EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00307R000100060003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 23, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC.#06609=84.
23 November 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community'met on
14 November 1984 to consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast- Meeting will-tie 19 Decemmber 1984
at 1400 hours in room 7E62 CIA Headquarters.:,.Recommendations for.
discussion/warning topics should be forwarded'to.the'NIO/EA'.by COB
7 December 1984. I would advise those attending from outside agencies to
arrive early to avoid parking problems created by the construction work.
For your convenience, please enter the compound thro to
123 entrance. Please phone attendance intentions to
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by COB 17 December-1984. " --
Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia
Attachment:
East Asia Warning and Forecast Report
SECRET
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 14 November 1984. East Asia Warning Meeting
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Opening Remarks
The Assistant' NI0 opened the meeting .with a review of events: that had..
'
been the subject of policymakers
concern during. the past month*. Next,
warning meeting objectives of forecast. and identification of collection
shortfalls were-reaffirmed to attendees.
North/South Korea Talks
The North's motivations stem from their recognition that they have
fallen behind the South economically and politically and that the recent
attention focused on the peninsula by China, the USSR, Japan and.:the US
could work to the North's disadvantage. . Accordingly, to avoid being
upstaged by the larger powers and to avoid complications in Kim-II-song's
intended transfer of power to his son, the North has taken the initiative
in these talks. The North will build on the positive results of their
flood relief to the South and attempt to use the talks to build a
reputation as a reasonable international power with other. countries. They
probably believe this approach has already been successful as"evidenced by
the lifting of the Japanese trade sanctions imposed. _fol.lowi.ng_the -Rangoon __
bombing. Nevertheless, the North still faces'an uphill battle in
moderating the South's suspicion...Th us,::.i.n:..the..opening_.stages,. there will
be a good deal of posturing by both parties as they both attempt to gain
value from the talks. Despite the North's apparent frustration over
President Reagan's reelection and resultant reaffirmation of US support
for the South, we expect that the North will persevere in this effort.
During an earlier campaign of reconciliation, they persevered for over two
years, 1971 to 1973. We would expect to see the same perseverance this
time.
Forecast
The North and the South will keep the talks discreet; trade, Red Cross
affairs, the Olympics will each be handled separately with as little
mingling of the issues as possible. The North will,.if required, give
modest quids in order to keep the talks going. Although the North
probably wants to derail the "88" Olympics in Seoul and embarrass the
South, they will in the short term press to co-host the Olympics and offer
other inducements to get some piece of the action and the international
recognition that would accompany. The North's interest in collaborative
development projects and the South's primary interest in North-South trade
probably will complicate efforts at reaching specific arrangements for
economic cooperation.
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Philippine Armed Forces - Who's in Charge
Changes in Philippine Armed Forces leadership thus far have been
superficial. Despite Ver's leave of absence as chief of staff and his
formally stepping down as head of the national intelligence and security.
authority, his access remains and his authority,'albeit behind the scenes,
is openly acknowledged. The expectation that this situation may continue
indefinitely cannot he ruled out. .Ver, on.one=occasion,said that his.':
leave as chief of staff could last until the'1987 elections. We expect
Marcos to keep a firm handle on Ramos rather than allowing him to gain
power at Ver's expense. Already there are rumors that Ramos.is unwilling
to accept this condition and may, himself, retire rather than.remain as a
powerless figure head. The potential for conflict over leadership in the
Philippine Armed Forces is growing.
Marcos, if he hopes 0to keep all his options'open'for the 1987 election
campaign, need a reliable military, led by a close ally. Marcos appears
to be aware of public dissatisfaction with General Ver but unaware of the
strengtq of dissatisfaction with Ver inside.the Philippine Armed Forces.
Not only is this dissatisfaction with General Ver growing, his supporters
in the armed forces continue to dwindle, and there is open talk of a
post-Ver era.
Forecast
Marcos will continue to exercise control over the Armed Forces by
controlling promotion and assignment within the officer corps through
either Ver or another handpicked, successor. We'expect no improvement in
the counterinsurgency program as long as this situation persists.
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Kampuchean Dry Season Campaign, Outlook
Aggressive Vietnamese . action during the past,wet season has curtailed
resistance activities*in the interior of Kampuchea, especially by the
non-communists. Chronic. ammunition shortages and leadership_.shortcomings
continue to hamper non-communist faction performance. DK activities:in
the interior also were, curtailed by aggressive.Vietnamese operations;
however, as the season wore on the DK did mount attacks on:.rail lines.
These attacks, while successful, did little to disrupt Vietnamese
logistical preparations for the upcoming dry season campaign. The result
is that Vietnam is in a much more favorable position for this campaign and
could launch their offensive earlier than usual. In addition to their
military preparations, Vietnam has been employing an extensive civilian
work forces along the Thai/Kampuchean border. This work force appears to
be involved in-construction to block insurgent access to the interior.
Vietnam probably recognizes that it cannot completely destroy the DKand
the non-communists; however, it clearly intends to prevent a recurrence of
last year's disruptive resistance activities in the interior..
Forecast
We expect Hanoi's dry season operations to begin earlier, involve
larger numbers of Vietnamese-Kampuchean forces, and possibly employ new
weapons systems, such as Hind helicopters which recently have been moved
from Hanoi to Tan Son Nhut. The Vietnamese are unlikely to be deterred by
Chinese action on the Sino-Vietnamese or the Sino-Laotian Borders. Some
considerable degree of success is possible given.the sleepy atmosphere on
the non-communist bases through the wet season and the still fragmented
nature of the non-communist resistance.
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0 SECRET 0
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NIC #06197-84
31 October 1984
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for the 14 November 1984 East Asia Warning
and Forecast Meeting
1. The monthly East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting is scheduled
for Wednesday, 14 November 1984 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA
Headquarters. Please npte that the meeting will be held one week earlier
to accommodate the Thanksgiving holiday.
2. Participants should be prepared to discuss the following topics.
Keep in;mind that our objective is to identify collection gaps and make
forecasts rather than just review current intelligence.
-- Opening remarks (1400-1405)
-- North and South Korea Talks -- the implications and economics of
the dialogue. OEA (1405 - 1420)
-- Philippines -- General Ver and the military, who's in charge of
the AFP? DIA (1420-1435)
-- Kampuchean Update,
OEA (1435 -1450)
-- East Asian Estimate production update. (1450-1500)
3. Please phone your attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by your security office
by COB 9 'November 1984. Because seating in 7E62 is limited, timely
arrival is suggested. Visitor parking is also at a premium and
participants are encouraged to use the shuttle buses or carpool to the
meetings.
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