A VIEW OF THE FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00307R000100070010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 2, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 November 1983
A VIEW OF THE FUTURE
National Intelligence Council
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II. Driving Forces
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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A. The Diffusion of Power and International Realignments
B. Resource Problems
C. Changing Economic and Financial Patterns
A. The Soviets and Eastern Europe
B. Challenges in the Third World
C. Regional Developments
IV. Fundamental Issues Facing the Intelligence Community
A. Intelligence on Political Instability in the Third World
B. Technical Collection Challenges
C. Information Handling and Intelligence Collection
D. Preparing for Uncertainty with Finite Resources
E. The Human Factor
F. The Intelligence-Policy Relationship
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A VIEW OF THE FUTURE
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I. Introduction
1. The Director of Central Intelligence has asked the Intelligence
Community Staff to establish a long-range strategic planning process for the
Intelligence Community. The IC Staff will act as facilitator in this process
in which the members of the Community will establish goals and delineate
strategies to implement those goals pursuant to a planning cycle. Planning is
to reflect a range of conditions in the 1990s, i.e., 10-15 years hence.
2. Notwithstanding the analytical difficulties inherent in forecasting
world conditions over the next 10-15 years, it is important that long-range
strategic planning for the Intelligence Community be carried out against the
background of an attempt to identify the social, political, military,
technological, and economic factors and potentially significant international
trends which are likely to emerge over this period and to shape intelligence
requirements in the 1990s. Thus, at the request of the IC Staff, the National
Intelligence Council has undertaken: (1) to identify driving forces that are
likely to be outside the control of US policies but which could create new
conditions under which national policies will have to be made; (2) to select
the issues that are likely to dominate US policy planners and decisionmakers
in the 1990s; and (3) to highlight certain fundamental internal issues that
will face the Intelligence Community.
3. The principal threat to the security of the United States will continue
to be the hostility of the USSR. The Soviet challenge will be manifested by a
drive to strengthen its control over unenthusiastic allies, to expand its
influence beyond the bloc where feasible, to weaken Western alliances and to
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foster instability in areas outside direct Soviet control. This challenge,
however, will be tempered by the Soviet internal weaknesses and by Moscow's
need to cooperate to some extent on international political and economic
problems. The Soviet quest for the dividends of military power will continue
to stop short of war -- particularly a nuclear one -- to the degree that the
United States is able to play an effective role in stemming Soviet
encroachment and shaping a pluralistic international system that can resist
Moscow's blandishments and subversion.
4. Thus, it must be recognized that any view of the 1990s and the inter-
national relationships that will obtain then will be heavily affected by US
policies and actions in the interim. While the continuation of certain
fundamental US policy objectives may be recognized implicitly, this paper does
not attempt to forecast what US policies or actions will be or what results
they may engender. However, certain driving forces for change will exist,
such as greater diffusion of economic, military and technological
capabilities, heightened resource allocation problems and changing economic
and financial patterns. The net long-term effect will be a further
stratification of both the developing and industrialized world according to
states' abilities to cope with and exploit these driving forces for change.
Certain newly industrializing countries will reach a new level of economic
maturity while other developing countries will fall even further behind in the
effort to develop resources and achieve political stability. Strong
incentives--both positive and negative--will cause the emergence of regional
alliances to deal with these forces. Accordingly, US policymaking will have
to take account of the potential diversity within the developing world. and its
future implications for international cooperation on both the global and
regional levels.
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5. These driving forces will, in our view, be accompanied by a substantial
increase in the likelihood of political instability and low-level conflict in
the 1990s. Third World turmoil will be exacerbated by increased tension
between population growth and diminishing economic prospects. Latin America
and Africa are likely to experience the greatest economic deprivation, and the
attending political instability in these areas could create new opportunities
for Soviet meddling. At the same time, more familiar political, military,
ethnic, and religious tensions will continue in such current hotspots as the
Middle East and Southwest Asia. US policies designed to pre-empt greater
Soviet involvement in the Third World will require clear understanding of the
forces at work as well as the international conditions that may be altering
economic growth and political alignments. The efficacy of the USSR's use of
surrogates will increase. The Soviet Union itself will be subject to
increasing internal and external pressures that raise the prospects either of
overdue economic reforms or rising potential for domestic instability.
Despite a commitment to continue its expansionist efforts, the worsening
economic situation in the Soviet bloc could limit Moscow's ability to take on
major new commitments beyond continued military assistance, and may contribute
to a weakening of its grip on Eastern Europe.
6. No less significant will be the growing impact of non-state actors on
international problems. Fanatic religious or ethnic groups, as well as
radical political movements, will have the ability to dramatically change the
political landscape through their willingness to defy national authorities via
both peaceful and violent means. As recent events in Beirut demonstrate, a
committed few can upset the hopes and plans of the international community.
This trend is likely to grow, as the means to disrupt societies and the
sources of political instability grow.
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II. Driving Forces
A. The Diffusion of Power and International Realignments
7. The diffusion of power--economic, technological, political and
military--is likely to be a key factor shaping the world of the 1990s. This
process is not susceptible to the exclusive control of any powerful state, and
its consequences are likely to be felt most by those who have traditionally
used their superior economic or military power to create international
institutions and alliance systems that meet their national objectives. Thus,
the United States could find itself pursuing more of its foreign policy
objectives through cooperative undertakings, not only with traditional allies
but also with newly industrializing states of various regions. The decline in
the US proportion of world GNP relative to the faster growth of the newly
industrializing countries (NICs) and the diffusion of military
capabilities--both nuclear and conventional--will steadily reduce US economic
and military preeminence as well as alter the power relationships between the
middle-ring powers of the developed world and the NICs. This diffusion of
power could prompt greater diplomatic activism on the part of emerging
regional powers and become a force for greater stability, or, alternatively,
it could promote renewed nationalistic ambitions and become a license for,
military conquest and regional hegemony. Many of these phenomena could affect
the USSR as well.
8. The greater diffusion of military and economic power promises to
stimulate new alignments in international relations as well. Economic
pressures, especialy if protectionism becomes more widespread,'could result in
new economic associations. In the event that developing countries are unable
to revitalize their economies and development programs, the possibility will
grow that debt-ridden developing countries will form "debtor cartels" in order
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to exert pressure on Western banks and governments. The most likely
associations would seem to be those among the industrialized states, the NICs,
and those LDC's that have significant resource opportunities. One basis for
such associations might be for the more advanced creditor states to reduce the
debt burden of LDCs in exchange for preferential access to key resources.
Such resource alliances would offer the US new diplomatic options beyond its
traditional alliances.
B. Resource Problems
9. Population. Demographic momentum will bring world population beyond
the 5 1/2 billion mark by 1995, with the 30 percent increase overwhelmingly
concentrated in South Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The already large gap
between rich and poor nations will widen, yielding a greater differentiation
within the less developed world. For example, some NICs--such as South Korea,
China, India and Brazil--will have emerged in the 1990s as substantial actors
on the world stage, with. the confidence derived from sustained economic growth
acting to soothe internal tensions. Other LDCs will continue to suffer from
food shortages, chronic political instability, and endemic pressure for mass
migration.
10. Food. Propelled by population pressures, food production and/or access
to available stocks of food will remain a cyclical but critical factor in the
survival of many less developed states. While the world's food supply will
steadily increase over the next decade, the bulk of these supplies will reside
in countries already having high per capita food consumption. Average yields
are still low in most of South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, giving ample
room for improvement even before taking into account likely breakthroughs in
agronomy. However, reduced per capita consumption could still result,
especially in Africa, because of government policies which create
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disincentives for food production and inadequate systems for exploiting
improved techniques in production and distribution. Increasingly, such
countries will look to developed countries for cheap food sources and
financial support. Genetic research could fundamentaly change this bleak
picture, but in the process alter the present food producer-consumer relation-
ships.
11. Water and Pollution. Regional water shortages will become more
frequent in the 1990s, as population growth alone will almost double water
requirements in many regions. The prospect that deforestation--occurring
primarily in the humid tropical regions of Africa, Asia and South
America--could destroy extensive forests, raises the possibility of more
erratic water supplies as well as serious losses in low cost fuelwoods. Of
less concern to most LDCs, but of mounting importance to developed and rapidly
developing economies, will be pollution of aquifers and other water sources by
chemicals and pesticides. The global search for and protection of clean water
sources will grow more expensive, and will force nations to consider
cooperative measures that will avert conflicts over water resources.
12. Energy. A global energy crisis of some magnitude is likely in the
1990s. Despite the intensification of oil exploration, the discovery of high
quality reserves continues to be much slower than the depletion of existing
reserves. The present oil glut will discourage more expensive petroleum
exploration, conservation efforts and substitution of other energy sources,
and thereby increase the likelihood of some shortages during the next
decade. Overall demand for energy, however, will steadily grow over the next
15 years. Market forces will tend to push energy prices up, despite
government intervention in some cases.
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13. However, as low cost oil supplies and major energy savings
opportunities dwindle, alternative sources--such as coal, tar sands, coal
gasification, solar and nuclear power--as well as incremental conservation
strategies will require long-term capital investments. For many poor LDCs the
prospects of new short-term shortages and higher.prices will spell greater
problems for governments already facing dismal economic prospects and
continuing debt problems. With the expected gradual shift away from Mideast
oil, OPEC will become less a factor in international energy dealings. Because
of the rising importance of alternative energy sources, new trade patterns and
financial flows will be established.
14. Migration/Refugee Flows. Continued large-scale movements of people,
driven by socio-economic necessity or military conflicts, can be expected.
Some Third World governments will be tempted to view migration to neighboring
countries as an inevitable safety-valve for popular unrest caused by a
worsening economic climate. This trend is already well established in Central
America and the Caribbean where population pressures, mass unemployment, and
urban violence are forcing larger numbers of people to seek refuge in the
United States. Should military conflict continue in the region, the flow of
political refugees from Central America could threaten the stability of Mexico
and cause bilateral relations with the US to worsen. Elsewhere in the Third
World, the incidence of mass migration is also likely to continue as parts of
Africa become ecologically uninhabitable and as oppressed ethnic groups in the
Third World seek to escape domestic violence and civil war. During the next
decade, the developed countries in West Europe will continue to regulate the
legal entry of foreigners, in order to fill expected job shortages, but they
will find it increasingly difficult to stem the flow of illegal immigration.
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C. Changing Economic and Financial Patterns
15. International Economy. By the 1990s, the world economy will have
become more internationalized, as commercial activity and technological
capabilities become dispersed. Manufacturing industries will become more
interdependent--that is, major firms will buy components from a wide range of
countries and there will be growing specialization in production. Such a
pattern is already emerging in the automobile and steel industries and can be
expected to encompass the electronics and computer fields in the coming years.
16. The next decade will see a vast increase in the competitiveness of the
NICs in medium technology machinery and equipment. Although Japan will
continue to be a major factor in automotive markets, the new long-term
competitive threats in this area will come from countries like South Korea and
Brazil which can master modern technology and have access to a relatively
well-trained but low-cost labor force. New.capacity for industries like steel
and basic chemicals will eventually be built exclusively in the LDCs.
17. Increasing competition for world markets will alter international trade
flows. Trade opportunities between the US and other producers could become
more one-sided: the US market will remain the largest and most accessible
target for foreign producers, but US exporters will increasingly need to
compete in international markets that are heavily restricted. Trade barriers
will not only adversely affect US market opportunities in developed countries,
but they will also cause growing export items from the dynamic NICs to enter
the less restricted US market. The trade battleground will shift increasingly
to the high technology arena. In addition, trade competition will take new
shapes, involving the use of robotics and management techniques that promise
greater productivity and better quality control. Overall, the prospects for
protectionism and cartelization under the guise of industry safeguards will be
heightened.
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18. Despite the greater worldwide dispersion of economic power, America's
major trade contender will continue to be Japan and its economic partners in
Asia. Japanese competition in very high technology industries presents a
special, challenge: its per capita GNP and average productivity is still below
the US and many countries in Western Europe, but it has the world's most
disciplined and best educated labor force. Apart from lower wages, Japan's
unique competitiveness in many industrial areas will remain its ability to
develop much improved production processes and its willingness to support
massive research and development expenditures in such areas as computers,
microelectronics, biotechnics, robotics and telecommunications. Japanese
firms can be expected to attack the US market in these fields as they build
the necessary production volume. The West Europeans will do well in some
areas--for example, sophisticated machine tools and aerospace technology--but
by and large they will lose out to the Japanese and the Americans in the race
for high technology markets.
19. Financial Flows. In the context of expanding and increasingly diverse
world trade, the extent of international funds movements will increase and the
technological means by which the flows are carried out will become more
complex. Financial transactions involving different currencies, tax havens,
captive insurance or leasing subsidiaries, specialized markets, free-trade
zones, etc., will multiply. As telecommunications and computer support of
such operations grows, the potential for disruption or illicit use of the
system will rise. Already, arms dealers, drug networks, and terrorist
organizations move legally or launder billions of dollars annually through
existing channels and markets. The size and sophistication of such funds
flows will have grown by the 1990s, together with the prospect of fraud or
tampering with the system itself.
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III. Dominant Issues
A. The Soviets and Eastern Europe
20. Reform or Stagnation in the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet
system will remain basically unchanged--totalitarian, suspicious, and
expansionist--giving top priority to the development and use of military
power. In the face of long-standing and worsening economic problems, Soviet
leaders have demonstrated a persistent ability to avoid needed changes in
economic management that could, at the same time, serve to undermine the
Communist Party's control. The leaders have thus far responded largely by
making marginal adjustments in Soviet economic plans, constraining mass
consumption, tolerating corruption, and using foreign trade and massive
technology theft to compensate for internal industrial weaknesses. However,
the Soviet Union will be subject to increasing internal and external pressures
that raise the prospects either of overdue economic reforms or a rising
potential for domestic instability in the 1990s. Perennial external pressures
in the political dynamics of East European ferment could further deepen
existing strains within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.
21. Eastern Europe presents some real uncertainties for the Soviets. In
these countries, both Communist rule and Soviet domination have remained
unpopular for decades. Essentially the same pressures which caused the
Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and Czechoslovak "Spring" of 1968 resurfaced in
Poland in 1980 and again in 1982. Now workers and miners are increasingly
challenging the regime in Romania. Political legitimacy in Eastern Europe is
brittle, and beneath the surface nascent resentments against the established
order are strong in nearly all countries. No one can predict where the next
Nagy or Dubcek or Walensa will surface, but when it happens the new reformer
will be able to tap a reservoir of deeply-rooted impatience for real change.
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Perhaps the most critical variable for future stability in Eastern Europe is
what will happen in the Soviet Union. If the Soviets can successfully manage
their growing economic and political stresses, they may be as able to handle
Eastern Europe in the future as it has in the past. But if the Soviets
falter--which they might--the ruling regimes. in most of these client states
will falter too. The prospects for turmoil in Eastern Europe increase
geometrically with unsteadiness in the USSR.
22. Thus, a key intelligence question for the 1990s will be whether the
Soviet leaders can manage their own domestic problems in concert with chal-
lenges from the weakening empire in Eastern Europe without risking greater
political instability for themselves and their satellites. With the passage
of time, Soviet domestic problems are likely to worsen, and the chances of the
political system muddling through in its present form will probably decrease.
As tensions mount over how to introduce economic reform and yet maintain
political control, leadership struggles are likely to increase, and the
consensus style of decisionmaking will be harder to manage.
23. The Strategic Competition. Regardless of the character of internal
political developments, Soviet concerns about US military modernization,
particularly in the strategic nuclear area, are likely to grow. The Soviets'
traditional fear of encirclement will be reinforced by emerging nuclear
threats posed by Western Europe and China. If present modernization plans are
carried out, British and French nuclear forces will grow substantially by the
1990s: the number of missile launchers will rise modestly to approximately
200, but the number of warheads targeted against the Soviet Union and East
Europe could increase five-fold China's nuclear capabilities
are also destined to pose a greater threat to the Soviets than to the US. The
PRC' is now deploying ICBMs, constructing a small fleet of ballistic missile
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submarines and developing new strategic ballistic missiles. China will
probably be able to deploy small numbers of new intermediate-range and
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles in the late 1980s and mid-1990s,
respectively. Limited opportunities for greater cooperative elements in
Soviet-American relations could be generated by this gradual sense of
encirclement together with the increasing danger of nuclear war sparked by
Third World regional tensions and nuclear proliferation.
24. With or without arms control agreements, the Soviet-American strategic
arms competition will continue to be a dominant issue in the 1990s. Advances
in strategic weaponry by China and other powers will be important factors in
an increasingly multifaceted strategic environment, but Soviet developments
will still dominate intelligence planning. Improvements in all aspects of the
Soviet strategic program will create an expanded number of options for shaping
the size, mix, and characteristics of offensive and defensive forces. Despite
their impressive offensive force improvements, the Soviets' potential future
developments in strategic defenses could be of even greater significance to
the perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the strategic balance. The
Soviets already have the capability, in the absense of an ABM treaty, to have
widespread ballistic missile defenses in place by the early 1990s, although
there are doubts about how well such a system would function.
25. Soviet efforts to apply advanced technology in four military
areas--nonacoustic sensors for broad ocean anti-submarine warfare (ASW);
"Stealth" (low observables) technologies; directed energy weapons (space based
lasers and RF weapons); and electronic warfare (EW)--could, if the Soviets
succeed in major advances, also have profound consequences.
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26. A number of other weapons-related developments could also affect US
military programs:
-- The survivability of offensive and defensive forces will depend
increasingly on mobility, camouflage, concealment and deception.
Greater mobility, in particular, will reduce the cycle time permitted
target planners to identify, target and destroy Soviet weapons systems.
-- Advances in electronics and sensors will lead to greater automation in
the operation of weapons, reducing the human element and raising
required skill levels.
-- Microbiological research and development of chemical weapons and
mycotoxins will expand the scope of possible weaponry and strategy.
-- New types of nuclear and non-nuclear munitions will mean more dual
purpose missiles, further complicating distinctions between conventional
and nuclear systems and tactical and strategic weapons, both for
purposes of military planning and arms limitation agreements.
27. Barring effective arms control agreements, the strategic competition in
space will have intensified by the 1990s. The high rates of Soviet
expenditures on space expected over the next decade--outpacing the growth rate
of the Soviet economy and even overall military spending--promise to yield a
wide variety of new Soviet systems that could be deployed by the early to late
.1990s, both for space-based warfare and for space links to existing ground-
based systems. While such an investment is likely to lead to a reusable space
transportation system and other military-related vehicles, the most
significant future impact of increased Soviet efforts could well be the
extension of Soviet military reach through space-based global command and
control communications systems and more accurate intelligence collection for
targeting, navigation and tactical support. In the future, anticipating
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.developments in the Soviet space program will become increasingly difficult
28. Arms Control Monitoring. The continuing strategic competition will
complicate any potential arms control negotiations and the intelligence
monitoring tasks associated with them. By the 1990s, owing to the
accelerating evolution of military technology, weapons systems will be more
difficult to monitor with or without arms control agreements. However, under
any future agreements, qualitative constraints will be very difficult to
monitor by NTM (National Technical Means) alone, and will require extensive
cooperative measures. Moreover, the trend toward greater mobility in both
strategic and conventional forces will reduce intelligence analysts'
confidence that all Soviet forces have been accounted for. Monitoring of
existing strategic arms control accords is already becoming more difficult, as
the Soviets introduce new systems and increasingly use camouflage, concealment
and deception (CCD)
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30. Soviet S&T. The current Soviet military technology base is likely to
continue to lag the West in many but not all key areas. The factor probably
most responsible for the Soviet lag in technology is the insularity of the
Soviet system from the West and the absence of effective incentives to promote
technical innovation and creativity. This insularity, self-imposed by the
Soviet leadership's continuing political insecurities and long an
institutionalized feature of Soviet life, will continue to hamper the Soviet
S&T community. Thus, new US systems--as well as new Soviet weapons that are
heavily dependent on advanced electronics--are likely to challenge Soviet
technology, since its manufacturing and systems engineering capabilities will
not be strong across the board. In critical areas the Soviets will make major
efforts to keep up with the West. By 1990, the Soviet state of the art in
computers and microelectronics manufacturing processes will only be roughly
equivalent to that which exists in the US today. And while this will permit
the Soviets to support mass-production of microelectronics for most weapons
systems and defense manufacturing needs, they will have difficulty producing
advanced technology weapons systems that integrate more complicated
electronics, advanced computers, and computer software. In selected areas
where the Soviets are already strong such as millimeter wave propagation,
optical computing, and optical signal processing, their vigorous R&D programs
may result in important technological advances.
31. We expect the vigorous Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology to
help overcome their weaknesses in the S&T field. The Soviets will probably
concentrate most heavily on microcircuitry and electronics where the gap
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between their technology and Western advances is the greatest. Already,
substantial infusions of Western technology, legal and illegal, have
significantly strengthened the USSR's technology base in microelectronics,
computers, inertial and radar guidance components, and composite materials, as
well as manufacturing and test equipment necessary to produce them. To keep
pace with future US military advances, the Soviets will have to rely on
continued access to critical Western technology. Moreover, the Soviet
acquisition effort will probably focus increasingly on other technologically
advanced countries such as Japan 'and Western Europe--especially if US
technology transfer policy remains relatively more restrictive than that of
other COCOM members. If the Japanese were to achieve a significant lead over
the US in critical areas such as microelectronics and computers, technology
acquired from them might permit the Soviets to take the lead over the US in
military applications of this technology.
B. Challenges in the Third World
32. Future developments in the Third World will demand greater attention by
US policymakers. The socio-economic forces cited earlier are likely to propel
many less developed states into acute states of political and economic
crisis. By the 1990s, most leaders who came to power during the decolo-
nization of Africa and Asia will have left the scene, and new political and
military elites without the charisma of their predecessors will be forced to
grapple with their countries' many problems. The solutions to accelerating
population growth, high unemployment, and rampant inflation will in most cases
encompass forms of authoritarian rule and austere economic policies. There
could well be a greater economic impulse toward mixed economies in some Third
World countries but this will be severely modified by the perceived need for
centralized political control in others. The aging of charismatic
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revolutionaries like Fidel Castro and the dismal economic progress that such
regimes have made under Moscow's tutelage could lead some new leaderships to
value ties with the West as the only realistic hope of meeting their
countries' basic needs. Despite a commitment by the Soviets to continue their
expansionist efforts, the deepening economic crisis in the Soviet bloc could
limit Moscow's ability to take on major new commitments other than continued
military assistance. Some regimes, however, will remain susceptible to
influence by the Soviets and their surrogates.
33. The Third World will be more subject to serious military conflicts, as
it will not only face growing resource scarcities and economic distress, but
will have a greater military potential for trying to solve those problems
through force of arms. Advanced weaponry will be increasingly accessible to
countries outside of the traditional major power alliances, making new
alliances among LDCs plausible, and conflicts among such nations more likely
and more bloody. By the 1990s, several LDCs will possess the S&T capability
to produce sophisticated conventional weapons. The use and/or sale of such
weapons will pose a serious threat to regional stability and problems for the
major powers. The Third World's quest for more advanced and expensive
military equipment--encouraged by the demonstrated impact of high-technology
weapons in Lebanon and the Falklands--will provide new opportunities for major
power military sales programs. By the 1990s, the Soviets will likely have
expanded their military and military-support facilities around the globe in
areas which are now neutral or even friendly to the US and its allies. This
enhanced power projection capability will increase the possibility of active
participation by Soviet forces by the late 1990s in limited war situations in
which the Soviets judge the risk of escalation to war with Western powers to
be acceptable.
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34. Nuclear Proliferation. A principal source of political instability
facing the West will be a growing nuclear potential. Formidable technical
difficulties, energy retrenchment and global economic distress have combined
to make acquisition of a complete fuel cycle less feasible. However, the
long-term process of developing a weapons capability
is likely to generate
indirect threats to US security in the next decade. The transition from
nonweapon to weapon state is destabilizing, and a nuclear weapons capability
in one state could set off regional rivalries which could escalate into wider
conflicts. The West's ability to manage this proliferation problem will
decline. as the consensus on non-poliferation (NPT, IAEA, supplier country
guidelines) weakens and an increasingly disparate nuclear marketplace grows.
Nuclear weaponry in the hands of more nations could also make new military
relationships possible and less predictable.
35. Terrorism. The range of isolated terrorist activity as well as the use
of terrorism as a governmental foreign policy weapon will almost certainly
grow over the next decade.
nuclear terrorism in particular will rise. Present efforts to penetrate
terrorist groups will have to be expanded using new equipment and procedures,
and better liaison with counter-terrorist officials of friendly governments
will be necessary.
C. Regional Developments
36. Future Hotspots. The US will undoubtedly find itself drawn into
regional conflicts that will bring the two superpowers into periodic and
potentially dangerous confrontation. The spread of conventional military
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technology and nuclear weapons will reduce both Soviet and American influence
in such conflicts. ,Politico-military flashpoints in the future could include:
-- Eastern Europe, if there is a significant decline in Moscow's capacity
to exert political and military control over this region.
-- Mideast, where continuing conflicts--seasoned with a growing Soviet
involvement and a nuclear proliferation danger--could compel Western
reactions, particularly if the security of Saudi Arabia or the stability
of its conservative regime comes into question.
-- Southwest Asia, where the effects of Moslem fundamentalism, regional
tensions (Iran-Iraq and Pakistan-India) and Soviet military involvement
in Afghanistan will remain destabilizing.
-- Southern Africa, where Pretoria's deterrent strategy or action by
"front-line" states to overthrow apartheid rule could provoke a
confrontation.
-- Korea, where the North's military growth continues to outpace the
South's, raising the danger that Seoul's efforts to maintain the balance
could adversely affect its economic growth and domestic stability.
-- Central America and the Caribbean Basin, where the Cuban condition is
likely to become increasingly unstable and the political evolution of
Mexico is unpredictable.
37. Shifts in Alliances. The next decade is also likely to witness
significant changes in US alliance relationships with both Europe and Japan.
West Europeans will increasingly perceive their interests as distinct from
those of the US and the Soviet Union, but will wish to retain their American
defense guarantees. In the near term, Europe is likely to continue suffering
from gradual economic decline and widespread stagnation, as well as a fitful
showing in the race to develop and exploit new technologies, all of which
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1
could seriously test social cohesion and traditional welfare practices, and
inspire more inward-looking, commercially defensive behaviour. Over the
longer term, European democracies will probably be able to adjust to changes
in the world economy and restore modest growth in'their domestic economies.
However, in the absence of major Soviet provocations, US allies will be loath
to augment their military forces by diverting greater resources away from
their task of economic revitalization. We do not expect that West European
allies will abandon political and economic policies that can develop mutual
Soviet-West European interests and bind Eastern Europe closer to the West.
38. There is little likelihood that Western Europe will have resolved major
problems that have stood in the-way of its political "unity." Indeed, low
economic growth and protectionist impulses are likely to predominate over a
more innovative spirit of "Europe-building." Nevertheless, the political and
economic rationales for European unity will not have disappeared, and
"European" options will continue to be explored. Strains among the West
European allies regarding military modernization versus arms control will grow
as the Conference for Disarmament in Europe becomes a focal point of East-West
relations. Moreover, the differences between European and American
perceptions of how to achieve European security could also be accompanied by
an intra-European debate over how the liberalization of Eastern Europe and the
economic problems of the Soviet bloc will impact on Western Europe's
stability. The transfer of power to a post-war generation may have special
significance in West Germany, leading perhaps to closer inter-German ties and
FRG attempts to distance itself from both the Soviet and American military
blocs. Assertions of West German independence within NATO could provide the
impetus for renewed Allied concern about the "German Question" and the status
of Berlin.
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39. Japan, in contrast to Western Europe, will be able to achieve
acceptable levels of economic growth even as it jettisons some of its older
basic industries. During the 1990s it will make the transition to a highly
technical, information-processing economy that challenges the US in banking,
biogenetics, computer technology and microelectronics. The potential for US
dependence upon Japan for strategic imports will grow. Internationally, Japan
will attempt to adhere to a low-profile stance that understates its economic
importance but will be forced to assume greater regional military
responsibilities. Its influence with the PRC and ASEAN will also rise. Thus,
the importance of a cooperative politico-economic triangle formed by
Washington, Tokyo and Beijing will grow. Japan's economic strength and pro-US
orientation will promote what promises to be a rapidly industrializing Pacific
Basin that will be generally supportive of US policies. Many countries in
East Asia will be moving into the category of the newly industrializing,
picking up basic industries that will be phased out in the advanced industrial
economies--such as textiles, machine tools, chemicals, metals, and
electronics. Social and economic pressures may lead to the collapse of the
regime in the Philippines.
40. The US Backdoor. In Latin America, prospects for political stability
depend heavily on economic performance, which in turn will be greatly
influenced by the international economic environment. Under favorable
conditions, the larger countries of South America, led by Brazil, have a good
chance of achieving steady economic progress with increasingly stable
democratic institutions based on West European or North American models. A
stagnant and protectionist world economy probably would foster the traditional
cycle of democratic and authoritarian alternations, with anti-Yankee populism
featured heavily in the authoritarian phases. Some of these countries might
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again become tempting targets for Soviet meddling. They will in any event
continue the recent trend toward independent assessment of their foreign
policy interests.
41. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean will be hard
pressed to achieve minimal economic and social viability unless they develop
special economic relationships with the United States, Canada or Mexico, or
among themselves. In that area, power is more likely to fall to either right
or leftwing authoritarian regimes, with some of them emulating the Mexican
one-party model. At the same time, Cuba is likely to become increasingly
unstable: the Cuban revolution will have peaked and popular dissatisfaction
with the aging and increasingly erratic rule of Fidel Castro (if he survives
until then) will mount. There is little doubt that American policies in the
region will need to have a higher priority in the 1990s.
IV. Fundamental Issues Facing the Intelligence Community
42. The dynamic and increasingly complex character of international affairs
places a premium on US intelligence efforts to keep ahead of fast-breaking
events rather than reacting to them. Planning for such a dynamic future will
require the attention of top level Intelligence Community officials
responsible for long-term budgetary decisions, many collection and production
offices and policy-making users of intelligence. While other parts of the
Intelligence Community will establish the goals and strategies which will
prepare the Community to meet future intelligence requirements, the National
Intelligence Council believes that some implications are inescapable from the
foregoing analysis. We foresee the following as fundamental developments that
will alter the operation of the Intelligence Community and the relationship
between intelligence and policy-making bodies.
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A. Intelligence on Political Instability in the Third World
43. One of the most pressing intelligence needs in coming years will be
that of greater understanding and foreknowledge of many Third World crises.
This will require a substantial improvement in political, sociological, and
biographical intelligence collection -- especially on the part of Embassies.
While recognizing the inherent unpredictability of many political phenomena in
the Third World, there is a glaring need to improve our ability to detect
underlying revolutionary trends. Greater willingness by both collection and
analytical elements to identify and utilize theoretical models designed to
accomplish this task will be essential.
B. Technical Collection Challenges
44. The technical collection environment of the 1990s will be dramatically
altered by the revolution taking place in the laboratories and research
institutes in both the Free World and the Soviet bloc. Unquestionably, the
job of technical collection will be made more difficult, expensive, and less
predictable as the sophistication of weapons systems (e.g., more
miniaturization and greater mobility) advances and as more nations introduce
complicated and more secure systems for military, economic, and diplomatic
communications. Special challenges will need to be faced:
i
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insights.
45. To master these coming challenges, we must take advantage of our own
technical collection base. First, the synergism of planned collection systems
must not be underestimated. While it may be relatively easy for an adversary
to restrict one source of potential intelligence, we may be able to exploit
our capabilities to move rapidly from one collection system to another and
greatly increase the opportunities for collection. Second, the continued
viability of all technical collection efforts will depend on our investment in
future computer techniques. The critical issue for the 1990s will be the
maintenance of our technological edge, particularly through continued
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4P MP
government support for advanced cybernetic projects. The loss of our
technological lead will not only threaten our technical collection
capabilities but also the security of US communications.
C. Information Handling and Intelligence Collection
46. Information and raw data concerning trade, industry, finance, sciences,
weapons technology, space, military insurgencies, etc., will proliferate
exponentially over the next decade, in the context of the information/com-
munications revolution. As technical collection against denied targets
becomes more difficult, we can. also anticipate the increasing relative
importance of large volumes of overt human source material. Those able to
acquire information in a timely fashion and to store, manipulate, analyze and
communicate it effectively will derive significant advantages. Aggressive
Community efforts will be needed to capitalize on new information collection
and handling technologies and to push forward the frontiers of such
research. This is an area where the Intelligence Community can and should
lead technology much as NASA led developments in space-age technology through
the 1950s and 1960s.
47. The past decade has yielded collection systems of enormous capacity and
complexity. However, we have not given the same attention to the development
of comparable information handling systems and thereby have faced the analyst
with a data glut problem of awesome proportions. The problem is not too much
information or knowledge, but simply our inability to derive information from
the vast quantities of data being collected every day. The same attention
must be given to the information handling problem in the next ten years, as we
have given to collection in the past decade.
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D. Preparing for Uncertainty with Finite Resources
48. With the advance of technology, the prospect of greater world
instability and other features of the foregoing view of the future comes a
realization of the limitations of intelligence resources. The enormity of the
task of planning for uncertain developments in the 1990s suggests a number of
general conclusions:
a. Qualitative changes in the performance of intelligence
collection and analysis will be required in light of constraints
which will exist on growth in the size of the workforce.
b. Intelligence capabilities must be developed which allow for
flexible, rapid deployment to a wide variety of contingencies or
crises.
c. The anticipated increase in information flow will be
accompanied by a need for greater discipline in minimizing
resources regularly devoted to areas of peripheral concern. There
may be more targets for which intelligence resources simply do not
exist, and greater reliance on private sector or liaison service
capabilities may be required in these cases. The task will be to
exercise such selectivity while maintaining the flexibility
required to meet unpredictable contingencies?which often render
established prioritization irrelevant.
d. Where possible, greater integration of community elements
will be necessary in order to create a more efficient allocation of
resources. A responsible balance must be found between the real
benefits of competing analysis and collection, and the high cost of
duplicative efforts undertaken at the expense of other established
priorities.
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E. The Human Factor
49. Many of today's analysts will need to be retrained in order to function
in the computer-oriented milieu of the 1990s. It will be necessary that
collectors, producers, and consumers have basic skills in data processing and
computer applications to a degree that would be regarded as exceptional by
today's standards, and that information handling support personnel play a
larger role.
50. The Community will also need to acquire and train a new generation of
interdisciplinary analysts, combining, for example, the ability to estimate
future S&T developments with the capacity to measure their implications in two
or three other dimensions (political, economic, military, social, historical,
psychological, or other). Conventional lines between science-engineering and
social science, or between politics and economics, increasingly will cut
across international realities, and the Intelligence Community will need minds
trained to be equally at home with quantitative and qualitative approaches.
First hand experience in a country, linguistic capacity and biolgraphical
insights on emerging leaders will also be important. As with today, the
highest premium must be placed upon analysis which reflects clarity of
thought, accuracy, candor and dispassion.
F. The Intelligence-Policy Relationship
51. The more complicated international environment may, in selected areas,
cause the traditional distinction between intelligence and policymaking
functions to be blurred. New issues on the policy agenda requiring
specialized expertise and greater intelligence input (e.g., weapons technology
transfer or the flow of narcotics funds) will arise. In such instances, the
Intelligence Community could be increasingly called upon to assist in the
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development of policy options, and intelligence agencies must be sensitive to
the problem of its support driving the decisionmaking process.
52. Should our analysis of greater Third World turmoil and a diffusion of
power prove accurate, there will be more situations in which political action
may be chosen as an appropriate response to evolving international crises.
Not only will this pose additional resource burdens on intelligence agencies,
but it will demand intensified awareness of the need for intelligence
objectivity while engaging in such activities.
53. A trend toward a greater volume of intelligence and easier access to it
by policymakers could also alter the traditional producer-consumer relation-
ship. As electronic data transmission and storage capabilities advance,
policymakers as well as intelligence analysts will have both raw and finished
intelligence literally at their finger tips. This will raise concerns not
only about data storage security but also about protection of sensitive
sources and methods.
54. It should be recognized that the sharply rising volume of intelligence
data will at the same time greatly outpace consumers' ability to absorb this
flood of information. The vast glut of raw intelligence available to
policymakers could also become a liability, if they make policy decisions
based on unevaluated reporting rather than complete intelligence analyses.
This hazard will make timely and insightful analysis even more vital.
Moreover, we will require a far more systematic and effective tie than now
exists, organizationally and procedurally, betwen senior intelligence
producers and senior consumers.
55. In sum, the present methods for communicating intelligence to consumers
will have to change in the 1990s. There will be no real substitute for com-
prehensive written analyses that convey genuine understanding of complex
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