CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00307R000100020085-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 85
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

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Chronology of Recent Events in Korea
31 August 1983: Deng discusses the idea of a Korean confederation and US
troop withdrawal with Anna Chennault.
28 September 1983: Deng discusses confederation idea with Secretary
Weinberger, noting that "the DPRK...(has) put forward a
proposal--an independent Korea in the form of a
confederation. The Chinese government endorses this
proposal...it is my hope.that China and the United States
can do something to promote peaceful reunification in
Korea."
29 September 1983: Hu Yaobang suggests to a visiting Japanese Socialist Party
delegation that measures to reduce tensions in Korea may
be in the offing.
30 September 1983: US announces new policy on contacts with North Korean
diplomats and reiterates willingness to hold three-way or
four-way talks on Korea.
8 October 1983: Chinese Foreign Ministry says it received a North Korean
proposal for talks
9 October 1983: Bombing in Rangoon.
TASS reports the bombing in a radio broadcast in Korean
that accuses South Korea of using the incident to
aggravate tensions on the peninsula.
13 October 1983: Red Star and Pravda replay North Korean account of the
Rangoon bombing.
6 November 1983: China reports both Burma's announcement blaming the North
Koreans for the bombing and P'yongyang's official denial
of the charges. Moscow reports only the North's denial.
7 November 1983: US retracts new policy on contacts with North Korean
officials in aftermath of Rangoon bombing.
10 November 1983: Soviet press comments on the Burmese breaking relations
with North Korea. Soviet reporting on the bombing drops
off and rhetoric shifts to blasting "Team Spirit 84" and
the President's trip to Seoul.
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24 November 1983: Hu Yaohang, in remarks publicized by Xinhua, implicitly
criticizes the North Korean bombing in Rangoon by
stressing China's opposition to all actions likely to
aggravate tension in Korea "no matter where they are
from."
24 November 1983: Hu Yaobang in Tokyo tells Nakasone that "China approves of
an independent and peaceful reunification of Korea in the
form of a confederation. A confederation is good in that
one cannot swallow the other."
6 December 1983: China conveys a second North Korean proposal for talks to
the US Embassy in Beijing. The proposal states that "the
DPRK would like to hold talks with the United States on
the Korean issue without any conditions, which means that
we agree to the participation of South Korean
authorities...."
2 January 1984:
7 January 1984:
10 January 1984:
11 January 1984:
[IS and South Korea respond to the North Korean offer of
6 December by proposing two-way talks (North-South) or
four-way talks (North-South - PRC - US).
North Korean offer of 6 December leaked in South Korean
media.
North Korea publicizes its 6 December proposal for
three-way talks; China publicly endorses the proposal.
North Korea makes public a 10 January letter to "the Seoul
Authorities" that says in part"...problems must be solved
with the United States first of all. This is because the
United States is not only a signatory to the Korean
Armistice Agreement, but also has its troops stationed in
South Korea and holds all the prerogative of military
supreme command. ...We consider that the Seoul
Authorities, another party directly involved in the
tensions created in our country, may participate on an
equal footing in the talks between us and the United
States...the tripartite talks may take up the question of
signing a peace agreement, which would replace the
Armistice Agreement between us and the United States...the
peace agreement between us and the United States, in our
opinion, may include mainly the problem of withdrawing the
US troops and military equipment, including nuclear
weapons, and the problem of conditions guaranteeing a
durable peace and the declaration of nonaggression between
North and South...After a guarantee is provided...a
dialogue may be opened between North and South for a
discussion of the reunification question."
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14 January 1984: Moscow Pravda, Commentator's Column, states that North
Korea "may envisage tripartite talks involving the DPRK,
the United States, and South Korea that are to center on
the question of replacing the armistice with a peace
agreement and on the withdrawal of US troops...(after
these talks succeed) it might then be possible for the
DPRK and South Korea to hold talks on the basis of
previously agreed principles...."
20 January 1984: Moscow Izvestiya says that "the only way to achieve peace
in and the peaceful reunification of Korea is constructive
dialogue...to develop this, as a North Korean report on
the subject stresses, the DPRK proposes holding trilateral
talks involving the DPRK, the United States, and South
Korea. The talks must focus on the question of replacing
the armistice with a peace agreement and the withdrawal of
US forces from South Korea...."
3 February 1984: TASS news analyst Biryukov writes from Moscow that
"Getting together at the negotiating table, the three
parties concerned--the (DPRK), the USA and South Korea--
must work out measures that would reliably prevent the
Korean Peninsula from becoming a new potential source of
world war...so it would seem that the US administration,
which periodically issues proposals to begin a "diplomatic
dialogue" regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula,
should have also reacted to that initiative...."
3 February 1984: North Korean English language broadcast alleges that "a
meeting denouncing the Rangoon bomb blast caused by the
Chon Tu-hwan puppet clique was held at a People's Militia
training center...the Chon Tu-hwan group is now resortng
to dastardly intriques to shift the responsibility for the
Rangoon explosion onto us...."
9 February 1984: Chinese Premier Zhao at a press conference in Beijing says
that "China has not thought about participation in the
talks and the DPRK has not suggested our participation."
9 February 1984: NCNA quotes Zhao as telling Australian Prime Minister
Hawke: "China supports the proposition of President Kim
II-song for establishing a democratic confederal republic
of Koryo...China does not recognize the South Korean
regime nor approve of the project of cross-
recognition...."
15 February 1984: South Korean Prime Minister replies to North Korean letter
of 11 January, stating that North Korea "should take
convincing actions regarding the Burmese incident.. .(and
accept) a meeting between the highest authorities of North
and South Korea...as North-South dialogue proceeds
smoothly, we could foster an international environment
favorable to the establishment of a permanent peace on the
Korean Peninsula and unification of the divided country by
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holding talks in which those countries directly or
indirectly responsible for the division of the Korean
Peninsula and the Korean War could participate
together...."
22 February 1984: Deng Xiaoping tells Brzezinski and others from Georgetown
Center that tlin order to have stability, Kim Il-song's
proposal for confederation is good. I have been thinking
for many years that the idea of confederation may be a
good thing for China. Our policies toward Taiwan are
reasonable. There are two different systems, capitalist
and socialist, but there could be one China with two
systems. In the case of Hong Kong, also, there could be
one China and two systems, so that altogether in China
there could be three systems, with those in Taiwan and
Hong Kong different. This is a good format also for
Korea, to avoid a slide into war to settle that
problem...."
27 February 1984: An official of the North Korean representation to the
Military Armistice Commission proposes talks to reduce
tensions with his US counterpart. South Korea is to be
excluded.
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