EUROPEAN REVIEW SPECIAL ISSUE: A PREVIEW OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200620001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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European Review
Special Issue: A Preview of the
French Parliamentary Elections
14 February 1986
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EUR ER 86-005
14 February 1986
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European Review
14 February 1986
Special Issue: A Preview of the French
Parliamentary Elections
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Briefs France: Mitterrand's New Book
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Articles Perspective
France is bracing for a roller coaster ride into the political unknown
after the legislative elections on 16 March. Public opinion polls,
political commentators, recent local elections, and the "kick-the-
rascals-out" mood of the voters all indicate that the conservatives
will be swept back into power. But Socialist President Francois
Mitterrand's term of office does not expire until May 1988. Never
since General de Gaulle set up the Fifth Republic in 1958 has a
president had to contend with a politically hostile National
Assembly, and no one knows where this will lead.
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The Right's Fragile Consensus
Most French political observers seem to believe that conservatives of
the two traditional groupings?the Gaullist Rally for the Republic
(RPR) and the Centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF)?will
win a majority in the legislative elections. Gaullists and Centrists
have mustered significant unity in preparing for their first, all-out
contest with the left in five years, but unity has required assiduous
efforts both to paper over longstanding disagreements on policy and
submerge competing personal ambitions.
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Public Opinion and the Election
The RPR/UDF alliance that voter surveys indicate will gain control
of the National Assembly apparently is benefiting from the
conjunction of a long-term trend in public opinion toward the center
and an attitude of disenchantment that has hurt the incumbent
Socialists. Popular views on the consequences of the election,
however, are much less well defined, particularly on how a
Gaullist/Centrist-dominated legislature should govern with a
Socialist still serving as President.
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The Economic Scene
On the eve of the legislative elections, the outlook for the French
economy is the brightest it has been since the Socialists took office
in 1981. After the Socialists' inept initial attempt at economic
management, and several years of lackluster growth, the economy
now appears to be one of the government's strong suits. Much to the
Socialists' frustration, however, President Mitterrand and the
government of Prime Minister Fabius have been getting little credit
for the strengthening economy in the polls.
Immigrants as an Election Issue
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One of the key issues in the March elections revolves around
immigrant policy, in large part because the public associates
foreigners with other domestic problems, such as unemployment, the
declining quality of public services, and an increased crime rate.
Whatever the outcome of the voting, foreigners are likely to face
increased legal constraints, tighter border controls, and more
frequent police sweeps in search of illegal immigrants than at any
time since the 1970s.
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Viewpoint
US-French Relations During "Cohabitation"?March 1986 and 25
Beyond
Profiles The Ministerial Front-Runners
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Chirac-Giscard-Barre: Troubled Triangle
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as uncoordinated viewc
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Briefs
France Mitterrand's New Book
President Mitterrand's latest book on foreign policy?mostly a collection of his
speeches over the past five years?argues forcefully the wisdom of his positions on
the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Reserving his sharpest invective for SDI and its proponents, Mitterrand offers
grudging admiration for Gorbachev's latest arms control proposals, which he
characterizes as authored by a skillful chess player. On SDI he argues that "there
is a contradiction on the American side, between calling on various European
countries to deploy nuclear missiles on their territory, while simultaneously casting
doubt on the usefulness, even the morality, of such weapons."
Mitterrand faces the prospects of cohabitation with a conservative government
after the 16 March legislative elections, and
Gaullist and Centrist leaders will force the President to share at least some of
his authority over foreign policy with the new government. Mitterrand's book is
almost certainly intended to give Socialists a boost in the current campaign, by
portraying his stewardship of foreign affairs as forceful and determined to protect
French interests, but it is also probably intended to reassert his right to direct
foreign affairs against the probable challenge from conservatives.
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Articles
Perspective
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France is bracing itself for a roller coaster ride into
the political unknown after the legislative elections on
16 March. Public opinion polls, political
commentators, recent local elections, and the "kick-
the-rascals-out" mood of the voters all indicate that
the conservatives will be swept back into power after a
five-year hiatus in their dominance of the Fifth
Republic. But Socialist President Francois
Mitterrand's seven-year term of office does not expire
until May 1988. Never since General de Gaulle set up
the Fifth Republic in 1958 has a president had to
contend with a politically hostile National Assembly,
and no one knows where this will lead.
The vaguely worded constitution gives the president
power to name the prime minister and call a new
election; but the prime minister, who names his own
government, is accountable to parliament, which can
also veto most presidential actions. French presidents
from de Gaulle onward have probably exercised more
power than any other elected official in Western
Europe, but that power has rested on firm backing
from parliament. A period of "cohabitation," as the
French call the relationship between a president and a
government of opposing political camps, could lead to
a profound restructuring of the political institutions.
It is the uncertainties of cohabitation that add spice to
what otherwise might be a fairly pedestrian election.
Socialists and conservatives alike have moved toward
the center of the political spectrum in recent years,
and it would be hard to slip a matchbook cover
between their differences on most policies. The
general consensus on defense and foreign policies, in
particular, is likely to ensure little change of France's
external course?especially given the president's
traditionally strong role in these areas. To the extent
that the conservatives gain the upper hand in the
tussle to direct policy, there may be a more openly
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receptive approach to the Strategic Defense Initiative
and relations with Moscow?notably cool under
Mitterrand?may warm a little.
Despite strong conservative rhetoric, there is apt to be
surprisingly little change in economic policy?an area
where the Socialists, after a brief and disastrous foray
into economic expansion, have had notable success.
The conservatives will maintain the austerity program
and try to hold on to the low rate of inflation and
improved growth that they will inherit, while
searching for a way to bring down unemployment and
reduce public debt. Some of the Socialist
nationalizations will doubtless be rolled back, but this
is likely to be a slow and careful process.
Public opinion, too, has been evolving toward the
center. More and more voters are expressing
impatience with the trappings of political ideology and
refusing to identify themselves as either "leftist" or
"rightist." There is one issue, however, where more
extreme views appear to be gaining ground. Opinion
polls point to growing apprehension and resentment
about the number of immigrants in France?linked in
the popular mind with emotion-stirring issues like the
rise in crime, growing unemployment, and the threats
to French culture. To the extent that immigration
reform becomes a wild card in the election, it is likely
to strengthen the hand of the conservatives, who have
borrowed some of the less radical approaches to
immigration restriction from the extreme right
National Front.
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The Right's Fragile
Consensus
Most political observers in France appear to believe
that conservatives of the two traditional groupings?
the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the
Centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF)?will
win a majority in the legislative elections on 16
March. Gaullists and Centrists have mustered
significant unity in preparing for their first, all-out
contest with the left in five years, but unity has
required assiduous efforts both to paper over
longstanding disagreements on policy and submerge
competing personal ambitions. Most knowledgeable
observers suspect also that the right's homogenized
election platform?wheeled out ceremoniously on 16
January?owes more to facing the exigencies of
getting elected than to a genuine rapprochement of
views. If this is true, differences on key issues are
highly likely to reemerge to some degree once the
conservatives win control of the government. These
divisions could create serious problems for the right as
it attempts to navigate the dangerous waters of
"cohabitation" with a still-powerful and cunning
Socialist President.
Conflicting Presidential Ambitions
Aside from the prospects for cohabitation between
conservatives and President Mitterrand after the
forthcoming elections and probable conservative
victory, no topic has dominated reporting on the
election more than the bickering and cleavages among
conservatives. The French right is potentially most
divided by the presidential aspirations of its four
principal leaders?Jacques Chirac, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, Raymond Barre, and Francois Leotard.
Although all except Barre have managed to put aside
personal ambitions and form a working alliance in the
elections, and although all except Barre have
promised to cohabit with Mitterrand, the potential for
disunity will almost certainly run increasingly higher
as each jockeys for position as the right's undisputed
contender in the two years between the legislative and
presidential elections in 1988.
Despite indications that the traditional conservative
parties have worked out a serious consensus on most
issues and will try to implement a joint policy, we see
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A rare moment of harmony
a strong case for the scenario seemingly at the heart
of Barre's calculations?that presidential ambitions
and residual policy differences will make it
increasingly difficult for Gaullists and Centrists to
govern together. If as this hypothesis suggests
cohabitation with Mitterrand becomes a poisoned
chalice for both Chirac and Giscard, this would
redound in favor of the right's most promising
presidential contender, Raymond Barre.
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Raymond Barre?Avant Moi, Le Deluge. Barre
consistently outscores all other conservative front-
runners in voter preference polls and probably
commands the loyalty of a sizable portion of the
UDF's rank and file. he 25X1
is building an efficient national election
organization?the kind of machine that is likely to
make him in the future an even more formidable
challenger to both the left and other leaders on the
right. Barre argues that the right should refuse to
govern with a discredited Socialist President, forcing
Mitterrand to surrender his mandate and resign.
Barre's position on cohabitation probably is
determined at least in part by his front-runner
ranking in the polls; his clear advantage is to force
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?
presidential elections as soon as possible. Yet
conservative success either in dealing with Mitterrand
or in cooperating with each other to pursue common
policies militates against Barre's interests. For this
and reasons of principle, he has enunciated some
notable policy differences with both Gaullists and
some Centrists, and these threaten to make him a
troublesome fly in the RPR-UDF ointment.
Waltz of the Prima Donnas. While Barre was staking
out his rejectionist claim, other conservative
contenders apparently concluded that getting elected
was their first priority. To this end and under the
constant prodding of Giscard?dubbed the "apostle of
union" by a cynical press?the three have submerged
personal as well as policy differences in creating at
least a facade of RPR-UDF unity. Behind this not too
imposing breastwork, however, the struggle for
dominance continues. Boosted by his excellent
performance in a televised debate with Prime
Minister Fabius last October and by the
organizational and financial strength of his RPR,
Chirac emerged as the early leader of the threesome,
and he has consistently outmaneuvered the others in
strengthening his position. According to informed
speculation and conversations between Chirac staffers
and US officials in Paris, Chirac probably will
demand the prime-ministership from Mitterrand if
the right wins a majority in the elections. If he does, it
will almost certainly be because he must cohabit in
order to differentiate himself from Barre, who is his
strongest rival, and because he calculates that a
successful performance in this office will be his
springboard to the brass ring two years hence.
Giscard was never very popular as President (1974-81)
and fell badly in the polls last year. His leadership of
the UDF, which he created in the mid-1970s, is
increasingly questioned by political insiders, Centrist
challengers, and the news media, and in his latest
interviews he seems reconciled to playing a supporting
role in Chirac's cast of ministerial characters, at least
for a while. Giscard, however, almost certainly hopes
to use any ministry he might get to reassert his
authority in the UDF over his ambitious protege,
Francois Leotard, and to be in a good position to
replace Chirac as Barre's principal competitor for
conservative leadership if Chirac stumbles as Prime
Minister.
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Leotard, who might claim an important ministry in
any conservative government, has been polishing his
boyish, athletic, and clean-cut image for several years
while presenting himself as the thinking, caring
citizen's alternative to the right's stable of aging
hacks. He, too, could profit if Chirac falls and
probably believes that he has already outmaneuvered
Giscard for leadership of the UDF?even if his old
mentor does not know it yet. Leotard will probably see
any ministry as a means of keeping his face plastered
all over France, even if this means occasionally
disagreeing with other conservative leaders. Whatever
his post in the Cabinet, Leotard will keep his distance
from government policy; should Chirac and Giscard
falter, he could argue that France could expect little
better from tired old politicians capable of peddling
only tired old ideas.
In our judgment, Chirac, Giscard, and Leotard
probably will bend over backward to ensure that
personal ambitions do not jeopardize the right's
chances at a substantial legislative majority, and
Raymond Barre has nothing to gain from a
conservative failure in the election. After the
balloting, however, these ambitions are likely to
create clashes over policy formulation and
implementation as well as over minor appointments.
Such troubled waters would give Mitterrand?who
says he intends to remain in office until his term
expires in 1988?ample opportunity to fish for
differences he could exploit to his own purposes. A
senior adviser and personal confidant of the French
President recently told US officials in Paris that
Mitterrand?one of the cleverist political infighters in
France?expects to be in his element when the
victorious conservatives begin to quarrel over policy.
The Conservative Policy Consensus: How Durable?
Conservatives are divided by both policy differences
and overweening ambitions. Gaullists and Centrists
differ most from the extreme right National Front
(FN), with whom they have disparaged cooperation.
To avoid playing into FN hands and to deny the left
opportunities to play them off against each other, the
RPR and UDF have signed a joint platform that seeks
to gloss over their policy differences, at least until the
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right has returned a majority to the National
Assembly. While this agreement has shielded the
right's fragile unity from its enemies, it has not
concealed the fact that Gaullists and Centrists harbor
different conceptions of how to solve France's
manifold problems. These differences almost certainly
will continue to create frequent frictions both before
and after the election.
Defense and Security Issues. A general consensus on
defense and security matters encompasses most of the
French political specturm, including much of the non-
Communist left. We agree with the US Embassy's
assessment that basic tenets of French defense policy
will remain essentially the same after the March
elections and that change is likely to be evolutionary
rather than abrupt. Nevertheless, some strains are
likely to emerge over nuances of policy and over
varying levels of commitment, and these may become
more apparent when the hard choices of balancing
obligations require decisions. As in other areas,
moreover, the ubiquitous conflict of competing
political ambitions on the right may also widen
substantially differences that now seem slight.
Two changes?both in the RPR?lie at the crux of
the conservative consensus on defense. Traditional
Gaullist antipathy for both NATO and European
integration has been submerged in the party in favor
of an Atlanticist vogue that has even led a few to talk
of the need to find ways that France can participate
more fully in NATO's military wing; some would
even have expanded France's defense commitment to
embrace West Germany and Europe in general. The
Gaullist old guard?Michel Debre and Pierre
Messmer?still counsel wariness of the Alliance, still
influence defense policies, and apparently still carry
great weight with Chirac. Younger thinkers, however,
less conditioned by events and biases of the Gaullist
era, have apparently made the long march to a more
pragmatic defense policy. Gaullist efforts to enunciate
a common defense policy in the postelection period
could hit rough sledding in adjusting such differences.
The US Embassy and press reports also note that,
despite rumblings among UDF supporters of Barre,
the Centrists have evolved toward a more pro-Alliance
position. Barrists, on the other hand, often voice more
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traditional Gaullist attitudes, including notions about
the sanctity of French independence from NATO-US
domination and the need to maintain an independent
dialogue with the Soviet Union. Barre, in fact, has
criticized Mitterrand for compromising France's
dialogue with the USSR. These differences are likely
to surface more openly after the election, especially as
Barre moves to help spoil the conservative
achievements in cohabitation.
Gaullists and Centrists may eventually differ most on
cutbacks in defense spending goals. Both support 4-
percent real growth, but Centrists seem inclined to
scale back as a corollary to their broader argument
that conservatives must cut government spending,
especially if they hope to avoid tax increases. Some
initial frictions also might arise over control of the
Defense Ministry, from which both Gaullists and
Centrists have enthusiastic claimants.
Foreign Policy. French foreign policy is probably the
strongest, most durable element of the right's
consensus, and conservatives differ little also from
Mitterrand on the shape of future policy. If
Mitterrand, however, is willing and able to make
foreign policy an issue, he might be able to open some
fissures in the conservative facade. Chirac, egged on
by more confrontational old-line Gaullists, could find
that more conciliatory, younger disciples demand
compromise. The same strains are possible in the
UDF, where Barrists are almost certain to argue for
confrontation calculated to drive Mitterrand from
office.
Economic Policy. Conservatives appear to disagree
most on national economic policy. After years of
searching for an alternative to the "slow growth?no
accidents" approach adopted by the Socialists, major
opposition economic policy makers have recently
started to come to grips with the economic and
political risks of moving too dramatically to lift
France off the slow-growth path. The likelihood of a
conservative victory in March has generated a
national debate among politicians, academics, and
businessmen on future economic initiatives. This
debate has been an education for the right, and the
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Differences Between Gaullists (RPR) and Centrists
(UDF) on Economic Policy
Tax Reductions
RPR insists on tax cuts of 45 billion francs in the first
year for both individuals and corporations. Also
wants to cut the "taxe professionnelle" (a locally
applied corporate payroll tax that amounted to about
87 billion francs in 1984) by 25 percent the first year
and 25 percent the second. Argues that tax cuts
would stimulate faster growth and beget larger tax
revenue. Pledges to abrogate the wealth tax imposed
by the Socialists in 1981 as ineffective.
UDF agrees with proposed abolition of wealth tax but
believes cutting the professional tax could ignite
grassroots reaction against the UDF and RPR in
1986-88 from powerful local political interests who
rely heavily on it to finance local government projects
and thus create serious problems for the right in the
1988 presidential election. Also fears cuts in
individual and corporate taxes risk an increase in
imports and currency problems, subjecting
conservatives to accusations of irresponsibility by the
Socialists.
Cuts in Government Spending
RPR believes present levels of spending should be
maintained. Gaullists worry that cuts in expenditures
for aid to industry would hurt RPR-oriented
businesses and also point to the firm opposition by
the French Employers' Association's (Patronat) to
any significant reduction of government help for
industry. They share, however, the UDF's belief that
conservatives should continue limiting the deficit to 3
percent of GDP, the current target of the Socialist
government.
UDF argues that tax cuts are indefensible without
agreement on offsetting expenditure cuts. Seeks a cut
of up to 30 billion francs in the first year, mostly in
reduced aid to industries. Argues further that a high
growth rate's influence on tax revenues would lag the
impact on the deficit that, they fear, could rise to 4 or
5 percent of GDP.
Monetary Policy
RPR is unwilling to tighten monetary policy, even if
the budget deficit grows. Gaullists argue that it is
better to accept a larger deficit and higher rate of
monetary creation as long as faster economic growth
results and unemployment can be stabilized or
reduced before the 1988 presidential election.
UDF is concerned about monetary expansion and
would prefer that the M-2 target for 1986-87 be
tightened to 5 percent or less, if the budget deficit
seems likely to exceed 3.5 percent of GDP. Also,
worries that a larger deficit without tighter monetary
policy would change inflationary expectations in
France and abroad; instead of further deceleration of
the consumer price index toward 4 percent by yearend
1986, expectations might drive it toward 6 or 7
percent, pushing up interest rates and dampening
investment intentions.
Price Decontrol
RPR favors immediate price decontrol?on both
industrial products and services?and abolition of
the ordinance of 1946 that permits controls to prevent
imposition of future restrictions.
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UDF contends that immediate decontrol of prices
would exacerbate inflation. Believes conservatives
should sponsor a phased decontrol to cushion the
inflationary impact and a strengthening of the
government's Direction de la Concurrence, which is
supposed to police price fixing.
Deregulation of Real Estate
RPR wants to stimulate the housing market by
gutting the 1981 "Loi Quillot"?a Socialist measure
that increased tenants' rights at the expense of
landlords. Also would legislate incentives for
building new houses, including subsidized mortgage
credits.
UDF fears that too radical a change in the "Loi
Quillot" would prove politically unpopular,
particularly if it led to sharp rent increases. Prefers
to stimulate building with tax incentives, such as
increasing the deduction for mortgage interest. Also
warns that, if housing construction stimulated by
such policies attracts a larger share of savings, the
stock and bond markets could suffer.
Exchange Decontrol
RPR wants to move quickly to abolish remaining
exchange controls and limitations on capital markets.
UDF prefers a gradual program phased over the two
years before 1988, reflecting concern that quick
decontrol would cause a large outflow of capital and
crimp domestic investment.
Denationalizations
RPR previously argued to rapid denationalization of
industries nationalized by the Socialists after 1981
but now agrees with the UDF on a phased approach.
UDF apparently argued successfully for a three-
phased approach over several years. Reportedly
expects a potential dispute with the Gaullists over
naming of the new management for nationalized
companies and banks.
Labor Flexibility-Employment
RPR seeks removal of all administrative restrictions
on layoffs?one of the Gaullists' 10 cardinal
economic measures to be enacted within six months
of election. Promises an emergency plan for youth
employment and promotion of worker participation
(for example, stock ownership) in corporations. Calls
for labor-management negotiations to eliminate
"rigidities that penalize employment," especially
removal of "threshold" requirements for firms
employing more than 10 and more than 50 workers.
UDF supports decontrol and increased flexibility but
fears that moving too fast could prove politically
unpopular with trade unions.
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RPR-UDF Approach to Denationalizations
A published study by prominent French lawyer Jean
Loyvette has outlined a denationalization program
that might serve as the basis for opposition unity on
the issue, according to the US Embassy in Paris.
Gaullists and Centrists reportedly endorsed the
broad thrust of the program last October. It
recommends three successive phases of
denationalization over five years at a cost of 120
billion to 130 billion francs.
The first phase, to be completed by March 1987,
would sell banks that the Socialists nationalized in
1982 along with three or four industries, including St.
Gobain and CGE. It would also reduce government
participation in the Elf Aquitaine petroleum, Matra
electronics, and Dassault aircraft firms. Second and
third phases would privatize the large banks
nationalized immediately after the Second World
War, the insurance companies, the Renault
automobile firm, and steel companies.
The study carefully explains how the financial
markets might digest denationalization without
major disruptions (a UDF fear) and suggests that
implementation should be carried out jointly by the
Finance Ministry, and ad hoc Minister for
Denationalization serving under the Prime Minister,
and a five-member Committee on Privatization. The
study also proposes a constitutional change to make
renationalization more difficult should majority
support change in the future,
public spotlight on conservative discord and indecision
has reportedly chipped away at business confidence in
the right, according to the US Embassy.
These lessons were reflected at a well-attended
national conference last November on the future of
the French economy. In the face of academic and
business pressure for a sharp break with current
policies, conservative party spokesmen showed a
remarkable reluctance to back any initiatives that
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differed much from those the Socialists are currently
pursuing. Since then national debates and
conservative disagreement have focused on price and
exchange decontrol, tax reform, reduced government
sending, denationalization, deregulation, and relaxing
rules governing hiring and firing. Although most
observers appear to agree that the conservatives will
adjust their public differences sufficiently to get
elected, none minimizes the problems inherent in
fashioning a workable consensus on policies that can
survive the strains of cohabitation with Mitterrand.
Heady predictions of immediate freeing of price and
exchange controls and quick action on hiring and
firing appear to have given way to concerns about
consequences, with the UDF taking the lead in
warning that some policies touted by Gaullists could
reignite inflation, cause enormous outflows of capital,
wreck domestic investment, and backfire on the right
politically. Barre, meanwhile, has railed against
quick-fix solutions that he routinely identifies with
Gaullists. Although Gaullists and Centrists have
reportedly worked out a hard consensus on
denationalizations, the issue remains a potential
minefield for conservatives, not least because many
politically sensitive decisions?such as streamlining
management and employment ramifications of selling
state-owned firms?are unsettled and unclear.
Other Policy Differences. Other issues, like
independence for New Caledonia and immigration
reform, could also cause frictions between
conservatives, and Mitterrand stands to benefit
especially if the RPR stirs resentment among Centrist
moderates by attempting to ram through solutions
that appeal to its fringe elements of the right. On
immigration, for example, Gaullists stand to reclaim
some stray voters by speaking to FN issues, but they
could arouse antiracist sentiments among Centrists if
they move too far too fast for UDF leaders like
Simone Veil, a Jew who survived Auschwitz.
Implications for the United States
Although finding a balance in dealing with the Prime
Minister and President is likely to be the most
troublesome problem facing US officials, numerous
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potential policy differences between the parties of the
new government portend a further complication of
future relations with France. Disruptions in the
conservative policy consensus could take some time to
repair, adding uncertainty to the always difficult task
of assessing France's stance on international issues.
Policy toward the United States could, moreover,
become an issue in some conservative disagreements,
if, for example, unreconstructed Gaullists declare
open war on revisionists concerning attitudes toward
NATO, SDI, and dialogue with Moscow.I, I
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Public Opinion and the Election
The RPR/UDF alliance that voter surveys indicate
will win a majority in the March election apparently
is benefiting from the conjunction of a long-term
trend in public opinion toward the center and a
"throw-the-rascals-out" attitude that has hurt the
incumbent Socialists. Public attitude on the
consequences of the election, however, are much less
well-defined, particularly on how a Gaullist/Centrist-
dominated legislature should govern with a Socialist
still serving as President. In addition, the 1988
presidential race is still wide open.
Long-Term Shift to the Center
Over the last few years?and particularly since 1981
when the left participated in the government for the
first time in a quarter century?public opinion polls
show that, for many voters, the traditional view of
French politics as a contest between left and right is
increasingly irrelevant. Both the left and right have
now governed in times of economic difficulties, and
neither seems to have a magic cure:
? In a January 1984 survey, 49 percent said the
distinction between left and right was out of date,
compared to 33 percent in 1981.
? In August 1984, 22 percent of the respondents
doubted the ability of either the left or right to
manage the government any better and said it made
little difference which party was in power.
? Another poll last November shows the public's view
of its political allegiance about equally divided: one-
third consider themselves to be on the left, one-third
on the right, and the rest refuse to categorize
themselves or have no opinion. (In a similar poll in
February 1981, 42 percent said they considered
themselves on the left, 31 percent on the right, and
only 20 percent expressed no preference.)
These polls show that political affiliation is often
linked to social groups. Leftist voters are prevalent
among young, male voters who work in white collar
and industrial jobs. The right draws more support
13
from older and female voters and those who work as
farmers, managers, and professionals such as lawyers
and doctors. The employment category strongest
among those who do not consider themselves to be left
or right is small shopkeepers.
Surveys of the public attitudes reveal a turn away
from both the traditional themes of the right?such as
nationalism, religious faith, and unrestrained
capitalism?and of the left?compassion, social
justice, and change (even insurrection). Opinion
presently seems to be moving toward the center, with
a tilt toward the right. In a December 1983 survey,
for example, 51 percent favored denationalizing the
firms that the government took over in 1982,
63 percent wanted to cut taxes even if this meant
reducing government services, and 72 percent wanted
to curb state regulation of the economy.
However, the shift to the right has its limits. Although
the French increasingly favor a more conservative
economic policy, they do not want to give up the social
gains made during the left's tenure in power. Of those
responding to a December 1983 poll, 73 percent were
against sacrificing the fifth week of paid vacation for
the duration of the country's economic troubles, and
55 percent did not want to make layoffs any easier.
This shift to the center has been accompanied by an
improvement in French opinion of the United States.
In October 1984, 40 percent said they had a favorable
overall view of the United States, up from 30 percent
in November 1982. The October 1984 poll also
showed that 47 percent agreed with US economic
policies.
The result of these long-term changes in public
opinion is that French politics is slowly evolving away
from a clash between left and right. Instead, it is
becoming a contest for support from a broad center.
The Socialists have become more pragmatic after
nearly five years in power, and the platform of the
RPR/UDF alliance promises they will maintain
social gains made under the leftist government, such
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as more paid vacation and earlier retirement. The vote
for extremist parties, on the other hand, has steadily
declined. These trends have been confirmed by recent
polls taken during the election campaign.
Rejection of the Incumbents
Disenchantment with Socialist leaders and policies
has reinforced the movement of opinion toward the
center:
? President Mitterrand had the approval of only about
a third of the electorate in polls taken last
summer?a record low for Presidents of the Fifth
Republic.
? After a strong start when he took over as Prime
Minister in July 1984, Laurent Fabius has fallen to
a 36-percent approval.
? According to a January poll, 85 percent of the
public thought the Socialists had been ineffective in
dealing with unemployment, which most people felt
should be the government's top priority.
? In other surveys, large majorities have said they
oppose the Socialists' abolition of the death penalty
and think the leftist government has been too soft on
illegal immigrants.
Polls taken at the time of the last national elections in
1981 showed that the left benefited from votes against
President Giscard d'Estaing, and now the voters
penchant for voting out governments they think have
not solved the country's problems is working against
the Socialists.
Voting Intentions for 16 March
Currently, the polls are showing that the RPR/UDF
alliance?with about 48 percent of the vote?
probably will get a working majority in the
legislature. Within the alliance, the RPR, with its
superior organization and funding, should emerge as
the dominant force. The RPR and UDF stand to get a
clear majority of the seats, even without a majority of
the popular vote, because the new electoral law passed
last year instituted proportional representation
Voting Intentions for March Elections
50
Approval Ratings for Leading Presidential Candidates
30
&totem er 1985 October 1985 November 1985 December 1985 January 1986
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14
PROJECTED NUMBER OF SEATS
BASED ON JANUARY POLLS
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The Socialists have been improving in the polls,
however, and the ratings of Mitterrand himself
recently have been going up as well, as some of the
Socialists' successes in managing the economy have
become more apparent to the public. In addition,
Mitterrand has been more active and partisan than
French presidents usually are at election time, and he
has thrown the prestige of his office behind the
Socialists' campaign to retain power. The Socialists
have also benefited from some of the undecided voters
making up their minds; surveys show that the number
of uncommitted voters is down from 20 percent last
August to 14 percent in January.
Nevertheless, the polls show that the Socialists are not
closing the gap quickly enough to retain control of
Parliament. If they continue to improve their score at
the current rate and start taking votes from the RPR
and UDF, however, a chance exists that there could
be a hung legislature in which no party or coalition
has a majority of seats.
16 March . . . and After
If the RPR and UDF do gain control of the Chamber
of Deputies on 16 March, they will face an
unprecedented political situation. Since the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic was adopted in
1958, the President has emerged as the most powerful
political leader. The President always has had a
sympathetic legislature to work with, however, and
many of the extensive powers he has assumed are not
laid out in the Constitution. The polling data show
that the public is uncertain about this situation, and
opinion has yet to gel into a consensus on how the
political system ought to function:
? In January, 39 percent thought that Mitterrand
should remain in office if the conservatives get
control of the legislature, 29 percent thought he
should resign, and 32 percent were undecided.
? The electorate, by a slim majority, also wants to
avoid a confrontation with 54 percent?in a poll last
November?favoring a search for common ground
between a Socialist President and a conservative
parliament, while 22 percent want an aggressive
rightist government, and only 16 percent desire a
stubborn defense of leftist positions.
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Under these circumstances it is not clear who the next
Prime Minister will be. Raymond Barre, from the
UDF, is the most popular conservative leader in the
polls, but he has refused to work with Mitterrand.
Barre believes the President should resign if the
conservatives win the election so that the presidency
and the legislature could be brought into line.
Mitterrand insists, however, that he has no intention
of stepping down. Most commentators therefore
believe that RPR leader Jacques Chirac?who has
indicated he would take the job?is the front-runner.
The selection of a prime minister is Mitterrand's
choice, however, and he probably will not decide on
who to appoint until after the election results are in.
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The March legislature election will be an important
precursor for the next presidential election, now
scheduled for 1988. The polls indicate that the race is
still wide open, with Barre and a moderate Socialist,
Michel Rocard, in the lead. Both of these men have
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public images as pragmatists who transcend partisan
party constituencies. Their popularity is yet another
sign of the long-term trend that French politics is
moving away from a clash between dramatically
different philosophies of the left and right and toward
a contest for a broad center.
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The Economic Scene
On the eve of the National Assembly election, the
French economic outlook is the brightest it has been
since the Socialists took office in 1981. After the
Socialists' fumbling initial attempt at economic
management, and several years of lackluster growth,
the economy now appears to be one of the
government's strong suits. Much to the Socialists'
frustration, however, President Mitterrand and the
government of Prime Minister Fabius have been
getting little credit for the strengthening economy in
the polls.
Background
Soon after the election in 1981, Mitterrand and then
Prime Minister Mauroy launched an ambitious and
costly nationalization program and inaugurated a
policy of domestic economic expansion. The latter,
especially, led to a sharp increase in inflation and a
burgeoning trade deficit, aggravating an already grim
economic situation. Beginning in mid-1982, in the
face of serious economic decline, the Socialists
gradually abandoned their expansionist policies and
turned to conventional austerity measures. Between
June 1982 and March 1983, the Socialists imposed an
incomes policy to hold down wages and prices, tax
increases, tighter credit controls, a forced public loan
to the state, and twice devalued the franc. This radical
reorientation of Socialist policy has borne fruit:
? French inflation last year fell to 5.8 percent on an
annual basis, down from 13.3 percent in 1981.
? GDP growth, while still slow, shows signs of picking
up, and is likely to rise from 1.1 percent last year to
more than 1 percent in 1986.
? The French current account, which showed a deficit
of more than $12 billion in 1982, registered a small
surplus in 1985 that is almost certain to grow this
year.
Ironically, the Socialists have accomplished this
economic turnaround with pragmatic economic
policies more characteristic of conservatives than
Socialists. Beyond tighter monetary and fiscal policy,
the Socialists have turned increasingly to market-
oriented policies aimed at encouraging more
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flexibility and competition in the traditionally highly
regulated French economy. In a recent press
interview, Finance Minister Beregovoy pointed out
that 85 to 90 percent of French industrial prices are
decontrolled, roughly double the proportion a year
ago. Another of Beregovoy's legacies is the series of
measures adopted mainly in 1985 to liberalize French
capital markets. The Socialist government has eased
foreign exchange controls, and Paris has given the
green light for the use of financing instruments?such
as commercial paper and negotiable certificates of
deposit?commonly used elsewhere, but heretofore
banned in France.
In addition, while the Socialists nationalized the
major banks and a number of firms not already under
state control, they have used strict economic criteria
in setting performance standards. The government
has installed tough, businesslike managers at the
major nationalized industries who have generally been
hardnosed in their pursuit of improved profitability.
Perhaps foremost among these managers, is George
Besse, who took over early last year as head of
Renault, the troubled automaker. Soon after taking
the job, Besse announced plans to slash Renault's
work force by more than 20 percent, and he
subsequently won showdowns with France's most
militant labor unions. Altogether, the five major
French industrial firms nationalized in 1982?which
in 1981 lost more than $180 million?turned a profit
exceeding $500 million in 1985.
The Socialists' Accomplishments
One of the Mitterrand administration's greatest
achievements has been throttling inflation. This,
above all, has improved business confidence and led to
predictions that France is poised for several years of
stable and reasonably strong growth. French inflation,
calculated on an annual basis, fell from 13.5 percent
in 1980 to 5.8 percent in 1985. Even more dramatic,
the December-to-December increase was only 4.7
percent last year. This is a singular achievement for
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13.5
FRANCE: CONSUMER PRICES
Annual Percent Change
13.3
1980
12
1982
9.5
7.7
5.8
1983
FRANCE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Annual Percent Change
1985 Figure Estimated -
France, where inflation had not dropped below 5
percent since the early 1970s. Prime Minister Fabius,
hailing new projections from the French statistical
institute, recently claimed that France could bring
inflation down to the 2-percent range by the end of
1986.
French economic growth, while still unimpressive by
international standards, has improved since the
Socialists' 1982 policy reversal. The situation now is
perhaps best characterized as slow growth with good
prospects for improvement. France's gross domestic
Secret
5-
2
FRANCE: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
7.6
6.3
8.4
1980 1981 1982
9.6
1983
10.2
1984 190.5
FRANCE: CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
?4.2
1980
?4.7
?12.1
0.3
sedscardad.
1981 1982 1983 1984 2983
849cm 010 983110.99 0010.8
product grew in 1984 by 1.6 percent, more than
double the 1983 rate. Although growth dropped back
to around 1.1 percent last year, we believe the outlook
for 1986 is bright. Fueled by a recent increase in
domestic demand, and helped enormously by
declining oil prices, French GDP should spurt ahead
at an annual rate above 2 percent in 1986. French
consumers can look forward to an advance repayment
on the 1983 forced loan before the March elections. In
addition, the Socialists have scheduled a 3-percent tax
cut for 1986.
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France's external position has also improved, and?
thanks again to the decline in oil prices and softening
of the dollar?the prospects here too are good. Due in
large part to a declining trade deficit the current
account was nearly in balance in 1984 and registered
a small surplus last year. Recent predictions by the
French statistical institute, based on an oil price of
$22 a barrel and an exchange rate of 7.5 francs-to-
the-dollar, indicate a savings of $5.4 billion to
$8.1 billion on the trade account, heightening the
prospects for a balance-of-payments surplus in 1986.
The Paris stock market has reacted positively to these
developments. The most widely watched market index
rose 45 percent in 1985, and the volume of
transactions hit a record high. Perhaps most
important for the long-run economic vitality of
France, where firms have long been plagued by
undercapitalization, the volume of new issues
expanded by about 30 percent.
The Darker Side of the Socialists' Record
Despite the generally favorable economic
performance, the Socialist economic record has
blemishes. Most embarrassing?especially for a party
championing working-class interests?is
unemployment. French unemployment has risen by
600,000 since 1981, and the unemployment rate stood
at 10.2 percent last year. Even here, however, the
Socialists can argue that the picture is brightening.
The unemployment rate edged downward in
December for the fourth consecutive month, leading
Socialist politicians to proclaim that sustained low
inflation and good growth prospects are paying off in
job creation.
Persistent unemployment is one of the byproducts of
the austerity policy, but it also indicates the need to
reorient the economy away from flagging traditional
sectors like steel and shipbuilding. The Socialists have
made less progress in the more intractable area of
structural economic reform. In addition, the relatively
rigid French system stifles entrepreneurial activity.
The Socialists, nevertheless, have made a concerted
effort to expand France's high technology capabilities.
In 1982 the government adopted a program to boost
research and development spending from about
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1.8 percent of GNP to 2.5 percent, a figure
comparable to that of the United States. Last June
the government adopted an program for 1986-89
designed to push public and private research and
development spending to 3 percent of GNP by 1990, a
level that would give France one of the world's highest
proportions of spending on technological development.
Research has been one of the few items in the French
budget to escape austerity; last September the
government adopted an 1986 budget in which
expenditures for research are scheduled to grow in
real terms by 2 to 3 percent.
Another problem area is public debt?which while
still low by European standards?has risen sharply
under the Socialists. According to OECD statistics,
total public debt as a percent of GDP jumped from
25.9 percent in 1981 to 34.6 percent last year. This
economic handicap may eventually force the new
government to increase taxes and social security
contributions and possibly delay reflationary
measures. In addition, the refinancing requirements
for government debt may complicate
denationalization. The French Government is now
committed to borrowing some $130 million a year,
and the conservatives must be careful not to depress
the thin French capital markets with a wholescale
selloff of nationalized firms.
Outlook
If a conservative government indeed assumes power in
March, the French economy is likely to become a
political football. The right will install its program of
denationalization, continued austerity, and perhaps
budget balancing and tax cuts, and try to blame any
unfavorable economic developments on problems
inherited from the Socialists. Conservative spokesmen
are already claiming that the current government has
planted economic "timebombs"?such as a runup in
public debt and an artificial lowering of the
unemployment rate through jobs programs?set to
embarrass the conservatives. For their part, the
Socialists hope that the policies of the new
government will worsen economic performance over
the next two years, allowing the Socialists to appeal
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for a return to their program of "slow growth, no
accidents" during the 1988 presidential elections. The
Socialists may even calculate that a turbulent period
of cohabitation, which almost certainly will
undermine business confidence and weaken the
economy, will help sour the French public on the
right's economic platform and reelect the left in 1988.
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Immigrants as
an Election Issue
One of the key issues in the March elections revolves
around immigrant policy, in large part because the
public associates foreigners with other domestic
problems, such as unemployment, the declining
quality of public services, and an increased crime rate.
The issue gained prominence in the June 1984
European Parliament elections and in the March
1985 local elections when voters gave unexpectedly
strong support to the extreme right National Front,
which ran on an antiimmigrant platform. Mainline
parties on both sides of the political spectrum have
now integrated into their programs some of the milder
National Front positions, leading to a decline in that
party's fortunes. Thus, whether or not the Socialists
retain power after the elections, foreigners are likely
to face increased legal constraints, tighter border
controls, and more frequent police sweeps in search of
illegal immigrants than at any time since the 1970s.
The Immigrant Problem
The foreign population in France numbers between
3.5 million and 4.5 million, or approximately 7 to 8
percent of the total population. Although this
proportion has remained stable for most of the
century, and the rate of increase of the foreign
population has declined considerably in the past 10
years because of a ban on the entrance of foreign
workers in 1974, the nationality of recent immigrants
has made them more visible.
Immigrants from Europe used to predominate, but
now North Africans, who have been granted special
consideration for residency and work permits as
former colonists, have replaced them. Indeed, the
number of Europeans in the foreign population
decreased by about 350,000 from 1975 to 1985; the
number of Africans (including black Africans) grew
by more than 400,000 during this same period.
Officially, the Portuguese are the largest foreign
group in France (about 850,000 people), but the
Algerians (with about 800,000 people) are not far
behind them?and the number of illegal resident
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aliens increases both these figures. Approximately 40
percent of all foreigners living in France are from
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
The change began in the 1960s when the French
recruited non-European workers to fill "temporary"
labor shortages; since then, these migrant workers
have formed permanent communities in France and
are being joined by their dependents, who account for
most of the immigration since 1974. According to
government statistics, more than 70 percent of the
foreigners have lived in France for at least 10 years.
The North Africans concentrate in separate, highly
visible communities around the industrial centers of
France. Most of them reside in three regions: the Ile-
de-France (the Paris area), the Rhone-Alpes (which
incorporates Lyon), and the Provence-Cote d'Azur
(including Marseilles and much of the south). In
addition, they tend to cluster in slum-like suburbs or
city districts, making their presence all the more
conspicuous.
North African immigrants, unlike their European
predecessors, seem unwilling to assimilate into French
society. In fact, only about 13 percent of all
naturalizations of foreigners from 1970 to 1980 were
Maghrebians. This may be partially because of the
tenets of Islam, particularly in its recent, militantly
anti-Western form, that discourages practitioners
from succumbing to the "decadence" of French
culture. Sensational press articles depict French
culture being engulfed and obliterated under a tide of
non-European immigrants, whose birthrate is more
than twice that of the French.
Even level-headed individuals express concern over
the rising number of North Africans, in large part
because they are associated with a variety of social
ills: unemployment, a declining quality in public
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services, and a rising crime rate. The extreme right
blames the number of unemployed Frenchmen on the
presence of cheap foreign labor despite the fact that
the foreigners often take jobs the French would
refuse. Likewise, many Frenchmen complain that
immigrants make wide use of public health care
facilities and compete for scarce public housing while
their children devalue the quality of French public
education.
A high immigrant unemployment rate, 14 percent
overall and 22 percent for Maghrebians, adds to other
social problems. Concerned Frenchmen, point out that
immigrant children, who fail school in
disproportionate numbers and subsequently are
unemployable, often become involved in criminal
activity. Police records for 1983 attribute 15 percent
of all crimes and misdemeanors, 23 percent of all
homicides, and 58 percent of all drug trafficking to
foreigners. Moreover, much of the recent terrorist
activity is associated with Middle Eastern groups. As
a result, judiciary reports indicate that immigrants
are under closer surveillance by police and immigrant
arrests are most likely to be turned over for full
judicial prosecution than in cases involving
Frenchmen.
The Immigrant Issue and Party Platforms
Concern about the immigrant presence was first
openly vocalized in the political arena by Jean-Marie
Le Pen and his National Front Party (FN). The FN
wants to reestablish what it defines as traditional
French values and declares that those who do not
share them could never be French, no matter where
they were born or reside. The FN rejects the notion of
a "pluri-cultural" country. The FN leaves vague the
exact requirements for becoming French, but clearly
anyone not born of white, French-speaking parents
with long-term residence in France would find it
difficult under Le Pen's system.
The National Front's unexpected popularity
encouraged mainstream parties to incorporate some of
its less strident rhetoric. The FN demands immediate
deportation of illegal immigrants without legal due
process before expulsion. The center-right
opposition?the Union for French Democracy (UDF)
and the Rally for the Republic (RPR)?has called for
some form of expedited deportation procedure as well,
but one which would be compatible with French law.
The FN would reinstitute random ID checks without
"probable cause" to believe a crime had been
committed; so would the UDF-RPR opposition. Both
the FN and UDF-RPR would institute tougher
punishments for those assisting illegal immigration
and would give more summary powers to border
police than the present government.
The FN and UDF-RPR part company with regard to
social benefits for immigrants. The FN would abolish
altogether or create separate funding of benefits to
immigrants. They would also eliminate free education
for immigrants. An RPR spokesman has stated that
any benefits that immigrants contribute to from their
paychecks?such as social security, retirement, and
injury, illness, or unemployment benefits?should
continue to be paid as they are now. Only the Barrists
have come out firmly against the suppression of
benefits, saying this would be an affront to French
traditions.
The governing Socialist Party (PS) also has taken note
of popular sentiment against immigrants, though their
ideology has made them reluctant to take an overtly
anti-immigrant stand. Socialist Party First Secretary
Jospin admitted to US Embassy personnel that his
party, which instituted several liberal programs on
immigration after its election in 1981, has lost voters
to the opposition and even the FN as a result. The
Socialists, therefore, have moderated their policies on
immigration; in October 1984 the government
announced a new policy on immigration that, while
helping immigrants already legally resident in the
country, clearly restricted further entries. Family
members must now obtain immigrant visas before
leaving their country of origin rather than entering
France on tourist visas and adjusting their status
later. The government also reinforced the border
police and other organizations fighting illegal
immigration. The Socialists' new tone surfaced in the
televised debate last October between Prime Minister
Fabius and RPR leader Chirac. Fabius said he agreed
with much of the opposition's approach to the
problem, though he was obviously uncomfortable with
the issue and made a point to caution against racial
overtones.
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The PS campaign platform further reflects this
stricter approach to immigration in response to
popular sentiment, despite disagreement on the issue
within the party. The Socialists still maintain that
foreigners legally resident in France have contributed
to the country's welfare and should be able to share in
its benefits. But, realizing that many Frenchmen are
offended by the North Africans' choice not to
assimilate, the PS urges eventual "integration" of
immigrants into French society. The Socialists now
support some form of undefined immigrant
participation in local government. Earlier PS
proposals that immigrants be given the right to vote in
local elections without being citizens and that they be
"inserted" rather than "integrated" into French
society were scrapped. The final language of the
platform promises to "examine" the question of
immigrant voting and to fight illegal immigration and
the employment of illegal workers. However,
according to US Embassy reporting, the question of
immigrant voting and the use of language to describe
immigrant blending into French society led to sharp
debate within the party and contributed to dela in
the publishing of the official platform.
Outlook
The UDF-RPR's adoption of some of Le Pen's
policies and their appeal to voters not to deprive the
mainstream opposition of an absolute majority by
casting votes for the extreme right appears to be
working. National surveys of the electorate show the
FN to be running at about 4 to 6 percent?nearly half
the percentage they obtained in last year's local
elections?with many of the defectors going to the
RPR. Even in the FN strongholds, like the Bouches-
du-Rhone department, polls place them at 17 percent,
down from a high last summer of about 25 percent.
The UDF-RPR coalition continues to maintain that it
will not invite the FN into a rightwing government.
The UDF and RPR together have captured 45
percent of the electorate, according to recent polls; the
new system of proportional representation favors large
parties, and this level of support would provide about
20 seats more than they need to hold a 51-percent
majority in the National Assembly. Since the FN has
been steadily dropping in the polls, we believe it is
unlikely the UDF-RPR will need their support in
order to form a government.
23
We believe that government policies toward the
immigrant population will become stricter no matter
what the outcome of the March elections. Le Pen and
his party have brought underlying emotions on a
sensitive issue to the surface. To openly discuss the
immigrant problem no longer labels one a racist. In
addition, the North Africans, once courted as a
potential voting block, are choosing not to become
French citizens?thus diluting their political power.
Francois-Poncet, the French Foreign Minister during
the period 1978 to 1981, told US Embassy personnel
recently that this problem is potentially the number-
one issue in French politics in the years ahead if it is
not dealt with quickly and effectively. He predicted
that any aggravation of the situation, particularly the
continuation of clandestine immigration, could dispel
the levelheadedness that currently prevails. This
concern seems to be spread across the political
spectrum, and we believe fear of a radical backlash
will motivate the mainline parties into taking strong
action on the issue.
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US-French Relations During
"Cohabitation"?March 1986
and Beyond
Viewpoint
This article represents the views of the State
Department's Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs and Policy Planning Staff.
We may be entering a difficult period in our relations
with France. Following an almost certain victory by
the conservative opposition in parliamentary elections
in March, President Mitterrand will have to share
power?"cohabit"?with a conservative Prime
Minister and Cabinet, conceivably until the
Presidential elections in 1988. As he struggles for
political survival at home, Mitterrand may well
become more, rather than less, difficult to deal with
abroad. At stake will be the continuation of the strong
executive power and stable institutions characteristic
of the Fifth Republic as well as the positive elements
of French foreign policy, especially on East-West
issues
The Domestic Political Background
The parliamentary elections will take France into
uncharted political waters. The opposition parties are
virtually certain to win control of the National
Assembly from the Socialists. Mitterrand must then
appoint a conservative Prime Minister. For the first
time in the 27 years of the Fifth Republic, France will
be governed by a President of one party in parallel
with a Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Parliament from
opposing parties.
Under almost any possible scenario for
"cohabitation," Mitterrand is likely to be isolated
within his government and fighting to preserve his
authority. Many in the opposition hope to drive him
from office before his term ends in 1988?though as
of now he is determined to stay. He, in turn, will seek
to exploit the active rivalry among the three
presidential hopefuls of the opposition: Barre, Chirac,
and Giscard. For each of them also, cohabitation
offers risks as well as opportunities. Thus an
opposition Prime Minister with presidential ambitions
could well find his image tarnished after two years of
wrestling with a sluggish economy and austerity
25
budgets while Mitterrand retained the glamour of the
foreign affairs and defense portfolios. Barre has
elected to remain aloof?with the risk that he may
have become irrelevant at the end of two years.
Implications for French Foreign Policy
As the French domestic situation becomes
supercharged with constitutional and partisan
arguments, these disputes are increasingly likely to
intrude in the day-to-day management of French-US
relations. To shore up his weakened authority,
Mitterrand will seek to highlight his role as President
of France?to demonstrate his firm defense of French
interests, the respect he enjoys from other heads of
states, and his ability to deal with both Moscow and
Washington. He may indulge in some tiresome
Gaullian posturing for domestic effect, but
Mitterrand will also need to prove that he is an
effective, respected interlocutor for Washington.
Although foreign policy per se will not be a major
campaign issue, the opposition Prime Minister and his
government will be pursuing directly contrary
objectives. Their goal will be to circumscribe
Mitterrand's foreign policy role and ensure that
decisions flow through the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Minister. Without undercutting France's
external authority, they will want to portray
Mitterrand as a lameduck and may encourage foreign
governments to deal exclusively with the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet.
Implications for US Policy Interests
These domestic political battles have the potential to
complicate French relations with the United States?
which are prickly at the best of times.
The strength of France as an active player on the
international scene has benefited US policy positions
significantly. This has been possible over the past two
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decades at least in part because of the institutions of
the Fifth Republic and the strong executive power of
the French Presidency. Whether or not France
emerges from the cohabitation period with these
institutions and a strong executive power intact,
therefore, could have important consequences for the
broad range of US interests in Western Europe and
the world. Although Mitterrand has been troublesome
on many issues?SDI, economic issues, Central
America?in the key areas of East-West and security
policy, he has carried forward a significant evolution
in French foreign policy. His strong public stance on
Poland and Afghanistan at the beginning of his term,
his firm support for INF deployments, his initiation of
a security dialogue with West Germany were not only
helpful to US policy objectives but also represented an
important departure from the detente policies of his
more conservative predecessors. Without sacrificing
French independence, Mitterrand has made
cooperation with the NATO Alliance respectable in
France. Moreover, in these areas, his policies enjoy
broad support across the political spectrum
Some in the opposition will argue that French foreign
policy under a conservative government will be more
congenial to the US administration than that of
Mitterand and the Socialists. In some areas, a
government of the right will certainly be less
ideological and more supportive of our policies?most
importantly on Central America, but also on South
Africa and other Third World areas where no vital
French interests are involved. But on a broad range of
other issues?the new trade round, monetary issues,
agriculture, to name only a few?little change is
likely. (In fact, French conservatives are more
dependent on farm votes than the Socialists.) On SDI,
we will probably see some softening of the rhetoric
but no real change of position?regardless of what
opposition politicians are saying to us now. Concerns
about the viability of the French nuclear force and the
legitimacy of nuclear deterrence are widely shared.
Barre, for one, has made public statements as critical
of SDI as those of the present government.
Most importantly, the East-West policy of a
conservative French Government will probably be less
satisfactory over the long run than Mitterrand's. In
France, the right, rather than the Socialists, are the
traditional supporters of a policy of "equidistance"
between the superpowers and a privileged relationship
with the Soviet Union. This is in part the legacy of de
Gaulle; in part a government of the right must show it
can talk to Moscow?just as a government of the left
needs good relations with the United States. Thus,
Mitterrand's foreign policy has been occasionally
criticized from the right?by Barre, for example, and
also Giscard?for being too pro-US and sacrificing
French influence with Moscow.
As US-Soviet relations gradually improve, any
French Government would now be moving back
toward expanded dialogue with Moscow?seeking
greater room for maneuver and flexibility in its
relations with the East. We are seeing the beginning
of this process with Mitterrand?who will make his
second visit to Moscow in 1986 and clearly is
Moscow's preferred interlocutor in Europe. But the
process could well accelerate under a government of
the right and develop in ways unhelpful to us. A
complete return to the detente policies of the 1970s is
unlikely but we could, for example, see a reversion to
the rhetoric of equidistance?possibly even some
concession to buy off Soviet pressure on French and
British forces on INF. Much will depend on which of
the opposition candidates succeeds Mitterrand as
President. Judging from their public statements, we
would find Barre less congenial on East-West issues
than Chirac
Living With Cohabitation
Neither France's institutional stability nor the
evolution of French East-West policy will, of course,
depend primarily on the United States. Nonetheless,
the fluidity of French politics over the medium term is
likely to test the ability of US policymakers to ensure
that short-term actions do not run contrary to broader
interests.
In particular, the necessity of doing business with all
the players?the Foreign Minister, the President, and
to a much greater degree than heretofore, the Prime
Minister?will complicate any dealings with France.
US interests will suffer to the degree that either side
in a cohabitation arrangement believes that the
United States is partial to one or the other. Taking the
position that only the President can speak for
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France?as Mitterrand and the Socialists may seek to
argue?or appearing to bypass Mitterrand or to treat
him as a lameduck?as the conservative government
may urge?would risk alienating one side or the other
in a heated domestic squabble.
French Socialists are likely to be inordinately sensitive
to any US gesture, however unintentional, that might
be taken as a slight to Mitterrand personally. For
example, a repeat of the events surrounding President
Reagan's invitation to Mitterrand to attend the
Summit Seven meeting in New York before the US-
Soviet Summit last spring would probably generate
significantly greater French resentment in the period
ahead.
On the other hand, Mitterrand's supporters on the
moderate left will probably appreciate continued US
efforts to applaud the positive elements of
Mitterrand's foreign policy, especially with respect to
Franco-German relations, the INF issue, and the need
for strong defense
Any of several predictable opportunities for frictions
over the coming year?the Tokyo summit and the
perennial issue of a political declaration; Allied
consultations before and after the Reagan-Gorbachev
summit?promises to test everyone's ability to
navigate through a freshly sown minefield of French
sensitivities.
__,
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The Ministerial
Front-Runners
Profiles
Below are brief background sketches of the main
contenders for the four top ministerial posts in the
French Cabinet should the RPR/UDF Alliance win a
majority of the seats in parliament.
Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac
Mayor of Paris and President of the strongest
opposition party, the RPR, Jacques Chirac is the most
likely candidate for the post of Prime Minister. His
driving ambition is to be President. Some political
observers have suggested that he might even try to
force Mitterrand's resignation in an attempt to
enhance his own standing, but we believe that he
wants to lead a successful but uncompromising
cohabitation government, counting on that as his way
to the Elysee. Chirac's detractors accuse him of
lacking substance, conviction, and initiative, but his
perennially lagging popular support surged after his
October television debate with Prime Minister
Laurent Fabius. Chirac hopes to ride this tide right
through to the presidency in 1988. His foreign policy
stance is Gaullist, but not very different from
Mitterrand's. He is more favorable toward SDI than
Mitterrand has been, though he falls short of
promising French Government support for the
program. Chirac, 53, studied at Harvard and
graduated from the National School of
Administration.
Jacques Chaban-Delmas
Longtime Gaullist and former (1969-72) Prime
Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas has close ties to his
friend Francois Mitterrand and hopes to win the
Prime-Ministership in 1986, according to US
Consulate officials. Chaban-Delmas, 70, has
ostensibly dropped his presidential ambitions and is
actively preparing himself for the prime-ministership.
Failing to achieve that goal, Chaban-Delmas could
hold another portfolio?perhaps defense?in a
Chirac-led government, according to US diplomats. A
center-left Gaullist, he probably retains a preference
for an independent French foreign policy. We believe,
however, that he is likely to give firm support to the
29
Camera Press ?
Jacques Chirac, Mayor
of Paris
United States on East-West security issues. US
diplomats say he is a rather loyal friend of the United
States and detests Soviet Communism. They describe
him as a consummate politician with a flair for
grandeur. Ambitious and prudent, Chaban-Delmas
has proved his organizational and administrative skills
as well as his good sense of teamwork.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing
Former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing is one of
those most often mentioned as the Prime Minister.
Dubbed "the apostle of unity," Giscard stakes his
political future on opposition unity. He is a strong
advocate of cohabitation and as Prime Minister he
probably would be more respectful of President
Mitterrand's position than Jacques Chirac would be.
A likely presidential candidate in 1988, Giscard
denies that he will hold any position after the March
elections, but we believe he is interested in retaining a
high profile on the French political scene and may
well accept a position.
his heart remains at the Ministry of Finance and
he would like to hold that post again. He has also been
cited as a good choice for Foreign Minister. Giscard's
power base in the UDF has been eroding recently
because of the rising fortunes of Raymond Barre and
Francois Leotard. He recently claimed the great
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Paris Match ?
Jacques Chaban-Delmas,
Ilayor of Bordeaux, RPR
liberal center as his political territory, stating that
most Frenchmen share a growing number of common
Christian values based on opposition to racism,
sexism, statism, and support of European unity. Some
political observers, however, doubt his sincerity; as
President he did not support those ideals. He has
always had close ties to the United States, and he
claims to be friendlier to the United States than
Mitterrand (as President, however, he did not strongly
support Washington on East-West issues). Giscard,
60, is a deputy
in the National Assembly (since 1984).
Minister of Defense
Michel Aurillac
Michel Aurillac, a contender for Minister of Defense
in a Chirac cabinet, is a former RPR defense
spokesman, who retains influence in those matters
within the party
seem to come from Aurillac.) Although Aurillac has
publicly moderated his Gaullist views in the last few
years?even to the point of supporting French
participation in the US Strategic Defense Initiative?
A white paper he
authored in 1979 on RPR defense views is an often
cited example of Aurillac's traditional Gaullist and
anti-American stance. He is also President of Club
89, an organization he created in 1981 as a platform
for opposition views. Club members have stated that
the club's proceedings have been characterized by
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Jeanette Harris
Valery Giscard d'Estaing,
President
anti-Americanism. This stance, which is in sharp
contrast with Chirac's personal views, may hamper
his candidacy. Although not one of Chirac's closest
advisers, Aurillac has known Chirac since the early
1960s when they both worked for then Prime Minister
Georges Pompidou. Aurillac, 57, also served during
1984 as special assistant to Prime Minister Pierre
Messmer and as Cabinet Director to Interior Minister
Micel Poniatowski. Aurillac was a deputy from Indre
during 1978-81.
Pierre Messmer
A strict old-line Gaullist who was Prime Minister
during the period 1972-74 and Defense Minister from
1960 until 1969, Pierre Messmer currently represents
the Moselle Department in the National Assembly.
Some RPR members are supporting him as Minister
of Defense in a Chirac cabinet and give two reasons
for this support. First, Messmer is the only one of the
longtime senior Gaullists who has continued to evolve
in his views on defense questions?in fact, he is quite
open to consideration of new ideas, including, for
example, the US SDI. Second, Messmer has the
prestige and experience both to control the military
and hold off Mitterrand. In the past, his attitude
toward the United States was largely colored by his
Gaullist sympathies and as such he was a staunch
advocate of an independent French defense policy and
firmly opposed US "domination" of Europe.
Messmer, who will be 70 in March, is generally cool,
brisk, and businesslike with foreigners and
Frenchmen alike.
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Assemblee National C
Keystone Press C
Michel Aurillac, Politician
Robert Galley, Minister of
Defense
Robert Galley
Treasurer of the RPR since 1984, Robert Galley is
another viable candidate for the position of Defense
Minister. He has served in the Cabinets of de Gaulle,
Pompidou, and Giscard. He was Minister of Defense
and Cooperation during 1980-81. Galley, the
organizer and manager of de Gaulle's most important
technical and scientific projects, was profoundly
influenced by de Gaulle's philosophy of French
independence. Galley, as was Chirac, was also deeply
loyal to de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou. As
Minister of the armed forces, Galley placed
significant emphasis on weapons programs, believing
them to be the cornerstone of an independent French
force. In addition to his current position with the
RPR, Galley, 65, is a deputy in the National
Assembly and mayor of Troyes.
31
Paris Match C
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Pierre Messmer, Former Prime 25X1
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Alain Juppe, National
Secretary of RPR
Minister of Finance
Alain Juppe
Alain Juppe is RPR leader Jacques Chirac's chief
economic strategist. Although often mentioned as a
potential Finance Minister, Juppe may become head
of a new Ministry of Denationalization that Chirac
has recently decided to form, according to US
officials. They say he is Chirac's main conduit to the
French business community. Juppe strongly supports
economic liberalism in the form of lower taxes,
freedom of licensing, and denationalization. He has
studied recent US economic policy and would like to
fashion French policy along the same lines. If he
assumes the economic post, we expect he will move
quickly toward denationalizing banks and industry
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Pictorial Parade
Rene Monory, PS
being careful not to move so fast that he loses the
confidence of businessmen and investors in the stock
market. Juppe, 40, has been described by the French
press as "tall and dry
US officials find him
confident, relaxed, and willing to speak frankly on
current issues.
Rene Monory
Centrist Senator and former Finance Minister under
then Prime Minister Raymond Barre (1978-81), Rene
Monory has been described as independent and strong
willed. He has openly declared his willingness to serve
under Mitterrand in a cohabitationist government, at
the risk of being disavowed by his party, the Center of
Social Democrats (CDS), who has adopted an
anticohabitationist stance. Monory is an economic
liberal who, as Finance Minister, promulgated a tax
law?"Monory's Law"?which provided incentives
for private investors. Monory, 62, is well disposed
toward the United States and has a reputation for
being "the most American" of French politicians.
Minister of External Relations
Edouard Balladur
Edouard Balladur, a longtime friend of Jacques
Chirac, is his principal political strategist. US
officials say he is the most influential person around
Chirac. Chirac consults with him on all major issues,
and Balladur is considered a moderating force. RPR
members have suggested Balladur as a possible Prime
Minister if Chirac refuses the post. He appears to be
the leading contender for Foreign Minister if Chirac
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Le Point OD
Edouard Balladur, RPR
accepts the Prime-Ministership. A graduate of the
prestigious National School of Administration, as is
Chirac, Balladur became prominent as a close
colleague and adviser on labor affairs to then Prime
Minister Georges Pompidou in the 1960s. As Chirac's
adviser, he has been credited with counseling Chirac
to adopt a favorable, but still uncompromising,
position toward cohabitation. Balladur has also been
the force behind Chirac's evolution in favor of a less
Gaullist and more European position than that held
by the RPR in 1979. He is described by the French
press as courteous, distant, and discreet. Balladur will
be 57 in May.
Maurice Ulrich
Career diplomat and member of the Council of State,
Maurice Ulrich, 61, is currently serving under Paris
Mayor Jacques Chirac as Director General of the
Paris Community and of Information and
Communication. Particularly experienced in
European Affairs?he has been described as a "super-
European"?Ulrich was chief of staff under two
Foreign Ministers, Jean Sauvagnargues (1974-76) and
Louis de Guiringaud (1976-77). Ulrich handled EC
affairs for the Ministry during the early 1960s and
served as Deputy Permanent Representative to the
EC during 1965-68. Appointed head of the state-
owned television network Antenne 2, in 1978, he
resigned that post in 1981, when Mitterrand took
control of the government.
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Le Point ?
Maurice Ulrich, Journalist
Jean-Noel de Lipkowski
A career diplomat and specialist in European and
Third World affairs, Jean-Noel de Lipkowski, 65, has
served as Jacques Chirac's diplomatic counselor since
1981. A leftwing Gaullist, he has been a deputy in the
National Assembly since 1956, except for the period
1958-62. As a longtime friend of Valery Giscard
d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand, Lipkowski is
often mentioned by RPR members as a possible
Foreign Minister or Prime Minister. They view
Lipkowski as someone who is not a threat in either
position and who would be acceptable to both sides.
Mitterrand would accept him because he wants
foreign affairs to himself, and, with Lipkowski as
Prime Minister, the opposition parties could
concentrate on "other fish to fry" between 1986 and
1988. Lipkowski would also be acceptable to RPR
members because he is not an innovator and would be
a team player. According to US Embassy officials,
Lipkowski is basically a nationalist, believes strongly
in Western solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat,
and favors standing up to the Soviet Union at every
opportunity. He was instrumental in pushing Chirac
and the RPR into a position that was highly critical of
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Contrary to
Gaullist views, particularly among party leftwingers,
Lipkowski is a longtime champion of a politically
united Europe. Lipkowski has been open and friendly
with US Embassy officials.
33
Jean de Lipkowski, Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
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Jean Francois-Poncet
Giscard's Foreign Minister during 1978-81 and the
UDF's leading foreign affairs spokesman, Jean Fran-
cois-Poncet is, we believe, still a candidate for Foreign
Minister if the UDF is allotted that responsibility in
the subsequent apportionment of Cabinet posts. He
has told US diplomats, however, that he would refuse
that post in a cohabitation government because he has
been such a strong critic of current foreign policy and
believes France must "speak with one voice" on
external affairs. According to his colleagues, he is
ambitious and could be a dark-horse candidate for the
1988 Presidential election. He may not want to accept
the foreign affairs portfolio if he judges it could harm
those aspirations. In our judgment, he may change his
mind if the opposition wins a large majority. Francois-
Poncet is a traditional Gaullist who stresses French
independence from the United States in foreign af-
fairs and defense policy. A European nationalist, he
advocates foreign policy consensus on the Atlantic
Alliance, the French nuclear deterrent, and French
nonintegration into the NATO military command.
US educated, Francois-Poncet, 59, values French-US
ties.
has considerable charm and self-confidence. US
officials have remarked that he commands respect
and assumes natural leadership among his peers.
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Chirac-Giscard-Barre:
Troubled Triangle
Profiles
With experience, political adroitness, and intelligence
25X1 in common, Jacques Chirac, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, and Raymond Barre are staking out routes
to the Presidency that bear the distinctive stamp of
their individual personalities and backgrounds.
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Valery Giscard d'Estaing, in our judgment, is
continuing a search for a political role
Although Jacques Chirac is known for his rebellious,
confrontational style, we believe he identifies
personally with traditional values, the work ethnic,
and the status quo. Chirac is secure about his upper-
middle-class origins, conventional in his private life,
and confident of being in empathy with the French
people's core views. While his policies have varied in
wording, they consistently express his respect for
morality, authority, and institutional stability.
Chirac was a political conformist until the death of
his mentor Georges Pompidou in 1974, when he began
a risk-taking, sometimes flamboyant drive for power.
He backed Giscard for President and was rewarded
with the prime-ministership. He then left government
in 1976 to wrest leadership of the political right from
Giscard and successfully defied him in becoming
mayor of Paris.
Observers generally agree that Chirac relates well
with people and attracts loyal support within a
geographic area he can cover in person. However, his
forceful manner l I and old-
fashioned "look" have impeded efforts to extend his
appeal. According to the press , he has
moved recently to correct his media image,
demonstrate a capacity for moderation and
consistency, and acquire a substantive grasp of issues.
In our view, Chirac would risk becoming
"cohabitation" prime minister in order to show that
he can govern responsibly and thereby capture the
opposition's backing for President in 1988. His
success in office, we believe, would depend in part on
his ability to resist reacting impulsively to the
constitutional strains of shared power and
Mitterrand's unpredictable gambits.
35
A range of open and private sources attest to
Giscard's brilliance and effectiveness in serving strong
political elders.
He acquired a reputation as a
solitary decisionmaker
Unaccustomed to
failure, Giscard attributed his rejection by voters to
the wrongdoings of others and withdrew after losing
his bid for reelection in 1981.
Nevertheless, we believe Giscard is a resilient and
subtle calculator who is seeking a new beginning. He
has adopted a stance of unifying altruism and
noblesse oblige which fits the self-image to which he
aspires. It also implies to us that he would not
welcome being a "cohabitation" prime minister,
Giscard is known for his grasp of
media methods and has been trying to appear more
available and approachable in person. Though
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with de Gaulle's "third tradition," which avoids a
clear-cut choice between capitalism and socialism, he
is now advocating basic family values and professing a
free market philosophy. Some US officials suspect
that he is responding more to popular sentiment than
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EUR ER 86-005
14 February 1986
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In our judgment, Raymond Barre is making a virtue
out of his resistance to change and status as an
outsider. He is taking a moralistically disapproving
tone in dissociating himself from the economic evil
done by the Left, Chirac's quick fixes, and the
concept of "cohabitation."
Barre appears comfortable in the role of an outsider.
He was born in a French possession far from
Metropolitan France to a shopkeeper who left him in
genteel poverty. Unlike the others, he did not attend a
prestigious school, but he taught in North Africa
during the 1950s and has been an academic for most
of his adult life. Called the best economist in France
by Giscard when he became Prime Minister in 1976,
Barre left office five years later as the least popular
politician in the country.
Consistency, deliberateness, and certainty are the
hallmarks of Barre's character and political style.
According to US officials, he is personally gracious
and likable, clear and pedantic about his views, and
unruffled in his firm rejection of outside suggestions.
Popularly compared to "Babar" (the elephant in
popular French children's books), Barre offers
strength and sincerity rather than ideology. His
political beliefs express his personal values?
autonomy, stability, moderation, and dignity. He
stands for legitimate authority, pluralism, an
independent relationship with the superpowers, and
an emphasis on economics in foreign policy.
of a comparable scenario, Giscard was ready to
sacrifice Chirac as Prime Minister in 1976 but was
shaken by his rebellion and complained of his
"betrayal" in the unsuccessful campaign against
Mitterrand in 1981. Chirac apparently did not
condemn Barre for succeeding him, but their
relationship is strained, according to the media,
because Barre blamed Chirac for leaving intractable
economic problems which tied his hands and eroded
his credibility.
All three are maintaining a public show of correct and
even amiable interactions. However, Giscard has
made bitter references to how both former
subordinates treated him politically. In our view, he
resents on a personal level their presumption in
competing with him for primacy. Chirac has
temporarily subordinated his rivalry with the
politically weaker Giscard to their joint efforts to
drive Barre further into the political wilderness. Barre
is remaining aloof from dealing with his rivals'
personalities and expecting, in our judgment, that
their swipes at him will be submerged in the chaos of
the failure of cohabitation with Mitterrand.
In rejecting cohabitation, Barre is playing de Gaulle's
role of prophet waiting in the wilderness. We believe
this allows him to protect his renascent popularity and
image of competence while waiting for his political
rivals to fail and make him indispensable by default.
However, in our opinion, Barre's personal need to
vindicate his record as a national leader could impair
his timing in rallying the opposition parties to his
cause. In addition, his inflexible attitudes could make
his policies less palatable to voters.
Chirac, Giscard, and Barre are playing out their
triangular contentions against an historical backdrop
of shifting allegiances and mutual outrage going back
to their progenitor, Charles de Gaulle. "Sacked like a
servant" by de Gaulle in 1966, Giscard was held
responsible for toppling him in 1969. In the senior role
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