EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Directorate of
Intelligence
European Review
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
ropy 4 4 8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
European Review
Briefs Belgium: Problems in Wallonia
United Kingdom: New Look at Westminster-Parliamentary
Committees
Yugoslavia: Desire To Join EUREKA
Free Zones
The concept of a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone was given
new life at the pan-Nordic parliamentarians' conference in
Copenhagen in late November. Proposals for creation of a joint
working group on the zone issue will be taken up at a meeting of
Nordic foreign ministers on 9 March. Although the Socialists are
likely to succeed in persuading the conservative and centrist-led
governments to support the proposals, they will face strong
opposition from non-Socialists to make these groups dynamic
entities.
The Dutch parliament has ratified the INF basing agreement, but
actual deployment remains uncertain. If the Labor Party enters
government after the elections in May-still a possibility, according
to recent polls-it almost certainly would try to at least renegotiate
parts of the INF accord. Deployment is not completely assured even
if the coalition of Prime Minister Lubbers is reelected. The Dutch
do not plan to deploy cruise missiles until 1988, leaving ample time
for new events-such as an attractive Soviet arms control offer-to
emerge as an excuse for delay.
West Germany: Public Views on SDI
Recent polls call into question claims of Bonn officials that they face
serious public opposition to an SDI agreement with the United
States. We believe Bonn's introduction of broader technology-
transfer issues into the SDI negotiations results from intracoalition
maneuvering rather than from public opinion constraints.
i Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
13 25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Bulgaria: Leadership Shakeup
The sweeping reorganization of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers and
the dismissal of two senior party officials last month are probably in
response to continuing economic problems and Soviet pressure to
rectify chronic mismanagement. The changes set the stage for
Bulgaria's Communist Party Congress, which begins on 2 April.
25X1
25X1
Profile Albania: The Political Lineup Under Alia
25X1 25X1
Looking Ahead
Some articles are preliminary views oJ'a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views oj'a single analvst: these items
will be designated as uncoordinated views.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 - Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Belgium Problems in Wallonia
A confrontation in the Walloon regional government between the Social
Christian-Liberal coalition and the opposition Socialists threatens to cause friction
in the Martens government. The Socialists, angry at being excluded from the
regional government despite their electoral strength, are contesting the center-
right coalition's legitimacy by arguing that it lacks the legally required majority in
the regional council. The Socialists have said they will seek nullification by the
courts of all acts of the regional authorities and have begun a campaign of
obstruction in the council. Last month they prevented the new Assembly president
from presenting his program by blocking his path to the speaker's podium and
destroying his microphone.
of control over religious education to the regional authorities.
Thus far the center-right coalition has stood united against the Socialist onslaught,
but this cohesion could crumble. The Walloon Liberals-unlike their Social
Christian partners-all along have favored including the Socialists in the regional
government to enhance stability and policy effectiveness. Strains between the
governing partners probably also will arise from the need to have all delegates
present at regional council meetings to defeat motions by the opposition.
Continuing friction at the regional level could spill over to the national government
of Prime Minister Martens as it confronts divisive issues, especially the devolution
United Kingdom New Look at Westminster-Parliamentary Committees
The Parliamentary investigation into the Westland affair demonstrates the vigor
with which MPs are using the Select Committee system to scrutinize Whitehall
ministries. The Committees are designed to reflect the political balance in the
Commons, but opposition MPs often hold the chairmanship. The chairman of the
powerful Public Accounts Committee, for example, is almost always an opposition
MP.
the Committees are now in a position to exert.
The current system dates from Parliamentary proposals in 1978, which
recommended that each government department be monitored by a Select
Committee and that the Committees be given power to summon ministers and civil
servants to testify. Ironically, given Prime Minister Thatcher's struggle with the
Select Committee on Defense over the Westland affair, many of the proposals
were implemented by the Thatcher government in 1979. Fourteen Select
Committees were established to follow major Whitehall departments. Ministers
and civil servants are not required to come before them, but they almost always
agree to appear when requested. The Prime Minister's decision to permit officials
to appear before the Defense and Trade Committees is an example of the pressure
1 Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Parliamentary Select Committee recommendations are not binding, but they have
changed the way government does business in Britain. During the Westland
investigation, the government has been forced to produce internal documents on its
decisionmaking process to an extent unusual in the normally closed Whitehall
environment. Committee reports are also taken seriously; last spring a Select
Committee report critical of energy pricing policy was in large measure
responsible for Thatcher's decision to abolish the British National Oil Company.
The Foreign Affairs Committee has not hesitated to question foreign policy
decisions-a 1984 report critical of Thatcher's stand during the Grenada invasion
was especially nettlesome to the government.
East Germany-
West Germany
East German Travel Concessions
East Germany has quietly told the Bonn government that it is implementing more
generously its regulations on private travel to the West by East Germans.
Normally only men over 65 and women over 60 may travel to West Germany with
relative ease; others may visit only close relatives in the West and then only for
"urgent family reasons," including weddings, funerals, and jubilee wedding
anniversaries. According to West German officials, the GDR authorities are
granting more exit permits in cases where the kinship is more distant and the
Contrary to earlier
liberal approach last year. The number of exit permits granted in 1985 remained
at about the same level (60,000 to 65,000) as in the previous two years. This time,
however, it appears likel that the GDR is prepared to allow more of its citizens to
leave temporarily.
The East German regime presumably calculates that this "humanitarian
concession" will find favor in Bonn and demonstrate the GDR's will to maintain. a
positive tone in intra-German relations. At the same time, it is a calibrated
response to the average East German's primary grievance-his inability to travel.
The numbers involved now are small, but concessions could cause the regime
problems by raising popular expectations and eroding the regime's argument for
not being more liberal: almost all of the 60,000 returned home after their visits last
~~
25X1
25X6
25X6
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Yugoslavia Desire To Join EUREKA
Yugoslav officials in industry and government want to participate in the West
European EUREKA program. Businessmen and scientists from Serbia and the
more developed northern republics have spearheaded calls for action by Belgrade,
including an appeal to premier-designate Branko Mikulic to include EUREKA
participation in his government's program. Federal Assembly delegates recently
backed a membership bid, and Foreign Minister Dizdarevic raised the issue during
his visit to Bonn in late January, according to press reports. West European
officials, however, have stated that for now EUREKA membership will not be
expanded beyond Western Europe although additional firms will probably be
allowed to join eventually.
Despite widespread Yugoslav enthusiasm for EUREKA, press reports indicate
that there has been some "polemical" debate on the issue. One group of politicians,
scientists, and businessmen suggested in late January that the need to modernize
the economy outweighs the need to resolve "foreign policy or ideological
questions."
The Yugoslavs-particularly Croatians and Slovenians who are known to want
high-technology industries-are evidently worried that failure to join the
EUREKA team will eventually hurt their ability to compete in Western markets
for finished goods. The participation of economic competitors such as Greece and
Portugal doubtlessly aggravates this concern. The polemical exchange indicates
that some ideologues believe EUREKA membership would identify Belgrade too
closely with the West, undermining its policy of nonalignment. Pro-EUREKA
officials are likely to carry the day in Belgrade, but the West Europeans-
concerned about EUREKA'S military applications-still will be reluctant to allow
Yugoslav participation.
3 Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
The Nordic Region: Proposed Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
~ Arcuc 4
v~
_ / Ocean ~t `,
~`~v `f ~~~ , can~aa , so ao za o ~o ao so
Greenf~nd
1v ~ (DenX~erk)
~~,I. /` ?
Denmark
Strait
Iceland
e~Xkjavik
Greenland
z Sea
// Jan Mayen
~~\ (NOnvay)
A Nordic nuclear-weapons-free ~ ~'l ie e
zone as envisoned by proponents. Lloanrnark)
Some proposals do not include
Iceland. ~ _ Shetland
_,_ Islands
Norwegian
Sea
North
Sea
~~}, ~ ~w
~ Novay
~` Zemlya
? ~~ !Soviet UmoN~
aei. RspWblle ~~
~1,, ~[."' of Gierrrtiar.y
88ItfC
Sea
Murmansk
Xpte. Peni#4uta
SOYPet
tlnipaft
7h8 Uni[e# Stitae l3axo?nmept haM
pk nGQpaiYid the inp#tpwatwrtal
E~rtpni>.,,4etvk. a##i.dfiunpit iiila
!ha Spvig2 U#ian. dt4ar iiaNatlyrq
`t'apralAMtgli9a fa aat patstr~erilX
~ thpnGNVa.
STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 - Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Nordic Countries: Renewed
Discussion of Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zones
The concept of a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
(NNWFZ) was given new life at the pan-Nordic
parliamentarians' conference in Copenhagen on 29
and 30 November 1985. Representatives of Social
Democratic parties in Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Iceland, and Finland agreed to work in their
respective parliaments for creation of a joint
NNWFZ working group and to request that their
governments organize apan-Nordic group of officials
to cooperate with the parliamentary group on the zone
issue. These proposals will be taken up at the meeting
of Nordic foreign ministers on 9 March. Although the
Socialists are likely to succeed in persuading the
conservative and centrist-led governments to support
formation of the working groups, they will face strong
opposition from non-Socialists to promoting them as
dynamic, action-oriented bodies.
The Conference
Social Democratic Prime Ministers Olof Palme of
Sweden and Kalevi Sorsa of Finland emphasized their
governments' favorable attitudes on the zone issue,
but official involvement by the governments of
Denmark, Norway, and Iceland was limited to
general remarks in keynote addresses. These
governments, led by conservative coalitions, are
skeptical about the feasibility of establishing a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in Scandinavia, even if it
were placed in a broader European context and
included guarantees from both superpowers. In their
view, such a zone would not serve the Nordic region's
security interests and would be in conflict with their
countries' NATO membership and with Alliance
defense strategy.
Despite their assurances that the conference would
avoid resolutions, the Social Democratic participants
angered the non-Socialists by agreeing to work in
their respective parliaments for the establishment of a
joint NNWFZ working group. In addition, acting on
a Finnish proposal, conference chairman Anker
Jorgensen, who is also chairman of the Danish Social
Democratic Party, called for a Nordic
intergovernmental body to coordinate discussions on
the zone-apparently a kind of secretariat.
Swedish and Finnish Positions: A Closer Look
In the past, the main impetus toward a Nordic zone
has come from the neutrals, Sweden and Finland,
which traditionally have sought to minimize East-
West tensions in the region.
Official Swedish endorsement of an NNWFZ
notwithstanding, the Palme government is giving little
more than lipservice to the concept, according to US
Embassy officials. Stockholm has said, for example,
that it cannot commit itself to any concrete initiatives 25X1
in the current international political climate. Sweden
is apprehensive that creating a web of zone treaties
would constitute a radical departure from its
longstanding neutral and independent security policy.
Sweden's reluctance basically stems from fears that a
zone could compromise its neutrality by making it
vulnerable to superpower pressure-principally,
pressure from Moscow to "guarantee" the nuclear-
free status of the Baltic.
Whatever their skepticism about the zone's feasibility,
the ruling Social Democrats probably will continue to
support an NNWFZ as a complement to Sweden's
rejection of nuclear weapons even as a means of self
defense. The Swedish opposition parties, however,
probably will continue to express serious doubts about
this means of protecting Swedish territorial
Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
In Search oJ'a Concept
The NNWFZ idea has attracted sustained interest in
Scandinavia during the 1980s, particularly.from So-
cialist politicians, peace activists, and leftist intellec-
tuals. The level of interest has grown over the past
several years, as discussion of the vulnerability of the
strategic Nordic region has increased in government
and NATO circles. A majority in each of the Nordic
parliaments now supports the idea. Official studies
have been prepared, including a paper in 1984 on
Danish security policy in the 1980s and a recent
Norwegian Government white paper evaluating the
zone concept. The latter concluded that implementa-
tion of an NNWFZ should be attempted only cjfter
agreement has been reached on a more comprehensive
European scheme that might, for example, call for a
reduction of both nuclear weapons and conventional
.forces in Europe to the "lowest possible and balanced
sovereignty and their borders' inviolability. The non-
Socialists generally claim that they would support a
Nordic zone only if the Soviets agree to include Soviet
Baltic territory and guarantee compliance with all
elements of an agreement.
By contrast, support for the NNWFZ has been an
integral part of Finnish foreign and security policy for
more than 20 years. In Helsinki's view, it
complements Finland's overall foreign policy
objectives, especially the maintenance of friendly
relations with. the Soviet Union, increased Nordic
cooperation, and the promotion of international
recognition of Finland's neutrality. It has become a
predictable Finnish response to perceived crises or
increased tensions in East-West relations, and, in light
of Finnish obligations under the Fenno-Soviet Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance
(FCMA), it is even logical that they should view it in
this way.
The Finns, we believe, raise the zone issue as a kind of
safety valve through which they seek to demonstrate
to Moscow that they are working actively to reduce
the threat to the Soviet Union from Nordic soil or
through Nordic airspace. Helsinki's motive in these
cases is to avoid giving the Kremlin leadership any
pretext for suggesting that Soviet weapons be placed
on Finnish soil or that joint military exercises be held,
as provided for under the FCMA treaty.
The US Embassy in Helsinki reported in mid-1985
that Finland deliberately has formulated its
substantive NNWFZ positions only in the most
general terms. Finland maintains only that the
formation of the NNWFZ should allow all parties to
maintain existing security agreements, be thoroughly
agreed upon by the Nordic states, and in some way
involve the superpowers. At the Copenhagen
conference, Prime Minister Sorsa underscored the
need for the Nordic countries to first reach a common
understanding about the zone and only then begin to
examine the project on a "wider international basis."
Two days before the conference, Helsinki announced
that a special working group within the Foreign
Ministry would prepare a study incorporating the
Finnish conception of how an NNWFZ might be
established as well as views expressed in discussions
with other Nordic countries. The government
probably will be encouraged that the idea is no longer
rejected out of hand by its detractors. The
significance of this, in our judgment, is that the Finns
will find it easier to achieve their primary goal of
keeping the matter under indefinite discussion among
and within the other Nordic governments.
Impact in Denmark and Norway
The Copenhagen meeting is likely to make Denmark's
minority government even more vulnerable in the near
term on security issues. The Socialist opposition in
parliament has been consistently successful in forcing
the government into a corner on these issues,
including the NNWFZ. The Schlueter government,
for its part, questions both the zone concept and its
practicality, especially in terms of verification and
Soviet reliability. As with other nuclear-related issues,
however, the government is likely to be compelled to
accept the parliamentary resolutions of the opposition
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Social Democrats, demanding that measures be taken
toward the establishment of an NNWFZ. With the
spark provided by the November conference, these
resolutions are likely to become even more strident
and insist that the government take action.
Nevertheless, Copenhagen may be able to forestall
the opposition's demands for concrete action on the
zone by agreeing to support some projects of the
proposed joint Nordic working group, such as studies
and roundtable meetings.
In Norway, although the conservative-led government
is in a minority, the Socialists appear more willing to
negotiate responsibly on security issues. Debate on the
proposals of the Norwegian white paper probably will
be postponed until the spring of 1987 in order to give
the parliamentary staff time to study the paper and
parallel reports on NATO strategy and arms control.
Moreover, both the Labor Party and the government
coalition appear to share many of the white paper's
negative views on the prospects for establishing an
NNWFZ in the immediate future, suggesting that
any new impetus to the zone proposal from the left is
highly unlikely.
Outlook
The conference may not have made the NNWFZ
proposal seem any more practical or feasible, but it
definitely put the concept firmly back on the political
agenda. The Nordic Social Democratic
parliamentarians already have called for a similar
conference later this year, clearly hoping to make it
an annual event. The next parliamentary gathering,
however, has tentatively been scheduled for the latter
half of 1987 in Oslo-after local Norwegian
elections.' The next opportunity for the NNWFZ
itself to be discussed will be at the meeting of Nordic
foreign ministers on 9 March, at which the non-
Socialist ministers probably will agree to the proposed
pan-Nordic secretariat. This will please the Finns and
the Swedes, and the non-Socialists may see their
concurrence as a less harmful alternative to more
dynamic action on a zone.
' According to the US Embassy in Oslo, the delay in scheduling
indicates that the Norwegian Labor Party leadership-despite
having agreed to host the next gathering-believes that too active
an advocacy of the zone concept could hurt Labor at the polls.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
The Netherlands:
Election Politics and
INF Deployment
The Dutch parliament has ratified the INF basing
agreement, but actual deployment remains uncertain.
If the Labor Party enters government after the
elections in May-still a possibility, according to
recent polls-it almost certainly would try to at least
renegotiate parts of the INF accord. Deployment is
not completely assured even if the coalition of Prime
Minister Lubbers is reelected. The Dutch do not plan
to deploy cruise missiles until 1988, leaving ample
time for new events-such as an attractive Soviet
arms control offer-to emerge as an excuse for delay.
Preelection Outlook
The opposition Labor Party undoubtedly will make
INF a principal issue in the May elections but faces a
difficult battle in dislodging the Christian
Democratic-Liberal coalition that has held power for
all but two of the past eight years. A public opinion
survey last December showed that the current
government would receive 75 out of 150 seats in the
Second Chamber of Parliament-compared with 58
seats for the Labor Party. The survey results indicate
that the government's positive deployment decision
last November did little damage to its electoral
standing and that the importance of INF as an issue is
declining. Although a majority of Dutchmen continue
to oppose cruise missile deployment, a survey last fall
revealed that "disarmament" was no longer among
the top 10 policy issues for voters. Even prominent
peace movement leaders have acknowledged to US
officials that public interest in INF is waning.
The government is also benefiting from an uspwing in
the economy and from the Labor Party's inability to
overcome intraparty strife and develop an effective
alternative economic program. Moreover, Labor's
aging candidate for prime minister, Joop den Uyl, has
far less voter appeal than energetic Christian
Democratic Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. Indeed,
Christian Democratic strategists have told US
officials that a key to the campaign will be contrasting
Lubbers with "yesterday's man," den Uyl. A strategy
of emphasizing a popular incumbent worked for
Prime Minister Martens in Belgium last year, and
Dutch Christian Democrats are counting on the same
thing.
The government's currently favorable standing in
public opinion polls could still decline, however, as a
result of an increasingly bitter dispute between the
coalition partners over euthanasia and budget issues.
A vigorous campaign by the opposition for dual
control of cruise missiles in the Netherlands-a
demand rejected by the government but shared by
many leftwing Christian Democrats--could also
divide the coalition.'
To maintain its electoral edge, the center-right
coalition wants to avoid any issues which might revive
peace movement activity. Dutch officials, according
to US diplomats, are concerned that Washington
might undercut The Hague's position by announcing
changes in US policy about respecting the limits set
by the ABM and the SALT II treaties. Foreign
' Provincial elections of 19 March will be an important preelection
test of the government's voting strength. In 1982 these elections
accurately predicted victory for the Christian Democrats and the
Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Labor Party leader
Joop den Uyl~
Minister van den Broek, in a recent meeting with US
officials, emphasized that "further abrogation" of
SALT II would have drastic consequences for Dutch
public opinion. Wariness about voter reaction and
possible linkage to INF also makes it unlikely that the
Dutch Government will sign an agreement with
Washington on SDI before the elections.
Implications of Different Electoral Outcomes for INF
If the Christian Democrats and the Liberals receive
slightly less than a majority of seats in the next
election-between 70 and 75 seats-they probably
will try initially to enlist support from the small left-
of-center D'66 Party. Although the D'66 is
ideologically closer to the Labor Party, its leader,
Hans van Mierlo, may agree to collaborate with the
Christian Democrats and the Liberals in exchange for
concessions on economic and social issues, such as
higher public expenditures for low-income groups.
The D'66 has opposed INF in the past, but a recent
party congress decided not to demand cancellation of
the US-Dutch basing accord once it was approved by
parliament. D'66 leaders did, however, make clear
that they would try to renegotiate parts of the INF
agreement with Washington. The D'66's acquiescence
in INF in any case will continue to depend on the
views of van Mierlo. The party relies on him to restore
lost popularity and appears ready to go along with his
views on INF. Should van Mierlo become more
hostile to deployment, the D'66 would quickly reverse
its present stand.
If the D'66 refuses to participate in a center-right
government, Lubbers might turn to the small right-
wing religious parties that are likely to win some nine
seats. Even though these parties are basically in tune
with the current government on INF, they probably
would not consider a coalition with the Christian
Democrats and the Liberals if the latter continue to
press for legalization of euthanasia-a policy action
morally unacceptable to the confessional parties.
If the center-right total falls below 70 seats, a
coalition between Labor and Christian Democrats
becomes difficult to avoid. The Labor Party probably
would try to make good its pledge to reverse the INF
basing agreement. Although international law experts
claim that a successor Dutch Government cannot
unilaterally abrogate the basing accord, the Labor
Party probably would try to justify a Dutch
cancellation of cruise missile deployment by pointing
to the US decision-now pending before Congress--
to override parts of the US-Dutch tax treaty. At the
very least we think the Labor Party would push for a
renegotiation of the terms of the INF agreement,
especially on questions of command and control. Such
a stand, in fact, might threaten INF deployment more
than demands for unilateral cancellation of the US-
Dutch accord because calls for renegotiation would
find greater support among leftwing Christian
Democrats. If attempts to renegotiate the agreement
fail, the Labor Party almost certainly would try to
delay the physical emplacement of the cruise missiles
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
by finding excuses for holding up construction of the
INF base at Woensdrecht.
Arms Control Temptations
We believe INF deployment is not completely assured
even under a reelected Lubbers administration.
Lubbers probably continues to hope that Washington
and Moscow will reach an interim accord on INF,
which would make cruise missile deployment in the
Netherlands unnecessary. An attractive Soviet arms
control proposal could revive anti-INF sentiment
among leftwing Christian Democrats-who may
again hold the balance of power in parliament if the
center-right returns with only a small majority-and
increase public pressure on the government to delay
cruise missile deployment. Thus far The Hague's
reaction to Gorbachev's most recent proposal has been
cautious. The government has emphasized that new
elements in the Soviet position deserve careful
analysis in NATO forums, but it has rejected
opposition demands to postpone ratification of the
The US proposal for eliminating intermediate-range
missiles in Europe and Asia probably will improve
Washington's "peace image," but it will also
strengthen Labor Party arguments that INF
deployment is unnecessary. Perceptions that
Washington insists on stricter verification procedures
or intends to ignore the limits set by the SALT II and
the ABM treaties almost certainly would prompt INF
opponents to charge that the United States continues
to place greater emphasis on a military buildup than
INF basing agreement
We believe that Prime Minister Lubbers may probe
Soviet flexibility on INF during his visit in Moscow-
which he has said will take place following ratification
of the basing accord-despite repeated assurances
that The Hague's deployment decision would not be
on the agenda. If the Soviets hinted that further
concessions are forthcomng to enable an early INF
agreement, The Hague might delay construction of
permanent INF basing facilities at Woensdrecht.
The prospects for successful INF deployment in the
Netherlands, we believe, also are related to Dutch
perceptions of US arms control efforts. If
Washington's proposals in Geneva appear more
reasonable than Moscow's-and manage to expose
Soviet offers as mere attempts to gain a propaganda
advantage-the opposition Labor Party would find it
more difficult to defend its anti-INF position,
especially if it participates in the next government.
on an arms control agreement.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
West Germany: Public
Views on SDI
Recent polls call into question claims of Bonn officials
that they face serious public opposition to an SDI
agreement with the United States. Polls generally
show more negative than positive opinions about SDI,
but they also show conclusively that it is not a major
issue for the West German public. We believe Bonn's
introduction of broader technology-transfer issues into
the SDI negotiations results from intracoalition
maneuvering-particularly pressure from Foreign
Minister Genscher-rather than from public opinion
constraints. Some Bonn officials, however, may be
trying to generate public expectations of US
concessions on tech transfer in order to strengthen
West Germany's bargaining position vis-a-vis the
United States. We doubt that SDI per se is likely to
become a major issue in the election next January, but
the Kohl government could rekindle public doubts
about its general competence if its tactics further
delay the accord with Washington promised by this
Table 1
Awareness of SDI's Purpose,
September 1985
spring.
Recent Survey Findings
Survey evidence shows conclusively, in our opinion,
that SDI is not a major issue for most West Germans:
? In no poll have respondents singled out SDI as one
of the most important issues facing West Germany.
? A large number of respondents-ranging from one-
quarter to one-third-generally express no opinion
on questions regarding SDI.
? Anywhere from 20 to 42 percent of the respondents
say they have never heard of SDI.
? In a USIA survey last September, only about one-
third of the respondents correctly identified SDI's
central objective as finding a defense against enemy
missiles. About one-quarter of the West Germans
confused it with antisatellite systems, and 10
percent thought its aim is to achieve military
predominance on the moon and the planets.
General
Public
Better
Educated
Defend against missiles
37
60
Destroy enemy satellites
27
37
Military predominance on
moon and planets
10
9
Don't know/haven't heard
29
4
Source: USIA. Columns sum to more than 100 apparently because
some of those polled gave more than one response.
These findings, in our opinion, in part reflect the
generally low priority of security issues among
Western publics. For instance, electoral studies
showed that INF was far less important than
economic issues in the 1983 Bundestag election
despite widespread peace movement agitation. SDI
appears far less salient than INF, almost certainly
because it requires no weapons deployments on West
German soil. In addition, the concept of strategic
defense apparently appeals to some peace movement
sympathizers who consider nuclear weapons
intrinsically immoral. While a barrage of criticism in
the leftist press probably has had some impact, it so
far has been unable to mobilize mass emotions against
West German participation in SDI research. The
highly educated minority, on the other hand, is both
more aware of SDI than is the general public and
more likely to oppose it, according to USIA surveys.
Among those who claim to know of SDI, negative
opinions predominate in more recent polls, but results
vary widely according to question wording. A
Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Table 2 Percent Table 3
West German Participation in SDI US Research in Antimissile Defense
Total
CDU/
CSU
SPD
FDP
Greens
Favor
31
47
22
51
12
Oppose
46
31
58
36
76
No opinion
22
22
20
13
12
Source: Poll for ZDF network, December 1985. Sample size of
subgroups-especially FDP and Green supporters-is so small that
these results are only rough estimates of the true figures.
February
March
September December
1985
1985
1985
1985
A good idea
48
40
34
31
A badidea
23
21
29
_
30
Don't know
30
39
36
_
40
Source: USIA. Columns may not sum to 100 because of rounding
error.
plurality opposed West German participation in SDI
research in a poll conducted for a television network
in December, and a more precisely worded Infas poll
in November found pluralities opposed to both private
and government participation. Various other West
German polls in 1985 also found negative sentiment
on SDI predominant, but USIA survey questions that
do not mention SDI by name find substantial-
although declining-support for the idea of strategic
defense. Slight pluralities in several USIA-sponsored
surveys, for example, said US "research into the
possibility of developing an antimissile defense
system" is a good idea and supported West German
participation in research efforts.
Younger, better educated, and leftist West Germans
are the most likely to oppose SDI, according to
various polls, while Christian Democrats are the most
supportive. Differences between the parties, however,
are smaller than over INF deployment in 1983. A
USIA study last spring found that one-third of the
Greens and the Social Democrats consider antimissile
defense a good idea, along with a slight plurality of
Free Democrats and a strong plurality of Christian
Bonn's Tactics on SDI
We believe these conclusions call into question recent
statements of some Bonn officials. During the West
German SDI delegation's visit to Washington in
January, Economics Minister Bangemann-like
Genscher a Free Democrat-argued that "domestic
political reasons" require a broad US-West German
accord on technology transfer rather than the more
specific SDI agreement favored by the United States.
Asked by Vice President Bush about the state of West
German public opinion on SDI, Bangemann replied
that the Bonn government faced a difficult situation.
He added, however, that the Cabinet's approach to
SDI-presumably meaning its desire for a broader
tech transfer agreement-would help to calm
discussion of the issue.
Bonn's tactics are likely to influence elites more than
the general public, in our opinion. The highly
educated minority might find an SDI agreement less
unpalatable if it included US concessions on a wide
range of technology-transfer issues, although leftists
almost certainly would remain opposed. Affected
businesses, of course, probably would welcome an
agreement that assured them the right to market
technologies acquired in the course of SDI and other
advanced technology contracts with the United
States. We have no evidence, however, that business
leaders provided the impetus for Bangemann's efforts
to link broader technology-transfer issues to the
framework agreement on SDI.
In our judgment, Bonn's approach to SDI results from
intracoalition maneuverings much more than from
public opinion pressures. Foreign Minister Genscher
originally opposed any US-West German framework
agreement on SDI, probably to avoid complicating
nr_v1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Bonn's relations with the East and to highlight the
Free Democrats' independence from their Christian
Democratic coalition partners. Once the Cabinet
decided to seek an accord with Washington, Genscher
apparently decided that expanding it into an umbrella
agreement on technology transfer would prolong
negotiations, appeal to West German industry, and
avoid a direct endorsement of SDI. Although
Economics Minister Bangemann initially argued for
Genscher's position during the talks in Washington
earlier this month, we believe he and Chancellor Kohl
remain committed to a separate SDI accord along
with a later and more general agreement on tech
transfer.
Implications
Because public views of SDI remain unsettled, more
forthright support by the Kohl administration
probably could increase popular acceptance of West
German participation. Until now, however, Bonn has
not spoken with one voice. Kohl has endorsed the US
research program but adds that offensive arms
reductions should take priority over eventual
deployment of strategic defenses. Government
spokesmen-especially Foreign Minister Genscher-
frequently point out potential problems posed by SDI,
such as complications for arms control negotiations,
pressures on spending for conventional military forces,
and a potential weakening of the US strategic
guarantee of Western Europe. Defense Ministry
spokesmen, by contrast, have publicly defended SDI
and called for complementary West European
research into defense against tactical ballistic
missiles
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Q
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Bulgaria:
Leadership Shakeup
The sweeping reorganization of Bulgaria's Council of
Ministers last month, along with the dismissal of two
senior party officials, is probably a response to
continuing economic problems and Soviet pressure to
rectify chronic mismanagement. The changes, which
mirror Soviet ministerial restructuring in recent
months, set the stage for Bulgaria's Communist party
congress beginning on 2 April. Politburo members
Chudomir Aleksandrov and Ognyan Doynov appear
to have emerged with enhanced power, a move that
may presage Todor Zhivkov's gradual transfer of his
responsibilities to a younger deputy.
Extensive Government Changes
The changes in the Council of Ministers were the
most extensive since 1979, when Bulgaria reorganized
its agricultural and food industries. A party plenum
on 17 and 18 January created within the Council of
Ministers new councils for economic policy; for social
policy; and for scientific, cultural, and educational
policy. According to an official announcement, the
new agencies will have authority to issue cabinet-level
edicts and will coordinate the activities of the
ministries under their purview. The chairmen of the
new councils were subsequently promoted to deputy
premiers.
Four ministries, including the troubled Ministry of
Construction and Territorial Settlement, were
abolished. Three of the ministers were dismissed. The
fourth, ex-Foreign Trade Minister Khristov, will head
a new "super-ministry" resulting from the merger of
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of
Supplies, and the Ministry of Production and Trade
for Consumer Goods. The State Planning Committee
was reorganized and renamed the State Planning
Commission, but it is unclear how its responsibilities
will be changed. Planning committee chief Ivan Iliev
was retained as head of the new commission.
The State Committee on Science and Technological
Progress, a key player in Sofia's drive to modernize
industry through application of modern technology,
was reorganized and renamed the State Committee
for Research and Technologies. Stoyan Markov, a
former deputy minister for machine building who was
promoted last October to head the committee on S&T
progress, was named chairman of the new Committee
for Research and Technologies. Markov, 43, is
reported to be a protege of Minister of Machine
Building Doynov. Markov was also named a
candidate Politburo member and First Deputy
Premier, making him one of the big winners in the
shakeup.
Personnel Changes. The reassignments significantly
enhance the political influence of Aleksandrov and
Doynov and make them the front-runners to succeed
Zhivkov. Aleksandrov was promoted to the Central
Committee Secretariat, a position that may give him,
along with Doynov, a key role in overseeing party
economic policy. According to a Western diplomat in
Sofia, Aleksandrov has been tasked with drafting the
rules and regulations for the new councils. Although
he has been relieved of his duties as First Deputy
Premier, Aleksandrov's promotion to the Secretariat
strengthens his party credentials and indicates that he
continues to be a Zhivkov favorite.
Doynov, 50, was promoted to head the new council on
economic policy, a move that, according to some East
European ambassadors in Sofia, makes him a virtual
"economic czar." Doynov has a background in
economics and foreign affairs and is believed to be a
principal advocate of expanded economic relations
with the developed West and gradual decentralization
of economic authority. Deputy Trade Minister Ginev
told the US Ambassador in mid-February that
Doynov will be responsible for ensuring that the
economy is able to respond quickly to changing
domestic and international conditions. Coupled with
his position on the Central Committee Secretariat,
Doynov's new post probably makes him Bulgaria's
single most important economic official. This is
Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February l986
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
especially true if the responsibilities of the Council of
Ministers, and hence Premier Grisha Filipov, have
been downgraded.
Politburo member Todor Bozhinov, who was also
Minister of Supplies, and candidate member Stanish
Bonev, who was fired from his post as state planning
chief last October, were dismissed from the Politburo.
Their dismissal almost certainly reflects Zhivkov's
dissatisfaction with economic performance. Bozhinov,
whose meteoric rise to prominence in the party and
the government in the early 1980s is believed to be
linked to his role in the formulation and
implementation of Bulgaria's timid economic reform
program, probably is blamed for energy and raw
material supply shortages and bottlenecks that
brought industry and construction to a near standstill
The ministerial reorganization probably also hurt the
political prospects of two men long identified as
possible successors to Zhivkov:
? Premier Filipov, 65, has had his authority on
economic policy undercut by the creation of the new
economic council and Doynov's elevation. The
designation of Markov to act as Premier in Filipov's
absence also restricts Filipov's authority. The new
economic decision making apparatus will intensify
the rivalry between Filipov and Doynov.
? Milkov Balev, 65, now may have the source of his
influence-access to Zhivkov and high party
position-matched by Aleksandrov. The latter's
youth and apparent vigor, moreover, make him a
more attractive candidate. Aleksandrov's visit to
Havana in early February to attend the Cuban
party congress, and his talks there with Nicaraguan
party leader Ortega, may be an indication that he is
now playing a more active role in interparty affairs.
This is a role that Balev sometimes assumed in the
past
Bulgaria: Selected Percent change over
1983
1984
1985
1986
Plan
National income
3.0
4.6
1.8
4.0
Industrial production
4.6
4.5
3.5
_
4.5
Agricultural production
-7.0
6.8
-9.0
_
7.4
Per capita income
2.8
2.7
2.7
_
2.0
Economic Implications. The reorganization
represents an effort by Sofia both to revitalize its
slumping economy and respond to Soviet criticism.
The economy has been slow to recover from weather-
related problems that depleted energy supplies,
reduced industrial production, and lowered
agricultural output in 1985. Both the Bulgarian press
and the Soviet Union also have criticized
mismanagement, excessive bureaucracy, corruption,
and low labor productivity that have hampered the
regime's recovery efforts. In a speech on 21 January
to the National Assembly that approved the
reorganization, Zhivkov acknowledged the need for
far-reaching changes and said the new councils had.
been created to eliminate bureaucracy. But the
shakeup also appears to mirror recent Soviet
ministerial reorganizations.
The new councils will be given broad responsibilities,
apparently at the expense of the branch ministries.
The council on economic policy probably will be
charged with limiting ministerial interference in
enterprise operation. Bulgarian Politburo member
Stanko Todorov told the US Ambassador that the
reorganization represented a reduction in the powers
of the individual branch ministries as well as of the
Council of Ministers. Todorov added that the councils
25X1
Z~X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
will coordinate the daily work of the economy and will
have decisionmaking power for that purpose.
The US Embassy reported in late February that
several of Bulgaria's industrial ministries are slated to
be split into smaller units subordinate to the economic
policy council. The rationale for dissolving the
ministries is to streamline economic management and
give managers more autonomy and responsiblity.
Aleksandrov, moreover, are well placed to offset any
political boost Doynov may receive from improved
economic performance. Doynov's duties also may
make it difficult for him to concentrate on building
his support in the party, where he is considerably less
experienced than Aleksandrov. The tradition in
Bulgaria and other Communist countries-where the
route to the top is through the party and not through
the state apparatus-also is not favorable to Doynov.
Zhivkov apparently hopes the reorganization will
breathe new life into his economic reform program. In
his National Assembly speech, Zhivkov called for an
increased role for "self-managed organizations" and
worker collectives. Moreover, Zhivkov revived the
issue of the New Labor Code, an adjunct to the
reform program that defines labor relations and wage
policy, promising that it would be ratified before the
party congress. An editorial in the party daily on the
same day said that achieving political, economic, and
social development through application of modern
technology would be a key issue at the party congress
and that this "scientific-technical revolution" would
be driven by self-managed organizations. According
to the editorial, these organizations will have broad
economic independence and greater rights in foreign
and domestic economic relations.
Aleksandrov joins Doynov, Zhivkov aide Milko Balev,
and Zhivkov as the only Bulgarian leaders who are
both full Politburo members and Central Committee
secretaries. Aleksandrov's new responsibilities
probably will allow him to continue to oversee the
coordination of economic policy but should shield him
from political damage if the Bulgarian economy
continues to falter. As a party secretary, moreover, he
now may have some say over party cadre policy. This
may allow him to place supporters at all levels of the
party apparatus
If Doynov manages to streamline Bulgaria's sluggish
economy, he probably can gain the edge in the
competition and put Premier Filipov-whose
responsibilities apparently now overlap Doynov's-out
of the running. But Doynov also has some liabilities,
and he will become especially vulnerable if Bulgaria's
economic problems continue or worsen. Filipov and
Prospects
The recent shakeup strengthens speculation that
Zhivkov will follow the example of Hungarian leader
Kadar and designate someone at the party congress to
act as "Second Secretary." Designating a deputy,
whether formally or informally, would allow Zhivkov
to lighten his own administrative burden. Aleksandrov
and Doynov probably would have the edge if Zhivkov
wishes to use the post to designate an heir apparent.
Filipov, Balev, or a less prominent candidate might be
named if a deputy is to serve merely as an executive
assistant. Whoever is named, a deputy would have a
great advantage in the succession sweepstakes.
The reorganization and personnel changes-vintage
Zhivkov responses to economic problems-are
unlikely to have much effect on economic
performance by themselves. Sofia faces deep-seated
ideological, social, and bureaucratic impediments to
implementing meaningful economic reforms.
Although better weather has improved the economic
outlook for this year, Bulgaria's systemic problems
with inefficiency, low productivity, and poor quality
will persist.
More personnel and organizational changes may
come before the Bulgarian party congress in April.
These should clarify the role of the new government
councils and the political fortunes of those selected to
lead them.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Albania: The Politburo
Lineup Under Alia
Almost a year after party leader Ramiz Alia came to
power, Albanian media are providing some indication
of the relative standing of the nine other full (voting)
members of the Politburo. These rankings may point
to general policy areas of concern in Tirane as well as
to those leaders Alia is relying on most to strengthen
his position.
Alia's Position
Alia has moved to establish himself as Albania's most
powerful figure, but he still lacks the unquestioned
personal authority enjoyed by Hoxha. He has
attempted few changes in the leadership he inherited
at the end of the Hoxha era, which suggests he is
moving cautiously.
During late 1985 Alia went on record with
comprehensive statements laying out his
administration's positions on foreign and economic
policy, emphasizing continuity with his predecessor.
Other officials with increasing frequency refer to
Alia's public utterances as the baseline from which
subsequent debate must proceed-though not with
the quasi-mystical aura of Hoxha's proclamations. [
The Winners
Five of the nine appear to be prospering within the
new order:
? Premier Adil Carcani, a Politburo member since
1961, has solidly established himself as number two
after Alia. Carcani and Alia are the only leaders
reported to "give instructions" during official
appearances. The press often identifies them with
full party and state titles at major gatherings,
whereas other leaders are listed simply as Politburo
members. Carcani gave the main address at one of
the two announced Central Committee plenums
held since Alia replaced Hoxha, and Alia himself
addressed the other. Carcani generally speaks on
economic topics but also on foreign policy.
? Vice President Rita Marko may hold claim to third
place in the lineup. He is a member of Hoxha's old
guard who has served on the Politburo since 1956.
His activities are reported frequently, and his
appearances are often high profile. Marko, for
example, accompanied Alia on his trip to southern
areas last August, during which Alia delivered his
most important foreign policy speech to date. In
October, Marko presented a national medal to
Politburo candidate member Foto Cami, who
recently was made a party secretary and is an Alia
favorite; the Albanian news service listed Marko
immediately following Alia and Carcani in
reporting the event, a rare exception to the strict
alphabetical listing normally used for Politburo
members. Later the same month, Marko presented
the state's medal to Alia on his 60th birthday. And
media reports indicate that Marko has primary
responsibility for preparing sessions of the People's
Assembly, despite his nominal subordination to Alia
at the top of that body.
? Manush Myftiu, also promoted to the Politburo in
1956, appears frequently at many different forums.
] Last October he was named to the Central
Committee commission charged with creating an
Enver Hoxha museum; the small commission
includes important figures such as Alia, Carcani,
Cami, and Hoxha's widow, Nexhmije. Myftiu
accompanied Alia on his visit to Hoxha's birth place
last summer and is the only leader besides Alia and
Carcani to have had his remarks on foreign policy
reported at length.
? Party Secretary Lenka Cuko, promoted in 1983, is
the only female Politburo member. She has gained
surprising prominence in male-dominated Albania.
Cuko was named to the Hoxha museum commission
and has joined Alia in laying ceremonial wreaths in
the names of both the Politburo and the Central
Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Committee, the only leader to have done so.
Sometime last summer, she apparently took over
Politburo responsibility for youth affairs. Cuko may
be benefiting from the economic performance of
Lushnje District, her power base, which was the
only district to fulfill the 1985 plan, according to the
official plan report.
? Party Secretary Simon Stejani, promoted in 1981,
also appears frequently and trails only Alia,
Carcani, and Marko in the number of speeches he
has given. Stefani is the only leader other than Cuko
to have laid a party wreath with Alia, although he
did so only in the name of the Central Committee.
Stefani's appearances indicate that he may have
some responsibility for military affairs.
The Losers
Men in two critical government positions head the list
of those whose influence appears to be diminishing:
? Interior Minister Hekuran Isai, a Politburo
member since 1975, has received below average
media attention despite his inherently powerful
portfolio and status as one of only six party
secretaries. Moreover, the official daily Zeri i
Popullit early last December attacked lax
enforcement of law and order, indirectly referring to
Isai's ministry. An embarrassing and unresolved
public confrontation with Italy-caused by six
Albanians who managed to dodge Isai's security
personnel and take refuge in the Italian Embassy
late last year-almost certainly has further
damaged his status. He may be the first to be
sacked as Alia looks to put his own man in the
internal security job.
growth rates for 1985 beyond a few industries such
as knitwear). The industrial sector is likely to
stagger through 1986 as well, and Celiku may be
removed as minister-and perhaps from the
Politburo.
? Politburo members Muho Asllani and Pali Miska
have remained in relative obscurity and shown signs
of weakness. Asllani, for example, at an appearance
in October, played a secondary role to Mrs. Hoxha
who, as a Central Committee member, normall}~
takes a backseat to Politburo members. Moreover,
press reporting indicates that Asllani early this year
lost his position as Party First Secretary in Durres
District. The official media indicate that he moved
to the top of the Shkoder District party, but he has
largely stayed out of the public eye and failed to
appear at a meeting between Carcani and the
Shkoder leadership in mid-February-a violation of
normal protocol. Miska, for his part, has been the
besieged Celiku's only rival in public adoration of
Influence on Policy
In the murky world of Albanian politics, the link
between leadership maneuvering and national policy
is obscure. We lack concrete evidence but believe that
the latest shifts could reflect debate over several
policy questions.
Interior Minister Isai may have opposed Alia on steps
he apparently has taken to ease slightly the repressive
internal political climate. ~
Last January the
? Minister oJ'Industry and Mines Hajredin Celiku,
who was promoted in 1981, holds one of the most
powerful government positions yet and has become
one of the least visible Politburo members. Celiku
has overseen the industrial sector during several
years of extremely poor performance (the regime
declined even to report apparently dismal industrial
regime announced a qualified amnesty for political
prisoners, and some knowledgeable Western observers
say that under Alia the regime has allowed some older
Albanians greater opportunity to visit relatives in the
West. As the man responsible for internal security in
a traditionally xenophobic country, Isai is among
those officials most likely to have opposed even
marginal relaxation.
25X1
L ~JC "I
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Industrial czar Celiku, for his part, may have opposed
introducing even minor expedient "reforms" into his
sector-a policy of cautious experimentation
apparently favored by Alia and Carcani in tackling
Albania's economic stagnation. A Chinese journalist
reported-and was confirmed in part by official
Albanian statements,-that in the agricultural sector
the regime is encouraging peasants to farm their own
plots and raise poultry and livestock, a reversal of
practice over past decades. The plan report for 1986
indicates that the Ministry of Construction will start
promoting private home construction through
government financial assistance in an effort to ease
the housing shortage. But there are no signs that the
Ministry of Industry and Mines is encouraging such
new approaches in response to weak performance,
despite calls in the media for measures such as linking
wages to productivity
On the other hand, the movement of up-and-coming
Cuko into youth affairs reinforces other evidence that
the regime is increasingly concerned over the
possibility that Western economic and cultural
contacts will spread non-Communist values to
Albanian youths. The media often bemoan, for
example, ideological laxity and growing materialism
among students.
Alia appears to be pulling together an "inner
Politburo" consisting of the five leading full members
and Foto Cami. This group is large enough-
particularly if, as we expect, Cami is elevated to full
membership on the Politburo at the party congress
this year-to assure Alia a working majority on the
Politburo and within the Secretariat. Whether or not
old Hoxha loyalists Marko and Myftiu accept even
modest economic and political experimentation, they
apparently are willing to back Alia out of instinctive
loyalty to the party First Secretary.
We have seen no evidence, however, that Alia or
Carcani would push major changes in the system that
might alienate the old guard. Presumably secure for
now against challenges from within the party, Alia
may turn Celiku and Isai into scapegoats for their
lack of progress in overcoming economic stagnation.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Economic News in Brief
Bundesbank study concludes West Germany
approaching "upper limit" on social welfare costs .. .
sharp increases since 1970 reportedly dulling private
incentives, promoting black economy, and
exacerbating unemployment by causing widespread
substitution of capital for labor ...serious financing
difficulties seen in 1990s without major reforms.
Recent survey shows trade union membership in
Britain fell in 1984 despite growth in number of people
working ...total membership was 2.2 percent down
from 1983 ... reflects worker disillusionment with
trade unions and Prime Minister Thatcher's efforts to
curb unions' power.
Recent British study found that voluntary export
restraints on autos and VCRs impose heavy costs on
British consumers, while saving or creating relatively
few jobs ...Thatcher government will use findings to
try to galvanize public opinion against protectionism.
Spanish defense budget for 1986 cut in real terms by
6.3 percent ...part of budget austerity designed to
encourage private-sector recovery ...reverses long-
term trend of growth ...will delay purchases of new
weapons.
Czechoslovakia considering new system of rating and
certifying quality of industrial products ...stricter
grading criteria to be based on "world standard" .. .
apparent response to Soviet pressure for improved
export quality and to growing noncompetitiveness of
Czechoslovak products on international markets.
Secret
EUR ER 86-006
18 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Looking Ahead
March/Apri l
Western Europe
Swiss to decide on UN membership in referendum on 16 March ...debate centers
around definition of Swiss neutrality ...most political leaders favor UN entry, but
public likely to defeat proposal.
Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney meets President Reagan in Washington on 18
March ...acid rain, North American air defense, and bilateral trade to be major
topics of discussion ...Mulroney considers US agreement to implement
recommendations of just-concluded acid rain study the sine qua non of a successful
summit ...Canadian officials believe a US rebuff on issue would contribute to
further decline in Mulroney's popularity.
West German-Soviet Joint Economic Commission meets in Moscow on 3 and 4
April ...West Germans will express concern about their trade deficits with the
USSR over past five years ...Bonn nevertheless optimistic that new Soviet five-
year plan, which calls for increased capital investment, will provide good business
opportunities.
3 3 Secret
EUR ER 86-006
28 February 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/02 :CIA-RDP87T00289R000200630001-8