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Zambia:
Tension Between Labor
and Government
Relations between Zambia's independent labor
movement and President Kaunda's ruling United
National Independence Party have deteriorated as a
result of the country's economic crisis. In addition,
labor leaders are now under pressure from rank-and-
file members who believe the current union leadership
no longer adequately represents their interests.
Tensions between labor and the government, as well
as intraunion frictions, are likely to continue because
of Lusaka's acceptance of harsh IMF-requested
austerity measures designed to put Zambia's failing
economy on sound financial footing.
The Faltering Economy
Zambia's economy is struggling after nearly a decade
of decline caused by falling prices for copper exports,
which accounts for 90 percent of foreign exchange
earnings. President Kaunda announced last
November an accelerated effort to deal with the
continuing economic crisis, as inflation topped 25
percent, real GDP continued to fall and
unemployment approached 50 percent, according to
press and US Embassy reporting.
Kaunda has committed his government to reduce
dependence on copper exports by raising food prices
and is calling for massive foreign investment in
agriculture, to encourage farm production and
exports. These policies, however, have deprived
Zambia's manufacturing sector of scarce foreign
exchange needed to purchase critical inputs
contributing to a slowdown of industrial output that is
causing industry to operate at about 40 percent of
capacity. In addition, the IMF has called for further
stringent measures, including devaluation of the
national currency. Official figures show the average
Zambian's purchasing power sank to 27 percent of its
1975 value by mid-1984.
In the face of rising inflation the unions have staged
several wildcat strikes to force the government and
industries to negotiate pay hikes, according to US
Embassy reporting. Although the unions were
successful in securing wage increases in the past,
dwindling economic resources have made the
government less cooperative than before.
Recent Strikes
Lusaka's concern over wildcat strikes mounted when
some medical personnel walked off the job and others
instituted a work slowdown in January. Kaunda
responded by declaring medical employees "essential
personnel" and liable to criminal charges under the
Preservation of Public Security Act, according to
Embassy reporting. Similarly, in February, Lusaka
declared workers in health, water supply, food and
fuel distribution, mines, and transport employees
"essential personnel," as financial workers, teachers,
and post and telecommunications service employees
also went on strike. At the same time, the government
passed additional regulations declaring that the
automatic deduction of union dues' by employers
would be revoked when a union stages an illegal
strike.
Despite Lusaka's tough actions, mineworkers staged a
wildcat strike in early June to protest pay and
benefits. In a week about 57,000 miners were on
strike, resulting in the closure of nearly all the copper
' Union dues are deducted by employers and forwarded to the union
and the ZCTU. The ZCTU chairman recently said that, without
the mandatory deductions by employers, the unions could not exist
financially, according to Embassy reports. The inability to get
workers to pay their own dues directly to their union makes the
ZCTU extremely vulnerable to government efforts to decrease the
independence of the labor movement. F__1
Secret
ALA AR 85-014
28 June 1985
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The Zambian Congress of
Trade Unions
The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
developed from a strong labor movement that
predated Zambian independence. Beginning in the
1920s, black workers-especially black miners-
made sporadic attempts to organize against white
employers. Major strikes by the miners in 1935 and
1940 over pay and working conditions helped to
instill a political awareness that later fueled the\
nationalist campaign to end British colonial rule in
what was then Northern Rhodesia. Following
independence, President Kaunda dissolved the
existing trade union federation and created the
ZCTU in 1965 to act as an umbrella organization in
an attempt to make the unions more responsive to the
wishes of the ruling party.
The Trade Unions and Trades Dispute Ordinance
established the ZCTU and defined the powers of the
unions. The Minister of Labor appoints the ZCTU
officers and also has the authority to dissolve the
ZCTU without challenge. According to the law, an
industry or trade can only be represented by one
union. Each union elects a chairman, who must be a
member of the union that elects him for at least three
years prior to his election. Each union chairman is
mines. Although the government did not charge the
miners with a violation under the Preservation of
Security Act, over 4,000 workers were fired, causing
the collapse of the strike on 7 June. By designating
the workers as "essential" and threatening revocation
of automatic dues payments, the government
weakened the options of the Zambian Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU) leadership in achieving labor
objectives
Prospects
We believe government and labor tensions are likely
to escalate as Kaunda attempts to balance the
demands of labor with his desire to undertake
economic reforms. As Lusaka moves toward
implementing tough economic reforms sought by the
IMF, Zambian workers face declining real wages and
then a member of the ZCTU Supreme Committee,
which is charged with the responsibility for settling
disputes between labor and management. Under the
legislation, strikes are permitted only for specific
reasons and only after all other methods of settling
disputes have been exhausted.
Despite the ZCTU's, and its member unions' legal
subordination to the government, the unions
repeatedly have defied the ruling party and its
policies. In an attempt to reduce friction between the
unions and the government, Kaunda sought in 1982
to include the ZCTU leadership in the
decisionmaking process by appointing five labor
leaders to serve on the boards of parastatal
organizations. The effort, however, failed to co-opt
the ZCTU leadership and the unions have, so far,
been able to avoid absorption into the governmental
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, in recent years the ZCTU
has only been able to gain minimal wage increases
and the ensuing wildcat strikes have further eroded
its ability to act as an effective spokesman between
organized labor and the government.
additional confrontations between the government
and the unions are likely. Moreover, major
concessions to the unions by Lusaka would jeopardize
the IMF austerity program and offer only a
temporary respite from labor confrontations.
The ZCTU leadership, for its part, will be unable to
prevent individual unions from undertaking unilateral
job actions, in our view, as rank-and-file frustrations
grow. Efforts by some ruling party members to bring
the labor movement under the direct control of the
party are unlikely to be effective. The ZCTU already
is unable to enforce its own policies and it is doubtful
that the government will fare any better.
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Zambian Congress of Trade Unions,
Distribution of Membership
The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions has a membership of
between 170,000 and 200,000 workers. Membership has dropped in
the last five years, due to recession and unemployment. Only the
approximately 57,000-member Zambia Miners Union constitutes a
notable bloc outside the ZCTU.
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Frederick Chiluba, a candid, dynamic, and effective
labor official, has served as chairman of the ZCTU,
since 1974. Chiluba, outspokenly pro-Western and
frequently critical of socialist schemes and of many
of the economic policies of President Kenneth
Kaunda, harbors political aspirations, according to
US diplomats. He has, however, avoided personal
attack on the popular Kaunda and has emphasized
the joint efforts of the ZCTU and the government to
develop the country. Kaunda, encouraged by hardline
members of the ruling party, has long been suspicious
of Chiluba and the ZCTU and has threatened, during
several periods of labor tension, to end the federation
independence by incorporating it into the party. In
1981, Kaunda detained Chiluba and several other
ZCTU officials for three months during one such
period of unrest. Chiluba has supported moderate
policies throughout the current labor crisis, probably
to avoid another crackdown.
Increased militancy on the part of the unions will slow
attempts by Kaunda to institute economic reforms,
but is unlikely, in our judgment, to threaten the
stability of the regime in the near term. Militant
union activity, including wildcat strikes and perhaps
sabotage incidents, however, could act as a catalyst to
Newstead Zimba has served as general secretary of
the ZCTU since 1974. A loyal lieutenant to ZCTU
chairman Chiluba, Zimba is an experienced,
respected, and active trade union leader, who has
criticized Kaunda's threats to incorporate the ZCTU
into the ruling party, as well as the President's
economic policies. He was detained for several
months in 1981 during a period of labor unrest.
Zimba, educated locally, was a teacher in Zambian
schools from 1959 until 1971, when he was elected
president of the National Union of Teachers. He
served as president of the ZCTUfrom 1971 until
1974 and was a member of Parliament from 1978
until 1981. Zimba, 48, belongs to the Tumbuka
ethnic group. (u)
cement popular dissatisfaction with Kaunda over the
long term, thus posing an indirect threat to the
government.
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Lesotho:
Election Prospects
After years of delay by Prime Minister Leabua
Jonathan, Lesotho is preparing for its first elections
since 1970, although a date has not been announced.
Jonathan is convinced he must hold elections to avoid
losing Western assistance,
however, that the elections will not take place until it
is clear the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) will
achieve a landslide victory
Jonathan already has taken
several steps in an attempt to frustrate the opposition
and increase popular support for the BNP-including
granting government employees their first major
salary increase since 1975. South Africa is openly
funding several opposition parties, but probably
cannot affect the outcome of the elections.F___1
Preelection Maneuvering
The BNP in the past year has established special
electoral rules and procedures that strongly favor it,
according to the US Embassy. Each candidate must
pay a new registration deposit of $500 and be
sponsored by 500 constituents. In addition, district
elections may be held on different days, a provision
many observers believe will allow the party's militant
youth wing-the BNP Youth League-time to move
from poll to poll to intimidate voters.
these
requirements are likely to prevent all but the
wealthiest and best known opposition figures from
running, Most
observers believe that even the largest opposition
party cannot raise the money or gather enough
signatures to field more than a handful of candidates
for the 60 parliamentary seats. One party even has
approached the US Embassy for funds. Moreover,
Jonathan has publicly discouraged the Basotho-the
primary tribal grouping in Lesotho-from sponsoring
opposition candidates. In addition, the Embassy
reports that opposition figures have been denied
Democratically elected in 1965, Jonathan and the
BNP have ruled Lesotho without recourse to
elections since 1970, when Jonathan declared the
results of the first postindependence vote null and
void because he was losing, and suspended the
constitution. Although Jonathan announced his
intention to hold elections in 1981, aframework for
the vote was not put forward until 1983.
The Parliament Bill of 1983, intended to act as a
constitution, eliminated several provisions of the
British-drafted constitution promulgated by
Lesotho's 1966 independence order that limited the
power of the prime minister. The new constitution
completely eliminates the ability of the king or the
traditional chiefs to block legislation. Under the new
provisions, the king must assent to any bill presented
to him, and the prime minister may assent for him
should he fail to do so. Although the king is still
vested with executive authority, in reality he has no
power independent of the prime minister.
The government asserts that traditional democratic
practices are preserved through the holding of mass
public meetings. In practice, however, dissent is
rarely aired at these government-orchestrated
gatherings, according to US Embassy reporting. The
government also emphasizes respect for the tribal
chieftancy system, which extends from village chiefs
to district chiefs and finally the king, although this
system plays little role in the decisionmaking process
and serves primarily to elicit public support for
decisions already made by the Jonathan government.
access to the government-controlled media
Secret
ALA AR 85-014
28 June 1985
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Leabua Jonathan, founder and leader of the ruling
Basotho National Party, has been Prime Minister
since 1965 and Minister of Defense since 1967. A
savvy, tough politician, Jonathan maintains a firm
grip on the country through his control of the
government apparatus and the security services. He
has retained power through arbitrary legislation and
the intimidation and/or imprisonment of political
opponents. He survived an attempted coup in 1974
and an assassination attempt in 1983.
Jonathan, a member of Lesotho's royal house of
Molapo, was educated locally. After working in the
gold mines of South Africa in his early twenties, he
returned home in 1937 to work as a local
administrator. He has been involved in politics since
that time and played a key role in the negotiations
that resulted in Lesotho's independence in 1966.
Jonathan apparently has resorted to even harsher
measures to intimidate his opposition. A government
official has admitted that the Army, under direct
orders from the Prime Minister, has threatened
potential sponsors of opposition candidates in
numerous villages
a strict anti-Communist course,' personality conflicts
have prevented anything more than general
discussion, according to US Embassy reporting.
Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BCP, by far
the largest opposition party in Lesotho and winner of
the voided 1970 elections, is weakened by its division
into four factions. One faction, which participates in
the interim national assembly appointed by Jonathan,
is viewed by other BCP members as traitorous. A
second faction, led by secretary general Godfrey
Kolisang, has reversed its stance of nonparticipation
in the government, and has decided to contest the
Jonathan also has taken steps to arm Youth League
members and plans to have them to guard the polling
voter registration has proceeded in an orderly fashion,
although opposition leaders have complained about
Youth League members disrupting their political
rallies.
A Weak and Divided Opposition
Halfhearted efforts to forge a united front against the
BNP have accomplished little, with the exception of a
joint action committee to investigate the possibility of
fielding a common slate of candidates. While
opposition leaders agree on the necessity of removing
Jonathan from office and steering Lesotho back onto
elections.
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Ntsu Mokhehle, an African nationalist with leftist
sympathies, is the founder and leader of Lesotho's
most important opposition group, the Basutoland
Congress Party (BCP) and commander of its military
wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army. In exile since a
failed coup attempt in 1974, Mokhehle is the only
opposition figure with any significant support,
according to US Embassy reporting. Mokhehle's long
absence from Lesotho, however, has hurt local BCP
organization and has led many younger Basotho to
regard him primarily as a historical figure.
Mokhehle, 66, has a degree in zoology from South
Africa's Fort Hare University. Politically active since
the early 1940s, he played an important role in the
negotiations that led to his country's independence in
Two other factions operate in exile. Ntsu Mokhehle-
the former leader of the BCP and, in our view, the
only viable opposition figure-heads one faction. We
believe that Mokhehle's endorsement is critical for
those Basotho who voted for the BCP in 1970.
Mokhehle has condemned the elections as a one-sided
exercise designed to entrench Jonathan in power, and
has denied that Kolisang has any right to represent
the party, according to US Embassy sources. Rather
than participate in elections, Mokhehle has called for
a meeting with Jonathan to restore the 1966
constitution and form a coalition government.
Although Jonathan has indicated a willingness to
meet with Mokhehle and allow his return from exile,
most observers consider this a ploy to co-opt him.
Mokhehle also heads the BCP's military wing, the
Lesotho Liberation Army, which in the past has
received funding and support from South Africa for
its attacks on the Jonathan regime. The current
improvement in Lesotho-South African relations,
however, has led Basotho exiles to conclude that
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South Africa has shifted tactics away from guerrilla-
based intimidation of Maseru in favor of political
pressures, as the
South Africans have cut off funds and logistic
support. One of the exile-based factions renounces
Catholic community, the NIP has not attracted wide
support since forming in December 1984, according to
US Embassy reporting.
violence as a political tool.
Basotho Democratic Alliance (BDA). Formed and
supported financially by Pretoria in early 1984, the
BDA is strongly anti-Communist, but has
disappointed its founder's plans to form a united
opposition front.
the BDA has failed to gain significant support
from the Lesotho population and its leaders are not
representative of the party. According to US Embassy
reporting, the party's leaders have been discredited by
their ties to Pretoria, and are considered by many
Basotho to be unprincipled opportunists.
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). The primary goal
of the MFP has been to return the king to power. The
party was founded in the mid-1960s, but has
remained small and is not a threat to the Jonathan
regime, in our view. In early 1984, however, a senior
government official was concerned about reports of
South African support to the MFP,
The official said
that Pretoria had purchased 30 vehicles for the MFP,
which doled them out to tribal chiefs in the villages.
United Democratic Party (UDP). Party leader C. D.
Mofeli is openly pro-South African, according to the
US Embassy. The UDP opposes the presence of ANC
activists in Lesotho, and, according to press reports,
Mofeli has claimed that the raid against ANC targets
in Maseru by South African security forces in
December 1982 was a justified preemptive act. Mofeli
has complained to US Embassy officers that funding
from Pretoria had diminished since the formation of
the BDA.
National Independence Party (NIP). Lesotho's newest
political party, the NIP, espouses anti-Communism
and peaceful coexistence with South Africa. Its
founder, A. C. Manyeli, was a cofounder of the BNP
and a former minister in the Jonathan government.
Although Manyeli is extremely influential within the
Outlook
We believe that none of the opposition parties or
politicians now active in Lesotho, or any combination
thereof, is capable of defeating Jonathan. The
opposition remains weak and divided and, in our
judgment, unable to put forward a credible candidate,
even though Jonathan's regime is unpopular with
many Basotho, and despite South African help. We
believe that only Mokhehle, by virtue of his charisma
and residual popularity, would have an outside chance
of defeating Jonathan, yet Mokhehle is unlikely to
participate in the elections.
The most serious challenge may arise out of conflicts
within Jonathan's own party.
Although
Jonathan allowed the Soviet Union, China, and North
Korea to open embassies in Maseru in 1983, recently
he has played down his new ties to the Communists to
avoid further alienating Lesotho's large anti-
Communist Catholic population. A senior minister in
Jonathan's cabinet has reported to US Embassy
officers that a major split is developing in the BNP
along East-West lines. It is unlikely, however, that the
leftist faction could garner sufficient support to
remove Jonathan.
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Africa
Briefs
President Moussa Troare, who was reelected last month to another six-year term,
is likely to face mounting public pressure to resolve the drought-ridden country's
serious food shortages. The US Embassy in Bamako reports that some 1.4 million
people-about 20 percent of the 7.7 million population-are at risk of starvation
and the numbers are growing. The Embassy indicates that there is currently a
200,000-million-ton food deficit, and serious shortages are expected until the
harvest in October. Although the fall crop may help ease the immediate crisis if
the rains due this month prove adequate, seed shortages, migration of farmers to
urban areas, and a dangerously reduced water table almost certainly will make
recovery from the drought a long and difficult process.
The military occasionally grumbles over the lack of improvement in the country's
economic and drought problems, but remains Traore's strongest support, according
to US Embassy reports. While Traore has experienced some shaky periods in his
16 years in power, we believe he is in control for now and faces no immediate
threat. If economic and drought challenges go unmet, however, Traore's support
almost certainly will erode and the possibility of a coup or assassination attempt
will grow.F___-]
In our view, Traore is likely to continue his tentative rapprochement with the
West, particularly with France, the former colonial power, in search of reliable
sources of military, economic, and emergency food assistance. Bamako has been
working to reduce the country's longstanding dependence on the USSR because of
the poor quality of Soviet military training and supplies and Moscow's stingy
response to the country's food needs. We believe that occasional tensions with the
USSR are likely to continue because of periodic effort by the Soviets to stem
Mali's turn to the West. According to the US Embassy, Bamako accused two
Soviet diplomats last year of encouraging university student demonstrations
against the regime. Moscow has tried to
infiltrate the Mali Peace Movement, a principal point of contact outside of the
government for the Soviets.
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28 June 1985
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Seychelles
ship repair facility on the main island of Mahe,
The Rene regime has not moved on a Soviet offer to construct a floating drydock
The Soviets last summer told Rene they could build drydock facilities
for Seychellois use near the local naval base at Port Victoria and, pending the
results of a Soviet hydrographic survey, on a small outlying island. Conktruction at
Port Victoria reportedly was to begin earlier this year but, no
work has been done because negotiations over the location stalled when Seychelles
defense officials decided to build the facility at a site the Soviets say is unsuitable.
The impasse comes at a time when Seychelles is launching an ambitious national
development plan and is looking to the West and moderate Arab countries for
badly needed financial backing.
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