NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200780001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence
14 SO T ~ Z i V., uiupy
U U N ( R L i"I
Near East and
South Asia Review
'NESA NESAR 86-006
28 Fe' ?warv 1986
Copy. 442
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Despite poor health, Ayatollah Khomeini played a key role in the
past year, balancing radicals and conservatives in the choice of
president, prime minister, and Cabinet. Majles Speaker Rafsanjani
exploited the infighting during this period to strengthen his position
and will consolidate his power as Khomeini's health deteriorates.
Lebanon: The Propaganda Warl 9
The proliferation of illegitimate radio and television stations in
Lebanon is intensifying animosities among the country's rival
militias as clandestine media spread rumors and disinformation
designed to undermine the credibility of political opponents and seek
to reinforce internal factional cohesion
Libya's Increasing Ties to Radical Palestinians I 15
Libya has sporadically provided funding, arms, training, and
safehaven to most of the radical factions of the Palestinian
movement since the mid-1970s, and Tripoli and the Palestinians are
probably assessing each other's capabilities and intentions carefully,
with an eye to determining whether closer ties are warranted.
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NESA NESAR 86-006
28 February 1986
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Morocco and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain close ties based on
mutual interests even though the amount of Saudi aid has decreased
and the disbursement of the funding has been erratic and less than
King Hassan's expectations.F--]
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Purchase of Italian Refinery
authors,
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
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Iran: Power Struggles
Ayatollah Khomeini has played a key role in
arbitrating factional disputes since the presidential
election last summer. His intervention was crucial in
balancing radicals and conservatives in the choice of
president, prime minister, and Cabinet. Majles
Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the second most
powerful political figure in Iran, appears to have
exploited the infighting during this period to
strengthen his position. Khomeini's deteriorating
health will stimulate fighting within the government
that will allow Rafsanjani to consolidate his power.
Balancing the Factions
Khomeini intervened before the presidential election
to prevent it from becoming politically divisive.
Prominent radical and conservative clerics were
planning to enter the race, threatening a bitter
campaign in which the major issues dividing the
regime would be aired.
Khomeini let it be known that he
favored the reelection of President Khamenei, a
pragmatist who has been associated with both radicals
two top conservative clerics decided not to seek the
position because they believed Khomeini opposed such
a move. In addition to Khamenei, the Council of
Guardians certified only two other candidates out of
50 entries to participate in the election-both minor
political figures with no significant following.
After the election Khomeini appeared willing to allow
the President to replace Prime Minister Musavi. In a
speech to government officials, Khomeini said that
they should not consider their positions permanent
and should be ready to serve where most needed. F_
Khamenei and many members of the Majles viewed
Musavi and his Cabinet as incompetent as well as too
radical and wanted to replace them with moderate
technocrats. Moreover, the Majles had stalemated the
Musavi government's major economic initiatives for
several years. Khomeini probably hoped the factions
could agree on a compromise candidate who could
break the deadlock.
The effort to find a substitute, however, provoked a
strong reaction from the radicals and bitter debates
both inside and outside the Majles. Several Tehran
newspapers criticized Khamenei for his conservative
tendencies and efforts to bring "capitalists" back into
the government. Radicals in the Majles argued that
"this talk of defending capitalism and the free market
in this country, this wave of traditionalism and right
wingism will destroy the revolution."
Over a month of intense infighting failed to produce a
replacement, and Khomeini resolved the issue by
endorsing Musavi.
however, many conservatives refused to go along.
Almost 100 deputies indicated their dissatisfaction
with Musavi's policies by voting no or abstaining in
the selection of Musavi and 10 of his Cabinet
nominees.
Several leading conservative spokesmen remained
silent during the debates. Their reluctance to oppose
Musavi openly probably stemmed in part from
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28 February 1986
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deference to Khomeini. They also apparently believed
the country's severe economic problems would
undermine a conservative government at this time.
many conservatives believe that
disgruntlement with Prime Minister Musavi will lead
to his resignation. They probably hope this will open
the way for a more moderate figure, such as Foreign
Minister Velayati or the widely respected Ayatollah
Mahdavi-Kani, who would bring conservatives into
Majles Speaker Rafsanjani Gains
Rafsanjani appears to have strengthened his position
since the presidential election. In line with Khomeini's
wishes, he publicly supported his rival Khamenei for
President and appears to have mediated an agreement
between various factions to unite in support of
Khamenei. Even so, Rafsanjani opposed Khamenei's
efforts to replace Musavi.
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the Cabinet.
Once the government was in place, Khomeini moved
quickly to limit divisive policy initiatives by the
radicals. In a speech to the Cabinet, he urged respect
for the private sector and, in particular, the important
role of the bazaar. He argued that the Constitution
and Islamic law clearly limit government intervention
in the economy. In a speech to Iranian diplomats,
Khomeini reiterated his endorsement of a moderate
foreign policy, saying that Iran must expand ties to
countries around the world and use nonviolent means
to export the Islamic revolution.
Khomeini still allows the radicals considerable
freedom of action in some spheres. State prosecutor
Ayatollah Khoiniha has been campaigning since
September against court decisions allowing Iranian
expatriates to regain businesses confiscated after the
revolution. Khoiniha also has confiscated land
belonging to officials or supporters of the Shah's
regime and ordered that a list of such people be made
public. Khomeini has not openly criticized Khoiniha,
Khomeini may have supported the decision in
November to designate Ayatollah Hosein Montazeri
as his successor to curb infighting among the Iranian
factions. The Iranian Constitution allows an
Assembly of Experts to choose either a single leader
or a group of three or five to rule. Iran's leaders had
been deeply divided over this issue. Majles Speaker
Rafsanjani had long advocated the selection of
Montazeri, but Khamenei and others favored a
council. They believed a single leader would
consolidate power at their expense. Senior
conservative clerics opposed the choice of a single
successor on theological grounds.F---]
Rafsanjani favors the preservation of a balance
between radicals in the executive branch and
conservatives in the Majles because this compels the
factions to turn to him to work out compromises. The
rivalry between Khamenei and Musavi reduces the
influence of the President and weakens the executive's
institutional position in relations with the Majles.
Rafsanjani probably masterminded the Assembly of
Experts' selection of his political ally Montazeri to
succeed Khomeini. The Speaker almost certainly
expects to wield effective power after Khomeini dies,
with Montazeri acting only as titular leader. He and
Montazeri are using the latter's new stature to
Outlook
Khomeini's health continues to deteriorate and will
increasingly limit his ability to oversee the regime.
Political maneuvering in anticipation of his death
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seems certain to sharpen factional disputes.
Rafsanjani is likely to benefit most during this period
as factional leaders increasingly turn to him to
mediate their differences. Montazeri lacks the
prestige and political skill to play such a part.
The designation of Montazeri as Khomeini's successor
strengthens the prospect that the transition to a new
leader after Khomeini's death will go smoothly. But
considerable opposition to Montazeri, both among
radicals and conservatives, may reopen the succession
issue after Khomeini dies. This could lead to the
establishment of a leadership council in which all
interests are represented more equitably.F-7
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Lebanon:
The Propaganda War
The proliferation of illegitimate radio and television
stations in Lebanon is intensifying animosities among
the country's rival militias. In the face of the
government's helplessness, the clandestine media
thrive on spreading rumors and disinformation
designed to undermine the credibility of political
opponents but also seek to reinforce internal factional
cohesion. The confusion in the media is symptomatic
of the disarray that has characterized Lebanon since
the beginning of the civil war in 1975.
and accomplishments of the enemy. Disinformation
campaigns, which are common, are the main source of
rumors among the Lebanese population.
The Lebanese, however, have been hardened by their
civil war experiences and view factional propaganda
with considerable skepticism. Thus, propaganda has
only a limited effect, since it generally reinforces
rather than weakens the bonds between leaders and
followers on both sides of the fence. The result is
increasing polarization.
The broadcasts by the various factions are a mix of
propaganda and reporting in which everyone claims to
speak in the name of freedom, legitimacy, democracy,
justice, peaceful coexistence, and nonsectarianism.
During periods of acute tension, propaganda messages
compound the mistrust and hatred among the various
groups and create a climate of fear, which often
complicates cease-fire negotiations and leads to
renewed fighting.
The factional militias have found it expedient to
switch to psychological warfare to intimidate and
demoralize one another. Broadcasting stations are
favorite targets for terrorism and artillery shelling.
Programing is subject to the patronage of the
dominant local militia. Stories that the shrinking
official media consider too inflammatory or likely to
incite factional fighting are quickly aired by the
illegitimate media in open defiance of government
authority.
The mushrooming of private radio and television
stations has also depressed government revenues, as
some stations have begun introducing commercials
into their programs. According to press reports, the
Lebanese Government is apprehensive about the loss
of advertising revenues and blames the illegal media
for the sharp dip in such revenues in 1984-85.
Propaganda employed by the Lebanese antagonists
often conceal the sources of information, attempt to
exaggerate the military or political prowess of the
original initiator, and attempt to discredit the goals
Secret Wars: Spreading Lies About Your Foes
Propaganda attacks appear to increase with the level
of fighting between the rival militias but remain high
even when there is a lull in the fighting. There is a
continuing propaganda war between the two principal
Christian radio stations-the Voice of Lebanon and
Radio Free Lebanon- and the radio station of the
Druze militia, the Voice of the Mountain. Beirut
Domestic Service, the only remaining government
radio station but currently under Shia Amal control
because of its location in West Beirut, is locked in a
similar war with the Voice of Hope, the radio station
operated by the Army of South Lebanon under Israeli
supervision. Beirut Domestic Service is considered by
most Lebanese as neutral except when it reports on
issues dealing with South Lebanon-an area of major
concern to Amal.
The unofficial Christian media often put out stories
reflecting heightened tensions between the Druze and
the Shias. A recent Radio Free Lebanon broadcast
stated that a high-ranking Shia official was ambushed
by Druze gunmen on the coastal highway while on his
way to the south. The Voice of the Mountain
promptly responded, calling the broadcast the work of
"suspect radios broadcasting tendentious rumors and
seeking to spread confusion and sedition." In another
case, the Voice of Lebanon reported heavy clashes
between Shia Amal militia and combined Hizballah,
Palestinian, and Lebanese Communist Party
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Voice of Hope. Mouthpiece of Army of South
Lebanon. Closely aligned with Israel and run by the
fundamentalist Christian Broadcasting Network.
Also operates the Middle East television station from
Marj Uyun. Vehemently anti-Syrian and anti-
Iranian. Claims to be nonpolitical. Funded by
Christian groups and individuals.
Voice of Lebanon. Currently under Christian
Phalange control; loyal to President Gemayel. Also
operates Channel 11 television station and the Voice
of Right and Dignity. Notorious for broadcasting
false reports.
Ihdin Free and Unified Lebanon. Former President
Suleiman Frangieh's radio station in the Zgharta
region in northern Lebanon. Sometimes represents
Syrian perspective on Lebanese events.
Islamic Unification Radio. The former radio station
of Shaykh Said Sha'ban in Tripoli. Represents
Iranian views and other radical fundamentalist
ideologies. May now be under Syrian control.
Voice of the Mina. Radio station under one of the
Islamic Unification leaders, Shaykh Hisham
Minqara in Tripoli. Anti-Syrian and pro-Islamic
fundamentalism. May now be under Syrian control.
Lebanon Broadcasting Company. The quasi-
governmental television establishment whose
channels-2, 4, 7, 9, and 11-are often pirated by the
illegal media.
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation. The television
center for the Christian militia of Samir Ja Ja,
located in East Beirut. Also controls Radio Free
Lebanon and has inaugurated a new radio station, the
Voice of the Lebanese Forces.
militiamen. Beirut Domestic Service responded by
reading an official Amal statement denying that these
clashes took place.
Spreading rumors to increase tensions in their
opponent's camp is also practiced by the Voice of the
Mountain, especially against President Gemayel and
the Christian militias. The Druze radio station often
resorts to name calling, referring to Gemayel as the
"Somoza of Ba'bda" and labeling the Christian
militias as separatists, while praising militia forces
opposed to the Christians as nationalists. When the
so-called Flag war flared up last November between
the Druze and the Shia militias loyal to Amal, the
Christian media quickly seized the opportunity to
widen the hostilities betweeen the two former allies
with exaggerated stories of Druze and Shia massacres
and atrocities.
Voice of the Syriacs. A Christian radio station
located in the Christian enclave. Claims to be
nonpolitical and designed to represent the Syriac
culture from which former Christian militia
commander Fadi Fram emerged.
Voice of the Mountain. The Druze radio station in
the Shuf region under the control of Walid Jumblatt.
Anti-Christian militia and often attacks President
Gemayel. Will soon begin television broadcasting.
A Propaganda Case Study: Hubayqa Versus Ja'Ja
The propaganda war is so important to the political
survival of the various factions that it occasionally is
employed to win internal factional power struggles. In
January 1986 Elie Hubayqa, former commander of
the Christian militia, in a bid to consolidate his grip
on the Christian community following his signing of
the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Accord directed all
the media under his control to attack his political
rivals Samir Ja'Ja and President Gemayel. The Voice
of Lebanon, which was under Hubayqa's control,
found itself in direct confrontation with Radio Free
Lebanon, controlled by Ja'Ja.
The newly emerging Christian factions had earlier
wrested control of most media inside the Christian
enclave from the wing of the Phalange Party
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Beirut Domestic Service. Lebanon's official radio
station now under the control of the Amal militia in
West Beirut. Anti-Voice of Hope and primarily anti-
Israeli. Has provided surprisingly evenhanded
coverage, but continues to exaggerate Lebanese
guerrilla successes against Israel and the Army of
South Lebanon.
Voice of Arab Lebanon. Mouthpiece of the pro-
Nasirite Sunni militia, Al Murabitun. Broadcasts
from a mosque in West Beirut and will soon begin
operating a television station.
Voice of the Homeland. Sunni station of the
moderate philanthropic foundation Al Maqasid in
West Beirut. Its director is Tamam Salam.
Advocates continued amicable relations with
traditional Christians.
Voice of the South. Set up by Israel to overcome the
propaganda fallout from Israel's repression of Shia
guerrilla warfare in the south. Broadcasts counter
Amal, Hizballah, and Syrian messages dealing with
suicide, martyrdom, and heroism.
Voice of the Armenians. Represents the views of the
leftist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASALA).
Voice of Heaven-The Armenian Radio Station of
Lebanon. Status quo station, anti-ASALA, and
mouthpiece of the Dashnak Party.
Voice of the Islamic Revolution. A Hizballah-run
station in Balabakk, supported by Iran. Calls for
Islamic revolution and broadcasts radical religious
messages and slogans. Anti-US and anti-Israel.
Voice of Arab Revolution-The Voice of National
Resistance. Newly inaugurated station directed
against Israel and Army of South Lebanon. Believed
to be financed by Syria but operated by group of
Lebanese Shias, Communists, and Syrian National
Socialists.
a Syria is encouraging former Christian militia leader Elie
Hubayqa to set up a radio station beamed at the Christian
community from the Natn region.
traditionally loyal to the Gemayel family. At the
outbreak of hostilities on 13 January, Hubayqa
controlled the Voice of Lebanon, the major Christian
television station, the Lebanese Broadcasting
Corporation, the Al Amal Phalange newspaper, and a
daily newspaper called Al Jumhuriah. Ja'Ja
controlled Radio Free Lebanon and the Al Masira
magazine. Al Amal was forced to suspend
publication, and its offices in East Beirut were soon
occupied and subsequently ransacked by Hubayqa's
supporters. Issues of Al Masira opposed to the
Tripartite Accord were confiscated on Hubayqa's
orders.
As the fighting among the Christians intensified, so
did the propaganda war. Hubayqa took to the air first,
claiming he was forced to move against Ja'Ja and
Gemayel for security reasons. His real motives had
more to do with his belief that Gemayel and Ja'Ja
masterminded a failed assassination attempt against
him on 31 December. The Voice of Lebanon
described Hubayqa's opponents as "highwaymen and
felons." Hubayqa's operation, commented the radio,
was designed to "ensure the safe movement on the
main roads of all citizens ... from agitators, hirelings,
and payday gunmen.... The responsibility for the
situation must be borne by the `Man of the Palace' "
(Gemayel).
Outsiders quickly sought to inflame the Christian
quarreling. Beirut Domestic Service, under Amal
influence, broadcast rumors and false reports to
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increase Christian suspicions, such as claims that
Israeli gunboats had attacked Hubayqa's
headquarters in Karantina. Similarly, Baghdad's
Voice of the PLO falsely reported that Hubayqa was
killed in a gun battle on 15 January. The Druze Voice
of the Mountain claimed that Gemayel and Ja'Ja's
forces were taking advantage of the fighting by
executing kidnaped Lebanese that were being held in
the Christian militia's barracks.
Addressing his Christian constituency, Ja'Ja stated
that "remaining silent now means collusion against
you, every child, old person, man and woman, and
even crime against our values, principles, and future."
The Voice of the Mountain attacked Gemayel by
stating that "choosing between the emperor and his
interests and whims or the interests of the homeland,
the nationalist forces have adopted the national option
out of their commitment to the agreement supported
by Damascus. When the Somoza crimes became
intolerable, the nationalist forces attacked his
stronghold in Bikfaya and the eastern areas." Radio
Free Lebanon responded by announcing that "certain
well-known suspect information media have been
spreading fabricated and false reports about alleged
attacks and advances in the direction of the eastern
areas."
A propaganda technique utilized effectively by the
two Christian camps was the jamming of each other's
radio stations. The Voice of Right and Dignity, which
supports President Gemayel, had to change its FM
frequency after being jammed by Hubayqa.
Hubayqa's defeat by Ja'Ja and his departure from
Lebanon continue to generate propaganda in the
Christian camp. After car bombs exploded in East
Beirut in February, Ja'Ja's militiamen began
rounding up former Hubayqa supporters and
announced on their Radio Free Lebanon that "certain
individuals involved with Hubayqa took advantage of
the prevailing freedom to reassemble a number of
sabotage teams and to implement a terrorist plan
supported from abroad." Hubayqa, in exile in
Damascus, replied that Ja'Ja's broadcast about
terrorist cells in East Beirut was designed to justify
Ja'Ja's repression and arrest of innocent civilians.
Seeing an opportunity to sow conflict between Ja'Ja
and Gemayel, the Druze Voice of the Mountain
reported that gunmen belonging to Ja'Ja had
assassinated a Phalange notable, Elie Karameh, a
Gemayel loyalist.
The Christians also seek to divide their enemies. Their
Voice of Lebanon frequently reports that savage
fighting between the Amal Shia militia and the
Palestinians is erupting or about to erupt in the
Palestinian camps. Such announcements are designed
to maintain a high level of distrust between the
Palestinians and the Shias. Pro-Amal Beirut
Domestic Service counterattacks by minimizing
reports of fighting and announces that "suspicious-
minded" media have been spreading false reports
about clashes between people in the Palestinian camps
and outsiders.
Foreign Propaganda
Highly sophisticated propaganda campaigns have
been directed at the Lebanese since 1948 by both
Israel and Syria. Most recently, Damascus radio has
been airing commentaries critical of the United States
for hindering the Syrian peace plan for Lebanon.
Syria is known to have occasionally financed the
Druze Voice of the Mountain to attack President
Gemayel and the Christians as circumstances
warrant.
Israel responds through the Voice of Hope in South
Lebanon run by the Army of South Lebanon. A
unique Israeli attempt to divide the Shia Hizballah
extremists and Syria is the publication and
distribution of anti-Syrian pamphlets in Lebanon that
accuse Syria of torturing Muslims as well as
"impugning" the character of radical Shaykh Subhi
al-Tufayli.
To cement its relationship with its Lebanese
constituency, Jerusalem Domestic Service often
broadcasts Israeli Government statements on South
Lebanon. Thus, it carried an Israeli official's address
to a gathering of Christian supporters on the
anniversary of the death of the founder of the Army
of South Lebanon. The Israeli official said, "When I
come here to represent the Government of Israel, I
have only words of peace, friendship, and love."
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Outlook
The propaganda war is likely to intensify in light of
the failure of the Lebanese to reach a political
compromise. Technical assistance from abroad will
probably enhance the various factions' abilities to
expand programing and to improve communication
effectiveness.
The proliferation of clandestine radio and television
stations is likely to continue fulfilling political rather
than social functions and will increase hostility and
mistrust between the various combatants. The result
is likely to be increased Lebanese reliance on rumors
as a means of reinforcing beliefs they already hold
about perceived enemies. The air is likely to remain
filled with accusations of wrongdoing, plots, and
conspiracies. Such a climate will encourage
intensified fighting, since propaganda of this sort aims
to consolidate power within each group, bolster
morale, maintain allegiance to commanders, and keep
fighters engaged in combat rather than tell the truth.
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Libya's Increasing Ties
to Radical Palestinians
The attacks on the El Al ticket counters in the Rome
and Vienna airports on 27 December have focused
attention on the degree of Libyan involvement in these
acts of terrorism. Even more significantly, they may
be one more signal of increasing ties between Libya
and radical Palestinian terrorist organizations like the
Abu Nidal Group.
Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi began supporting
more radical Palestinians in the mid-1970s after
deciding that Yasir Arafat and the Palestine
Liberation Organization were becoming too
moderate. Since then, Libya has sporadically provided
funding, arms, training, and safehaven to most of the
radical factions of the Palestinian movement, notably
the Abu Nidal Group, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC), the Fatah dissidents, Sa'iqa, the Popular
Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation
Front PLF).
Libya is again increasing aid to these groups
and prvides logistic support to terrorist operations.
Qadhafi probably would see great profit in linking his
regime more directly to these militants and their
activities. They share common enemies-Israel and
its supporters and moderate Arab and Palestinian
leaders-as well as a ruthless approach to pursuing
their struggle. The Palestinian groups are rich in
manpower and have extensive operational networks in
Western Europe. Their successful attacks on two
continents have attracted significant international
attention. By joining forces with them operationally,
Qadhafi could probably trade increased financial and
logistic support for a role in the Palestinians' target
selection and use of their personnel and West
European support apparatus for Libyan operations.
The radical Palestinians would have their own reasons
for more active cooperation with Libya and, in at least
one case, have proposed joint planning for terrorist
operations. Groups such as Abu Nidal and the PFLP
appear to be searching for alternative or
supplementary backing to that provided by Syria,
their longtime patron. They may believe that
Damascus tries to exert undue control over them or
that Syria views the Palestinian cause as less
important than its own goals in Lebanon. They may 25X1
also hope to gain use of Libyan diplomatic facilities to
help stage their attacks.F___~ 25X1
Financial Support
Libya is more willing-or perhaps more able-than
Syria to provide funds to radical Palestinian groups.
Qadhafi has not kept all his promises to provide
Safehaven
The radical Palestinians' search for alternatives to
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Syrian hospitality to avoid the strings that Damascus
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activity-has led several groups to consider other
countries as bases for their operations. At least two of
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these radical groups give signs of moving their
operations to Libya, which may make benefits in
addition to safehaven-such as passports and similar
documentation-available to them.
Military Aid and Training
Libya has given military training to Palestinian
groups for more than 15 years. Current training of
Palestinians occurs both inside and outside Libya. It is
well established that Libya provides weapons to
several Palestinian groups.
among recent instances of Libyan
support:
? embers of the PSF received
frogman and other naval training in Libya, which
could be adapted to terrorist operations.
? Libya planned to create a joint
multiple rocket launcher facility in Lebanon with
the PFLP-GC.
? Libya provided weapons to radical Palestinians who
fought against the mainline Shia Amal movement in
last summer's camp wars in Lebanon.
As with money, Libya does not follow through on all
of its commitments. Fatah dissidents, for example,
requested arms from Iran, saying that Libya had not
delivered the weapons it promised.
Outlook
Tripoli and the Palestinians are probably assessing
each other's capabilities and intentions carefully, with
an eye to determining whether closer ties are
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warranted. Nonetheless, greater cooperation may
have limits. Each of the Palestinian groups,
particularly Abu Nidal, has its own agenda and
values its autonomy. Consequently, we expect none of
these groups would be willing to become fully
dependent on Libyan support. Moreover, in many
respects, Syria is a natural ally and should continue to
play a key role. Nevertheless, to the extent that links
between Libya and the Palestinian radicals increase-
a process that appears to be under way-the range
and effectiveness of each partner's terrorist operations
will also increase.)
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Between Friends
Morocco and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain close
ties based on mutual interests. King Hassan provides
political support for Riyadh's foreign policy goals and
assists Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab
regimes in internal security and military training.
Riyadh provides financial assistance that strengthens
Hassan at home and bolsters stability within Morocco
and the Maghreb generally. Although Riyadh's
decreased oil earnings may reduce the level of Saudi
financial assistance over the next two or three years,
we believe mutual political interests will continue to
foster close Saudi-Moroccan relations.)
in an attempt to ease tensions. According to the US
Embassy, it was also at Saudi behest that Hassan
began to improve relations with Colonel Qadhafi-a
process that led to the Moroccan-Libyan union in
1984. FI
Saudi Support
Economic Ties. Financial assistance from Saudi
Arabia has helped stabilize the Hassan regime and
enabled Rabat to sustain the Western Sahara war.
Mutual Interests
Morocco and Saudi Arabia have developed a strong
working relationship. Hassan and Saudi King Fahd
maintain close personal ties based on similar political
interests that include shoring up conservative Sunni
regimes, supporting moderate Islamic organizations
and objectives, encouraging free enterprise, and
advancing moderate Arab goals for a Middle Eastern
peace
In 1982, Morocco and Saudi Arabia worked closely
together at the Arab League summit meeting in Fez
to obtain endorsement of the "Fez Plan" as the
official Arab League position on a settlement to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1984, Fahd and other
moderate Arab leaders engineered the reintegration
reduce the friction between Morocco and its Maghreb
neighbors. While diplomatically and financially
favoring Hassan's position on the Western Sahara,
the Saudis have played an important, if somewhat
unsuccessful, role in encouraging better relations
between Morocco and Algeria. For example, they set
up the first heads-of-state meeting in 1983, and,
following Moroccan reversals on the Western Sahara
issue in the Organization of African Unity and the
United Nations, they were in touch with both leaders
Private transfers of money from Saudi Arabia
supplement official assistance.
Wealthy Saudis also have made extensive private
investments in Moroccan agriculture and basic
industries.
Security Assistance. Saudi financial support helps
Morocco provide security assistance to moderate
African and Arab governments. This cooperation
grew out of an understanding reached between the
two conservative monarchies in the mid-1970s as
members of the now defunct Five-Power Intelligence
Committee-Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt,
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and France-that multilateral effort was needed to
thwart radical initiatives, counter Soviet inroads in
Africa, and combat international terrorism. The spirit
of the agreement continues on a bilateral level
between Rabat and Riyadh. F_~
Since the Grand Mosque incident at Mecca in 1979-
when several hundred armed religious fanatics seized
the Grand Mosque and called for the overthrow of the
Al Saud dynasty-Morocco has furnished security
training to Saudi personnel. According to the US
Embassy at Rabat, the Saudi Government is
financing the presence of some 1,500 to 2,000
Moroccan Army, Air Force, and gendarmerie
personnel to train Saudi security and military
personnel as well as to undertake specific internal
Saudi Arabia is no longer an important source of
military funding for Morocco.
We believe that declining Saudi oil revenues led to a
much more critical review within the Saudi
Government of how and where Saudi Arabia spends
its money. As the Saudis perceived a reduced military
threat to Morocco-to be succeeded by drought and
an export slump-Riyadh reduced military support
while maintaining economic assistance.
Outlook
Morocco will undoubtedly continue to pursue strong
bilateral ties to Saudi Arabia. Although Hassan's
preoccupation with growing domestic concerns may
lead him to retreat somewhat from involvement in
general Middle Eastern issues, economic realities, as
well as his diplomatic isolation in Africa, will require
continuing close attention to relations with potential
Arab donors and oil suppliers. F__1
enhance Arab and Muslim unity and support
In our view, as Saudi oil revenues drop, a greater
percentage of remaining money will be dedicated to
domestic expenditures and to rewarding or placating
Saudi Arabia's nearest neighbors. Nevertheless,
according to US Embassy officials, Morocco remains
the hinge on which Saudi policy toward the Maghreb
turns. Rabat plays a key role in Saudi efforts to
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we believe the relationship will continue
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Near East and
South Asia Briefs
Purchase of Italian Refinery
Tripoli is consolidating control over its recently purchased TAMOIL refinery in
Milan. The Libyans plan to double refinery output by late 1987 and to expand the
distribution network within Italy, The
refinery is the most modern in Italy with a distribution system of 850 service
stations. The refinery and distribution network will guarantee Tripoli access to the
Italian market and help stabilize Libya's oil exports and revenues during the
current soft oil market. Tripoli plans to discharge all employees of Jewish descent
and to utilize only Libyan or Cuban crude. Havana produces only a small amount
of crude oil, but its high sulfur content makes the crude a good blending stock for
the refinery, which cannot operate efficiently solely on low sulfur Libyan oil.
Moreover, the deal will help bolster Havana's foreign exchange position and
provide a secure outlet for difficult-to-market Cuban crude
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