LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200910001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence PIASTER FILE U
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Review
Latin America
17/
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Latin America
Review
Articles Brazil: Growing Leftist Influence in the Church
Leftists are gaining influence in the Brazilian Catholic Church, and
are increasingly advocating land reform and becoming involved in
labor agitation and 'political organizing. F--]
Although student protests have increased, their demands generally
have concerned university policies and other parochial interests
rather than national or international issues.
Mexico: Governor Steps Down in Chihuahua I 11
The announcement that controversial Chihuahua Governor Ornelas
is taking an extended leave of absence suggests that President de la
Madrid wants to strengthen political leadership in the state before
next year's critical gubernatorial election. F--]
Cuba: Growing Interest in Computer Technology 13
Havana wants to use computer technology to streamline the
government bureaucracy, but hard currency shortages and trade
restrictions are hampering efforts to acquire more advanced
Western equipment. F-7
Secret
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Cuba: Outpost in Cape Verde
Havana provides military and security advisers and health,
education, and agricultural aid to Cape Verde, reflecting a need to
protect the Cuban aerial resupply link to Angola.
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Haiti: Exile Activity
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Exile groups trying to overthrow President Duvalier are likely to
remain an irritating, but manageable nuisance to the regime. F-
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Peru: An Economy Under Siege
Honduras-Nicaragua: Border Tensions
Cuba-Poland: Polish Leader's Visit Accomplishes Little
Guyana: Foreign Exchange Crisis
Trinidad and Tobago: Downside of the Oil Boom
Bermuda: Call for Early ElectionsF-~
Costa Rica: Financial Squeeze Eased
Mexico: Defense Secretary Criticizes President
Mexico-Japan: De la Madrid Postpones VisitF
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Brazil: Growing Leftist
Influence in the Church
The growth of leftist influence in the Brazilian
Catholic Church-a trend evident since the military
seized control of the country in the mid-1960s-has
accelerated since the restoration of civilian
government under President Sarney in March. In the
more open political climate under civilian rule,
radicals in the church appear to be increasing their
involvement in advocating land reform as well as in
labor agitation and political organizing.
Longstanding Leftward Trend
The Catholic Church in Brazil generally supported
national governments before the 1964 military coup.
Subsequently, the military regime's repressive
policies, together with economic and social inequities
stemming from its free enterprise approach to
development, alienated many clergymen and Catholic
lay leaders. The Catholic left-composed of bishops,
clergy, and lay activists-grew steadily and by the
late 1960s had become a major opposition force.
Leftist clerics and lay leaders became increasingly
outspoken against the regime. Some were arrested for
having ties with uerrilla groups, while others went
into exile.
Conference at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968. It relates
Christian principles to social conditions, often using a
Marxist-oriented analysis of class conflict, and
encourages social and political action to eliminate
exploitation of the poor.
In addition, the ideas of Liberation Theology have
been diffused through Brazil's lower-income groups
by Christian Base Communities (CEBs)-local
groups, led by Catholic laymen and priests, that first
sprang up in the 1960s. The CEBs, whose activities
range from Biblical studies to labor agitation, now
number over 70,000 throughout Brazil, according to
the US Embassy.
CEBs are strongest in the impoverished
northeast and have about 4 million members
nationwide.
The CEBs lack centralized direction, and their impact
in the political arena has varied widely from region to
region. CEBs in the northeast and in industrialized
Sao Paulo have had the most success organizing the
poor into political action groups, primarily in support
of the small but radical Workers' Party, according to
the Embassy
The emergence of Liberation Theology in Brazil and
other Latin countries during the early 1970s
reinforced the views of leftist Brazilian clerics that the
church had to become politically involved to change
the social system. Liberation Theology was conceived
by Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez and other
Latin clergymen following the condemnation of "neo-
colonialism" by the Latin American Bishops
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ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Factions Within the Church Hierarchy
Individual Brazilian Catholic bishops set the tone for
political activities within their own dioceses, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. The approximately 300
bishops meet once each year as the National Confer-
ence of Brazilian Bishops, but that body usually
steers clear of controversial issues.
According to the US Embassy
three loose factions or "tendencies'-conservative,
liberal, and leftist-are evident within the Brazilian
church. The conservative group consists of a handful
of bishops who supported the former military regime.
They believe that the church's mission is strictly
spiritual and does not encompass social reform or
political action. The liberals comprise the largest
group, both within the hierarchy and among the rank-
and-file clergy. They believe the church has a social
reform mission to improve the lot of the poor.
According to the US Embassy, although the liberals
deny that the church should play apolitical role, they
acknowledge that its social reform mission can some-
times extend into the political arena, and they are
sympathetic to Liberation Theology.F_~
The leftists, whose influence and outspokenness far
exceed their numbers, consider themselves the van-
guard of social reform, according to the US Embassy.
Leading members of this group-such as Cardinal
No Lorscheider, the president of the Bishops' Confer-
ence; Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns of Sao Paulo;
and Cardinal Aloisio Lorscheider of Forteleza-have
promoted the spread of Liberation Theology, advo-
cated a radical overhaul of the Brazilian economy,
and forged church ties with the far-left Workers'
Party and allied labor unions. Since the mid-1960s,
the leftists, with at least tacit support from the
liberals, have succeeded in transformin a once-
passive church into an activist one.
Political Activity Under Civilian Rule
Since the return to civilian rule, leftist members of the
clergy have increased their calls for major land
reform. Several leftwing bishops successfully lobbied
for the appointment of a prominent Catholic lay
leader and proponent of land reform, Nelson Ribeiro,
as Agrarian Reform Minister in the new
administration. Ribeiro submitted a far-reaching land
reform proposal, endorsed by President Sarney, to the
Congress in May. It calls for expropriation of large
estates and uneconomic small holdings and the
resettlement of over 7 million people during the next
15 years. The National Conference of Brazilian
Bishops, a body that represents the country's
approximately 250 active and 50 retired bishops, has
called for immediate implementation of the land
reform plan, according to the US Consulate in Sao
Paulo. The plan has encountered strong opposition,
however, from congressmen representing large
landowners. It has also sparked premature seizures of
land by peasants as well as violence between these
squatters and landowners' private militias. F__1
In the freer political climate under civilian rule,
church laymen and clergy, working through the
CEBs, are expanding their ties with the Workers'
Party and labor unions affiliated with it. According to
the US Embassy, the Workers' Pastorate, a little-
known branch of the Sao Paulo diocese, cooperates
closely with the most militant factions of the Workers'
Party.
church laymen and clergy openly supported strikes
backed by the Workers' Party in Sao Paulo. F_
Church leftists also are beginning to establish new
We believe they created these parties in order
appears to have gained a large following.
to run candidates in several cities in November's
mayoral elections, with the hope of attracting support
among moderate voters unwilling to back a Workers'
Party ticket. Thus far, neither of the new parties
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In addition, leftist bishops increasingly are flouting
Vatican wishes by expressing support for the Cuban
and Nicaraguan Governments.
Arns publicly supported Nicaraguan Foreign Minister
D'Escoto-a Maryknoll priest-during D'Escoto's
hunger strike in July to protest US policy. In addition,
the US Embassy in Managua reports that leftist
Bishop Casaldaliga of Brazil's Mato Grosso state
traveled to Nicaragua to conduct public masses in
support of D'Escoto's fast. Nicaraguan bishops
protested his actions to the Brazilian hierarchy with
little effect, according to the Embassy. Casaldaliga
claimed to be acting on behalf of some two-dozen
Brazilian bishops.
The Conservative Response
Pope John Paul II's opposition to Liberation Theology
and to clergy participation in politics appears to have
placed the Vatican on a collision course with the
leftist-dominated hierarchy of the Brazilian church.
In May, Rome ordered the silencing-reportedly for
one year-of a leading Brazilian liberation
theologian, Father Leonardo Boff, because of his book
attacking the hierarchical structure of the church.
Leftist Brazilian bishops were angered by the
Vatican's action, and some of them issued a sharp
protest statement, according to press reports. F
The silencing of Boff may have been the opening salvo
in a campaign by the Vatican and the minority
conservative bloc in the Brazilian church to reduce
Outlook
We believe leftist influence in the Brazilian Catholic
Church will continue to expand during the next
several years in the newly open political climate. In
our view, Vatican-backed moves by conservative
prelates to counter the leftward trend are unlikely to
have much effect because the right wing is too small
and isolated within the hierarchy. The strong
sentiment within the Brazilian church in favor of
greater independence from the Vatican also is likely
to work against the conservatives' efforts.
We expect leftist-oriented church leaders to continue
pressing for land reform while also speaking out on
other issues such as US policy in Central America.
Moreover, church activists are likely to expand their
collaboration with the Workers' Party and the labor
movement.
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Mexico:
Trends in Student Activism
The apparent surge in student demonstrations and
other protest actions at a number of Mexican
universities in the past year does not reflect a trend
toward greater involvement in national politics.
Student demands generally have related to university
policies and other parochial concerns rather than to
national or international issues. The reluctance of
Mexican students directly to confront the government
probably has resulted from fears of reprisal,
preoccupation with more immediate financial and
other matters, and a lack of unity among youth
groups. In the foreseeable future, Mexican students
probably will have little influence on national politics,
although they may occasionally have some impact on
state and local affairs.F__1
? University students in San Luis Potosi seized and
burned buses in September after one ran over a
student. The violence ended only after the bus
company agreed to indemnify the victim's family
and city authorities promised to improve bus service.
? At the Autonomous University of Coahuila, almost
a year of protests that left two dead and many
injured ended in March with the naming of a
compromise candidate as rector. The unrest initially
had been sparked by two dental students armed
with pistols and Molotov cocktails who occupied a
university building to demonstrate their
dissatisfaction with examination practices and
demand the dismissal of the university's rector.
Background
Students traditionally have not been a strong political
force in Mexico. They were not major actors in the
1910 Mexican Revolution, and, even today, they
identify with the revolution far less than workers and
peasants, in whose name it was foughtr__1
In fact, Mexican students tried to flex their collective
muscle only during a brief period in the late 1960s.
This period was characterized by increasingly large,
peaceful student demonstrations, some of which were
beginning to attract middle-class support. Students
were protesting what they considered the repressive
and undemocratic nature of Mexico's political system.
Student activism, however, was short lived. The
government crushed the student movement in October
1968, when security forces fired on youthful
demonstrators in Mexico City's Tlatelolco Plaza,
killing over 300 and wounding as many as 1,000,
according to Embassy and press reports. The
massacre, followed by the jailing of many student
leaders, assured that the 1968 Olympic games were
without incident. F__1
Recent Unrest
In recent years, there have been a number of student
demonstrations, but virtually all have focused on
campus issues rather than national or international
matters:
? In September students at the Autonomous
University of Chihuahua occupied university
offices, commandeered city buses, and blockaded
streets to protest the reappointment of a
controversial rector. The official subsequently
resigned, as did the Governor, a close political ally.
It now appears that the students were used
indirectly by one faction of the ruling party to force
the ouster of the Governor, the leader of the other
faction.
In the past year, major student protests also have
occurred at universities in the states of Chiapas,
Puebla, and Veracruz, all of which have reputations
for student and faculty activism. Such student
demonstrations, while used on occasion for political
purposes by others, generally have not been politically
motivated, according to the US Embassy. Student
concerns have focused mainly on university-related
matters, such as admissions policies, academic
regulations, availability of scholarships, and
unpopular administrators. In several cases, students
have joined with teachers to protest low faculty pay,
reductions in education budgets, or poor classroom
facilities. Local issues, including hikes in bus fares
and refusals to give students discounts at theaters,
also have touched off demonstrations.
Secret
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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To the extent Mexican students have addressed
national issues, they usually have limited themselves
to foreign affairs, where their traditionally leftist bent
is generally in line with administration policy.
According to the US Embassy, in recent years there
have been a number of student protests against
alleged US intervention in Central America, and
support for Nicaragua's Sandinistas appears strong on
are also said to oppose what they
perceive as US pressures on Mexico, the US military
buildup, and the influence that the International
Monetary Fund exerts on Mexican policy. Students
and faculty activists have not strop 1 attacked their
government's domestic policie
Reasons for the Student Mood
The failure of students to be more active in national
politics is partly the result of cynicism of Mexican
youth about their ability to influence events,
according to the Embassy. In addition, students, with
good reason, fear government reprisals for
participation in antigovernment demonstrations. In
effect, the lesson of the 1968 crackdown has not been
forgotten, and both students and teachers remain
circumspect in openly criticizing the system. F_~
At the same time, according to the Embassy, many
students have stayed out of politics because they are
preoccupied with immediate financial concerns.
Higher education has not been a major government
priority in recent years, with the result that many
students apparently have had to use their free time to
make ends meet. F----]
Another factor limiting the impact of student activism
is the fragmentation and political infighting that
characterizes most student organizations. Leftist
groups at the Autonomous University of Mexico in
the capital, for example, are divided into Marxist,
Trotskyite, and Maoist factions, among others. Most
Mexican universities do not have central student
federations. There is no national organization capable
of, or responsible for, representing student interests
thoughout the country.F_~
The government, for its part, has taken a number of
measures to discourage potentially disruptive student
activism. It has sought, although with little success, to
co-opt students by enlisting them in the ranks of the
ruling party's youth affiliate-the National
Movement of Revolutionary Youth. More effective
have been the government's efforts to secure the
appointment of university administrators in whom it,
has confidence. In addition, at some of the larger
schools, university and government officials have
hired groups of thugs to masquerade as students to
intimidate dissident students and faculty members.
According to the Embassy, such young toughs, who
generally are deployed against leftist groups, at times
provoke violence so that authorities have an excuse to
intervene and arrest student activists.
Prospects
We anticipate that student involvement in university
and local matters will continue, leading to some
ferment on campus and occasional violence. Students
.probably will have some influence on local and state
politics, as they evidently have recently in Chihuahua.
We believe, however, that student protest activities
generally will remain isolated and that they will not
be directed against the national government.
Authorities in Mexico City appear to have the
information, the resources, and the will to contain any
student disorders they view as threatening.
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Mexico: Governor Ste s
Down in Chihuahua
The announcement in mid-September that Oscar
Ornelas Kuchle, governor of the key northern border
state of Chihuahua, will take an extended leave of
absence-an act tantamount to resigning-suggests
President de la Madrid wants to strengthen political
leadership in the state before next year's critical
gubernatorial race. Ornelas, whose six-year term will
expire next year, had been in political trouble with
leaders of his own party since he did not prevent the
National Action Party (PAN) from winning
mayoralties in the state's two largest cities-Ciudad
Juarez and Chihuahua City-in 1982.F__1
Criticism of Ornelas' leadership sharpened after he
failed to mobilize his party to campaign hard in
midterm congressional elections last July
a result, the conservative PAN made a strong
showing, winning three of Chihuahua's 10
congressional seats and officially capturing an
impressive 36 percent of the vote statewide, 10
percentage points more than it won in any other state.
Internal divisions within the state's ruling party also
contributed to Ornelas' demise, according to the US
Consulate in Ciudad Juarez.
The forced resignation of Ornelas shows that de la
Madrid does not intend to permit the PAN to
challenge the ruling party's electoral dominance.
Nevertheless, the split within the ruling party in
Chihuahua and Ornelas' probable bitterness at being
forced out will hamper the ruling party's efforts to
sweep state and local races in 1986, which are likely
to be among the most hotly contested in the country.
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nominee and may choose someone better able to unite
the warring factions within the official party. Leading 25X1
contenders for the PAN nomination are Mayor Barrio
of Ciudad Juarez and Mayor Alvarez of Chihuahua
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state and, probably would
give the ruling party stiff competition.F_~ 25X1
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ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Cuba:
Growing Interest in
Computer Technology
Havana's increasing interest in computer technology
reflects the regime's desire to streamline government
bureaucracy as well as President Castro's fascination
with modern technology. Several constraints,
however, are preventing Havana from making
effective use of computer technology. Hard currency
shortages have hindered the country's ability to
import higher-quality Western computers, especially
the more expensive, large mainframe computers. So
far, Cuban purchases of Western computers have
been largely limited to less than 2,000 relatively
inexpensive personal computers that have more
limited capabilities than mainframe machines.
Cuba faces the additional obstacles of the US trade
embargo and COCOM (NATO Coordinating
Committee on Export Controls) restrictions in its
attempts to acquire more advanced Western
equipment. Havana has used a variety of indirect
means to circumvent such restrictions, but often may
be forced to settle for much less sophisticated
technology produced at home or by other CEMA
countries. CEMA, however, has given Havana little
assurance that it is willing to underwrite development
of a high-technology base in Cuba. There has been
only limited development of an infrastructure-in the
form of training, maintenance, data bases, and a
related semiconductor industry-to support computer
users in Cuba. For at least the near term, therefore,
the ailing Cuban economy probably will be largely
unable to benefit from the potential efficiencies from
computer usage.F__1
Beginning Efforts- Personal Computers
Cuba's hard currency reserve difficulties have limited
its ability to buy the mainframe computers used for
many commercial and scientific applications. Indeed,
almost all of the Western equipment Havana has
obtained thus far are personal computers that are
used for routine administrative tasks in government
Havana has begun to show some interest in the
related field of semiconductor technology. According
to press reports, Cuba purchased over $2 million
worth of equipment from a Spanish firm between
1979 and 1982 for manufacturing integrated circuits
and semiconductors. Over the last year or so, Havana
has been seeking additional semiconductor production
equipment from British and Japanese companies.
Secret
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Cuba reportedly is taking steps to centralize its
control over computer purchases and to ensure
compatability between different models.
the Cuban Institute of High
Technology is the focal point for all government
agencies wanting to buy computers.
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Applications
Cuba's public health services appear to be one of the
primary recipients of Western computers.
Cuba has requested assistance from the UN
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in the
establishment of a computer and software training
center, as well as five other computer projects,
Havana apparently hopes these projects will spur
increased productivity and innovation throughout the
economy. Cuba submitted a project proposal to
UNIDO last April entitled, "Improved Industrial
Management Through Computer Support,"
Support for Computer Users
So far, Havana has provided only limited assistance to
computer users through a few data base connections,
a modest computer training program, and a small
investment in the semiconductor industry. According
to the Cuban press, Cuba's Electronic Components
Enterprise began to gather information on Soviet
electronics from a Moscow data base in June. The
Scientific and Technical Documentation and
Information Institute-an affiliate of the Cuban
Academy of Sciences-has links to Soviet, Bulgarian,
and Czechoslovak data bases, according to Cuban
As a necessary adjunct of its increased utilization of
computers, Cuba has established a computer training
institute, as well as a computer repair facility in
Havana. The Computer Training Center of the
National Institute of Automated Systems and
Computer Techniques was created in 1978, and,
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according to the Cuban press, had graduated 13,000
students through 1984. According to press reports, the
Computer Training Center works closely with similar
institutions in Hungary and East Germany. Cuban
representatives also reportedly participated in
conferences hosted by the Intergovernmental
Commission on Computer Technology in East
Germany and Hungary earlier this year.
Nevertheless, these efforts are very
miniscule given the size of the Cuban labor force (over
3 million persons) and the number of Cuban
enterprises.
CEMA Aid
Havana probably can expect little aid from other
CEMA countries for its fledgling computer industry.
Cuba's role within CEMA as a producer primarily of
agricultural goods and raw materials was reaffirmed
at a meeting of the organization held in Havana last
October. Much to Castro's dismay, CEMA squelched
his hopes that it would support a more industrialized
Cuban economy with particular emphasis on the
electronics sector. At the same time, Moscow agreed
only to maintain current levels of economic aid in the
next five-year plan. F__1
Outlook
Castro's continued emphasis on putting Cuba's
economic house in order probably will require
increased use of computers to improve efficiency. The
bureaucratic reshufflings expected to occur over the
next few months could result in more management
positions being filled by technocrats who are likely to
favor increased usage of computers. If Castro adopts
the advice of his economic advisers to increase
incentives and permit more managerial autonomy at
the enterprise level, lower-level managers also
probably will rely more on computers to cut costs and
remove manufacturing bottlenecks. Moreover,
Castro's longer-term strategy of improving relations
with the West in hopes of gaining economic relief, if
successful, could enable Havana to expand its network
of front companies abroad and to additional sources
of high-technology products.
Nonetheless, existing obstacles hampering Cuba's use
of computers will continue to slow down Havana's
acquisition of computer technology. Its ability to
import quality Western computer equipment probably
will remain constrained, at least in the near term, by
hard currency shortages and restrictions imposed by
COCOM member countries on Cuba's import of
high-technology items. Despite Cuba's collaboration
with other CEMA member countries on computer
projects such as data transmission networks and the
design and production of mainframe and
microcomputers, Havana cannot expect any
significant financial assistance from CEMA in
advancing its technological capabilities. Another
impediment to the widespread adoption of computers
by Cuba is the long leadtime required to train a
sufficient number of programers, engineers, operators,
and systems analysts. Thus far, only a very small
percentage of Cuba's labor force has received such
training.F_~
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Cape Verde
Cape Uerde
}siandx
Santo
Antao
yParte Grande
Mindelo,
Santa Luzia
Boa
Vista
Cape Verde
Amilcar Cabral y
' International Airport P Sal
Sao
Tiago
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Cuba: Outpost in Cape Verde
Cuban interest in Cape Verde and its influence in the
government of this small group of islands off the
northwestern coast of Africa have been strong for over
a decade
Havana, which has cultural and ethnic
similarities with Cape Verde and provides health,
education, and agricultural aid, exercises far more
influence with Praia than Moscow doe
Cuban advisers) are active
in nearly every department of the Cape erdean
Government.
We believe Havana probably will continue to cultivate
close ties with Praia so long as its commitments on the
African continent, particularly in Angola, remain
high. Even so, given the small size of the country, the
Cubans probably will opt to keep their presence at or
near current levels, lest they wear out their welcome
with Cape Verdean officials. )
Moreover, most of Cape Verde's
government ministers and many of its citizens
reportedly have received free education and political
and technical training in Cuba
Cuban influence in Cape Verde appears to be heaviest
Verdean military and police officers go to Cuba for
training, and that the security services are closely
tailored after the Cuban model.
In our view, Havana's desire to maintain warm
relations with Praia most likely stems from the need
to protect its aerial resupply link to Angola, where
some 35,000 Cuban troops support the Luanda regime
against antigovernment forces. All flights carrying
Cuban personnel to and from Angola make their
necessary refueling stops in Cape Verde. Although
most of the arms, ammunition, and other supplies
destined for Angola are now routinely flown or
shipped in by the Soviets, limited quantities of
supplies-including arms-evidently are still carried
aboard Cubana Airlines military flights transiting
Cape Verde.
Secret
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Haiti: Exile Activity
Exile groups committed to the overthrow of President assassinating Duvalier, or both, have continued over
Jean-Claude Duvalier have long had little support in the past year:
Haiti or among Haitian expatriates. All of their
previous attempts at invasion or assassination have ? Last November, the government arrested 19 persons
been unsuccessful, although some groups have carried
out terrorist actions in Haiti. We believe these groups
will remain an irritating but manageable nuisance to
the regime over the foreseeable future. Nevertheless,
a number of groups continue to hatch plots against
Duvalier, which the Haitian Government takes
seriously and carefully monitors.F-7
The Exile Community
Although we lack reliable statistics on the extent of
emigration, large numbers of Haitians have left their
country over the years. The US Embassy indicates
that the vast majority are refugees-rather than
political exiles-driven by dismal economic conditions
to seek a better life elsewhere. Significant
communities of ethnic Haitians exist in The Bahamas,
the Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Cuba, Guyana, Canada, and the United States. Most
appear to be unemployed or occupy the lowest rungs
of the job ladder and thus are barely able to support
themselves, much less fund a movement against the
Duvalier regime.F_~
Recent Activities
During the past 28 years of Duvalier family rule,
exiles have formed numerous groups aimed at
toppling the regime, although we believe such activists
still constitute only a tiny minority among the exile
community. We believe these groups generally are
characterized by limited resources, poor organization,
and inability to work together. According to the
Embassy, the ideological commitment of most exile
groups is weak, and the groups span the political
spectrum. Their only common goal is the regime's
overthrow; few have specific or coherent plans for a
post-Duvalier Haiti. Although some have proven
capability for terrorist acts in Haiti, a review of recent
exile activities indicates a pattern of failure in
carrying out their plots. Nevertheless,
an alleged plot
Secret
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Haitian National Bernard Sansaricq Miami
Popular Party (PPNH)
National Democratic Leslie Manigat Caracas
Group of Haiti (RDNP)
National Democratic Pro- Lionel Laine
gressive Party of Haiti
(PNDPH)
Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Haiti
Haitian National Louis Dejoie, Jr. Puerto
Farm-Industrial Rico
Party (PAIN)
Unified Party Rene Theodore Dominican
of Haitian Republic
Communists (PUCH)
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Little Foreign Support
According to the Embassy, Cuba has not shown much
interest in Haiti since it provided support for a few ill-
planned invasions of Haiti over 20 years ago.
Although the Castro government continues
broadcasting in Creole to Haiti and persists in its anti-
Duvalier line, Havana currently does not publicly
identify any revolutionary movement as representing
a credible threat to the Haitian regime, according to
York, and Montreal, according to the Embassy.
members of the Volunteers
US officials. Cuba probably recognizes the
intractable political and economic problems that
would have to be tackled should any revolutionary
group succeed in ousting Duvalier, and thus sees little
onnortunity at present to advance its interests there.
Aside from contributions from members, the exile
groups receive some funds from charitable and
religious institutions, international labor
organizations, and private interest groups,
Individual sympathizers also are a
source of funds. According to the US Embassy,
former Haitian President Paul Magloire reportedly is
one of the principal financial backers of the Hector
Riobe Brigade.F_~
Government Countermeasures
According to the Embassy, the government's main
defense against an exile incursion is a pervasive
intelligence network controlled by various official
security services. these
services have proved reasonably adept at infiltrating
the exile groups in the Dominican Republic, Canada,
and the United States. In the United States and
Canada, such intelligence gathering is aimed at the
large Haitian expatriate communities in Miami, New
for National Security gather information from
Haitian residents and Haitian businessmen who cross
the border periodically from the Dominican Republic.
According to Embassy reports, Haiti is relatively
satisfied with the cooperation it receives from the
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to organize openly there.
we doubt this translates into increased
support for exile groups or enhances their chances for
achieving their goals. At least a few groups, however,
are likely to have the ability to carry out terrorist acts
in Haiti, even though the prospect of assassinating
Duvalier is slim. l
popular discontent is growing,
Outlook
We believe the chances for an exile overthrow of the
Duvalier regime are slim over the foreseeable future.
The groups' own shortcomings would seem to
preclude them mounting a viable effort against the
government. In addition, no exile incursion in the past
28 years has received widespread popular support
within Haiti, according to the Embassy. Although
According to the Embassy, in the event a group of
armed exiles or exile-supported mercenaries
succeeded in landing in Haiti, the Army, along with
whatever forces the small and ill-equipped Air Corps
and Navy could muster, would respond. Paramilitary
forces based in the area of the incursion probably
would be called on to assist the regular military units,
according to Embassy reporting. The Haitian
Government probably believes that its security forces
can handle small-scale sea or air incursions similar to
those that have occurred in recent years. Controlling
its common border with the Dominican Republic is a
more complex problem, however, and we believe it
will require continued cooperation with Santo
Domingo. F__1
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Latin America
Briefs
Honduras-Nicaragua Border Tensions
Honduras and Nicaragua have increased their military preparedness in the wake
of Tegucigalpa's mid-September retaliatory airstrike against Sandinista border
units bombarding Honduran territory, but both sides so far have avoided further
confrontations. is
proud of its raid on a Nicaraguan outpost that had fired artillery against suspected
anti-Sandinista targets inside Honduras. Honduran pilots claim to have destroyed
an artillery position and at least one helicopter. F_~
The Honduran high command reportedly has drawn up contingency plans for
further retaliatory attacks if necessary, and initiated a modest reinforcement of
troops near the border.
Nicaragua, for its part, has sent up to 1,000 troops to a village near the
scene of the mid-September clash and reinforced at least one border brigade with
additional artillery and armor, Managua also has
publicly warned Honduras that un oreseea a circumstances could arise from
the convergence of thousands of Nicaraguan, rebel, and Honduran troops in the
border area.
At the same time, however, the Hondurans appear to be seeking to avoid any
unnecessary confrontations, and there have not been any further reported
Sandinista attacks on Honduran territory.
The military high command in Tegucigalpa apparently considered
one recent incident not significant enough to merit retaliation
The incident involved a Nicaraguan patrol that reportedly
kidnaped ree men several kilometers inside Honduras, interrogated them about
insurgent locations, and released them the next day.
23 Secret
ALA LAR 85-022
11 October 1985
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Guyana Foreign Exchange Crisis
Guyana's severe foreign exchange bind threatens further to depress the economy-
1984 output was only 76 percent of the peak 1976 level-and increase pressure on
President Desmond Hoyte to find viable solutions as he prepares for elections
required to be held by next March. In September, Trinidad and Tobago suspended
its oil credit facility due to Guyana's inability to pay arrears of $217 million;
future purchases apparently will be made in cash. Meanwhile, Guyana reportedly
will repay its debt by making monthly exports of 3,000 tons of rice, a Guyanese
staple already in short supply. Hoyte recently ordered troops to distribute rice to
prevent hoarding and maintain order.
Hoyte also has begun to court foreign investors. Finding the $19 million needed to
cover Guyana's arrears to the Fund, a prerequisite for a new program, is likely to
prolong negotiations. Meanwhile, worsening rice and petroleum shortages are
likely to undercut Hoyte's recent efforts to consolidate business and labor support,
as well as raise the chances of social unrest and increased repression.
Trinidad and Tobago's oil-based economy-once the envy of the Caribbean
region-has experienced a cumulative decline in real GDP of 19 percent since
1982 and faces much harsher austerity in the coming years. Unaccustomed to the
draconian measures needed to revitalize the economy over the longer term and
worried about the record low popularity jeopardizing the ruling party's nearly 30-
year hold on power, the Chambers government has taken only piecemeal actions to
deal with the country's hemorrhaging foreign exchange reserves. Embassy
reporting indicates that Trinidad will postpone severe belt tightening until
elections are held, probably by late 1986. Such foot-dragging, however politically
understandable, will merely make the adjustment process more difficult no matter
who wins. The private sector, long overshadowed by the vast public sector, is too
small to take the lead in creating new jobs or generating new sources of foreign
exchange. Even the Caribbean Basin Initiative and other US trade benefits are
unlikely to spark much growth in Trinidad's nonoil exports as Ion as labor costs
remain high and the Trinidadian dollar remains overvalued.
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The moderate United Bermuda Party is expected to easily maintain its political
dominance in elections to be held on 29 October 1985. Premier John Swan, the
party's leader, has called the elections two years ahead of schedule.
Swan currently enjoys a 76-percent approval rating, drawing support
from both the black and white communities as well as advocates of independence.
His campaign will benefit from the disarray plaguing the opposition Progressive
Labor Party. Earlier this year, four legislators who were expelled from the party
for challenging its leadership formed their own party. Indeed, we believe the ruling
party-currently holding 26 of 40 seats-will increase its majority slightly in the
House of Assembly. No major changes in domestic or foreign policy are expected.
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Secret
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