NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200720001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER Fill COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
-SeetCt-
7
Near East and
South Asia Review
NESA NESAR 86-003
/7 January 1986
441
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Syrian-Sponsored Terrorism in Western Europe
Syria's attacks on political and religious dissidents, pro-Arafat
Palestinians, and the personnel and facilities of regional foes are a
calculated effort to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals.
To shield itself from direct association with such operations, it
increasingly employs Palestinian surrogates.
Libya: The Effect of Economic Sanctions
The breaking of US economic ties to Libya will have some
disruptive effects, but, as time passes, the impact will fade unless
there is substantial participation by other OECD countries in the
sanctions. The likelihood of Libya's other trading partners following
the US lead is not high.
Morocco: The Succession Question
King Hassan will continue to dominate the Moroccan political stage
for at least the next several years, but his death or incapacitation
would threaten political stability. If his successor, Crown Prince Sidi
Mohamed, failed to prevent turmoil, senior military officers would
intervene.
The two major alliances of North Africa are undergoing strains that
could lead to a shift in the balance of power in the Maghreb, and,
although a dissolution of the current groupings is unlikely in the
near term, unchecked friction could lead the countries to realign
their foreign policies.
The Arab League and the Question of Consensus I 15
Although the Arab League Pact does not require consensus
decisions, early League failures of policy coordination led to the
adoption of consensus-style decisionmaking for regional questions,
and this will persist as long as the Arab world is polarized.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Jordan: Who Will Follow King Hussein?
The most likely development after Hussein's death would be a
peaceful transfer of power to his brother and constitutionally
designated successor, Crown Prince Hassan. Whether Hassan can
sustain the support extended by the military and general population
will depend on circumstances and his leadership capabilities
Egypt: Politics in the Senior Officer Corps
Rumors of a serious rift between President Mubarak and the
Defense Minister have fueled speculation that Abu Ghazala may be
on his way out. To replace him, Mubarak would have to find a
Defense Minister who can maintain military cohesion and loyalty
while coping with domestic strains caused by increasing economic
stringencies.
Saudi Arabia: Seeking Markets for Petrochemicals
Saudi Arabia is aggressively seeking markets for its expanding
chemical exports. It recognizes the limits to export growth in the
West and has begun to seek additional markets in China and the
USSR, apparently uninhibited by the absence of political relations
with these potential trading partners.
The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain:
A Catalyst for ChangeF__1
The Iranian-backed Shia dissident Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain is working to facilitate Tehran's goals of establishing an
Islamic republic in the island state and is using terrorist tactics to
achieve this aim. It also seeks to end the US presence in Bahrain and
poses a threat to US personnel and facilities.
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Soviet operations in Afghanistan are evolving in a way that suggests
a regionally differentiated strategy that demographic trends
reinforce, and the Soviets' ability to control northern Afghanistan
will be essential to the success of this strategy.
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themselves, dimming even further prospects for a settlement.
Sri Lanka's approximately 1 million Muslims have become
increasingly caught up in the Sinhalese-Tamil communal violence
over the last several months. If no settlement is reached and fighting
resumes in the Eastern Province, Muslims may resort to arming
India: LCA-Light Combat Aircraft or Last Chance for
Aeronautics?
program's progress
India hopes its domestic Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program will
both stimulate its aeronautic industry and reduce the Air Force's
dependence on Soviet aircraft, but bureaucratic infighting, lack of
technical expertise, and spiraling costs have considerably slowed the
Nepal: Drugs in the Kingdom
collectively challenge the government.
Narcotics trafficking and drug abuse are growing in Nepal, and,
although they do not directly threaten the stability of the regime,
they have added to domestic pressures-bureaucratic corruption,
shifts in traditional social patterns, economic problems-that
Mauritania:
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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Syrian-Sponsored Terrorism
in Western Europe
Syria sponsors terrorist attacks in Western Europe in
a calculated effort to achieve both domestic and
foreign policy goals. Syrian intelligence organizations
coordinate attacks against political and religious
dissidents, pro-Arafat Palestinians, and the personnel
and facilities of regional foes. Syria officially
denounces terrorism, but we believe it considers these
operations part of its national security strategy and
that it distinguishes such operations from terrorist
incidents perpetrated by other groups that receive
Syrian support. There is no evidence that Syria
cooperates with indigenous terrorist groups in the
execution of attacks in Western Europe or that Syria
has sponsored attacks specifically targeting American
or European civilians.
Syria has used its own agents and, since 1984,
surrogate groups to execute operations. We believe
Syria has increasingly employed surrogates in part
because these groups can use their established cells in
Western Europe-and the Palestinian and other
Europe. Syrian intelligence used assassinations and
threats of assassination to consolidate Assad's
domestic political power by silencing his external
Early attacks in Western Europe, believed to have
been organized by Syrian intelligence and carried out
by Syrian operatives to intimidate regime opponents,
include:
? The assassination of former Syrian Prime Minister
Middle Eastern populations there-to support their ? The assassination attempt on Muslim Brotherhood
operations. We also believe Syria facilitates these leader Issam al-Attar in Aachen, West Germany,
surrogate operations by using their diplomatic on 17 March 1981. The attack resulted in the death
channels in Europe to transport operatives. Although of Attar's wife
Syria uses surrogates to shield itself from direct
association with such operations, it runs the risk of
being implicated in attacks that are carried out by
Syrian-supported terrorist groups without Syrian
endorsement.
The Early Focus
Western Europe became a focus of Syrian-sponsored
terrorism in the late 1970s when Syrian operatives
pursued and executed anti-Assad dissidents there.
Many Syrian dissidents, especially Muslim
Brotherhood fundamentalists, had fled Syria to
escape persecution and sought asylum in Western
? The attempt on 19 December 1981 to bomb the pro-
Iraqi Arabic-language weekly Al Watan al Arabi in
Paris. The bomb was in a packing container
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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There appeared to be a lull in Syrian operations in
Western Europe in 1982 after the Assad regime
subdued the Muslim Brotherhood at home. In
addition, West European governments pressed Syria
to end terrorist attacks on their territory.
? The rocket attack on 3 April 1985 against the
Jordanian Embassy in Rome. The rocket attack was
claimed by Black September,
? The missile attack on 4 April 1985 against an Alia
aircraft in Athens. The missile was fired at the
aircraft from the ground as it took off from Athens
airport.
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group had been responsible for several terrorist
operations in Western Europe directed against Syrian
dissidents on behalf of Syria,
Current Phase
Syrian-sponsored terrorist incidents in Western
Europe resumed in 1983 with attacks on pro-Arafat
Palestinians and Jordanian diplomats. I
Several attacks on Jordanian personnel and facilities
by Abu Nidal representatives took place after Jordan
renewed diplomatic relations with Egypt in
September 1984 and allowed the Palestine National
Council to meet in Amman the following November.
These attacks were encouraged by Syria to bring
pressure on the Jordanians not to proceed
independently in Middle Eastern peace negotiations.
Attacks against Jordanians in Western Europe,
believed to have been sponsored by Syria as part of
this drive, include:
? The attack on 21 March 1985 on the offices of
Alia-the official Jordanian airline-in Rome,
Athens, and Cyprus, claimed by Black September.
Black
September is a covername for the Abu Nidal group.
? The assassination in July 1985 of Jordanian First
Secretary Ziad Sati in Ankara, claimed by the Abu
Nidal group.
Black September.
? The assassination on 18 September 1985 of
Jordanian publisher Michel al-Nimairi in Athens.
Nimairi was a personal friend of PLO leader Yasir
Arafat and publisher of the Arab-language
magazine Al Nashra. The attack was claimed by
Syrian Use of Surrogates
Syria increasingly uses Palestinian groups as
surrogates to carry out operations in Western Europe,
making it more difficult to implicate Syria in a
particular incident. These surrogates often have cells
in Europe that facilitate the coordination and
execution of operations. Syria provides safehaven and
training facilities in Syria or Syrian-controlled
territory in exchange for the surrogates' cooperation.
One suspected Palestinian group used by Syria for
operations in Western Europe is the Eagles of the
Revolution, the terrorist arm of Saiqa.
To conceal Syrian involvement, this group
uses Palestinians from other countries, rather than
Palestinians residing in Syria, to conduct operations.
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he Abu Nidal
group, however, has its own agenda, and we believe
operations conducted in Western Europe by this
group do not always have Syrian endorsement,
particularly since the group's involvement with Libya
has increased. We have no information to indicate
Syria was directly involved in the attacks last
December on the El Al counters at the Rome and
Vienna airports.
in Rome and Vienna, Syria has told Abu Nidal
representatives not to give interviews in Syria. We
believe this is an attempt to avoid publicity on the
presence of the Abu Nidal group there. Syria
probably is concerned that it will lose influence over
the Abu Nidal group with the movement of some of
its members from Syria to Libya and Lebanon.
Outlook
We believe there is a high risk that Damascus will
enlist surrogate groups to strike at US personnel and
facilities in Western Europe if the United States
launches a military strike against Syrian targets.
We believe Syria will continue to selectively sponsor
terrorist attacks as a means of furthering both
domestic and foreign policy objectives and that
Western Europe will remain a prime locale for such
attacks. Ease of travel and the accessibility of targets
facilitate operations in Western Europe. In addition,
Syria's increased use of surrogates for its terrorist
operations complicates efforts to interrupt their plans
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Because Syria attempts to conduct its terrorist
operations in Western Europe in a manner that will
not jeopardize its relations with European countries,
we believe Syria refrains from cooperating with or
sponsoring European terrorist groups.
and shields Syria from direct ties to the attacks.
will continue to implicate Syria.
Targets will continue to be judiciously chosen to
prevent damaging Syria's relationship with West
European states. A Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement
may lead to fewer attacks against Jordanian personnel
and facilities, but activity against pro-Arafat
Palestinians will persist. In addition, activity in
Western Europe, independent of Syrian endorsement,
but conducted by Syrian-supported terrorist groups,
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Libya: The Effect of
Economic Sanctions
The breaking of US economic ties to Libya will have
some disruptive effects, but, as time passes, the
impact will fade unless there is substantial
participation by other OECD countries in the
sanctions. Although most of the $300 million worth of
products exported by the United States are generally
available on world markets, the time needed to locate
new suppliers will aggravate current shortages of
consumer and industrial goods in Libya.
The likelihood of Libya's other trading partners
following the US lead is not high. Many, particularly
the Europeans and South Korea, are owed hundreds
of millions of dollars by Tripoli and are expecting
repayment in crude oil. Others have valuable
equipment, construction, and service contracts with
Libya.
Tripoli will have greater difficulty replacing the $300-
400 million in services provided annually by US
companies. Contracts with US firms totaling as much
as $3 billion will have to be relet to firms in other
countries. Japanese, South Korean, or West European
firms are capable of taking over the US role in the
Great Manmade River Project, Qadhafi's most
ambitious economic undertaking to date. Most of
Libya's development program has little impact on the
average Libyan, however, and the slowdown in the
domestic economy has already greatly delayed the
rate of project completion.
The new sanctions probably will disrupt the Libyan
petroleum industry over the next one to two months as
US production companies disengage from Libya. US
firms play a major role in Libyan operations and
market about 200,000 b/d-roughly 18 percent of
Libyan exports. As a result, oil exports could
temporarily fall from the current 1.1 million b/d, but
Tripoli probably will take prompt action, including
price cuts, to regain sales. Beyond the marketing
disruption, any short-term production problems in
fields involving US oil companies could be handled by
foreign technicians and a small, but competent cadre
Western Oil Companies in Libya
Wintershal- 49 2
West Germany
of trained Libyan managers. Moreover, most US
companies providing exploration and maintenance
services operate through their West European
subsidiaries, often using no more than 500 to 800
employees, and replacements could be recruited from
a number of countries. Most essential oilfield
equipment is already obtained from non-US sources.
Tripoli could offer the US oil concessions to
companies in Austria, West Germany, Italy, France,
Finland, Brazil, or even Romania. Alternatively,
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NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
Equity Share Current Crude
in Libyan Liftings
Operations (thousand
(percent) b/d)
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Libya may nationalize the companies and operate
them with foreign technical assistance as happened
after Exxon's withdrawal from Libya in 1981.
Qadhafi is unlikely to detain US citizens or take them
hostage. Following the initial imposition of sanctions
in 1982, for example, Qadhafi helped expedite the
departure of US citizens as a propaganda ploy.
Qadhafi probably believes any move against US
personnel would be used to justify a US military
strike against Libya. The Libyan leader, however,
may offer lucrative incentives to retain the services of
select, highly skilled workers. Some 400 to 500 US
citizens probably will remain in Libya. Qadhafi is
likely to use the US economic sanctions to marshal
support for even greater domestic austerity and to
blame Washington for any further deterioration in
Libyan economic conditions.
Secret 6
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Morocco:
The Succession Question
We believe that King Hassan will continue to
dominate the Moroccan political stage for at least the
next several years, but his death or incapacitation-
though unlikely-would threaten political stability.
senior military officers would be likely to intervene on
their own behalf or in support of a palace conspiracy.
Even under these circumstances, the country would
probably continue its moderate, pro-Western
doubt that Islamic fundamentalists could oust
Hassan. The fundamentalists' prospects would be
better in an atmosphere of political indecision
following Hassan's death, but, once they emerged as a
threat, the military would probably act preemptively
to prevent them from seizing power.
Formal Succession Arrangements
The Moroccan Constitution specifies that the crown
should pass to the King's oldest son unless the King
designates another son as his successor. This
arrangement accords with the general observance of
primogeniture in Morocco. It makes Sidi Mohamed
the Crown Prince, even though Hassan has never
formally designated him. Negotiations among secular
and religious leaders also play a role in appointing
successors to the throne, and the senior theologians of
the realm confer ultimate authority on the new
monarch. When the succession occurs, we expect that
the country's religious leaders-who enjoy close ties
to the royal house-will give their blessing to the new
King as they have done on similar occasions in the
past.
Sidi Mohamed
Sidi Mohamed-22 years old-has been rigorously
groomed since childhood to succeed to the Moroccan
throne, according to US Embassy reporting. He
frequently appears in public with his father and
sometimes performs ceremonial functions by himself.
During the past few years, Sidi Mohamed has been
eased slowly into more important official functions.
The Crown Prince was the royal representative to the
1985 international trade fair in Casablanca, and his
father has used him occasionally as a special envoy to
deliver personal messages. Recently he was named
coordinator of the armed forces staff, his first
substantive position.
Palace Interest Groups
Real power during the transition is likely to rest with
senior palace advisers, led initially by Ahmed Reda
Guedira, Ahmed Bensouda, and the aging Gen.
Moulay Hafid. The latter is Hassan's uncle and
Minister of Royal Household and would most likely
continue to control access to the new King.
The only Cabinet minister who might strive for
influence with the new regime or challenge the
opinions of the royal counselors is the tough and
efficient Interior Minister Driss Basri, who controls
internal intelligence, security, and information.
Embassy reporting indicates that Basri is a tenacious,
efficient functionary who advocates prompt
suppression of demonstrations and disturbances.
Loyal to King Hassan, Basri has been left in charge
on several occasions when Hassan has been out of the
country.
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NESA NESAR 86-003
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Nonroyal Challengers
In our view, Morocco's established political parties,
labor unions, student groups, and fringe opposition
groups are neither sufficiently well organized nor
capable of working together well enough to challenge
the present succession arrangements. In our view,
most of these groups have been manipulated,
neutralized, or repressed by Hassan.
Political Parties. The Socialist Union of Popular
Forces represents the urban lower classes and is the
country's only significant independent opposition
party. We believe this party would have difficulty in
becoming an influential voice in post-Hassan Morocco
because he government
has muzzled its leadership and severely restricted its
activities. The Party of Progress and Socialism, the
Moroccan Communist party, has little popular
support and is tolerated only as a symbol of Moroccan
liberalization. It supports the government on most
controversial regional issues and is careful not to get
too far out of line. In our view, it would not threaten
Sidi Mohamed's rule.
Organized Labor. Organized labor is a weak element
in Morocco's political system. Although labor's rank
and file is restive over poor economic conditions,
senior leaders of major unions either have been co-
opted by the regime or imprisoned. We do not see
labor either challenging the new King on its own or
working effectively with dissident groups.
Students. Rising expectations among the burgeoning,
youthful population are a principal source of
discontent. Students led disturbances in early 1984,
are deeply alienated, and could become volatile again.
Radical students have set up or joined clandestine
organizations that could provide important cadres of
support to an attempt to overthrow the regime. By
themselves, however, students do not appear strong
enough to bring down the monarchy, and their links to
other disaffected groups are weak.
Islamic Fundamentalists. Militant fundamentalism,
calling for a return to Islamic principles, is becoming
increasingly attractive to young Moroccans and is
gaining support among intellectual and urban circles,
according to Embassy reporting. Although Hassan as
"Commander of the Faithful" has deflected criticism
from religious groups, his son might not be so adept.
If Muslim fundamentalists and the orthodox religious
community joined forces against Sidi Mohamed, we
believe they could seriously undermine his authority.
Fundamentalism could conceivably become a rallying
point for disaffected groups. During the disturbances
in 1984, fundamentalists helped foment unrest by
distributing tracts attacking the King and calling for
an end to the monarchy.
Even so, politically aggrieved fundamentalists have
attracted only limited public support. Although
Morocco is an Islamic society, most Moroccans
appear satisfied with the relaxed and tolerant version
of the faith practiced in their country, and we doubt
they provide fertile ground for the broad-based,
politically oriented fundamentalist movements that
have sprung up in other Islamic countries in recent
years. The fundamentalists also lack a charismatic
leader who might head a Khomeini-style revolution.
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The Military. Both Hassan and Sidi Mohamed can
withstand challenges to their rule in the near to
medium term because they enjoy the military's
support. Overall, Moroccan military officers lead a
good life, believe the King cares for them, and are
more interested in professional matters and their
career success than in political affairs. Hassan faced
serious challenges to his regime in two brief military-
led coup attempts in the early 1970s, and in response
he restricted the authority of the military
establishment and centralized command and control
in the palace. Postcoup purges and attrition have
eliminated potential contenders for power from the
military. In their place has emerged a military
establishment that is conservative and seemingly
faithful to the King.
Senior colonels, particularly, are loyal. Although
Embassy officials have speculated that they could
shift their loyalty to preserve their privileged status,
they appear to recognize that they have a stake in
maintaining the status quo. They come from the
upper class and are eager to safeguard the system that
has amply rewarded their service. Middle-level
officers (junior colonels and majors), on the other
hand, have higher levels of educational and technical
experience than their superiors. They are generally
competent and hardworking but are relatively
unrewarded and, in our view, pose the greatest threat
to the King. Nevertheless, even if a few strongly
disaffected middle-level officers attempted to move
against the King, they are sufficiently hemmed in by
their more loyal peers and other officers that they
would have trouble acting against either Hassan or
Sidi Mohamed. Junior officers appear loyal to the
King, and we believe their criticism is more directed
at their superiors than the regime. We doubt that they
have the leaders or motivation to stage a successful
coup.
Possible Succession Scenarios
Sidi Mohamed Becomes King. In the near term,
Hassan is more likely to leave office as a result of
death or illness than because of a coup attempt or a
popular uprising. If Hassan's demise by natural
causes is unexpected, we believe that the most likely
sequence would be for the senior palace advisers, led
initially by Gen. Moulay Hafid and the two royal
counselors, to endorse the Crown Prince as monarch.
We believe Sidi Mohamed would attempt to continue
his father's domestic and foreign policies and would
benefit from the institutional authority inherent in the
Moroccan monarchy and the high regard for his
father's memory. Palace advisers, military leaders,
and the security forces would want him to succeed
and would give him time to consolidate his position.
Senior Military Officers Take Over Following Sidi
Mohamed's Succession. If Sidi Mohamed failed to
consolidate his power early in his reign or proved
unable to prevent the development of serious domestic
turmoil fueled by worker, student, and militant
fundamentalist grievances, we believe that senior
military officers could intervene on their own behalf
or in support of a palace conspiracy.
Once the military had taken over and stabilized the
situation, they would most likely try to restore civilian
rule, probably in the form of a constitutional
monarchy with greater limitations on the monarch's
authority and a larger institutional role for the armed
forces. US and local observers have noted over the
years complaints within the military and civilian
establishment that the palace has too much control
over even minor decisions, such as military
promotions and daily management of the
bureaucracy.
Middle-Grade Military Officers Take Over. It is
possible-though less likely-that a reformist "young
colonels" movement could develop among middle-
level officers. Serious, unchecked deterioration of
economic and social conditions-especially if they
bred widespread civil strife-could prompt these
officers to move against the King in the belief that
they represented the country's best interests. Orders
by the ruler to implement repressive measures could
increase the pressure on these officers to act if junior
officers and enlisted men were sympathetic to the
disgruntled populace and refused to carry out those
orders.
At the end of this chain of events, as in the previous
one, the conspirators might install another member of
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the royal family as a figurehead and operate behind
the facade of the monarchy. We believe, however,
that they would be more likely than the senior
colonels to replace the monarchy with a constitutional
republic.
Junior Officers Take Over. The least likely military
intervention, in our view, would be a military cou
initiated by junior officers.
The Islamic Fundamentalists Take Over. A
fundamentalist takeover appears less likely than a
military challenge to the Alaouite dynasty. A more
promising, albeit still unlikely, context for an Islamic
takeover would be failure by Hassan's successor to
consolidate his power and resolve the nation's
economic and social problems. If the militants tested
Sidi Mohamed and found him weak, they would
probably escalate their opposition, attempt to
manipulate student groups and the unemployed, and
call upon lower ranking officers and enlisted men to
regard them as brothers and not repress their efforts.
Implications for the United States.
We believe the most likely succession to Hassan-Sidi
Mohamed's orderly takeover-would not change
Morocco's moderate, pro-Western orientation.
Initially preoccupied with consolidating his power and
the nation's social and economic problems, the new
King probably would not undertake significant
international initiatives for some time.
Under a regime led by senior officers-because they
come from the upper class and have an economic
stake in the country-Morocco would remain pro-
Western and favor good commercial and military
relations with the United States so long as the new
rulers perceived continued US willingness to support
Rabat's efforts in Western Sahara and to recognize
Morocco's other regional interests. Such a regime
would probably push for increased US military
assistance.
Middle-grade officers who removed Hassan or Sidi
Mohamed might be less favorably disposed to US
interests. They are more nationalistic than the senior
colonels and probably would seek a more neutral
position between East and West, though they would
still want increased US assistance. They probably
would be more sensitive to Morocco's neighbors and
to the moderate Arab states and would not want to be
closely identified with the United States.
We believe that the US-Moroccan relationship would
dramatically change following a takeover by Islamic
fundamentalists. We believe they would condemn the
United States for supporting a corrupt monarchy and
would refuse all US financial and military assistance.
They probably would terminate US access to
Moroccan ports and other strategic benefits accorded
to the United States. We doubt, however, that any
Moroccan fundamentalist regime would be as
extreme as the Khomeini leadership in Iran.
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North Africa:
The Power Equation
The two major alliances of North Africa are
undergoing internal strains that could lead to a shift
in the balance of power in the Maghreb. Morocco's
King Hassan and Libyan leader Qadhafi are
increasingly dissatisfied with the implementation of
their union; longstanding differences among Algeria,
Tunisia, and Mauritania have prevented their loose
pact from taking root. We do not anticipate a
dissolution of the current groupings in the near term,
but friction, if unchecked, could lead the countries to
realign their foreign policies. Tentative signs are that
change in the alliances would involve rapprochement
between Algeria and Libya and possibly expanded ties
between Morocco and Tunisia. We believe Algeria
and Libya are the most likely countries to benefit
from major changes, while Morocco and Tunisia
would be more isolated and vulnerable. Overall, the
balance of power in the Maghreb would not change
appreciably, unless in the unlikely event that Algeria
and Libya form some sort of alliance. Such shifts in
the region would provide opportunities for Moscow to
expand its influence and would produce mixed results
for Washington.
Background
Since late 1984, the two North African groupings-
the Arab-African Union of Morocco and Libya and
the loose coalition of Algeria, Tunisia, and
Mauritania-have sparred for advantage. Both
alliances are based on profound differences and old
rivalries between partners. Historically, Morocco's
King Hassan and Tunisia's President Bourguiba have
been strongly oriented toward the West, Algeria has
been among the foremost proponents of radical
socialism, and Qadhafi has peddled his Green Book
and brazenly interfered in other countries' affairs.
Fissures in the Alliances
During recent months there have been indications of
tension within the two North African alliances.
Libyan leader Qadhafi is disappointed with his union
with Morocco, even though it has entailed few costs
for him. Qadhafi is particularly frustrated with
Morocco's reluctance to cooperate on defense, as
called for in the treaty establishing the union, and by
Rabat's refusal to provide embargoed spare parts for
Libya's inventory of US-manufactured aircraft. He is
also angered by Hassan's refusal to come to Tripoli
for a state visit and by the King's inability to use his
influence with Washington or Paris to reduce
Western hostility toward Tripoli.
Morocco, which has more to lose in the relationship,
also is dissatisfied with the union. Hassan realizes
that the union has damaged Morocco's ties to
Washington and jeopardized Rabat's acquisition of
much-needed weapons. He also is concerned that the
union has accelerated the warming of ties between
Algeria and the United States and probably believes
the Algerians will try to convince Washington to
support the Polisario in the Western Sahara dispute.
Moreover, we believe Hassan is aware that the union
has resulted in a sizable influx of Libyans into
Morocco, which increases the potential for Qadhafi to
create trouble for Hassan, especially if the union fails.
Libya's military threats against Tunisia during the
past six months have given impetus to cooperation
between Algeria and Tunisia. Even so, Tunisian
leaders are uncomfortable with the relationship. They
worry about becoming militarily dependent on Algiers
and have longstanding suspicions that it sees Tunisia
as part of Algeria's sphere of influence, according to
the US Embassy in Tunis. Unlike the other countries,
Algeria's leaders have less scruples about their
alliances and the effects on the country's overall
foreign policy, but they fear that these commitments
risk war with Libya and Morocco.
Shifting Coalitions
The members of these alliances have begun to take
steps to compensate for recent strains with their
partners. Since November, Libya has undertaken a
diplomatic offensive to improve relations with Algiers.
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Qadhafi has sent senior envoys to Algiers and used
other intermediaries, such as the Iranian Foreign
Minister, to arrange a meeting with President
Bendjedid. Qadhafi probably wants to break up
nascent Algerian-Egyptian military collaboration
against his regime and to reduce tension on his border
with Algeria to better allow him to meddle in Chad.
We believe that a report from a reliable source of the
US Embassy in Algiers that Qadhafi may renew
military support to the Polisario is, if verified, a step
to help repair relations with Algeria.
Algeria is skeptical of Qadhafi's motives, but
President Bendjedid appears willing to meet with him.
Algeria set tough conditions for a meeting, however,
including cessation of Libyan subversion in Tunisia.
We believe Algeria also will demand that Libya cease
its support for Algerian dissidents and reduce its
involvement with Morocco. Reports from the US
Embassy in Tunis that Algeria is encouraging Tunis
to adopt a less confrontational posture toward Libya
could indicate that Algiers is attempting to placate
Libya.
Morocco generally has looked outside the Maghreb to
overcome its isolation in North Africa. Hassan
probably believes that he has little choice as long as he
continues his union with Qadhafi. The King appears
to view France as a counterweight to Algeria and a
potential source of military and economic support.
There also are signs that Hassan is interested in
expanding ties to Communist countries. Over the long
term, he probably wants to persuade Moscow not to
provide Algeria with new weapon systems.
Tunisia, more than the other countries, is militarily
vulnerable. Its primary concern has been stability in
the face of Libyan blandishments and doubts about
French and US willingness to come to its defense.
Even so, Tunisia is wary of Algeria and has looked to
Egypt and Iraq for military support.
Regional Prospects
Neither of the two North African alliances is in
imminent danger of collapse, despite the strains. Both
Hassan and Qadhafi view the Moroccan-Libyan
union as a marriage of convenience. Algeria and
especially Tunisia will find it necessary to maintain
close ties as long as the Rabat-Tripoli alliance endures
and the threat exists of Libyan interference in the
Tunisian succession.
Nevertheless, we believe the Maghreb countries will
seriously consider foreign policy realignments in the
region if current frictions intensify over the next year.
It is also possible, but less likely, that a
rapprochement between Libya and Tunisia would
produce the same result.
Winners
Algeria and Libya would be the most likely countries
in the region to change partners and negotiate a
compromise. They also would be the primary
beneficiaries of any shift in the existing alliances.
Reconciliation would reduce the military threats each
faces from abroad. Both countries are surrounded by
hostile neighbors, and each could reorient its forces
toward its traditional enemies. Libya could strengthen
its border with Egypt, while Algeria could reduce its
garrisons on the Libyan border and return units and
equipment to the Moroccan frontier.
In our judgment, any Libyan-Algerian
rapprochement would be no more than a fairly loose
association because of competition for regional
dominance.
Algerian distrust of Qadhafi is so intense
that only his removal from power and a regime in
Tripoli not controlled by pro-Qadhafi radicals would
allow a close relationship.
Losers
Morocco and Tunisia would find themselves more
vulnerable if the current alliances were to shift,
especially because of their weaker military position
and economic problems. They would find themselves
without any partners in North Africa or thrown
together in a weak coalition. Moreover, a collapse in
the Moroccan-Libyan pact would tarnish the image of
King Hassan, because he placed his prestige on the
line in forming the union. He argued both at home
and in Washington that the union would enable him
to tame Qadhafi.
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The loss of Algeria as a key ally would be a severe
blow for Tunisia, since the country's leaders have
turned to Algeria in the wake of disillusionment over
what they perceive as parsimonious security
assistance from France and the United States. Both
Tunisia and Morocco would be prone to Libyan
subversion.
Morocco almost certainly would be compelled to
break ranks with Libya if the Algerian-Libyan
rapprochement showed promise. The Moroccan-
Libyan union might also split if Hassan became
convinced that Qadhafi had resumed military aid to
the Polisario or was engaged in subversive activity in
Morocco. In these circumstances, Hassan could turn
to Tunisia, even though he would know that his new
partner could not supply the strategic and economic
assistance Morocco needs. Tunisia might reciprocate
a Moroccan overture, but its leaders, too, would see
limited advantages to such a relationship. A more
likely course for Morocco and Tunisia would be
concerted efforts to obtain assistance from France,
wealthy Arab states, and the USSR if the United
States was not receptive to their needs.
The New Balance of Power
We believe that a realignment of states in North
Africa would not significantly alter the balance of
power or stability in the region. Morocco and Algeria
will continue to be adversaries and will remain at
loggerheads over Western Sahara. The position of
Libya toward the other Maghreb states would be
somewhat improved because Algiers is the only
regime that can effectively challenge Tripoli.
Overall military stability, at least in the short term,
would be enhanced by an accommodation by Algeria
and Libya, which have the largest and most lethal
inventories of weapons. Thus, while the prospects of
military conflict in the Maghreb may recede with a
change in the alliances, heightened anxieties in
Morocco and Tunisia would keep the region on edge.
The emergence of a formal political alliance between
Algeria and Libya would produce a significant change
in the balance of power in the Maghreb. Even
cooperation short of a compact between them, such as
support for the Polisario and Moroccan dissidents,
would result in significantly heightened friction in the
region. The war in the Western Sahara would be
prolonged, and state-sponsored terrorism would
increase. Qadhafi, for his part, would be careful not to
antagonize the Algerians with overt attacks on
Tunisia, but he probably would adopt a more
aggressive stance toward Egypt.
The Soviet Angle
Such shifts in the alliances probably would encourage
Libya and Algeria to look to the Soviet Union as a
potential wedge against the others. High-level
contacts between the Soviets and Algeria and Tunisia,
including a reported forthcoming visit to both capitals
by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, suggest that
Moscow senses an opportunity to increase its
influence in the region. Moscow favors a
rapprochement between Algeria and Libya because of
the Soviets' traditional friendship with these two
countries. Moscow also would discourage an
alignment against Morocco and Tunisia out of
concern that such a move would increase
opportunities for the United States.
None of the Maghreb countries, except for Qadhafi's
Libya, are prepared to jeopardize their security links
to Western Europe or the United States. Tunisia
probably hopes its contacts with the Soviets will
prompt the United States to increase its aid, and
Algiers and Rabat could do the same. These three
countries also probably hope they can get Moscow to
curb Qadhafi's excesses.
Implications for the United States
These shifts in relations among the Maghreb states
would have mixed results for Washington, but,
overall, it is conceivable that the United States would
lose influence in North Africa.
Morocco and Tunisia would move closer to
Washington out of necessity. Both countries would
view Washington as the best source of military
assistance. Nevertheless, the United States would not
necessarily have greater leverage, because Rabat and
Tunis would probably conclude that Washington
would be more dependent upon them. The degree to
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which Rabat and Tunis turned to Washington
probably would depend on the nature of the Algerian-
Libyan relationship. The closer the ties between
Algiers and Tripoli-particularly any hint of military
cooperation-the more willing Morocco and Tunisia
would be to cooperate with the United States, perhaps
even willing to discuss military facilities.
Relations between Washington and Algiers probably
would become more ambivalent. Algeria presumably
would want to continue to expand ties to the United
States to modernize its economy and military. To the
extent that Algiers felt compelled to placate Qadhafi,
however, it would have less incentive to cooperate
with Washington. Algeria may even decide to refrain
from acting as a political conduit to radical Arab
regimes. Qadhafi, for his part, would eliminate the
military threat from Algeria and co-opt a key ally of
Washington in the US effort to undermine the Libyan
regime.
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The Arab League and the
Question of Consensus
Consensus building in the Arab world occurs at times
of polarization and reflects the absence of a dominant
power capable of molding an effective majority
coalition. This recipe for deadlock has been especially
noticeable since Egypt was ejected from the Arab
mainstream in 1979 after it signed the Camp David
accords with Israel. Consensual decisionmaking is not
an Arab League requirement. It evolved as the Arabs
recognized that lack of policy coordination often
damaged their common interests. Inability to act,
however, has been the cost of consensus.
Using the Arab League as a forum for debate, Arab
leaders have sometimes tried to challenge the practice
of consensus decisionmaking, arguing that it ought to
be abandoned for the regional good when it frustrates
the will of the majority. Unless they can forge a
coalition strong enough to force dissenters into line,
they must abandon their quest, as Jordan's King
Hussein did in late 1985. Such attempts have failed
because minority states may retaliate against those
who challenge them and because the shifting nature
of Arab coalitions makes states cautious about
changing practices that might be used at another time
to protect their own interests.
1955, Arab leaders have complained about the
inability of the Arab League to act decisively on
important regional matters. In recent years, Saudi
and Jordanian leaders have raised the issue of
consensus and majority rule:
? Frustrated with League inaction on his Middle
Eastern peace proposals at the abortive Arab
summit meeting in November 1981, Saudi King
Fahd threatened to support a change from
consensus to majority rule. Syria, Algeria, and
South Yemen had successfully blocked Fahd's plan
after the Saudis made a highly visible commitment
to gain Arab and PLO leader Arafat's endorsement.
(A second Fez summit meeting in September 1982
endorsed Fahd's plan.)
? Jordan's King Hussein beginning in 1984 proposed
that consensus decisionmaking in the League be
replaced with majority rule because the consensual
approach allows a single country or small group of
states to block action on issues that strongly affect
the interests of the majority. Specifically, Hussein
was objecting to the hardline Arab states, led by
Syria, blocking progress toward a Jordanian peace
initiative.
Consensus and Arab Unity
Although the Arab League Pact does not require
consensus decisions, early League failures of policy
coordination led to the adoption of consensus-style
decisionmaking for regional questions. It was believed
that Arabs would have greater international leverage
and minimize their vulnerabilities if they worked out
internal differences and presented a unified position.
Achieving policy coordination through consensus has
had its problems. If a small group opposes the
dominant position, nothing can be done. Since at least
' These failures included lack of coordination during the 1948
Arab-Israeli war; the unilateral Jordanian decision to incorporate
the West Bank in 1950; the drawn-out dispute over Iraq's
adherence to the Baghdad Pact in the early 1950s; and the
protracted Yemeni civil war beginning in 1962, when League
members split over which side to support.
The special summit meeting in Casablanca last
August once more highlighted the debate, although it
did nothing to resolve it. The moderates talked
beforehand about proposing a change to majority rule
at the meeting, but, even though Syria, Libya,
Algeria, South Yemen, and Lebanon stayed away-
and important League actions are sometimes taken in
the absence of several members-those present chose
not to raise the voting issue. Hussein's inability to
gain sufficient support for his peace initiatives marked
an end to his challenge to consensus and a new
emphasis on unity, as embodied in reconciliation
efforts initiated at the meeting. The consensus
question could come up again as the Arab countries
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Decisionmaking Provisions in the Arab League Pact
A close look at League voting rules reveals surprising
flexibility. All important votes do not have to be
unanimous; many are made by two-thirds or even
simple majority. Article 7 states that only votes that
are unanimous will apply to all members; other
decisions are binding only upon those who support
them. League foreign ministers voted in 1984 over
Syrian and Libyan objections to condemn Iranian
attacks on Gulf shipping. Furthermore, even
requirements for unanimity have been interpreted to
apply only to members actually attending a meeting.
Perhaps the League's most dramatic action, the
expulsion of Egypt in 1979, was carried out in the
absence of Oman and Sudan, which boycotted the
meeting.
Article 7 also states that, in all cases, a member state
shall enforce the decisions of the Council "according
to its respective basic laws. "
Unanimous Vote Specifications. Article 18 states
that if a member fails to fulfill its obligations under
the League Pact, the Council can eject it by
unanimous vote (the accused state has no vote). This
was the provision used in 1979 to expel Egypt.
The Council also makes decisions about how to
respond to aggression against a member by
unanimous vote (Article 6).
Two-Thirds Majority Vote Requirements. Perhaps
the most important evidence for flexibility in League
rules is the regulation that proposals to change the
Pact can be approved by a two-thirds majority
(Article 19). Such amendments, however, must be
held for final action at the following session of the
Council. If a state rejects an amendment, it may
withdraw from League membership when the
amendment goes into effect (and is exempted from the
usual one-year notification usually required for
withdrawal). Thus, technically, if the moderates can
sustain a two-thirds majority over two sessions of the
Council (which take place no more than six months
apart), they can change the voting rules.
Other two-thirds majority requirements apply to
votes of the Joint Defense Council of the League and
the Council's appointment of the secretary general.
Simple Majority Votes. Decisions of the Council on
matters brought to the League for arbitration and
mediation and not concerning independence,
sovereignty, or territorial independence can be
decided by simple majority and are binding (Article
5). Administrative and procedural matters also
require only a majority vote of the Council (for
example, budget, personnel, regulations for
subordinate organs), according to Article 16.
In subordinate organs such as the committees for
economic, social and cultural, financial, and legal
affairs, voting is normally by simple majority.
prepare for the next summit meeting (tentatively
scheduled for March 1986), particularly should
reconciliation efforts fail.
The Arab League and the Issue of Consensus
The persistence of consensus decisionmaking in the
Arab League stems not from League rules, but from
the nature of Arab political relationships.
Nevertheless, the Arab League provides an arena
where these relationships are played out.
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The League Pact contains surprising flexibility in
voting procedures. The key provision stipulates that
only decisions made by unanimous consent are
binding on the entire membership; other decisions
bind only those who support them.
Many important votes-including amendment of the
Pact-are taken by two-thirds majority. Thus, the
moderates need only muster a two-thirds majority and
sustain it over two consecutive League meetings (held
no more than six months apart) to modify the Pact
and introduce majority rule.
League secretaries general have supported a switch to
majority vote in the Arab League Council since the
mid-1950s, with varying responses from the
membership depending upon whose interests were
threatened at the time.'
After Egypt signed the Camp David accords, League
deliberations on its ejection sparked a new effort to
rewrite the Pact to strengthen the majority. In 1980
committees were designated to suggest amendments
to the charter. The draft proposals gave the majority
more authority to pass resolutions over minority
opposition and strengthened the role of the secretary
general. A two-thirds majority would prevail in the
Council. A Supreme Council composed of heads of
state would have the power to enforce League
decisions with a pool of military forces. The proposals
were considered in 1982 and 1984 and failed to pass.
Failure To Change
Calls for majority rule, which usually come from
states seeking support for specific policies, can be read
as attempts to press an opposing minority to conform
rather than sincere efforts to end consensus:
? A member of a majority on one issue may hold
minority views on others, and most states are
reluctant to give up a tool that might be used to
protect their own interests.
2 Like the UN secretary general, the League's chief administrator
has authority beyond routine matters to the extent of his personal
effectiveness and powers of persuasion. The League secretary
general's often lengthy term in office adds to his potential power.
Current Secretary General Chedi Klibi strongly supports majority
rule.
? Minority states have means of retaliating against
those who attempt to push through measures they
oppose, such as terrorist attacks, support for
domestic opposition groups, and media campaigns.
The price for isolation is very high.
Even if the Council could make all important
decisions by majority vote the League would lack the
means to enforce them. The League has been a useful
vehicle for agreement when agreement was desired,
and occasionally as a forum in which to exert pressure
on a blacksheep, but its effective functioning has
always required that a desire for cooperation prevail.
It is by design an agency of coordination that lacks
the coercive powers of government. When Arabs are
polarized, the weak structure of the League provides
no mechanism to implement and enforce resolutions.
Thus, the Council fails most noticeably when the
membership is deeply split.
Consensus: Protection for the Weak
Consensus persists because it performs an important
function in the Arab world: weaker countries may
seek the security of consensus for self-protection.
Thus, at times when polarization is deep and there is
no strong state or states that can build a dominating
coalition, differences may be papered over in the
interest of "consensus" or "Arab unity."
Currently, the Arab world lacks a single dominant
leader. King Hussein and Syrian President Assad
have demonstrated leadership abilities and taken
initiatives to achieve well-developed objectives.
Hussein and Assad stand on opposite sides of every
key issue dividing the Arabs-the Iran-Iraq war
representation for the Palestinians, and willingness to
enter peace negotiations with Israel. Hussein's
initiative to form a moderate coalition strong enough
to change League rules made little progress in
convincing the vulnerable swing states-Saudi Arabia
and the smaller Gulf states-to risk the retaliation
that would ensue should they back the moderate
peace initiative opposed by Assad. So Hussein and
Assad, at least for the time being, are pursuing
reconciliation at Saudi urging and under the auspices
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of committees formed at the Casablanca summit
meeting last August.
For the time being, moderate protests against
consensus decisionmaking in the Arab League have
fallen silent. With no resolution to the impasse and
the moderate coalition crippled without Egypt, short-
term goals of regime security dominate the
moderates.
Outlook
So long as Egypt remains outside the Arab
mainstream and Iraq is weakened and distracted, the
Arab League is likely to continue to reflect the
polarization of the Arab world, with weaker states
taking refuge in consensus, giving the action-oriented
hardline minority, led by Syria, maximum room for
maneuver.
If stalemate persists in the Middle Eastern peace
negotiations, the League reconciliation phase will
continue, with all parties fully aware that little holds
it together except short-term interests:
? Assad's commitment to reconciliation is largely
tactical. He has assured the flow of Gulf state aid
and stymied the momentum toward peace that
Hussein had taken great risks to launch. Using the
threat of reconciliation with Jordan and Iraq, he
pressed the Iranians to resume oil shipments. So
long as the moderates do not undertake another
initiative-and bringing Egypt back into the
mainstream would be anathema to Syria-Assad
has little to lose by continuing the semblance of
consensus, pursuing his military buildup, and
enjoying his country's unprecedented influence in
Middle Eastern affairs.
? For his part, Hussein seems to have little choice but
to continue a low-visibility, low-risk consensus
strategy, ensuring the survival of his regime at least
for the short term, perhaps hoping that, in the
meantime, other participants in the peace talks will
break the deadlock.
Egyptian reintegration into the Arab mainstream
could restructure and strengthen the moderate
coalition and reduce Syria's influence in the Arab
world, but we regard this as an unlikely outcome:
? Syria will stop at nothing to keep Egypt out of the
Arab mainstream. Renewed Egyptian leadership in
the Arab world would challenge Assad's influence
and undermine his strategy.
? Saudi Arabia does not want to appear to endorse the
Camp David accords, as support for Egyptian
reintegration would imply, without a wider Arab
consensus. Moreover, the Saudis wish to avoid
having to make the painfully visible choice between
Syria and Egypt which Egyptian reintegration
would require. Finally, the Egyptians believe that
the Saudis view greater Egyptian influence as a
threat to their own position.
The improbable scenario in which Egypt returns to
the Arab fold and forms a new moderate coalition
would be the most likely context in which the
arguments for majority rule and against consensus
would once again be heard. In sum, demands for
majority rule arise when prospects appear good for
forging a strong alliance. Calls for consensus and
reconciliation are heard when states perceive
themselves weak and vulnerable and need to minimize
risk by seeking refuge in a broader coalition.
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Jordan: Who Will Follow
King Hussein?
Jordan's King Hussein, the longest reigning monarch
in the Middle East, is so closely identified with his
nation's government that few Jordanians can imagine
their country under another's rule. Over the years, the
monarch has become immensely popular because of
his charm and outgoing style, his ability to secure
Arab financial aid, and his finely honed diplomatic
skills. Jordanians are well aware of their country's
precarious position as a small, moderate Arab state
bordering Israel and Syria. King Hussein's success in
maintaining both his throne and his country's
stability-particularly since the Jordan-PLO civil war
in 1970-is widely attributed to his unique leadership
style
Because Jordan's continuity is so closely associated
with Hussein's highly personalized statecraft, the
issue of the succession is vital
Although we expect Hussein to rule Jordan for several
more years, the possibility for such unforeseen events
as assassination, accident, or serious illness remains.
Crown Prince Hassan
King Hussein's legal heir is his youngest brother,
Hassan ibn Talal. The 38-year-old Prince received a
B.A. degree in history and political science from
Oxford University in 1967 and is considered an expert
economist. The Crown Prince frequently serves as
regent in Hussein's absence and travels even more
extensively throughout Jordan than does the King.
Hussein highly respects
Hassan's judgment and has given him responsibility
for a number of social projects. For example, Hassan
participated in the drafting of Jordan's 1973-75 three-
year plan and the last two five-year plans (1976-80
and 1981-85). Hassan also founded the Royal
Scientific Society, which conducts much of Jordan's
development planning and research.
Like most Arab leaders, Hassan realizes it is
important to espouse the Palestinian cause publicly.
He has written two books on the subject: The
Palestine Question, and Palestinian Self
Determination: A Study of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. He has also made an extensive personal study
of demographic changes on the West Bank and Gaza
We believe that the most likely development after
Hussein's death would be a peaceful transfer of power
to the King's brother, Crown Prince Hassan, in
accordance with the Jordanian Constitution. The
military and most civilian sectors in Jordanian society
are loyal to Hussein and would be likely, at least
initially, to transfer their support to his designated
successor. Whether the Crown Prince could sustain
this support, however, will depend upon both
circumstance and his own leadership capabilities.'
Strip.
Hassan has gained the support of the Jordanian
business community, particularly young technocrats
who identify with his educational background and
pro-Western orientation, but he has alienated other
important sections of Jordanian society. Hassan
suffers from especially poor relations with the
Bedouin tribes, which make up most of the Jordanian
Army. In contrast to Hussein's easy relations with the
Bedouin, Hassan seems uncomfortable when visiting
and socializing with the tribal leadership.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Hassan's problems with the military are compounded
by the memory of his personal failure during the 1974
"Zarqa mutiny," when military officers refused to let
Hassan negotiate with the dissident Army leaders.
It would be impossible for Hassan to rule Jordan
without military support. The Crown Prince,
recognizing this fact, has invested a great deal of time
in courting the military, but he has achieved only
limited success. Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces Lt. Gen. Zayd bin Shakir is loyal to the
Hashemite family and would probably offer the new
King his full support. Whether this will be sufficient
to tie the entire Army to Hassan, however, is
uncertain.
Hassan's relationship to Jordan's majority Palestinian
population is also problematical. According to US
Embassy reporting, his pro-Palestinian activities have
won him some Palestinian support, but many deride
Hassan as responsible for convincing Hussein to
engage in the bloody 1970 showdown with the PLO.
intelligence, and concern for his people. Hassan's
devotion to his wife and family is widely admired, as
is his reputation for piety-a major asset in a country
where the legitimacy of the throne stems from the
King's claim to be directly descended from the
Prophet. These personal attributes, as well as the
overwhelming preference of most Jordanians for
continuing stability under Hashemite rule, are likely
to be Hassan's greatest assets.
Prince Abdallah
The King's eldest son, 23-year-old Prince Abdallah, is
a possible contender to the throne. Abdallah was left
out of the succession because his mother, British-born
Princess Muna, was not born a Muslim. Recent press
articles, however, have speculated that King Hussein
wishes to replace Hassan with Abdallah as Crown
Prince.
Like his father, Abdallah has an aptitude for military
affairs and is developing a reputation as a dynamic
leader. Abdallah,
currently a first lieutenant in the Jordanian armed
forces, has earned the respect and admiration of
officers and enlisted men alike for his competence and
dashing personality. His involvement in such sports as
race car driving and parachuting has inspired growing
support among younger Jordanians, as have his recent
activities as a spokesman for Arab youth concerns.
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Hassan's problems are compounded by the
widespread popular perception that he i
at times, overbearing. He has also been criticized
Ti oa tendency to analyze domestic and foreign policy
issues in an overly simplistic manner-behavior that
contrasts starkly with his brother's sophistication. US
Embassy officers believe, however, that Hassan is
aware of his limitations and is trying to change his
image by assuming a more prominent public role.
Jordanians may doubt Hassan's ability to cope with
critical internal and international problems, but
few doubt his honesty,
Those who favor a more charismatic leader than
Hassan note that Hussein himself inherited the throne
at only 17 years of age.
many Jordanians favor Abdallah because he has had
no involvement with past incidents-like the Zarqa
mutiny-that have damaged Hassan's credibility.
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Despite these arguments, Hussein is unlikely to
change the succession in Abdallah's favor in the near
term. Hussein's chief concern over the succession is
how it will affect Jordan's political stability. He
probably will not change existing arrangements unless
Prince All
The 10-year-old Prince Ali, Hussein's son by his third
and only Arab wife, Queen Alia, is second in line to
the throne. King Hussein could conceivably name Ali
his heir if he comes of age before Hussein's death, but
such a move is unlikely. Hassan would, by that time,
have over 27 years of experience in Jordanian politics
and would almost certainly be more acceptable as a
ruler to the Jordanian public
Impact of Succession on US Interests
Hassan would almost certainly continue Hussein's
moderate, conservative policies. We believe that he
would place great importance in maintaining close,
cooperative ties to the United States in military and
economic matters and continue King Hussein's
cautious approach to Middle Eastern peace
negotiations
The crucial issue for the United States is whether
Hassan, as King, would have the leadership ability to
maintain both his throne and Jordan's moderating
influence on Middle Eastern politics. As Hussein's
heir, Hassan is likely at least initially to inherit the
support of the Jordanian public. How long this
support lasts will be as much a question of luck as of
the new monarch's abilities. If he comes to power at a
time of crisis-or if Jordan's adversaries try to use the
change of leadership for their own advantage-
Hassan's lack of experience may lead to political
instability.
We believe Palestinian support of the monarchy will
be crucial to a smooth transition. The Palestinian
presence in the country is seen by many Jordanians as
the country's greatest potential internal threat,
particularly with the relocation to Jordan of some
PLO administrative offices and military units after
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Although we do
not believe this PLO presence poses a direct threat to
the regime, the power vacuum created by a weak
leader could trigger a Palestinian response similar to
1970.
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Egypt: Politics in the
Senior Officer Corps
Rumors of a serious rift between President Mubarak
and his Defense Minister have fueled speculation that
Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala may be on
his way out. Mubarak, however, would be hard
pressed to replace the popular field marshal, a key
figure in building the US-Egyptian military
relationship. Mubarak will have to find a Defense
Minister who can maintain military cohesion and
loyalty while effectively coping with domestic strains
caused by increasing economic stringencies. Looking
ahead, Mubarak is likely to screen senior officers now
in line for top command positions on the basis of their
loyalty to minimize military dissatisfaction with his
government and policies. Economic hardships may
bring demands for increased US assistance, but future
military leaders, more sensitive to domestic pressures,
may prove less cooperative with the United States.
Abu Ghazala Under Fire
Rumors that Abu Ghazala was in disfavor with
Mubarak have persisted for some time, but they
became more pronounced in the aftermath of the
Achille Lauro hijacking. US Embassy sources say
Abu Ghazala was privately critical of Mubarak's
decision not to use force to resolve the hijacking and
to turn the hijackers over to the PLO in Tunis. Abu
Ghazala's openly pro-US attitudes left him vulnerable
to critics incensed by the US diversion of the Egyptian
airliner carrying the hijackers. At the time, the local
gossip was that Mubarak planned to sack him.
In late November the Defense Minister was again the
object of opposition criticism for the inept Egyptian
commando operation in Malta. A quickly staged
People's Assembly debate produced a resolution
backing the government's actions and diverted
criticism to the media for initial exaggerated claims of
success in the bloody rescue operation.
the Defense Minister
has enemies within the Cabinet, led by foreign affairs
adviser al-Baz. The reshuffle that followed Prime
Minister Ali's resignation last September stripped
Abu Ghazala of allies and left him virtually isolated.
The Defense Minister is also vulnerable to charges of
corruption. Before the Achille Lauro incident, there
was a resurgence of rumors about market
manipulation and shady deals in land, iron and steel,
A counterforce to Abu Ghazala's critics-and a
deterrent to hasty action by President Mubarak-is
the Defense Minister's popularity within the
politically influential military establishment.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Mubarak installed Lt. Gen. Ibrahim al-Urabi as
armed forces Chief of Staff to counterbalance the
Defense Minister and prevent formation of a coalition
that could threaten the power of the President. Abu
Ghazala's skill as a politician and popularity within
the most powerful interest group in Egypt probably
explain the often reported rifts with President
Mubarak.
Problems With the Chief of Staff
The man in line to succeed the Defense Minister is
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant
Urabi, but hi
only marginal diplomatic skills do not equip him
well for the position.
morale in
the Egyptian officer corps was low and resentment
high because of Urabi's arbitrary disciplinary actions
against senior officers for seemingly minor offenses.
The clumsy commando raid on the hijacked Egyptian
airliner in Malta has prompted some criticism of Abu
Ghazala, but it may have a more damaging impact on
Urabi. many officers
attribute the ineptitude of the commandos to Urabi's
refusal to release funds for foreign training and
equipment. In mid-December Urabi personally
supervised the implementation of a new program to
retrain and reequip "Group 777" to counter criticism
that his austerity measures affected the group's
performance.
Urabi often enforces unpopular decisions-
particularly belt-tightening measures-within the
military. He has the kind of aloof, no-nonsense
personality ideally suited to the role he has to
perform. We believe the Defense Minister takes
advantage of this and allows his Chief of Staff to do
the dirty work, while listening to grievances and
enhancing his own popularity.
A New Chief of Staff?
Under Egyptian law the Defense Minister and the
Chief of Staff cannot be replaced simultaneously. If
President Mubarak plans to cashier Abu Ghazala, he
may have to replace Urabi first with a candidate more
acceptable to the military. Then, after an appropriate
breaking-in period, he can allow Abu Ghazala to
retire and promote the new Chief of Staff to Defense
Minister. Chief of Operations Maj. Gen. Ahmad Abd
al-Halim Salah appears to be the most likely
He has
been extended for an unprecedented ninth year in
grade, a conspicuous exception to the military's rigid
"up-or-out" rule. Salah is also reported to be a close
associate of Urabi, which minimizes chances that he
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would form a coalition with Abu Ghazala against
Mubarak. Salah is highly respected within the
Egyptian military and would have their confidence
and support.
Although Mubarak could appoint a civilian as
Minister of Defense, he is not likely to go against the
practice of keeping a military man in the office. The
Army has long been the dominant service in Egypt,
and for the near term Army officers have the inside
track to the three highest military posts. Nevertheless,
it is possible that Air Force or air defense officers
could rise to one of the top positions, since Mubarak, a
former Air Force officer, still has friends within that
service.
Rising Stars
Recent shuffles in the senior officer corps reveal
which officers are in line for armed forces Chief of
Staff and the major service commands. The Egyptian
military places great importance on seniority as a
criterion for promotion to higher office. Within the
armed services, the Chief of Operations is normally
viewed as the top contender for Chief of Staff, who, in
turn, is likely to replace the service commander.
Usually a major command provides the steppingstone
for the post of Chief of Operations. An individual
whose performance is unsatisfactory is either shunted
aside or allowed to retire.
According to these criteria, the following are likely
candidates for key leadership positions in the near
future:
? Third Army Commander Maj. Gen. Hasan Husayn
Zayat is seen as a probable replacement for
Operations Chief Salah. Zayat has seniority over
Second Army Commander Abd al-Munim Sa'id,
who assumed his command in December 1985.
? The rising star in the Air Force is Maj. Gen. Ala
Barakat, whose meteoric succession from Chief of
Air Force Operations to Air Force Chief of Staff
makes him the most likely successor to Air Marshal
Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Helmi, who may retire
in 1986.
? Air Defense Commander Lieutenant General
Hamdi, also a classmate of Mubarak and Abu
Ghazala, will probably leave his post to Major
General Khalil, his Chief of Staff.
? The current front-runner in the Navy is recently
appointed Chief of Staff Rear Adm. Ahmad Midhat
Ghanim
When Rising Stars Fall
Two promising careers recently came to an end
because the officers chose to challenge their superiors.
Pride may have led to their downfall, but the
circumstances surrounding their demotions may also
reflect growing tensions within the officer corps.
Mubarak visited the Second Army a week later to
announce an increase in the overtime bonus paid to
officers.
a been s i e o e
post of Director of Organization and Administration
for the Defense Ministry-a dead end job.
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The fall of Air Vice Marshal Abd al-Rahman in
December dashed any possibility that he would
become Air Force Chief of Staff.
officers dependent on the President's personal
patronage.
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Outlook
Because the military is the principal guarantor of the
government's stability, President Mubarak will want
to keep the armed forces squarely behind him during
the troubled times that are likely to come with the
country's increasing economic problems. He probably
will press the People's Assembly for concessions on
bread-and-butter issues important to the officer corps,
but these are likely to fall short of the military's
expectations. Mubarak, therefore, will want to ensure
that key military leaders are personally loyal to him to
minimize the possibility of military disaffection with
his regime. To bind the military more closely to his
personal fortunes, Mubarak may try to weed out
proteges of Abu Ghazala to undercut the Defense
Minister's influence and build a cadre of senior
When Abu Ghazala steps down-voluntarily or not-
the United States will lose an effective supporter
within the Egyptian military. If Urabi succeeds him,
bilateral military relations are not likely to run so
smoothly.
Unbuffered by Abu Ghazala's perspectives and
authority, Urabi's impact on the Defense Ministry
could be divisive-even destructive.
military bureaucracy.
Leadership changes in the near term are not likely to
produce a major shift in the direction of bilateral
military relations. Most of the rising stars in the
senior officer corps are known to be pro-Western
military professionals, but they lack Abu Ghazala's
broad power base and ability to manipulate the
economic woes.
Looking ahead, we believe that, as Egypt's economic
problems increase, the military will become more
demanding of greater US assistance. Even if US aid
grows, it is not likely to produce visible results. The
United States may be regarded with increasing
frequency as the cause, not the cure, of Egypt's
Domestic stresses are more likely to cast future
military leaders in a different mold. The armed forces
probably will face increasing domestic criticism of
their consumption of dwindling resources and
accusations of dependence on the United States. In
addition, the growing number of Islamic
fundamentalists will be represented in the conscript
force-and possibly in the junior officer corps.
Conditioned by this changing environment, the
Egyptian military may become less cooperative with
the United States and more assertive of their
country's nonalignment.
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Saudi Arabia:
Seeking Markets for
Petrochemicals
Saudi Arabia is aggressively seeking markets for its
expanding petrochemical exports. It has spent over
$14. billion developing its petrochemical industry and
is looking for a return on this investment. Riyadh is
attempting to negotiate trade agreements with the
European Community (EC), Japan, and the United
States to gain increased access for its petrochemical
production but has had little success to date. Saudi
Arabia recognizes the limits to export growth in the
West and has begun to seek additional markets. It has
approached the Chinese directly and the Soviets
through third parties and appears uninhibited by the
absence of political relations with these potential
trading partners.
The Petrochemical Investment Program
Saudi Arabia began developing its petrochemical
industry in the oil boom years of the 1970s. Its current
five-year plan calls for a tripling of the Saudi share of
the world petrochemical market-currently 2
percent-by 1990. Production will come from capital-
intensive facilities that enjoy major economies of scale
because of their efficient design, colocation with other
petroleum activities, and cheap natural gas
feedstock-approximately one-sixth the price of
natural gas in Western Europe and North America.
More than half of Saudi production will be aimed at
the export market. The primary exports will be
methanol and plastics, which are derived from
ethylene. Exportable products include linear low-
density polyethylene, high-density polyethylene,
polyvinylchloride, styrene, ethylene glycol, and urea
fertilizer. These petrochemicals are used in such
common products as bottles, phonograph records,
styrofoam, synthetic rubber tires, antifreeze, and
polyester
Although Saudi Arabia's petrochemical exports face a
glutted market, Riyadh is determined to sell its
output. Sales of petrochemicals-about $650 million
last year-have become more important to the
country as oil revenues continue to slide. Oil earnings
fell to an estimated $25 billion last year, down from a
peak of $110 billion in 1981, leaving Riyadh with a
record $25 billion current account deficit this fiscal
year. When all Saudi petrochemical plants are
completed and operating at capacity, they will
produce about $3 billion of exportable products.
EC-GCC Trade Friction
EC petrochemical producers are becoming
increasingly concerned about the prospect of a flood
of low-cost Saudi petrochemicals entering their
markets. In recent years, the Europeans have closed
over 20 petrochemical plants and laid off 70,000
workers, compounding their already worrisome
unemployment problem. The situation worsened last
year when the Saudis began to cut petrochemical
prices to gain a larger market share and circumvent
OPEC price guidelines, which do not cover petroleum
products.
In June 1984, responding to growing protectionist
pressure, the EC imposed a 13.4-percent tariff on
Saudi methanol exports, straining EC-Saudi relations.
Earlier that year, the Saudis had exceeded the very
small duty-free import limit allowed under the EC's
Generalized System of Preferences. They requested
tariff exemption, but the EC claimed that the
industry had strategic importance and needed
protection while it was restructuring. The Saudis
continued to press the EC to abandon the duty or to
raise its duty-free quotas, and further European
rebuffs prompted the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC)-led by Saudi Arabia-to threaten retaliatory
tariffs on European exports. The Gulf states
constitute the EC's third-largest export market.
Tensions between the EC and the GCC eased
somewhat following trade talks in Bahrain last
March, despite significant differences in their
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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Completion
Date
Estimated Cost
(billion US $)
Annual Production
Capacity (1,000 metric
tons)
Al-Jubail Petrochemical
Company
Exxon
National Methanol Company
Celanese, Texas
Eastern
Jubail
Arabian Petrochemical
Company
Jubail
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries
Corporation
Agip Neste Oy
Jubail
Jubail
1985
1986
0.4
NA
254
500
Saudi Petrochemical Company
Shell
Jubail
1985
2.8
2,060
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer
Company
Dammam
Onstream
0.3
450
Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company
Taiwan Fertilizer
Jubail
Eastern Petrochemical
Company
Japanese Consortium
Jubail
Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical
Company
Mobil
Yanbu
negotiating positions. Gulf officials advocated a two-
phase agreement: the first phase to guarantee
preferential access for their petrochemical and
petroleum product exports, and the second phase to
include broad discussions on trade. The Europeans
refused to commit themselves to the GCC agenda and
saw the talks as purely exploratory.
In August the EC imposed a 14-percent tariff on
imports of Saudi polyethylene. The duty surprised
Saudi officials because polyethylene imports from the
kingdom equaled only 1 percent of polyethylene
production in the EC. Saudi officials told EC
Commissioner Cheysson that they opposed the
erection of trade barriers and that they considered the
tariffs a blow to Saudi prestige, according to the US
Embassy in Riyadh. King Fahd prepared a plan to
impose a 15-percent duty on all EC exports to the
Kingdom, but the
plan has been shelved. Meanwhile, to conciliate the
Saudis, the EC Commission advocated increased
duty-free ceilings for all key Gulf petrochemical
exports.
Despite their anger at the imposition of the new tariff,
the GCC pushed for an accord with the EC, and a
ministerial meeting was held with EC leaders in
Luxembourg last October. The parties reached an
interim agreement-to last through 1986-under
which the EC agreed to advise the GCC when tariff
action on a GCC export was imminent. The
agreement was tested less than a month later when,
after warning Riyadh, the EC imposed a tariff on
Saudi ethylene glycol products. The tariff was
withdrawn under pressure from Riyadh, and the GCC
agreed to subject their petrochemical exports to
normal EC tariffs.
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Talks With the United States and Japan
The Saudis-under GCC cover-began to press for
exploratory economic talks with the United States last
March, probably as a result of disappointment over
progress in their talks with the Europeans and fear of
growing US protectionist pressures. The GCC
proposed an agenda for a first round of talks in
December that would include trade and market
access, energy-excluding price and production
levels-investments and financial safeguards, and
technology transfer and industrial cooperation.
The first round of US-GCC talks revealed the GCC's
lack of clearly defined objectives, according to the US
Embassy in Riyadh.
Another negotiating session is
scheduled for late spring in the United States during
which the parties will try to refine the issues further.
GCC talks with the Japanese are still in the
preliminary stages. The GCC first proposed
exploratory trade talks last July. Tokyo was reluctant
to agree, however, because it fears that the GCC
would view the talks as a preamble to negotiations for
some kind of bilateral agreement similar to that
proposed with the EC-Japan prefers to conduct
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Nonetheless, the Japanese
petrochemical industry is showing some willingness to
reduce domestic production to accommodate more
imports from Saudi Arabia and the United States,
according to the US Embassy in Tokyo.
The GCC has continued to push for talks, despite
Japanese reluctance. In September, GCC Secretary
General Bishara visited Japan to discuss future
economic negotiations. His presentation was not well
received, however, and the visit set the talks back
several months when Bishara mistakenly referred to
the possibility of a formal agreement, upsetting the
Japanese.
Seeking New Markets
Saudi Arabia's lack of success in negotiating
increased access for its petrochemical exports in the
United States, EC, and Japan has led it to seek other
markets. It is continuing to play these Western
producers against one another, but it has recently
approached China and the USSR, hoping to gain
access to those markets.
Riyadh began negotiating an economic agreement
with China last October that would include
petrochemicals as well as crude oil. Beijing earlier
agreed to conditions the Saudis set for the talks,
which,
stipulated that Riyadh would not break its ties to
Taiwan or establish diplomatic relations with China,
at least for now. The talks were attended by high-level
Foreign Ministry officials as well as technical advisers
and appear to have resulted in the basis for a trade
agreement.
The Saudis apparently are already selling
petrochemicals to China through third parties.
Several Japanese middlemen have been involved in
these sales, In
addition, Saudi Arabia is negotiating a sale of
360,000 metric tons of methanol-more than a
quarter of its annual methanol exports-to China
through the Netherlands.
The Saudis also are using foreign trading companies
to sell petrochemical products to the USSR
have never directly exported any petrochemicals to
the USSR, and only 1 percent of Saudi imports are
from the USSR and other Communist countries.
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Outlook
Saudi Arabia will continue to press for GCC-wide
trade agreements with the United States, EC, and
Japan using the threat of retaliatory tariffs in a
carrot-and-stick approach to gain increased market
access. The Saudis probably believe that these
countries have few alternatives but to negotiate and
that each wishes to avoid falling out of favor with the
GCC and possibly losing access to a lucrative export
market.
Riyadh probably will also continue to seek new export
markets for its petrochemicals in the USSR, China,
and elsewhere, even if trade agreements with the
Western states are concluded. As Saudi economic
difficulties mount, Riyadh is becoming interested in
pursuing economic relations with Communist states.
Although the Saudis probably are still weighing the
political tradeoffs of direct trade with the Chinese and
Soviets, they may be willing to improve relations with
both countries if sufficient economic rewards result.
however, the Saudis will threaten and probably will
carry out retaliatory measures-through the GCC-
to try to defend its interests in the US market.
Tensions between Western petrochemical producers
probably will increase as long as Riyadh is
unsuccessful in finding new markets for its
petrochemical exports. The EC is likely to push the
United States and Japan to share the burden of
additional imports of Gulf petrochemicals, which they
believe they will be forced to accommodate. EC
officials predict that 50 million metric tons a year of
refined oil products will come into the world market
from the Gulf region in 1985-90 and that they can
absorb only 20 million tons of this total.
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Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese need to import
Saudi petrochemical products, but they probably
would do so on a small scale to develop their links to
Riyadh. Beijing exports its own oil and petroleum
products but is eager to develop economic relations
with Saudi Arabia primarily to induce Riyadh to
break relations with Taiwan. The Chinese market for
Saudi oil and petrochemicals, however, is too small by
itself to prompt the Saudis to take such a step. The
Soviets would welcome trade ties to Riyadh in the
hope of eventually reestablishing diplomatic relations.
Implications for the United States
An economic dialogue with the GCC offers the
United States potential commercial advantages in the
region-including preferential access to the Gulf
market. An economic agreement also would serve as
an important political gesture to GCC members. For
its part, Riyadh will continue to cite the importance of
its petrochemical industry and stress the need to
maintain good Saudi-US relations. Riyadh is
particularly sensitive to its growing trade deficit with
the United States-nearly $2 billion last year. If
trade talks falter and US protectionist pressure grows,
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The Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain: A Catalyst
for Change
The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
(IFLB}-an Iranian-backed Shia dissident group-
poses a serious terrorist threat to the island state. The
group is working to facilitate Tehran's goal of
establishing an Islamic republic in Bahrain and is
using terrorist tactics to achieve this aim. Operatives
of the IFLB have been apprehended over the past two
years on missions to assassinate top government
leaders, sabotage key economic installations, and
subvert or neutralize intelligence units. Although the
group has not previously attacked US targets, it seeks
to end the US presence in Bahrain and thus poses a
potential threat to US personnel and facilities.
Iranian ayatollah.
Mudarassi was Khomeini's personal
representative to Bahrain following the Iranian
revolution but was expelled because of his subversive
activities among Bahraini Shias.
Background
We believe the IFLB is the largest of the Iranian-
backed Shia dissident organizations in the Arab states
of the Persian Gulf. The group was established in
1979 following the emergence of the Khomeini regime
in Iran and has since aggressively recruited and
trained Bahraini Shias. The group's most notorious
act was an abortive coup attempt in Bahrain in
December 1981, which resulted in some 70 arrests.
Bahrain is susceptible to Iranian-sponsored subversion
for several reasons. It is the only Arab Gulf state with
a Shia majority-some 70 percent of the population.
According to US Embassy reporting, complaints
against the ruling family for corruption and greed are
rising, and demonstrations during Ashura-a Shia
holy period-have grown more disruptive each year.
The Bahraini economy, moreover, is gripped by a
recession. Because Shias historically have been the
economic underdogs, they believe they are bearing the
brunt of the economic downturn and their discontent
is rising.
Leadership and Organization
The IFLB's headquarters is in Tehran
Its leader, Abd al-Hadi Muhammad Mudarassi,
Bahraini security officials believe the IFLB's current
membership is at least 1,500 and could be larger
because the group's clandestine and cellular structure
makes reliable estimates difficult. Large numbers of
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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local sympathizers add to the group's effectiveness by
August 1979 IFLB leader Abd al-Hadi
Muhammad Mudarassi expelled
from Bahrain.
December 1981 Coup attempt foiled.
Bomb explodes prematurely in
London, killing two Bahrainis.
Bahraini Embassy likely target.
June 1981 Murder of Bahraini security
officer. IFLB member confesses in
July 1985.
December 1984 Five incidents of sabotage against
telecommunications facilities in
probable attempt to disrupt
Independence Day.
June 1985 Eight Bahrainis arrested and
expelled from London for
involvement in anti-Bahraini
activities.
hunger strike.
Martyrdom expected to coincide
with Ashura demonstrations and
incite discontent.
September 1985 IFLB member confessed to
planning suicide car bombing of
government building in
November. Prime Minister's son
likely target.
providing funds and tacit support.
Goals and Strategy
The IFLB is dedicated to overthrowing the ruling
Sunni Muslim Khalifa family and establishing an
Islamic republic along Iranian lines. The IFLB also
calls for eliminating corruption and Western
influence, including revoking the US Navy Middle
East Force's right to use local port facilities
The IFLB's strategy is to use a small cadre of well-
trained, fanatic Shia fundamentalists to spearhead a
revolution among the discontented Shia community.
IFLB leader
Mudarassi believes a successful revolution requires
the support of at least 40 percent of the Shia
community. Consequently, Mudarassi stresses that
every opportunity must be seized to incite hatred
among the people toward the Khalifa government and
to revive the belief that Bahrain belongs to the Shias.
Mudarassi contends that the elements for promoting
such hatred exist in Bahrain, and it only requires a
group of well-trained activists to "light the fuse."
Tactics
The IFLB's primary tactics are terrorist actions that
could destabilize the government or serve as catalysts
Among its recent efforts:
? n ormation on the activities and routine of the
Amir and his ministers.
? Identification of Bahraini security and intelligence
personnel and their families.
? Security arrangements at the US Embassy.
? Layouts of the Jaww prison where IFLB members
are detained, Government House, the police fort
(Ministry of Interior), and new government
buildings.
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Key IFLB Personalities
Abd al-Hadi Muhammad Mudarassi:
Leader, Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
An extremist by all accounts, Abd al-Hadi
Muhammad Mudarassi retains the tacit support of
high placed Iranian clerics and has used his access to
Tehran radio to incite IFLB supporters. His
extremism has often conflicted with Iranian foreign
policy and embarrassed Tehran.
he has fallen out of favor with
Khomeini after serving briefly as Khomeini's
personal representative" in Bahrain in 1979. In 1982
he was tried in absentia in Bahrain for planning and
helping execute a 1981 coup attempt. While Hadi no
longer enjoys the power he had before the coup
attempt, he retains close ties to Ayatollah Montazeri,
Khomeini's announced successor,
Now in his late thirties Hadi, a
Hojjat al-Islam (one rank below Ayatollah), helped
found the fundamentalist umbrella group known as
Islamic Action with his brother Taqi and their uncle,
Muhammad Husayn Mahdi Shirazi.
Muhammad Taqi Mudarassi
Intelligent, pragmatic, and a good organizer,
Muhammad Taqi
Mudarassi enjoys good relations with the Iranian
leadership-especially Ayatollah Khomeini, of whom
he is a disciple. Since September 1984, Taqi has
directed the activities of all Iranian-controlled Shia
dissident groups operating in the Gulf. He works
closely with his brother Hadi in controlling the IFLB.
Taqi, about 40, is also a Hojjat al-Islam and a
doctor of Islamic law. He served as Khomeini's
liaison with Shia groups inside Iran before the
overthrow of the Shah. Taqi replaced his uncle
Muhammad Husayn Mahdi Shirazi as head of
Muhammad Husayn Mahdi Shirazi
The 65-year-old Shirazi continues to serve as
spiritual inspiration to many IFLB membersfrom his
home in Qom, Iran. He has played only a limited role
in Islamic Action activities, however, since he lost
leadership of the group to his nephew, Muhammad
Taqi Mudarassi, in 1981. Shirazifell into disfavor
because of his contacts with Ayatollah Shariat-
Madari (a rival to Khomeini) and the perception on
the part of Iran's leaders that his political ambitions
conflicted with theirs. A capable organizer,
hirazi helped found Islamic
Action with his nephews in 1979. Although he claims
to be an Ayatollah, his status is not recognized by
most Iranian clergymen.
Mustafa Hashim Rida Musawi
Musawi, a 28-year-old Bahraini Shia militant
imprisoned in Bahrain, chose martyrdom to further
the IFLB cause. The IFLB persuaded him to begin a
hunger strike on 25 August 1985 in the hope that his
death would coincide with the sacred Shia holiday of
Ashura (24 September),
Musawi began intravenous feeding on 16 September
after Bahraini authorities transferred him from
prison to the officers' wing of a hospital. In late
September, Musawi's father, visiting at the behest of
Bahraini authorities, persuaded him to take some
nourishment. Ashura passed without major incident,
but Bahraini authorities are concerned that, should
Musawi die, his martyrdom could set off a new round
of antiregime violence.
Islamic Action in 1981.
? Procedures for entering the police fort in Manama
and restricted areas of the airport.
? Information about the building used to control
security on the Bahraini-Saudi causeway.
Propaganda plays an important role in the IFLB's
activities. The group uses literature, mosques, prayer
houses, and front organizations, such as the Islamic
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Association of Bahraini Students, to exploit Shia
economic, political, and religious grievances. Recent
practices include:
? The IFLB broadcasts a daily four-hour Arabic
"Voice of the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain"
program to Bahrain from Tehran's state-run radio.
The program has called on the people of Bahrain "to
take to the streets and resist with your chests the
bullets of the soldiers of the ruling regime in
Bahrain and ... learn the lessons of the revolution
in Iran."
? In August, an imprisoned IFLB member began a
hunger strike at the direction of the IFLB
command, which hoped his martyrdom would
coincide with the Ashura demonstrations.
? A magazine article published in Tehran in August
alleged that members of the ruling Khalifa family
and various government ministers were linked to a
prostitution network in Manama.
? In September, an IFLB leaflet appeared to
implicate the Bahrain security service in the death
of a popular Bahraini mullah. The leaflet surfaced
again in November attacking the government, the
security organizations, and their US supporters.
IFLB propaganda probably is quite effective in
attracting radical recruits
effectiveness of IFLB propaganda in inflaming and
rallying the Shia community, however, is limited by
the IFLB's clandestine structure, its strong
identification with Iran, and the lack of central
leadership within Bahrain.
Sources of Support
The IFLB receives extensive Iranian support. Iran
provides propaganda material, funding, and assistance
in infiltrating into Bahrain. Iranian officials also help
to identify potential recruits and conduct ideological
and religious indoctrination and military training.
Bahraini security officials, for example, have
identified hundreds of Bahraini Shias who have
received training in military and terrorist techniques
in Iran, Syria, or Lebanon, and the security service
believes some 200 IFLB members are undergoing
training in Iran.
In Bahrain, the IFLB receives generous contributions
from prominent Shia families, wealthy merchants,
and others who apparently want to hedge their bets in
the event of a revolution. We are uncertain of the
extent of cooperation between the IFLB and the
Islamic Call Party (Dawa)-Bahrain's other major
Shia dissident group. Leaders of the two groups,
however, have clashed in the past, and the Dawa has
accused the IFLB of poaching potential recruits
arriving in Iran from Bahrain.
Implications
The Government of Bahrain remains in power
through economic incentives and the effectiveness of
its security and intelligence services. A successful
terrorist action inflicting a heavy blow on the security
forces or removing the top leadership could result in
widespread demonstrations that the regime would be
hard pressed to control, according to US Embassy
reporting.
The IFLB's elaborate network of cells and supporters
also poses a threat to US personnel and facilities. In
Manama, the Administrative Support Unit for the US
Middle East Naval Force and Central Command is
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particularly vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The
IFLB, moreover, could hamper the ability of US
military forces to operate effectively if the United
States becomes militarily involved in the Persian
Gulf. US contingency planning envisions some use of
Gulf facilities, but they are vulnerable to sabotage.
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Divide and Rule: Soviet Regional
Policy in Afghanistan
Soviet operations in Afghanistan are evolving in a way
that suggests a regionally differentiated strategy that
demographic trends reinforce. Such a strategy
appears to entail pacifying, assimilating, and
economically exploiting the region north of the Hindu
Kush; fomenting tribal divisions in the east;
neutralizing and bypassing the central Hazarehjat
region; and depopulating the southwest to deny it to
the resistance. The Soviets may believe that a regional
approach to the war offers them the best prospect of
controlling strategically important parts of the
country in the medium term, while long-run trends in
the region work to their advantage. Their ability to
control northern Afghanistan will be essential to the
success of this strategy.
The Demographic Backdrop
Population flows in Afghanistan are stabilizing after
five years of major war-engendered shifts. Over half
the prewar population of Afghanistan has probably
relocated since the war began. Between 25 and 33
percent of the preinvasion population are estimated to
have been driven out of the country, and another 25
percent have moved to cities to seek refuge. Internal
redistribution of the population also seems to have
slowed, as cities and refugee camps have become less
attractive for resettlement. The massive 75-percent
growth in urban population between 1979 and 1985,
for example, seems to have peaked.
These shifts are probably enabling Moscow to plan a
regional strategy with some degree of certainty.
Conceptually, the Soviets probably divide the country
into four regions, based both on their perceived
strategic importance and their ethnic makeup:
? Northern Afghanistan. The north's nine provinces
bordering the Soviet Union have the greatest ethnic
affinity with Soviet Central Asia. It is also the
region where the Soviets have the greatest economic
interests and where they are best poised to project
military power.
? The Hazarehjat. This central region of Afghanistan
is characterized by its predominantly Shia
population, its isolation, and its lack of strategic
importance.
? Southeastern Afghanistan. This mountainous
territory is critical to the resistance because of its
proximity to Pakistan, and to Moscow because it
contains the politically important capital, Kabul.
The area's largely Pashtun society is tribally based.
? Southwestern Afghanistan. The mountainous,
desert region bordering Iran and Pakistan's
Baluchistan is inhabited by the Baluch and Pashtun
tribes, which have historically resisted foreign
domination. The region is geopolitically significant
because of its relative closeness to the Persian Gulf.
These features provide incentives for the Soviets to
tailor their strategy in Afghanistan to local
geographic, ethnographic, and demographic
characteristics.
Assimilating Northern Afghanistan
Soviet regional strategy depends on assimilating-but
not formally annexing-northern Afghanistan to
Soviet Central Asia. With an eye toward subduing the
population, Moscow is pursuing a relatively less
aggressive military policy. According to media and
resistance sources, the Soviets do not appear to be
undertaking military operations against the civilian
population or the agricultural infrastructure. The flat,
open terrain, moreover, inhibits guerrilla activity and
allows Soviet forces to cross the border rapidly to
conduct counterinsurgency operations.
* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively
on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this
Agency. The views expressed are those of the author.
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The Soviets are investing heavily in northern
Afghanistan and appear to be integrating it
economically with the USSR. Their economic
investment here-which is largely in minerals and
industry-is much greater than in any other region.
The high level of Soviet economic activity serves to tie
the northern economy and its labor force into the
Soviet economy and suggests that Moscow will
continue to moderate its military activity in the region
to protect its investment. The degree of economic
integration, moreover, belies Soviet claims of seeking
an independent, albeit friendly, Afghanistan ruled
from Kabul.
Politically, the Soviets seem to be banking on
appealing to the ethnic minorities in the region and
their affinity to Soviet Central Asians. Propaganda
printed in local languages promotes Central Asian
figures and history. The Afghan Ministry of
Nationalities and Tribal Affairs, under KHAD's
direction, oversees the effort. The Afghan official in
charge of the northern zone-a Central Committee
member-was praised publicly by President Babrak
Karmal for his effectiveness in pacifying the north.
The pacification of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens
also has historic precedents, in contrast to tribal areas
south of the Hindu Kush.
The Soviets are also relying on coercive measures in
the north. These include intimidation, economic
coercion, infiltration, and military reprisals against
uncooperative villages. The coercive apparatus in the
north differs markedly from other areas of the
country. The police and militia outnumber regular
Afghan forces by almost 3 to I an extremely high
ratio. The locally recruited police and militia probably
serve as a specialized force for local control. This
arrangement may prove more acceptable to the local
population, who have traditionally resented control by
Pashtuns.
Isolating Central Afghanistan
The Soviets appear to have assigned low priority to
the Hazarehjat. The handsoff policy appears to be
encouraging conflicts among rival groups in the region
* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively
on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this
Agency. The views expressed are those of the author.
Soviet Economic Projects in Northern Afghanistan
Key projects that reflect the magnitude of the Soviet
commitment to integrating the northern Afghan
economy into that of Soviet Central Asia include:
? Extensive exploitation of natural gas reserves in
northern Afghanistan. The Soviets developed the
gasfields in the 1970s and built a gasline to carry
the reserves to Soviet Central Asia.
? An electric grid tied to the USSR. According to
Kabul press reports, the first stage of the transfer of
220 kilowatts of electricity from the Soviet border
to Kabul was completed in June 1985. Another 110-
kilowatt substation on the Mazar-e Sharif line was
inaugurated.
? A large cement factory. Kabul sources report that a
Soviet-financed cement plant in Baghlan Province is
operating beyond expectations. Another plant is to
begin construction in 1985 with Czechoslovak
assistance. The Soviets "trade" their inferior
cement for the superior Afghan product.
? A large fertilizer plant in Mazar-e Sharif.
? Bridges across the Amu Darya. The Soviets
completed a bridge at Termez before invading the
country. These could be used for better transport of
northern minerals, such as coal and iron, to the
Soviet Union.
? A large dam. A 40-megawatt dam is under
construction north of Herat that should irrigate
73,000 hectares. Its current status is unknown.
that make it a less effective resistance stronghold.
Pro-Iranian groups, actively supported by Tehran, are
contesting with older traditional leaders for influence
among Hazaras.
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Fostering Tribal Warfare in the East
The Soviet strategy in eastern Afghanistan appears
designed to defeat the enemy by depriving it of local
support. Military operations have been concentrated
in the vicinity of Kabul, between Kabul and
Jalalabad, in the Panjsher Valley, and in Paktia,
Lowgar, and Vardak Provinces. These areas have
suffered high levels of destruction, civilian deaths, and
depopulation.
The current strategy to drive out or kill civilians,
however, has peaked, as suggested by the drop in the
rate of rural migration. Tribes and families inclined to
migrate have done so for the most part. Those
remaining are hardened to war conditions, have
learned to adapt, and are determined to stay.
Soviet strategy probably has already shifted from one
of killing numerous civilians to one of negotiating
settlements with individual tribes. There is
considerable evidence of local truces with some tribes
and a major effort by KHAD to co-opt tribal militias.
Kabul has had some success with transborder tribes-
Afridis, Shinwaris, Mohmands, and Waziris-that
benefit from trade or heroin production, or that have
scores to settle with Pakistan. Moscow might even
revive the Pashtunistan issue-particularly if it
assimilates the north-to compensate Pashtuns for
the loss of influence north of the Hindu Kush and
increase long-term pressure on Pakistan.
Destroying Southwestern Afghanistan
The dramatic population drop in southwestern
Afghanistan is indicative of a concerted effort by the
Soviets to deny this region to the resistance rather
than to control it. The brutality of the military
campaign here, the lack of natural resources, and the
regime's failure to break the will of the resistance
further support this view. Unlike cities in the northern
sector and the east, cities in the southwest have not
swelled with immigrants but have lost substantial
portions-perhaps 30 percent-of their population.
High-altitude bombing has destroyed much of Herat
and as much as 50 percent of Qandahar, according to
Prospects
Although a regionally differentiated strategy may
offer the Soviets the best chance of achieving their
medium-term objectives in Afghanistan, it does not
guarantee success. Kabul and Moscow may fail to
pacify the northern population-the key to the success
of this strategy. Many northerners remember Soviet
harshness in suppressing the Basmachi uprisings
against Soviet domination of Central Asia in the
1920s and 1930s. In addition, pacification is a more
delicate operation than depopulation or stoking tribal
enmities. The northern population, moreover,
continues to support the resistance, particularly the
fundamentalist Jamiat groups. A failure to subdue the
north would increase pressure on Moscow either to
seek a negotiated settlement or to up the military
ante.
The Soviets, however, will probably not seek to annex
northern Afghanistan. Annexation would raise an
international outcry, give credence to charges of
Soviet expansionism, and draw attention to a war that
the Soviets would prefer the world forget. More
important, annexation would expand the size of the
Soviet Central Asian population-a development the
Soviets would probably seek to avoid both for reasons
of ideological control and demography. Annexation
would also have an adverse impact on Soviet efforts to
build an effective regime in Kabul, as no regime there
would accept such a move.
* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively
on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this
Agency. The views expressed are those of the author.
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Communal Conflict in Sri Lanka:
The Muslim Wild Card
Sri Lanka's approximately 1 million Muslims have
become increasingly caught up in the Sinhalese-Tamil
communal violence over the last several months.
Concentrated primarily in the strategic Eastern
Province, Muslims have suffered casualties, lost
businesses and homes, and have been forced into
refugee camps as a result of the ethnic fighting. Tamil
demands for linking the Eastern Province to the
predominantly Tamil Northern Province have given
Muslims a major stake in Sinhalese-Tamil
negotiations. We believe the government will take
Muslim interests into account in a negotiated
settlement. If no political settlement is reached and
full-scale fighting resumes in the Eastern Province,
Muslims may resort to arming themselves-perhaps
with outside Arab support-dimming even further
prospects for a negotiated settlement and expanding
the scope and intensity of Sri Lanka's communal
conflict.
Muslims in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka's Muslims represent only 8 percent of the
general population but are a major political and
commercial force in Sri Lankan society. Their
successful management of Sri Lanka's lucrative gem
industry, extensive ties to the Arab world, and
prominent role in a broad range of commercial
enterprises are an important asset to the economy.
Although Sri Lanka's Muslims are for the most part
Tamil-speaking, they are strongly opposed to Tamil
separatism and form substantial voting blocs in both
main Sinhalese political parties. They are organized
into many associations, enjoy educational and legal
concessions from the government, and have retained a
distinct cultural and religious identity that is accepted
by both Tamils and Sinhalese.
The insurgency's deep penetration during 1985 into
the Eastern Province-where Muslims represent 33
percent of the population-and the resulting warfare
have drawn Muslims into the crossfire between Tamil
guerrillas and government forces. Press reports
indicate a small number of Muslims have been killed
by both Tamil insurgents and government security
forces. the fighting has
created more than 5,000 Muslim refugees in
Trincomalee alone. Harassment and robberies by the
insurgents have prevented some Muslim farmers from
planting this year's rice crop and have forced some
Muslim shopowners out of business.
The continuing violence is gradually eroding the
neutrality of Muslims in the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict.
Four days of extensive fighting between Muslims and
Tamils in April 1985 and new clashes in October
underscored Muslim frustrations with disruptions of
the local economy and the murder by insurgents of
alleged Muslim informants. The US Embassy in
Colombo reports Muslims near Trincomalee staged a
strike in September to protest what they viewed as
insurgent attempts to coerce Muslim residents into
leaving the city. In recent months, Muslims and
Tamil civilians have worked closely to restore good
relations, but the continued presence of guerrilla
strongholds in densely populated Muslim areas of the
East could easily spark a new round of Muslim-Tamil
rioting.
A Muslim delegation, including leaders of the All
Ceylon Muslim League, met with Sri Lankan
President Jayewardene in November to declare the
Muslim community's opposition to Tamil demands for
a merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into
a single administrative unit. The Muslims recognize a
merger of the provinces would reduce their electoral
strength, leading to a significant loss of Muslim
representation in Parliament and fewer seats in any
provincial council born out of the negotiations. I
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NESA NESAR 86-003
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Muslim leaders have made their case to the militants
as well. Before the start of a second round of peace
talks last August, a Muslim delegation told key Tamil
militant leaders in Madras of their opposition to the
merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but
Muslims recognize that insurgent strength in the East
rivals the government's security forces and represents
a growing political authority directly affecting their
community's interests. We believe the inability of
government security forces to protect Muslim
interests and the likelihood of increased fighting in
the East will compel Muslims to continue their
contacts with the militant leadership.
The Importance of the Eastern Province
Tamil insurgents and government security forces
consider control of the Eastern Province vital to the
outcome of Sri Lanka's two-and-a-half-year-old
insurgency. For Tamils, the Eastern Province contains
important economic resources-port facilities, arable
land, and light industry-for an independent Tamil
state and encompasses an area traditionally regarded
by Tamils as their homeland. The union of the
predominantly Tamil Northern Province with the
economically important Eastern Province is critical to
an independent Tamil state and the goal of the Tamil
insurgency.
The government's stakes in the East are no less
compelling. Having ceded de facto control of the
North to Tamil guerrillas, the East has become the
government's last line of defense against the
insurgency and the possible partition of Sri Lanka.
The East is also a major beneficiary of the
government's most important development effort-
the Mahaweli Development Program, intended to
provide newly irrigated land for Sinhalese farmers
and increase food and cash crop production-and
includes Trincomalee, Sri Lanka's best natural
harbor.
The government's most important resource in the
Eastern Province and its strongest defense against the
insurgency are the Sinhalese and Muslims who
together compose 66 percent of the population. This
legitimizes Colombo's claim that the Eastern Province
cannot be considered part of a Tamil-dominated
region. To further dilute the Tamils' position, the
government has subsidized and even armed Sinhalese
to settle in the Eastern Province. The resettlement of
Sinhalese peasants-who tend to reflect strong
cultural and racial biases against Tamils-and
continued Muslim opposition to Tamil separatism
have made the Sinhalese and Muslim communities a
prime target of insurgent operations. During the
Muslim-Tamil clashes last spring, the government
encouraged Muslims to attack Tamils and provided
them with arms.
The Muslim Wild Card
The emergence of the Muslim community as a third
protagonist in Sri Lanka's ethnic strife represents a
destabilizing element in the long term. In our view, an
attempt by Muslims to use force to assert their
community's interests in the face of prolonged
Sinhalese-Tamil warfare would accelerate the forces
of social decay already under way in Sri Lanka.
Moreover, the Muslim community's strong links to
the Arab world could introduce major outside powers
into Sri Lankan internal affairs, undermining Sri
Lankan sovereignty and broadening the conflict
beyond South Asia.
Sri Lankan Muslims have already initiated contacts
with Arab states in a bid for military assistance.
some Muslims in
Batticaloa favor the establishment-with Arab
assistance-of armed Muslim groups to protect the
Muslim community from financial ruin and forced
removal by the insurgents. Muslims have asked Sri
Lankan Government officials who have links to Iran
and Iraq to help them acquire arms. Other Muslims
last August visited the Libyan mission in Colombo to
request military training. We have not identified
Arab provision of military weapons or training to Sri
Lankan Muslims, but a major escalation of fighting in
the Eastern Province directly affecting the Sri
Lankan Muslim community could prompt such
support.
Outlook
Colombo's continued opposition to the merger of the
Eastern and Northern Provinces in any settlement
will protect Muslims from the threat of Tamil
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domination and reduced Muslim representation in
Parliament. A compromise formula proposed by
moderate Tamils and perhaps acceptable to the
government that would add a combined regional
council to the separate provincial governments in the
North and East, however, would reduce Muslim
electoral strength at the regional level.
If peace talks fail and violence resumes, we believe
hardliners in the Muslim community would assume a
greater leadership role and step up efforts to build an
independent Muslim defense. In our view, armed
Muslim factions could push Sri Lanka closer to
internal chaos. Although the Muslims and the
government would share a common enemy, the advent
of Muslim militias would weaken the government's
already tenuous control over local civil administration
and increase the role of outside powers in Sri Lanka's
internal affairs)
Outside intervention in Sri Lanka would almost
certainly provoke concern in New Delhi. In our view,
New Delhi would press Colombo to block arms
shipments to Muslims and would increase its
intelligence gathering. New Delhi considers Sri
Lanka firmly within India's security sphere.
Moreover, a deterioration in Sri Lanka's political
stability caused by Muslim militias would pose the
threat of an increased refugee flow to India.
A decision by Pakistan, which is already supplying
weapons and training to the government, to provide
even modest assistance to Sri Lankan Muslims would
probably provoke an Indo-Pakistani diplomatic
confrontation. Pakistani support would also
complicate India's slow-moving mediation effort by
introducing the interests of an outside power and
strengthening the negotiating position of Sri Lanka's
Muslims.
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India: LCA-Light Combat
Aircraft or Last Chance
for Aeronautics?
India hopes its domestic Light Combat Aircraft
(LCA) program will both stimulate its aeronautics
industry and reduce the Air Force's dependence on
Soviet aircraft. Bureaucratic infighting, lack of
technical expertise, and spiraling costs coupled with
the attractiveness and availability of foreign
technology, however, have considerably slowed the
program's progress. If the program gets off the
ground, it may offer a substantial role to US
companies because of growing Indian interest in
Western design and components for the aircraft.
What the Indians Want
New Delhi hoped to further its goals of technological
independence, industrial expansion, and military
security by designing, producing, and fielding its own
first-rate jet fighter when the LCA program was
initiated in the early 1980s.' V. S. Arunachalam, chief
science adviser for the Ministry of Defense and one of
the program's major boosters, places great emphasis
on India producing its own aircraft and "breaking the
MIG syndrome" as well as on acquiring Western
technology, such as sophisticated computers, that can
be used in other programs as well. Officials of
Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. (HAL), India's
government-owned aircraft manufacturing firm,
believe a successful LCA program can guarantee the
nation's emergence as a major aircraft producer.
Nonetheless, many Indians associated with the
program appear to have conflicting views about the
LCA's capabilities and specifications.
Arunachalam
described the LCA as designed for short-range
ground attack with a secondary air superiority
mission, but with.a substantial air-to-air capability for
this secondary mission. The Indian Air Force wants
' India's sole previous attempt to build its own fighter resulted in
the "Marut"-an aircraft of limited capabilities produced in small
numbers in the I 960s and I 970s and now serving largely as target
the LCA to be an all-purpose fighter able to counter
Pakistan's newly acquired F-16s. An air superiority
mission tacked on to an essentially ground attack
aircraft or vice versa would result in mediocre
performance in either role.
Current Defense Ministry plans call for a test flight
by 1990 and full production to begin with 20 aircraft
by 1994. Diplomatic and
Problems Hindering LCA
Despite New Delhi's hopes for an indigenously
designed and produced aircraft, the Indians, in our
view, lack the technological expertise and production
capacity to build the LCA on their own. Some HAL
engineers, half in jest, say the acronym stands for
India's "last chance for aeronautics."
HAL is short of engineers and lacks
the proper facilities to produce the LCA once the
design and development stages are completed.
HAL has tried
to hire aerospace engineers in the West but is not
having much success. Current plans call for foreign
help in the LCA's design and for the incorporation of
complete foreign subsystems, including avionics and
engine.
and falling far behind schedule.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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and development costs would continue to rise beyond
the original estimate of $416 million. Opposition
critics are already arguing that the LCA should be
scrapped.
Technical and cost problems have led some officials to
reconsider the basic goals of the program, leading in
turn to increasing bureaucratic disputes. Diplomatic
sources indicate that many Air Force officers, who
doubt that an adequate LCA can be built in the
allotted time frame, favor purchasing a foreign
aircraft to fill the gap until India can produce its own.
Project redefinition has prompted Arunachalam's
increasing involvement in the program,
The Question of Foreign Content
The availability and attractiveness of foreign
technology, combined with the program's other
problems, have prompted New Delhi to turn
increasingly to foreign-mainly Western-suppliers.
India
approached several West European firms for help in
designing the LCA and received feasibility studies
New Delhi's request, the United States has released
the GE-F404 engine for use in the LCA, although we
believe some officials remain interested in the British
RB 199-104 engine as an alternative.
the Soviets also have offered
design assistance and subsystems for the LCA.r
The hard lobbying by high-ranking Air Force officers
for an aircraft as soon as possible increases the
possibility that India will purchase a complete fighter.
the Soviets
are pushing New Delhi to consider a favorably
financed coproduction deal for the MIG-29-a
prospect some Air Force officers are said to favor. We
believe the Soviets fear that India's large-scale
acquisition of Western hardware or development of its
domestic military technology and industry could
threaten the USSR's longstanding position as India's
major arms supplier. The heavy, twin-engine MIG-29,
however, does not fit India's present requirements for
an LCA. Diplomatic sources report the Air Force is
interested in examining the Northrop F-20-one
senior Air Force officer saying "the plane might sell
itself if we could kick the tires." Other light,
multipurpose fighters are scheduled to enter
production in the West by the early 1990s-like the
Swedish Gripen and the French Rafale-that could
fill the LCA's role and may become available for
export.
Implications for the United States
The Indians' waning confidence that they can build
the LCA with their own resources opens opportunities
for US aerospace companies. The Indian scientific
and industrial establishment-particularly
Arunachalam-regards US technology and expertise
highly, and
most Air Force officers consider US military
equipment the best in the world and far superior to
Soviet systems. Diplomatic sources indicate that New
Delhi has leaned heavily toward European help in the
program's design phase only because no US designer
expressed interest until Northrop initiated discussions
last fall.
Outlook
The Indians seem determined to pursue the LCA
program to completion. We do not believe that they
will be able to produce a finished LCA within their
present schedule or budget. Furthermore, we believe
that production will require even more outside design
help and foreign-made subsystems than New Delhi is
now considering. It, however, will serve to keep
India's aeronautic industry in business through the
end of the century.
Although growing problems with the program
increase the possibility that New Delhi may drop the
LCA and buy a foreign aircraft, we believe the
Indians would view such a move as a stopgap measure
until domestic industry is capable of producing an
LCA. Should New Delhi decide to buy an LCA
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outright, the F-20 is a strong contender. West
European competitors, however, could be expected to
push their candidates hard and, given India's
continued coolness to buying major US weapons,
could win the contract. Moreover, the number of
foreign aircraft purchased would probably be small.
Prime Minister Gandhi has made clear his preference
to spend funds at home for the development of
domestic technology.
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Nepal:
Drugs in the Kingdom
Narcotics trafficking and drug abuse are growing in
Nepal. The upsurge in narcotics-related money in
Kathmandu has created new pressures on the
government to contain bureaucratic corruption and to
insulate the King and the palace from charges of
involvement in the illicit trade. Nepal's growing
international popularity as a transshipment point for
drugs moving to Western Europe and the United
States and Kathmandu's apparent inability to control
this trade for the first time threaten to become a
factor of regime instability. We believe there is little
prospect the current administration will be able to
deal effectively with the narcotics problem because of
widespread corruption
Background
Nepal has been a drug haven for marijuana users
since the late 1960s. Prices for locally grown
marijuana always have been among the lowest in the
world, and local officials have an international
reputation for complacency. Marijuana is regularly
mixed with tobacco and smoked by Nepalese of all
classes, although most sources concur that marijuana
addiction among the local population until recent
years was quite low.
Press accounts note that in the early 1980s there was
a steady rise in the use of Kathmandu as a
transshipment point for heroin and other opiates
produced in the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and
Thailand) and the Golden Crescent (Iran, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan). During this same period, the
indigenous drug abuser population began to grow
rapidly. Describing the Nepal drug scene in late 1985,
resident of Kathmandu active in the
capital's only detoxification program noted:
? There is no effective government control effort.
Nepalese arrested for narcotics trafficking or abuse
are usually not charged or punished.
? All aspects of the narcotics trade have been taken
over by Nepalese nationals who forced Western
drug abuse
in Nepal has shifted from marijuana to heroin in the
last two years, and heroin is the easiest narcotic to
obtain in Kathmandu.
? The addict population of the capital alone has
jumped from an estimated 500 in the late 1970s to
between 12,000 and 18,000.
? The annual cost of heroin consumed by these
addicts is nearly $3.6 million, or about 7.5 percent
of Nepal's annual national budget.
Nepal's increasing
importance as an international trafficking center
parallels a shift in the sources providing narcotics for
domestic consumption and for transshipment to the
West. Before 1981 most heroin entered Nepal by air
from Thailand, but high-
quality heroin now comes predominantly overland
from Burma via eastern India. Most low- and
medium-quality heroin in Nepal is produced in
Pakistan and India and enters the country by air from
New Delhi or overland through scattered railheads
along the southern and western borders.
Nepalese are increasingly sought after as narcotics
couriers by international traffickers, according to
reports from the US Customs Service, US Drug
Enforcement Agency, and US Embassy in
Kathmandu. Nepalese couriers offer several
advantages,
? Nepalese can take advantage of natural cover for
egitimate reasons for traveling to Europe and East
? Until recently, Nepalese were rarely suspected of
trafficking in significant amounts of narcotics.
traffickers out of the lucrative drug business.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
17 January 1986
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? Many Nepalese have good personal relations with
Americans and other Westerners who have
vacationed in the country and have used these
connections to gain visas and other documents for
foreign travel. According to Embassy reports, the
large number of Nepalese applying for tourist and
business visas to the United States parallels the
increase in drug trafficking through the country in
the last two years. The Embassy estimates that
more than 20 percent of Nepalese visa applications
introduction,
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are connected with illegal drug smuggling.
Nepalese have been arrested in increasing numbers
over the last two years for carrying large amounts of
contraband narcotics. Gurkha soldiers carrying large
amounts of heroin and cannabis were arrested last
summer by customs officials in London and Hong
Kong. A Nepalese Gurkha who had served in Hong
Kong was arrested at about the same time in Des
Moines, Iowa, and charged with narcotics trafficking,
according to the US Consulate in Hong Kong.
Nepalese have been arrested for transporting heroin
to or through the United States on at least six
occasions during the last year, according to US
Customs Service records.
We believe large drug trafficking rings in Kathmandu
are becoming increasingly sophisticated in exploiting
traditional Nepalese trade connections to meet the
demands of the new narcotics trade. US Customs
Service reports note that the increase in narcotics
transshipment through Nepal has been greatly
enhanced by the growing number of international
flights through Kathmandu.
the national carrier, Royal Nepal
Airlines, has opened routes to Europe and the Persian
Gulf to facilitate the narcotics trade. Nepalese
traffickers who previously supplied Hong Kong with
heroin are increasingly turning up in Europe and
North America carrying large amounts of Southwest
Asian-origin narcotics.
Nepalese narcotics traffickers recruit couriers from
ethnic groups whose traditional vocations involve
either petty smuggling or licit foreign trade or travel,
such as Sherpa trek organizers and rug merchants.
The drug dealer arranges forged passports and visas,
travel expenses, and the necessary letters of
We believe the system is used to transport
many kinds of contraband, such as gold, licit drugs,
and foreign exchange as well as narcotics.
Control Efforts and Corruption
Efforts to improve the effectiveness of Nepal's
antinarcotics program are complicated by the
increasing level of corruption in both the government
and private sector. Although corruption is
institutionalized in Nepal and the system of
"chakadi" (gifts) to guarantee official favor is
standardized, we believe the rising influx of narcotics-
related funds into this system has skewed the
traditional relations between favor-seekers and
officials and facilitated the increase in trafficking.
Until early 1985 the Government of Nepal officially
denied the country had a domestic drug problem,
pointing to the large numbers of foreigners using
drugs in Kathmandu as the only issue. The
government resisted diplomatic pressure to sign
international narcotics control accords, claiming the
country had no need for international drug control
assistance.
? The government would face international
embarrassment when it proved incapable of
implementing the agreements.
? Marijuana cultivation and trafficking are
traditional sources of cash for ethnic groups in
Nepal's mountainous regions. Cutting off this
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income would result in a flood of unemployed,
dissatisfied peasants into Nepal's already
overpopulated southern border region.
Limited efforts by the Nepalese Government to gain
control over the burgeoning drug traffic have
uncovered the involvement of many high-level
government officials. For example, initial efforts to
create a drug enforcement capacity in Nepal in the
early 1980s were hamstrung by corruption and
favoritism,
The director of the first national drug investigation
unit was arrested on drug trafficking charges in 1982.
We believe that Kathmandu's inability to stem the
tide of drug trafficking comes in part from an
unwillingness to embarrass powerful officials,
including members of the royal family. F_
Charges of corruption, involvement of senior officials
and members of the royal family in narcotics
trafficking, and governmental misuse of national
development funds are growing more pointed.
We believe Nepal's request in
Nepalese citizens
We believe that,
despite the King's personal commitment to drug
control, the high level of corruption in the national
administration and Birendra's unwillingess to rein in
members of his family and staff are major obstacles to
a more effective antinarcotics program. Moreover, in
discussions with leading US officials in late 1985, the
King appeared to underestimate the scope of Nepal's
drug problem and not to understand `US concern in
controlling the transshipment of narcotics through
Kathmandu.
King Birendra believes several foreign embassies in
Kathmandu are actively involved in narcotics
smuggling
The Soviet, Polish, North Korean, and East German
Embassies are all suspected of using their diplomatic
pouches to move contraband narcotics. According to a
major Nepalese journal, Kathmandu recently began
to review its relations with North Korea and in late
December 1985 began considering whether to expel
P'yongyang's representatives from the kingdom on
charges of drug trafficking.
Beginning in mid-1985, Kathmandu began to respond
slowly to growing international and domestic
pressures to control the country's drug problem. A
new narcotics investigation squad was formed in July
1985. Nepal has sent two drug investigation officers
to the United States to study advanced narcotics
early 1986 for basic narcotics identification kits may
reflect the first concerted effort the government has
made to monitor or reduce narcotics trafficking.
have become concerned at the level of local addiction
and have created new treatment centers in the
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Kathmandu Valley. The alumni organization of the
most prestigious private school in the country has won
a grant from the World Health Organization with the
help of Queen Aishwarya to create a countrywide
series of antinarcotics presentations.
Outlook
We believe King Birendra is under increasing
pressure from opposition leaders and his own
supporters to crack down on drug-related corruption.
Increased narcotics trafficking and drug abuse, in our
judgment, do not directly threaten the stability of the
current regime. The narcotics issue, however, has
added to domestic pressures-bureaucratic
corruption, shifts in traditional social patterns,
economic problems-that collectively challenge the
government. We believe these pressures will increase
as Nepal prepares for national elections this spring. In
our view, student leaders and heads of Nepal's
outlawed political parties will use the King's inability
to handle the country's growing drug problems and
the rise in government corruption that has
accompanied narcotics trafficking to gather electoral
support for antiregime candidates.
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Near East and
South Asia Briefs
The refusal of Morocco to honor commitments to US and other foreign creditors
threatens its economic recovery and may make already strained relations with the
United States even worse. Morocco failed last week to meet the second deadline
set by commercial creditors to pay $83 million, the initial sum due under a
rescheduling agreement signed last October. The US Embassy in Rabat says
Morocco has requested a meeting to discuss the problem. Rabat claims the
problem is the result of unexpectedly low remittances from Moroccans working
abroad. King Hassan used money
previously allocated for the payment to settle an old obligation to the French to
facilitate discussions for an arms deal. Hassan's gesture may have prompted the
French to reopen negotiations on a $450 million package involving 24 Mirage 2000
jet fighters.
Collapse of the rescheduling agreement would jeopardize Rabat's $200 million
standby loan from the International Monetary Fund. According to the Embassy,
Morocco is already in trouble over its failure to meet IMF spending targets. Even
if Rabat can honor its agreements with the banks and the IMF, its economic
options will be severely limited without a marked improvement in the management
of its economy and in the world market for phosphates. In any case, a new IMF
program imposing harsher austerity measures on top of a reduced standard of
living would probably lead to outbursts of popular discontent. Opponents of
Hassan, particularly Islamic fundamentalists, would be quick to exploit any
opportunity to highlight his extravagant lifestyle. Hassan may turn to Libya for
financial relief. Mu'ammar Qadhafi may seek to take advantage of Hassan's
difficulties by offering money in return for US equipment and spare parts for
Libyan aircraft. He, however, is unlikely to give Rabat enough aid to turn the
economy around.
The Moroccan Government in December pushed through parliament the first
phase of its IMF-supported tax reform. A value-added tax, scheduled to go into
effect in April, will replace two fraud-ridden turnover taxes on goods and services.
Implementation could be delayed, however, because of parliament's concern over
the technical complexity of the new tax and, in particular, its potential inflationary
impact. The US Embassy believes the value-added tax, which has been in
preparation since 1981, will be revenue-neutral. Nevertheless, local retailers may
use the tax as an excuse to hike prices. Some government officials fear that any
increase in inflation, accompanying an already falling standard of living, could
provoke unrest.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-003
/7 January 1986
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Mauritania Oil Hopes Waning
Mauritania is unlikely to become an oil producer any time soon, despite initial
optimism by US oil companies exploring in country. According to US Embassy
reporting, OXOCO's recently concluded onshore seismic studies in southwestern
Mauritania proved favorable, but the company decided that the soft world oil
market made exploitation of the fields uneconomic. The Secretary General of the
Mauritanian Ministry of Mines and Industry believes Texaco has decided to
postpone drilling its offshore concession -despite promising seismic results-
because of the company's legal battle with Pennzoil. AMOCO also appears to be
dragging its feet on exploring potentially lucrative onshore and offshore fields.
Although the Mauritanian official maintains AMOCO is interested in exploiting
the concessions, a date for negotiating an agreement has not been set.
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Secret
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