LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200890001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence MASTER FILE COPY
Directorate of
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Latin America
Review
13 September 1985
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ALA LAR 85-020
13 September 1985
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Latin America
Review
13 September 1985
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Page
Articles
Cuba-Peru: Castro and Garcia Compete for Regional 1
Leadership
Newly elected Peruvian President Garcia's rivalry with Cuban
President Castro for regional leadership in Latin America has
focused mainly on the Latin American debt issue.
Caribbean: Labor Unrest
Recent strikes in several Caribbean nations reflecting mounting
union dissatisfaction over austere economic policies apparently are a
precursor to worsening labor trouble throughout the region.
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Mexico-Japan: Improving Economic Ties
Mexican and Japanese officials will be seeking agreements on
increasing trade between the two countries when Mexican President
de la Madrid visits Japan next month.
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Mexico?United States: Unfriendly Stance at the 23
United Nations
Mexico's recent voting record in the United Nations General
Assembly has been nearly indistinguishable from that of the USSR.
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ALA LAR 85-020
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Nicaragua: Sandinista Education Policy
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As part of their effort to broaden support for the regime and
strengthen control over the population, the Sandinistas have
reorganized the educational system, extended government authority
over private schools and emphasized the ideological content of
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instruction.
Briefs Argentina: Peronist Infighting Intensifies
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Guatemala: Economic Adjustments Put on Hold
Grenada: Investment Problems
Barbados: Severe Economic Problems
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Cuba Chronology
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
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Articles
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Cuba-Peru: Castro and Garcia
Compete for Regional
Leadership
New Peruvian President Alan Garcia's bid for
regional leadership has collided with Fidel Castro's
effort to reduce his regional isolation and gain
credibility as the spokesman for Latin America's
economically distressed nations. The debt issue has
become the focal point of acerbic personal rivalry,
with both leaders using vigorous diplomacy to gain
support for their respective radical proposals.
Underlying their differences in ideological and
national perspectives is a fundamental clash of egos.
Despite the public feuding between the two men,
Garcia probably will follow through on his declared
intent to normalize presently limited diplomatic
relations with Cuba. Nevertheless, more tangible
forms of cooperation will be obstructed by personal
enmity. Most analysts believe that the Cuban leader,
who has a tendency to react emotionally against
perceived slights, might try to incite the far left in
Peru against Garcia's leadership if the level of
animosity rises. Other analysts, noting the extensive
equities Cuba has in Peru, believe that Havana would
not resort to such actions at any time in the
foreseeable future.
Diplomatic Shadowboxing
Castro, who staked out his position on Third World
debt several years ago, seems miffed by Garcia's more
recent seizure of the debt issue. The Cuban leader
probably views Garcia's rhetoric as a threat to his own
strategy for becoming Latin America's debt
spokesman. Before Garcia took power, Castro urged
the new government to proceed with caution on debt,
suggesting that Garcia let others?that is, Castro?
take the lead, according to US Embassy reporting.
Castro's further recommendation that Peru negotiate
with the IMF apparently was a tactical move to
undercut Garcia as a competitor.
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Dismissing Castro's proposals as rhetoric,
Garcia pointed out that it is Peru and other Latin
American countries that have incurred a major debt
to the West, not Cuba. A short time later, in a
conversation with the US Ambassador, Garcia
repeated his criticism of Castro, objecting to the
Cuban President's portrayal of the problem as an
East-West rather than a North-South issue and
declaring his intention not to let Castro wrest
leadership from him. Moreover, to combat Castro's
initiatives, Garcia requested information on Cuba's
foreign debt from the US Embassy.
Garcia went public with his complaints against Castro
during a press conference in mid-July, calling Castro's
debt moratorium proposal unrealistic and publicly
repeating his earlier contention that debt is a North-
South problem. He pointedly added that most of
Cuba's trade is with the Soviet Bloc and thus Havana
has no real stake in the matter.
Battling for the Limelight
Both Castro and Garcia viewed the Peruvian
President's inauguration as a chance to seize the
initiative on regional debt.
Castro wanted an invitation to the
inauguration to enhance his credibility as a regional
statesman and give him a chance to win other foreign
leaders over to his approach. Garcia, out of deference
to the United States and possibly wary of being
upstaged by the Cuban leader, did not invite Castro.
Garcia probably also wished to avoid complications in
his efforts to get as many signatories as possible for
the Lima Declaration, a communique embodying his
views on debt repayment.
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Describing Peru as one of the most backward
countries in the hemisphere, Castro condescendingly
offered Garcia his assistance if Garcia was really
"serious" about struggling against mass poverty and
suffering. An angry Castro had earlier reacted to
Garcia's July press conference by downgrading the
level of Cuban representation at the inauguration,
according to the US Embassy. The official who did
attend, Vice President Jose Ramon Fernandez,
reportedly had two "difficult conversations" with
Garcia and concluded that Peru and Cuba could
perhaps be "friends" but not "allies."
Ego Entanglements
Frustrated by over a decade of pariah treatment in
the hemisphere, Castro probably views Garcia's
regional ambitions as those of a brash upstart. Castro
may have mistakenly anticipated playing tutor to the
new Peruvian President and was indignant that the
youthful Garcia presumed to act on his own without
seeking Castro's advice. Castro's inaugural message
was probably intended as a slap on the wrist to bring
the errant Garcia back into line.
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Prospects
Although current feuding between the two leaders
may delay restoration of full diplomatic ties, in time
each probably will support normalization of relations
for different reasons. Ties to a new democratic regime
would help to reduce Havana's longstanding regional
isolation and promote Castro's sought-after image as
a hemispheric statesman. In addition, Castro may
find that continuing the bickering would cause
problems for him with the USSR. The Soviet
leadership probably will remind the Cuban leader not
to take any actions that could upset Moscow's goal of
expanded influence in Peru. For his part, Garcia
probably will come to recognize that a failure to paper
over differences with Castro would greatly complicate
his own efforts to acquire a leadership role in the
Nonaligned Movement. Moreover, a prolonged
refusal by Garcia to normalize relations with Havana
would cause friction with important leftist groups in
Peru.
Nevertheless, the early clash of egos suggests that
tangible forms of cooperation between the two
countries will prove elusive. Havana may hope to
pressure the Garcia administration toward more
radical, anti-US positions through its links to the left
wing of Garcia's party, the United Left, a faction of
the Catholic Church, or a large Communist-
dominated labor confederation.
If Havana's attempts to influence Lima directly or to
exploit internal tensions prove ineffectual, a frustrated
Castro might intensify efforts to cultivate ties to
Peruvian insurgents.
Cuban officials, discussing the potential for
u an influence in Peru, recently stated their belief
that, in the long run, armed revolution is the only way
to bring about radical change in Latin America. The
Cubans further implied they believe the doctrinaire
Maoist Sendero Luminoso insurgent group eventually
will play a more important role in Peru than a legal
leftist coalition. Havana has been
frustrated by its inability to establish contact with
members of Sendero Luminoso thus far. The Cubans,
however, have a more natural ideological affinity for
the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. This
group, some of whose leaders received Cuban backing
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in the 1960s, probably would accept support from
Havana, but we have no evidence that Cuba presently
is providing any aid.
For his part, Garcia has several political advantages
in his contest of wills with Castro. Peru and other
Latin American debtor nations share a common
problem, in marked contrast to Cuba, whose recently
rescheduled debt to the West is relatively small.
Garcia's proposal to tie debt payments to export levels
has some appeal in the region, while Castro's proposal
for a debt moratorium has received a cold reception.
Moreover, since Castro has no direct stake in the
issue, Latin American leaders, typically suspicious of
his motives on most issues, may doubt his sincerity.
Although leaders of major Latin debtor nations, such
as Mexico and Argentina, have privately expressed
strong reservations about the wisdom of Garcia's
approach, they almost certainly admire his courage. If
economic conditions in the hemisphere deteriorate
further, and contribute to widespread popular
discontent, Garcia's stock may rise rapidly as others
come to view him as a more credible regional
spokesman than Castro.
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Caribbean:
Labor Unrest
Strikes in several Caribbean nations over the past few
months reflect mounting union dissatisfaction with
the imposition of austere economic policies. Although
government countermeasures have so far succeeded in
keeping a lid on labor dissidence throughout the
region, the area's dim economic outlook suggests that
worsening labor troubles are likely in most Caribbean
countries. Moreover, opposition leftists will attempt to
take advantage of deteriorating economic
circumstances by urging trade unionists to switch
traditional party allegiances. To the degree these
efforts are successful, popular support for the
conservative administrations now dominating the
region would be sharply reduced and political tensions
would rise.
Recent Labor Agitation
The most serious example of a labor backlash over
austerity occurred in Jamaica this summer. Following
weeks of small-scale, sporadic work stoppages, a
three-day general strike in late June by public-sector
workers protesting low government wage offers and
increased layoffs?at least 6,000 during the last two
years?nearly paralyzed the nation. According to
press reports, the strike, shutting down utility services
and schools throughout the country, was the most
serious labor action in over 40 years. Kingston was
particularly hard hit, according to the US Embassy.
Although private-sector workers did not join the
action, commercial activity also was seriously
affected. Tourist areas on the island's northern coast
that are major generators of foreign exchange,
however, were relatively unscathed.
We believe Prime Minister Seaga's repeated
unwillingness to consult with union leaders over harsh
economic adjustment measures contributed to the
unusual solidarity among Jamaica's disparate unions.
For the first time in recent years, leaders of the ruling
Jamaica Labor Party's union affiliate, the
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, dropped their
longstanding reluctance to press Seaga openly to
modify his austerity program and joined other unions
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in the strike, according to press and US Embassy
sources. We believe their willingness to cooperate with
the union affiliate of the leftist leaning People's
National Party, the National Worker's Union, was
the key to the strike's early success.
Labor unrest also intensified elsewhere in the region
during June and July:
? In the Dominican Republic, leftist-backed unions
called a nationwide work stoppage in mid-June to
protest President Jorge Blanco's veto of a minimum
wage increase for public-sector workers. The strike
was effective in several small interior cities,
according to US Embassy reports, but bickering
among union leaders limited its success elsewhere.
? In Suriname, bauxite workers at the Royal Dutch
Shell-owned Billiton operation held a work
slowdown to back up their demands for a 13-percent
wage hike.
? In the Netherlands Antilles, a proposed across-the-
board wage cut prompted demonstrations by unions
that government officials feared might turn violent.
? In Martinique, striking electrical workers cut power
to parts of the islands.
Government Response
Regional decisionmakers have employed varying
tactics to prevent labor unrest from spreading. Jorge
Blanco compromised to avoid a confrontation even
though labor unions in the Dominican Republic are
relatively weak. On the eve of a second planned
general strike supported by all major labor
confederations in July, the President agreed to raise
public-sector wages. In the Netherlands Antilles,
head of government Peters followed a different tactic,
quickly postponing implementation of the wage cut
and proposing a tax increase instead.
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Caribbean Labor Unions: A Brief Overview
Government-Labor Relations
Labor unions in the English-speaking Caribbean have
long had a close relationship with area governments.
According to academics, unions provided the political
leadership for many of these countries as they ap-
proached and obtained independence. Currently,
Prime Minister Compton of St. Lucia and Prime
Minister Bird of Antigua are trade union leaders
turned politicians. Most unions are allied with politi-
cal parties. In Jamaica, for example, the Bustamante
Industrial Trade Union has been the political back-
bone of the ruling Jamaican Labor Party for over 40
years. Likewise, the National Worker's Union has
long been the arm of the opposition People's National
Party; party leader Michael Manley is the union's
president.
Elsewhere, labor's political influence has been more
limited and labor-government relations frequently
have been adversarial. In the Dominican Republic,
Rafael Trujillo, who ruled from 1930 to 1961, ruth-
lessly crushed all union activity. Trujillo 's successor,
Joaquin Balaguer, paid lipservice to the cause of
independent labor, but continued to use repressive
tactics. Leaders of the ruling Dominican Revolution-
ary Party, although doubling the number of unions
officially recognized to nearly 1,000 and raising
minimum wages with greater regularity than previous
administrations, have kept tight control over union
activities. In Haiti, the Duvalier regime has only
recently allowed unions to begin organizing. The
Bouterse regime in Suriname has relied on force,
coercion, and intimidation to try to eliminate orga-
nized labor as the only remaining challenge to its
rule.
Membership
Reflecting strong labor-government ties in the
English-speaking Caribbean, unions draw from a
large share of the work force. According to academic
studies, union membership in Guyana, Jamaica, Bar-
bados, Trinidad, Dominica, and The Bahamas ranges
from 25 to 34 percent of the work force. Only
Suriname, with about 30 percent of its workers
belonging to unions, approximates this share else-
where in the region. Indeed, only 12 percent of the
Dominican Republic's labor force is unionized, ac-
cording to the US Embassy. Less than 1 percent of
Haitian workers belong to unions.
Labor-Management Relations
Because unions in the English-speaking Caribbean
have long been closely related to the principal politi-
cal parties, labor-management relations usually have
been characterized by mutual respect. Management
generally has recognized and bargained with unions.
Strikes, while more frequent now than they were 10
years ago, normally are not occasions for violence.
The nonconfrontational characteristics of labor-
management relations in the English-speaking Carib-
bean, according to academic studies, results in part
from the absence of comprehensive labor codes in
most of these nations. As a result, labor-management
relations are predicated more on custom and practice
than legal precedence.
Elsewhere, however, legal codes have restricted la-
bor's effectiveness. In the Dominican Republic, for
example, unions have little leverage to use in conflicts
with management. Labor laws clearly favor business
interests, and the right to strike is severely restricted.
Moreover, restrictive legislation?such as the law
requiring unions to have at least 20 members, in a
country where most businesses have less than 10
employees?hinders the potential for rapid union
growth.
Other leaders took a tougher tack. Jamaica's Seaga,
despite the strong political influence of organized
labor, refused to negotiate until the striking workers
returned to work, according to the US Embassy. As
enthusiasm for the strike waned, Seaga hardened his
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stand, withdrawing offers to talk with union
spokesmen, ordering additional layoffs, and
authorizing disciplinary action against recalcitrant
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strikers. He also deployed security forces to operate
key public services. Union leaders, stymied by the
Prime Minister's moves, decided to "suspend" strike
action. For his part, Surinamese leader Bouterse,
after originally endorsing labor's moves, withdrew his
support and urged workers to end their slowdown.
Without the backing of the Surinamese strongman,
the union had little choice but to at least temporarily
quiet their demands for a wage boost.
Opposition Moves
Minority parties on the left clearly are trying to take
advantage of growing union frustration to enhance
their own chances at the polls. In our view, opposition
strategists have focused on winning labor support as
the key to challenging the political status quo. For
example, the US Embassy in Kingston indicates that
Michael Manley's People's National Party tried to
use the recent strike to promote a longtime goal by
generating labor pressure on Seaga to call early
elections. At the same time, US officials indicate that
leftists in Dominica courted labor heavily in the
general election last July. According to US officials,
separatist groups in Guadeloupe have successfully
exploited the island's racial tensions and high
unemployment in spearheading proindependence
demonstrations and labor strikes in July.
Leftists in the Dominican Republic probably have
made more progress than their counterparts elsewhere
in expanding support among unionists. According to
US Embassy officials, various factions of the left
control some 30 percent of unionized labor.
Leftist efforts to shore up their traditionally weak
links with organized labor are being bolstered by
outside aid. The Marxist Worker's Party of Jamaica,
received
$40,000 from North Korea to help build links with
disgruntled unionists. Recognizing the crucial role of
labor unions in most Caribbean political systems and
their loss of influence with most area governments,
Havana recently has sponsored several conferences of
regional labor groups. Similarly, Moscow has made
overtures toward unionists in Suriname by inviting
them to attend a conference in the USSR.
What Lies Ahead
We believe deteriorating economic conditions will
continue to disrupt labor peace in the Caribbean over
the near term, but several factors will limit labor's
willingness to use confrontational tactics. US missions
throughout the Caribbean indicate that the principal
concern of many workers is job preservation. It is
generally understood that excessive wage demands
could well force employers, particularly multinational
firms with competitive options elsewhere, to shut
down. In some countries, factionalism among the
various unions will work against concerted action.
Nevertheless, most workers are unlikely to mute their
responses to sacrifice indefinitely. Those in the oil-
based economies?particularly Trinidad and the
Netherlands Antilles?are unaccustomed to the harsh
austerity we foresee in the next few years. Because we
doubt that an emphasis on job preservation will
suffice for long during a period of protracted
stagflation, rank-and-file pressure for more militant
stands is likely to grow. For their part, many union
leaders, anxious to prevent inroads by radical
organizers, are likely to press employers and
governments alike to implement more expansionary
economic policies. We believe any restructuring of
traditional union-party alliances will be gradual, but
the current trend is likely to continue until the
region's economic deterioration is reversed.
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Mexico-Japan:
Improving Economic Ties
Mexican President de la Madrid's planned visit to
Japan next month will underscore the importance
Mexico City attaches to its economic relations with
Tokyo. Japan is Mexico's largest trade partner after
the United States, and, in our view, de la Madrid
almost certainly will urge the Japanese to buy more
Mexican goods, increase technology transfer, and step
up direct investment. Japanese Prime Minister
Nakasone probably will pledge to maintain imports of
Mexican oil at least at present levels
The Japanese almost certainly
will express interest in selling more goods to Mexico
as a means of offsetting Japan's trade deficit.
Although Tokyo is interested in significantly
expanding its investment links with Mexico City, the
Japanese, in our judgment, will not supplant the
United States as Mexico's premier trade partner and
source of capital in the foreseeable future.
Background to the Visit
The visit, now scheduled for 6-9 October, will be the
first to Japan by a Mexican head of state since former
President Lopez Portillo went to Tokyo in October
1978. Then Prime Minister Ohira reciprocated with a
visit to Mexico in 1980, the year in which Japan first
purchased Mexican oil. Trade between the two
countries rose rapidly during the next two years.
Mexico's imports of Japanese goods fell sharply in
1982 as a result of Mexico's economic crisis, however,
and they have remained low since that time. Mexico's
sales to Japan have been largely unaffected, with the
result that Mexico has run a substantial trade surplus
with Japan since 1982. Last year, for example, the
surplus amounted to almost $1.4 billion.
Mexico City has demonstrated in a variety of ways
the importance it attaches to this trip. De la Madrid's
original itinerary included a state visit to China, but
that portion was canceled last month. Although
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Mexico's "pressing domestic matters" were cited as
the reason, it seems more likely that de la Madrid
viewed improved ties with Japan as his foremost
objective. In addition, planning for the visit has been
under way for over a year, according to the US
Embassy in Tokyo. Top-level officials have traveled
between the two countries on frequent occasions, and
a high-level commission to promote long-term
economic cooperation has been established.
Financial Concerns
The Japanese are likely to afford de la Madrid a
warm welcome and praise him for the politically
unpopular belt-tightening measures his
administration has adopted in an effort to put its
economic house in order. They will suggest that the
manner in which Mexico has dealt with its financial
crisis, notably its cooperation with the International
Monetary Fund and other international creditors,
makes it a model for other Third World debtor states.
The Japanese almost certainly are aware that Mexico
City is likely to miss some key IMF performance
targets this year, but, in our judgment, Tokyo will not
dwell on these problems.
De la Madrid, for his part, will express appreciation
for Japan's recent assistance in helping Mexico to
reschedule approximately $49 billion owed
commercial lenders. Twenty-eight Japanese banks
holding approximately $4.6 billion of the debt are
participating in the new multiyear rescheduling
agreement, according to the US Embassy in Tokyo.
De la Madrid probably will ask Tokyo to encourage
Japanese banks to make additional loans to Mexico.
He will stress, as he did in his recent State of the
Union address, that Mexico's financial problems are
far from over. He is also likely to note that the debt
burden of Mexico and other Third World states must
be viewed as a global concern and one that defies
solution by any single nation.
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Billions of Dollars
Billions of Dollars
Trends in Mexican Trade
Exports
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15-
10-
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1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Imports
1984
1979 1980
1981
1982 1983 1984
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I12 To World
El To USA
MI To Japan
I77 From World
NI From USA
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Oil Policy
De la Madrid probably will assert that Mexico's
continuing economic difficulties necessitate close
cooperation with Japan on oil-related issues. Mexico
City values Tokyo's purchases of Mexican petroleum
both because of the revenues such sales generate,
which amount to well over $1 billion annually, and as
a means of diversifying its customers. Japan is
currently the third-largest purchaser of Mexican oil,
after the United States and Spain. Nonetheless, in
recent years Mexico has supplied no more than 5
percent of Japan's petroleum needs.
Last April, at Mexico City's urging, Tokyo formally
agreed that over the next 12 months it would buy up
to 160,000 barrels of Mexican crude per day (130,000
of light crude and 30,000 of heavy), a volume
comparable to what the Japanese have contracted for
over the past several years. Nonetheless, we know
from diplomatic reporting that the Japanese have long
been displeased with the prices Mexico City charges
Tokyo for its oil, and they are likely to make their
views known directly to de la Madrid during his visit.
It is possible that de la Madrid may accommodate
Tokyo's concerns on this issue.
The Mexican President might, for
example, offer reduced prices in exchange for
agreement by Japan to increase oil purchases.
De la Madrid probably will meet with some success in
attempting to secure a Japanese commitment to help
finance a new oil pipeline, part of the so-called Pacific
Petroleum Project, that would run from oil-producing
areas of southeastern Mexico across the country to
the southern Pacific coast port of Salina Cruz.
According to the US Embassy in Tokyo, de la Madrid
is likely to seek $500 million in Japanese credits for
construction of the pipeline, which would make it
possible for Japanese ships to load all their purchases
of Mexican petroleum in the Pacific.
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Nonoil Trade
De la Madrid and Nakasone will want to discuss
prospects for expanding nonoil trade during the visit.
Brazil and Mexico are the primary markets for
Japanese imports in Latin America. Major Japanese
exports to Mexico include heavy machinery,
automobile parts, iron and steel products, electronic
equipment, chemicals, and scientific and optical
instruments. Major Mexican exports to Japan, in
addition to petroleum, are raw cotton, silver, salt,
shrimp, and fish.
Nakasone and other Japanese officials probably will
voice satisfaction with steps Mexico City has taken
recently to stimulate trade. In the past several
months, the de la Madrid administration has eased
import restrictions, adopted more realistic exchange
rates, and indicated it intends to join GATT. Japan's
leaders will urge de la Madrid to take additional steps
to promote a more market-oriented economy and to
open the Mexican market to foreign competition. The
Japanese also will ask the Mexicans to increase
purchases of Japanese goods, which declined by more
than two-thirds in value between 1981 and 1983
alone, to at least pre-1982 levels. De la Madrid, for
his part, will emphasize that Mexico will be in a
better position to do this if Japan and other
industrialized nations assist Mexico in its economic
recovery. He also will call on the Japanese to buy
more Mexican goods to further this end.
Investment Issues
De la Madrid will appeal for greater Japanese
investment as a means of fostering technology
transfer, creating employment, and boosting exports.
Japanese investments and joint ventures in Mexico
are now concentrated in the steel, electric, electronic,
and chemical industries, according to the US
Embassy in Tokyo. The single largest Japanese
investment in Mexico to date?well over $300
million?has been in the Sicartsa steel complex,
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which is owned by the Mexican Government, in the
Pacific coastal state of Michoacan.
Tokyo is likely to announce new plans by private
Japanese firms to invest in Mexico during de la
Madrid's visit. Japanese businessmen probably regard
Mexico as having considerable potential because of its
large labor pool and proximity to the US market.
Mexico City's decision earlier this year to accept the
proposal of a major US computer firm to invest in
Mexico, while allowing it to retain full equity
ownership, is an action that Tokyo almost certainly
regards favorably. Nonetheless, according to the US
Embassy in Mexico City, many Japanese businessmen
will proceed cautiously before investing in Mexico
because of losses on previous investments,
bureaucratic redtape, the pervasiveness of corruption,
and uncertainties about quality control, labor
relations, and economic management.
Political and Cultural Issues
Although Central America will be an important topic,
political concerns are likely to be secondary in the
talks between de la Madrid and his Japanese
counterpart. In the past, Japan generally has not
displayed much interest in the politics of the region
and has followed the US lead on Central American
matters. In recent months, however, Nakasone has
publicly emphasized that Tokyo is not taking sides on
disputes in the region. He has done so to counter
criticism from opposition members of the Diet,
according to the US Embassy in Tokyo. De la Madrid
almost certainly will reiterate his view that the
problems of the region can best be dealt with through
negotiations. He may encourage Tokyo to urge
Washington to renew bilateral talks with Nicaragua
and work toward a peaceful resolution of differences.
He is likely to ask the Japanese to increase their
economic assistance to Managua and other
governments in the region, suggesting that much of
the present turmoil is the result of poverty and social
injustice. In response, the Japanese may express
general agreement with the Mexican leader's
comments without committing themselves to concrete
action.
The two leaders also probably will discuss ways to
expand cultural and technical cooperation, and they
may sign a formal agreement. In recent years,
Secret
according to the US Embassy in Mexico, more than
1,500 Mexicans have received training in Japan, and
approximately 200 Japanese technicians have been
sent to Mexico to provide assistance in a variety of
fields ranging from agronomy to metallurgy.
Prospects
If successful, de la Madrid's visit to Tokyo, much as
Lopez Portillo's seven years ago, may mark a
watershed in bilateral relations. Both countries realize
there are longer term benefits to a growing economic
relationship. As a result, the formal agreements
concluded between the Mexican and Japanese
leaders, while important, will be more significant
because of the foundation they lay for future
cooperation.
During his visit, de la Madrid almost certainly will try
to convince the Japanese that he is sincere in his
efforts to open the Mexican economy to greater
foreign competition and to promote foreign
investment. He is likely to stress that Mexico City
views Tokyo as an important alternative or
supplement to the United States for trade, technology,
and capital.
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Mexico-United States:
Unfriendly Stance at the
United Nations
Mexican President de la Madrid has on many
occasions publicly expressed the desire to improve
relations with the United States. Nonetheless, in
recent years, Mexico City has aggressively opposed
Washington in the United Nations, both in debate
and on formal votes. The Mexican delegation has
appeared to relish the opportunity publicly to criticize
US-backed resolutions and to flaunt its independence
of Washington. During the last General Assembly,
according to the US Mission, Mexico's voting record
was nearly indistinguishable from that of the USSR
and other countries openly hostile to the United
States. Mexico's stance reflects the leftist bias of the
Foreign Ministry, in our judgment. De la Madrid, for
his part, may view it as promoting Mexico's image in
the Third World and helping to balance the relatively
conservative policy course his administration has been
pursuing at home. Although the Mexicans have told
US diplomats they will consult more closely with
Washington and tone down their anti-US rhetoric
after the 40th General Assembly opens later this
month, we do not believe Mexico City will
significantly alter its pattern of voting.
The Mexican Record
In the last General Assembly, which ended in
December, Mexico's overall record of agreement with
the United States was the lowest of all Latin
American countries except Cuba and Nicaragua,
according to the US Mission. The United States
agreed with Mexico on only 3.9 percent of the plenary
votes and only 2.4 percent of votes overall.' Moreover,
Mexico's voting diverged further from that of the
United States in 1984 than in the preceding year,
when comparable figures on agreement were 16.7 and
13.7 percent, respectively. In contrast, Mexico and the
USSR voted together on 90.7 percent of plenary votes
in 1984 and 82.4 percent in the previous year.
' Voting agreement is calculated only on those issues where both
countries voted yes or no. Abstentions are not included. "Plenary"
votes are those involving the entire General Assembly. Votes of the
various committees are included only in the "overall" vote totals.
23
Percentage Vote Agreement With
Mexico in the General Assembly
Yes-No Votes
1984
1983
Plenary
Overall
Plenary
Overall
United
States
3.9
2.4
16.7
13.7
India
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Yugo-
slavia
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Cuba
96.4
97.7
88.1
89.0
USSR
90.7
82.4
86.4
86.8
According to the US Mission, the Mexican delegation
in recent years has often been more critical of the
United States in UN debate than have representatives
of other countries, including India and Yugoslavia,
which are leaders in the Nonaligned Movement and
generally considered less supportive of Washington.
Issues
Mexico and the United States have taken opposing
stands on a variety of issues. During the last General
Assembly, for example, the Mexicans engaged in
what US diplomats have termed name-calling,
endorsing resolutions that singled out the United
States for condemnation. Such direct criticism by
name is contrary to UN practice and precedent,
according to the US Mission.
Mexico also opposed the United States on a number
of issues outside the Latin American context,
including disarmament and South Africa. The
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Mexicans were unhelpful, according to the US
delegation, on questions related to a nuclear freeze,
the prevention of nuclear war, and "nuclear winter."
Even when they sided with the United States in
condemning "foreign intervention" in Afghanistan,
Mexico's activist UN Permanent Representative,
Porfirio Munoz Ledo, implicitly attacked Washington
for aiding Afghan freedom fighters, according to the
US Mission. The Mexicans also endorsed a resolution
condemning alleged US and Israeli nuclear
cooperation with South Africa. Munoz Ledo
publicly defended the Mexican position, while even
diplomats from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
remained silent on the issue.
On issues closer to home, Mexico was no more
helpful. Its delegation lobbied on behalf of a
Nicaraguan draft resolution on Central America,
according to the Mission, rather than a more balanced
one supported by other members of the Contadora
Group. More generally, the Mexican delegation acted
as an advocate for Managua in the international
forum rather than the honest broker on regional
matters Mexico City claims to be. At the same time,
Mexico applied a double standard in the United
Nations on human rights. Although the Mexicans
supported tough resolutions denouncing human rights
practices in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile, they
declined to pass judgment on abuses in Nicaragua and
Cuba.
Mexican Motives
The leftist bias of the Foreign Ministry and, in
particular, of Mexico's UN delegation, in part
explains the country's UN voting pattern. The
Foreign Ministry has traditionally been a leftist
preserve, and de la Madrid may view it as politically
prudent to allow leftists relatively free rein on foreign
policy at a time when he is pursuing moderate
domestic policies. Munoz Ledo, who has served at his
post for seven years, is a former Minister of Education
and was once the head of Mexico's ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party, giving him considerable
influence within the government and party leadership.
Mexico City probably views its posture in the United
Nations as enabling it to burnish its Third World
credentials and play a leadership role in the
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Nonaligned Movement. The fact that Mexican
rhetoric at times is among the most strident within the
United Nations may, from the Mexicans' perspective,
serve to differentiate their policies from
Washington's.
Mexico City probably reasons that other issues in
bilateral relations are more important to Washington
than Mexican behavior in the United Nations. This
view has led the de la Madrid administration to adopt
positions in the United Nations antagonistic to the
United States with the expectation they will have
little impact on broader relations. In our view, the
Mexicans see their display of independence as costing
the United States little, since Washington can
effectively block any UN action detrimental to its
interests.
In some instances, Mexico's voting record also may be
explained by more specific concerns. In the case of
Nicaragua, for example, Mexico City probably
identifies with Managua's revolutionary aspirations
and defends the Sandinista cause in the United
Nations and elsewhere in part to maintain influence
with the fledgling regime.
Prospects
In recent months, Mexican UN and Foreign Ministry
officials have assured US diplomats they want to
consult more closely during the coming General
Assembly. Perhaps more important, senior Mexican
officials have indicated they will eschew "name-
calling" during the session, and President de la
Madrid, who plans to address the body in September,
has privately informed Washington that Munoz Ledo
will be replaced in the near future. Recent Embassy
reporting indicates that Munoz Ledo is maneuvering
to maintain his position, although de la Madrid
probably will offer him a desirable post if he agrees to
bow out quietly.
In our judgment, however, Mexico appears unlikely to
shift its pattern of voting significantly. The Mexicans
will use more frequent consultations primarily to
explain their positions on issues, and they will argue
that it is Washington, rather than Mexico City, that is
out of step with other UN members. Even Mexico's
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appointment of a new permanent representative
probably will not greatly alter its voting, which will in
all likelihood continue to reflect prevailing views
within the Foreign Ministry. The fact that de la
Madrid is increasingly adopting pragmatic economic
policies at home will, if anything, make it more
difficult to adjust Mexico's UN voting in ways
Washington views as positive.
More generally, we believe that Mexico City's
performance in the United Nations, barring strong
pressure from Washington, will remain inconsistent
with the Mexicans' stated desire to pursue close and
friendly relations with the United States.
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Nicaragua:
Sandinista Education Policy
Recognizing the importance of education in
broadening support for the regime and solidifying
control over the populace, the Sandinistas?with
Cuban and Soviet Bloc assistance?have expanded
and reorganized the educational system, extended
government authority over private schools, and
emphasized the ideological content of instruction.
Despite strong protests from parent and church
groups, regime efforts to don'iinate education are
almost certain to continue.
Since coming to power in 1979, the Sandinistas have
increased educational services as a means of
cultivating popular support. By 1984, according to
official statistics, the education budget had risen
dramatically and school enrollments had doubled. In
1980, the regime organized a massive, five-month
literacy campaign that not only served educational
purposes but also mobilized young supporters and
contributed to political indoctrination. Some 75,000
secondary and university students and international
volunteers taught basic skills to over 400,000 persons,
mostly in rural areas. Subsequently, Sandinista
planners developed a follow-on adult education
program. Although government claims to have
reduced the national illiteracy level from over 50
percent to about 13 percent are almost certainly
exaggerated, the US Embassy notes that even critics
credit these efforts with delivering rudimentary
education to thousands of people. Recently, however,
government officials have acknowledged an increasing
illiteracy rate, low academic performance in schools,
and a shifting of resources away from education to
defense, according to press reports.
A Political Agenda
We believe the regime views education as a tool for
social change. In public statements, Sandinista
leaders have stressed the responsibility of the
educational system to create "a new man, with a new
mentality" to carry out the goals of the revolution.
According to press reports, the regime has planned a
political education program for primary grades that
will consist of two hours per week of formal
27
Textbook Ideology
Nicaraguan texts at all levels are replete with anti-
US, anti-imperialist, and pro-Sandinista rhetoric:
? From a teacher training manual on methods to
make students politically aware:
"If five Sandinista Popular Army troops fought
with 15 'Contras' who were stealing from the
peasants and killed all 15, how many 'Contras' did
each soldier kill?"
? From a ninth-grade history text discussing Mexico:
"The occupation and plundering of territory by the
United States has given birth to a deep anti-
imperialist consciousness in the Mexican people."
? From the reading primer, Los Carlitos:
The letter "C": "Carlos Fonseca. . . the founder of
the FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation
Front]."
The letter "D": "Defense . . . the valiant militia
march on the plaza. All have rifles in their hands.
The militia are from the people. The people are
ready for defense.
The letter "J": El Ejercito [the Army]. . . defender
of our country . . . it will never again allow
intervention by foreign armies."
The letter "Q": "Yanqui. Sandino fought the
'Yanquis.' The Yanquis are always vanquished in
our country."
The sound "GU": "Our Vanguard, the FSLN,
guided and guides the struggles of the people."
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"patriotic" instruction to instill revolutionary values,
employing such methods as peace marches and
military-style games.
students
are required to be members of an approved
revolutionary organization, such as a neighborhood
watch committee, in order to register for high school.
Marxist ideas are taught in all
areas of the curriculum?for example, slogans
memorized as drills in language classes, and
mathematics problems worded to show Marxism as
superior to "imperialism." Students are required to
read the official Sandinista newspaper Barricada, but
are not allowed to dissent.
Sandinismo and the Universities
The regime also has moved to gain control over the
country's institutions of higher learning. The creation
of a Ministry of Higher Education with expanded
responsibilities in 1983 ended the autonomy of public
universities. According to US Embassy sources,
control mechanisms include an admissions quota
system?determining the number of students from
each of the country's departments, with rural regions
given priority?and abolition of elective courses. The
regime has increased emphasis on technical training
and made volunteer community service, such as
helping with harvests, part of course requirements,
according to press and US Embassy reporting.
only
Sandinista youth groups are allowed to organize at
the universities?including privately owned ones such
as the Jesuit-sponsored Central American University.
Students who fled to Costa Rica have told the press
they experienced abuse and classroom interference
from Sandinista supporters. Man ?rofessors
reportedly have left the country.
Cuban and Soviet Bloc Roles
Havana has been
a key player in the transformation of Nicaraguan
education. Cuban teachers began arriving in late 1979
and soon totaled 2,000. Most were repatriated earlier
this year as part of a Sandinista gesture to downplay
ties to Cuba, but the Cuban advisory presence in the
Ministry of Education continues. In addition, Havana
has printed textbooks, helped build schools, and
Secret
provided instruction in Cuba for an estimated 4,000 to
5,000 Nicaraguan youths since 1980. Cubans also
have played key roles in planning the literacy
campaign and reorganizing the educational system,
according to press and US defense attache reporting.
Cuban trainers have
provided Sandinista educators with guidelines for
incorporating ideology into course work
A number of other socialist countries?the USSR,
Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary?have provided scholarships to Nicaraguan
students. Moscow alone has trained hundreds of
Nicaraguans. The East Germans also have
participated in development of educational material,
teacher training, and teacher exchanges, and have
invested nearly $4 million for developing a
polytechnical institute, according to the US Embassy.
Parental and Church Reaction
The issues of control over education and the setting of
educational goals have sparked resistance from
parents' groups and the Catholic Church, according to
the US Embassy. In 1979 and 1980, parents in the
Atlantic coast city of Bluefields demonstrated against
the Cuban presence, unqualified teachers, and the
incorporation of Communist doctrine into the
classrooms, As early as
1981, some 60,000 parents formed an association to
protest the teaching of Marxist concepts, which they
argued would undermine Christian education. In mid-
1982, regime intervention in an administrative
appointment for a Church-sponsored school spawned
parent protests, a threatened school boycott, and
violent student demonstrations in a number of cities?
resulting in at least three dead, a number of injuries,
and numerous student arrests, according to US
Embassy and press reporting. Subsequently,
Managua backed down in an effort to mollify the
Church, and a pastoral letter from the Nicaragua
Bishops' Conference reaffirmed the Church's right to
its own educational institutions. More recently, the
Bishops labeled government intervention in teacher
selection a threat to the autonomy of such schools.
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Although the regime occasionally has retreated in the
face of vigorous parent and church opposition,
Managua is taking strong steps to suppress such
complaints.
in May the President of the Union of
Parents' Associations of Christian Schools?
representing some 32 Catholic and Protestant
religious schools?was arrested and beaten. Despite
his subsequent resignation, leaders of the opposition
coalition reportedly are pressing other members to
continue with plans for a national assembly on
education. In another example of the regime's
growing intolerance for dissent, security officials used
pointed threats to dissuade business leaders from
holding a national "Private Sector Day," according to
US Embassy reporting.
Outlook
The Sandinistas almost certainly will hold fast to their
educational policies. We anticipate further efforts to
tighten controls over such matters as faculty selection
and curriculum at both public and private institutions,
with continued emphasis on political indoctrination at
all levels. Although more protests from parent groups
and the Church are likely, the regime probably will
try to keep them from becoming confrontational.
Moreover, such resistance has little chance of
changing the Sandinistas' determination to put
education at the service of the revolution.
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Latin America
Briefs
Argentina Peronist Infighting Intensifies
Squabbling among the factions of the diverse Peronist movement?still
Argentina's leading opposition party?has intensified since the "unity" congress in
July. At that meeting an alliance of old-style bosses representing Peronism's
extreme leftists and rightists defeated moderate leaders seeking to reform and
democratize the party. Since then the reformists have regrouped and attacked the
official party hierarchy. Last month, party First Vice President Vicente Saadi was
ousted from his post as leader of the Peronist bloc in the Senate by a coalition of
reformist Senators and disgruntled provincial chiefs, and in the Federal District of
Buenos Aires a young reformist leader bested the official Peronist slate in internal
party elections. The most potentially divisive conflict has occurred in populous
Buenos Aires Province, a Peronist bastion long dominated politically by the party's
controversial rightwing Secretary General, Herminio Iglesias. Reformist party
members in the province have spurned Iglesias and are planning to run an
"independent" Peronist ticket in the Congressional elections scheduled for early
November.
The events of the last two months have confirmed that the unity achieved in July
was paper-thin. The reformists continue to snipe at the official Peronist leadership,
but they lack the unity and strength to mount a successful nationwide challenge to
the party bosses. Meanwhile, the party hierarchy remains dominated by
discredited old-guard politicians such as Saadi and Iglesias, who are alienating the
independent, middle-class, and centrist voters responsible for much of Peronism's
past success. Academic studies show that the party now almost exclusively consists
of urban industrial workers and the rural poor?dwindling segments of the
electorate. According to several polls, only 10 to 15 percent of the voters intend to
support the Peronists in the November elections?less than half the total now
backing President Alfonsin's Radical party. Although we expect Peronism to do
somewhat better than these polls indicate, the party almost certainly will suffer a
crushing electoral defeat that will make its reconstruction a long, arduous, and
uncertain process.
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Guatemala Economic Adjustments Put on Hold
Five days of rioting in Guatemala City following the announcement of busfare
increases are likely to be used by the Mejia government to justify avoiding any
economic adjustments prior to the presidential election on 3 November. Chief of
State Mejia, according to US Embassy reporting, believes the risk of social unrest
outweighs the need for policy reform. The government?in consultation with the
IMF?is preparing an economic package to be introduced after the election but
before the civilian president takes office in January, according to the Minister of
Finance. Although the government and the IMF may reach agreement on the need
to devalue the Quetzal sharply, IMF demands for deficit reduction will be more
difficult given strong private-sector opposition to even modest tax increases.
Moreover, Mejia's decision to back down in the face of public protests by
rescinding busfare hikes and promising public-sector wage increases will make it
more difficult for a newly elected civilian government to make and sustain
unpopular adjustments.
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Grenada Investment Problems
As Grenada approaches the second anniversary of the US-led intervention, the
country's inability to attract significant foreign investment is compounding the
island's severe economic problems. The Grenadian Government has tried to
promote new investment by selectively offering tax breaks and other incentives to
potential investors. Grenada's appeal to foreign business, however, is diminished
by its weak physical infrastructure, inadequately trained labor force, and vivid
memories of the country's political instability, according to Embassy reporting.
The government desperately needs new investment to ease serious liquidity
problems and to reduce the island's 35-percent rate of unemployment. As a result,
the government is considering additional measures to try to lure foreign business.
If the poor economic situation persists, public support for Prime Minister Blaize
could be seriously undermined.
Barbados Severe Economic Problems
The Barbadian economy?formerly one of the Caribbean's few strong
performers?faces no more than 1-percent growth in real GDP in 1985, following
four years of decline. As a result, real output at the end of this year is likely to be
less than 95 percent of the 1980 peak. According to the Barbadian Central Bank,
the country's sharp drop in foreign exchange earnings is largely due to continued
low world prices for sugar, the country's leading export. Manufacturers also are
posting reduced sales due to intraregional trade disputes and high wages that have
deterred potential foreign investors. Moreover, the strong US dollar is continuing
to hurt tourist receipts as travelers opt for more affordable European vacation
spots. To cover the island's financial shortfalls and stem the economic decline, the
government has borrowed heavily at home and abroad; Barbados' external debt
increased from $132 million in 1980 to $360 million by the end of 1984. Moreover,
according to Prime Minister St. John, the economic slowdown has caused the rate
of unemployment to top 19 percent?a 10-year high. Continuing economic
difficulties will heighten St. John's political woes and boost chances for an
opposition victory in the next national elections, constitutionally due by March
1986.
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Cuba Chronology
July 1985
1 July
The Council of State announces the release of Humberto Perez Gonzalez from his
post as Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister President of the
Central Planning Board.
Council of Ministers Vice President Jose Lopez Moreno is appointed Minister
President of the JUCEPLAN and Raul Cabrera Nunez, Minister of Construction.
Reuters reports that Havana is considering a major government shakeup including
a more prominent role for Fidel Castro's younger brother, Raul, and a new Foreign
Minister.
2 July Bolivian Minister of Social Services and Public Health Dr. Javier Torres Goitia
arrives in Cuba and is greeted by his counterpart, Sergio del Valle.
4 July
He decorates Fidel Castro with the Bolivian Health Order and thanks Cuba for
donating an intensive care unit to the La Paz children's hospital.
Fidel Castro presides over the party's 12th plenum. A decision is made to postpone
the Third Party Congress until 4-7 February 1986.
Deputy Director of the Communist Party Central Committee's Foreign Affairs
Department Eloy Valdes arrives in Addis Ababa. He meets with Ethiopian party
official Ashagre Yigletu.
President of the National Assembly Flavio Bravo receives British parliamentarians
George Foukes and Robert Jackson to discuss the unpayable Latin American
foreign debt.
Fidel Castro discusses the political situation, foreign debt, and the creation of the
new international economic order with the 650 Cuban delegates who will attend
the 12th World Youth and Student Festival in Moscow.
5 July Fidel Castro sends a congratulatory message to Cape Verdean President Aristides
Pereira on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Cape Verde's independence,
reiterating his determination to strengthen cooperation.
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8 July A water quota assignment plan is implemented in Havana to counter the prolonged
drought that has hurt agriculture throughout Cuba.
Vice Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon arrives in Argentina. In an interview at
the airport, he says the subject of Latin America's foreign debt will be discussed
with Argentine officials.
Fidel Castro presides over the eighth regular meeting of the National Assembly of
the People's Government.
The National Assembly of the People's Government approves the release of
Deputy Jorge Lezcano from his post as Assembly Vice President and ratifying
Severo Aguirre to replace him.
Addressing the American Bar Association, President Reagan characterizes Cuba,
Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Nicaragua as "a confederation of terrorist states."
At the National Assembly meeting, Fidel Castro responds to President Reagan's
address to the Bar Association, calling Reagan crazy and deranged.
Havana press announces that Fidel Castro, in a lengthy interview with publisher
Jeffrey Elliot and US Congressman Mervyn Dymally, says Cuba's relations with
the United States have worsened since Reagan took office.
9 July Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain cancels a planned tour of Cuba, Peru,
and Ecuador that was to begin on 19 July.
Officials from a British chemical enterprise and the Cuban State Committee for
Economic Cooperation agree to increase cooperation in public health, basic
industries, and sugar.
10 July Vilma Espin heads a delegation to Nairobi, Kenya, to participate in the UN
women's conference.
Fidel Castro and Rene Rodriguez meet with visiting Colombian Congressman Dr.
Jaime Betancur, who delivers a message from President Belisario Betancur.
11 July Vice Foreign Minister Alarcon arrives in Montevideo and meets with President
Sanguinetti and Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias.
Uruguayan Foreign Trade General Director Isidoro Hodara, Foreign Ministry
International Economic Affairs Director Jose Maria Areneo, and 25 Uruguayan
industrialists arrive in Havana to discuss aspects of the recently reestablished
trade relations between the two countries.
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13 July Fidel Castro discusses Latin America's foreign debt with a Brazilian labor
delegation that will participate in the trade union conference on 15 July.
15 July
16 July
17 July
18 July
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets in Havana with Eduardo Santos, Spain's Under
Secretary of the Industry Ministry, who heads a delegation of Spanish
industrialists.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez denies that recent cabinet changes had anything to do
with the 45-day postponement of the Third Party Congress.
President of the National Energy Commission Joel Domenech opens the "Energy
Under the Revolution" exhibit in Havana. He says Cuba saved 225,000 tons of oil
during the first half of the year.
The Latin American?Caribbean Workers Conference on the Foreign Debt opens
in Havana with more than 300 labor leaders from 30 countries attending.
Prensa Latina reports that Fidel Castro has invited Latin American
representatives to meet in Havana on 30 July to discuss the region's foreign debt.
Cuban Ambassador to the UN Oscar Oramas sends a letter to the president of the
UN Special Committee on Decolonization accusing the United States of violating
the Tlatelolco Treaty.
Havana press reports that Carlos Roca Caceres, Deputy of the American
Revolutionary Popular Alliance of Peru, says Peru will establish relations with
Cuba.
Labor leaders attending the debt conference pledge overwhelming support for
Cuba's proposal that the region's foreign debt be canceled and agree that 23
October will be the "Day of Action Against the Foreign Debt."
Politburo member Pedro Miret heads the Cuban delegation to Nicaragua
attending festivities commemorating the sixth anniversary of the Sandinista
revolution.
According to Paris press reports, the Paris Club says Cuba's 10 leading creditor
countries have agreed in principle to a major reorganization of the 1985 debt.
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19 July
Fidel Castro expresses "unwavering solidarity with Nicaragua against US
aggression" in his message to Nicaraguans on the sixth anniversary of the 1979
Sandinista revolution.
Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Manuel Estefania and Uruguayan official Isidoro
Hodara sign economic agreements concerning industrial, agricultural, and meat
products.
20 July Peru's President-elect Alan Garcia rejects a call by Fidel Castro for Latin
American nations to refuse to pay their combined foreign debt of $350 billion.
22 July Latin American journalists participate in a seminar on Latin American and
Caribbean foreign debt at the Jose Marti International Journalist Institute in
Havana.
23 July Foreign Minister Malmierca arrives in Algeria and meets with President Chadli
Bendjedid and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi to discuss
international matters and the Nonaligned Movement Ministerial Conference
scheduled for September.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives the credentials of the new Nicaraguan
Ambassador to Cuba, Luis Enrique Figueroa Aguilar.
26 July Fidel Castro, speaking in Guantanamo City on the 32nd anniversary of the assault
on the Moncada Barracks, blasts the United States for stationing troops on
Guatanamo Bay.
29 July Fidel Castro sends Peruvian President Alan Garcia best wishes for success in his
new post and offers Cuba's support.
Uruguayan President Sanguinetti praises the initiative by Fidel Castro to promote
a continental dialogue on the foreign debt problem at a press conference in Lima.
30 July The Latin America?Caribbean debt conference opens in Havana. Fidel Castro
explains the general rules governing the meeting to the participants.
31 July 0 Estado de Sao Paulo reports that Fidel Castro says his country "wants and
wishes" to reestablish diplomatic relations with Brazil and he believes that Brazil
may be "the key to the solution of the Latin American debt problem."
Secret
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