DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00413R000100090004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 6, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
6 April 1984
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES
Key Judgments
The recent development of the Egyptian armed forces does not
constitute a major military build-up; in actuality, capabilities have
declined following the termination of Soviet assistance in 1975 and the
removal of non-maintainable equipment from active inventory. This erosion
will be gradually reversed as US and other foreign equipment continues to
arrive and other equipment on hand is refitted. If sufficient external
assistance continues to be made available, Egypt's overall military
capabilities will appreciably improve during the next decade; however, the
gap in capabilities relative to Israeli forces has widened and is unlikely
to be narrowed.
The overall size of the Egyptian armed forces is unlikely to increase
during the next five years and in fact may decline somewhat. By 1989,
Syria will likely surpass Egypt in military capability. Iraq's army is
already considerably larger than Egypt's. Egypt's efforts at force
modernization, primarily through US assistance, are succeeding in restoring
capabilities eroded by aging Soviet military equipment. Barring any
unforeseen external threat, growing economic constraints will limit
Egypt's plans call for greater mobility and self-sufficiency.
Military planners are aiming for a smaller but more mobile and technically
more sophisticated force by the late 1980s. Although the United States has
become Egypt's most important source of arms, Cairo has developed ties with
other potential suppliers, mainly Western European countries and
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the
Department of State. It was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. The Assessment was
coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of
the Department of State. Information available as of 6 April 84 was used
in preparation of this Assessment.
This IIA is Classified NI IIA 84-10002
SECRET/NOFORN in its entirety.
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independent communist states such as Romania, North Korea and the PRC. The
Egyptians are also expanding domestic production in an effort to reduce
dependence on foreign suppliers; however, they will remain heavily
dependent on external support for the foreseeable future in achieving
further modernization. If such support remains forthcoming, the erosion of
Egyptian military capabilities since the cut-off of Soviet military aid
will gradually be reversed.
Crrorr
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Introduction
With an active-duty strength of 447,000, the Egyptian armed forces are
among the largest in the Arab world. Assets include a diversified
inventory of modern weapons, a combined-arms organization, and extensive
training. Nevertheless, dependence on foreign suppliers for weapons and
spare parts, a lack of tactical flexibility, and inadequate logistical and
maintenance systems continue to impair Egyptian combat effectiveness.
During the last decade, two major events have had a profound impact on
the development of the Egyptian armed forces: first, the termination of
Soviet military aid and, second, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which
led to a military supply relationship with the United States. US military
assistance has only recently begun to correct a serious decline in military
capabilities resulting from the cut-off of Soviet deliveries in 1975. In
early 1982 Egypt undertook a major program to reorganize and reequip
military units in a move associated with introduction of US weapon
systems. Deployment patterns have changed as well; the treaty with Israel
has enabled Egypt to withdraw major units from the Suez Canal to form a
strategic reserve in the Cairo area and to reinforce the volatile Libyan
front.
Strength and Force Structure
Egyptian armed forces strength has remained largely stable over the
past decade. During the 1973 war the regular armed forces were temporarily
augmented with reservists, reaching a peak personnel strength of
approximately 500,000. With the subsequent disengagement agreements, total
armed force strength had leveled off at 447,000 by the end of the decade
and has remained roughly at that figure. Tab A provides a breakdown of
strength trends by service for the three critical years of 1973 (eve of the
October War), 1979 (the peace treaty with Israel), and 1984 (the current
year).
The overall force structure has remained relatively constant since
1973 as shown in Tab B. Major units include 11 maneuver divisions, 25
fighter/bomber squadrons, and 4 air defense divisions. While the total
number of units has remained essentially static, personnel and equipment
levels within existing units have been reduced to accommodate withdrawal of
obsolescent equipment from active inventories. Furthermore, while manning
levels in front line units range from 85 to 100% of currently authorized
strength, within rear echelon units manning levels are much lower, ranging
from 35 to 60%. The Egyptians now have no capability for rapid expansion
of these understrength units and we know of no plans to acquire such a
capability.
A process of restructuring and reequipping existing units has resulted
from the introduction of US and other Western armament and the phase-out of
older Soviet hardware. In the army, for example, Egypt's acquisition of US
tanks and APCs has led to increased mechanization of infantry units with a
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concomitant enhancement of armor capabilities. In the air force
acquisition of US combat aircraft has resulted in an increase in the number
of fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons, but this has been offset by a
corresponding decrease in bomber squadrons as Soviet bomber aircraft have
been removed from active inventory. Introduction of Western equipment has
not affected the organization of principal subordinate units within the air
defense command, which is still organized along Soviet lines despite
incorporation of US and other Western systems.
Equipment
Overall equipment inventory levels reflect a slight increase over the
past decade. Significant losses were incurred in the 1973 war;
furthermore, with the cessation of Soviet military supply in 1975, much of
the Soviet equipment still on hand is no longer operable. Since 1979, and
especially since 1982, US equipment deliveries have supplemented Egyptian
holdings. Neither US deliveries nor recent acquisitions from other states
have replaced losses on a one-for-one basis in some categories of
equipment, however. Tab C shows major types of weapon systems in Egyptian
operational inventories for the years 1973, 1979, and 1984.
Recent equipment deliveries, however, have effected some qualitative
improvements, particularly in tactical and strategic mobility. The armored
division has become the primary stike force within the Egyptian Army. The
acquisition of 130-mm M-46 towed field artillery and 122-mm truck-mounted
8M-11 multiple rocket launchers from North Korea in the late 1970s
significantly enhanced Egypt's artillery capabilities, although the total
number of artillery weapons has declined somewhat. Success with anti-tank
weapons during the 1973 war and later during the 1977 border clash with
Libya encouraged the Egyptians to upgrade their man-portable antitank
weapons to mobile jeep-mounted systems. The current deployment of these
systems at critical points along the Israeli and Libyan fronts reflects
Egypt's continuing emphasis on this capability.
Qualitative improvements have also been effected in the air and air
defense forces as new Western equipment has been absorbed. The
introduction of F-4 and F-16 aircraft has given the air force a greater
ability to reach distant targets with larger payloads. The deployment of
new Crotale and I-HAWK batteries has given the air defense command a
continuing capability to protect ground forces and key installations
against attacking enemy aircraft.
Defense Expenditures, Foreign Military Relationships, and Domestic
ruction
Egypt has always been reliant on external funding for a large portion
of its defense expenditures. In 1973, Egypt's domestic defense budget was
$1.6 billion; in addition, Egypt had two other sources of funding at that
time: Soviet financing of military equipment on easy credit terms; and the
annual subsidies, provided by oil-rich Arab states to Egypt to maintain its
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military capabilities after the 1967 war. By mid-1979, with the cessation
of Soviet assistance and the termination of Arab subsidies following the
signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the picture had become much
different. Currently, we estimate Egypt's indigenous military budget at
$2.5 billion, a figure supplemented by US security assistance funding for
$1.3 billion. Eavnt has received some Arab funds
in payment for surplus obsolescent military
hardware, sold principally to Iraq. Tab D gives a tabular resume of
defense expenditures for the three years under discussion.
Foreign military relationships have continued to be a determining
factor in Egypt's ability to equip and maintain a defense establishment.
Once the only major military power in the Arab world, Egypt saw its
military capabilities erode drastically following the 1975 cutoff in Soviet
military assistance. Spare parts shortages began to have a grave impact on
military readiness. The operational lifespan for much of the equipment was
exceeded, and it became necessary to cannibalize major items such as tanks,
APCs, and artillery pieces for spare parts.
To keep its Soviet-manufactured equipment operating, Egypt turned to
other sources. It purchased some spare parts from Romania, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary but, in general, had only limited success in
obtaining equipment and spare parts from East European countries. Egypt
was able to obtain some spare parts and military equipment from the PRC and
North Korea. However, these countries had only limited capacity to meet
Egypt's enormous arms needs. As early as 1974, Egypt had already turned to
Western Europe, especially France and the UK, for military equipment and
assistance in refurbishing its existing equipment. Egypt continues to seek
Western European arms to supplement US military supply, while periodically
tapping independent communist supply sources such as Romania, North Korea,
and PRC. Yet, in spite of substantial deliveries from all quarters since
the mid-1970's, the bulk of equipment in the Egyptian inventory is still
Soviet in origin and increasingly obsolete.
Egyptian domestic arms production capability has improved somewhat
over the past decade, but the arms industry as a whole remains relatively
inefficient and dependent on external assistance. Egypt produces a
majority of its small arms, mortars and rocket launchers, and artillery
ammunition. In addition, it produces limited quantities of air defense
artillery and wheeled APCs. Recently, the Egyptians have begun to assemble
French ALPHA-jets and GAZELLE helicopters.
Training and Readiness
The Egyptian armed forces have placed increasing emphasis on unit
training in recent years. As a result, the likely performance of selected
units in combat has been enhanced, and the average Egyptian solider's
ability to use his weapons and equipment has improved. Training is still
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not geared, however, to encourage flexibility and initiative on the part of
individuals or units.
Between the 1967 and 1973 wars, unit training was designed to support
operational plans for recapture of the Sinai, through increased emphasis on
crossing water obstacles, capturing mountain passes, and utilization of
airborne and air assault forces. After the 1973 war, the Egyptians again
assessed their performance and began to take steps to correct deficiencies
noted. Subsequent training reflected greater attention to large-scale
exercises and offensive operations including in-depth penetration of enemy
lines. Since 1979, the Egyptians have placed increased emphasis on joint
exercises involving army, air force, navy and air defense command units.
Many deficiencies remain, however, in training and readiness.
Tactical air support during exercises remains weak; quantities of
ammunition for live-fire training are inadequate; and the use of equipment
in training is often restricted because of concern over cost and
operational wear.
Future Developments
The planned modernization of the Egyptian armed forces over the next 5
years should lead to an enhancement of the country's military
capabilities. As a result, Egypt will be able to deal more effectively
with hostile military threats and, at the same time, to project a small,
lightly equipped, air-transportable force abroad to friendly countries
which might request Egyptian assistance. The enhancement of these
capabilities will depend heavily on a continuation of foreign military
assistance.
Egypt is now committed to a modernization program for its armed
forces. The program will require 5 to 8 years and an estimated $30 billion
to complete. To achieve a modern military force, the Egyptians will need
to make major improvements in logistics, maintenance, ground transport,
tactical/strategic airlift, and command, control, and communications.
While US military assistance will improve Egyptian forces
qualitatively over the next 5 years, projected US acquisitions will not
fully replace currently obsolete equipment. At the same time, the
Egyptians will seek to diversify their sources of foreign weapons so that
they will not again become dependent on a single supplier as happened with
the Soviets. Finally, Egypt will attempt to expand domestic arms
production in an effort to reduce the need for foreign weapons imports and
support the Egyptian economy. Despite efforts at self-sufficiency,
however, Egypt will attain only a limited degree of independence from
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foreign arms suppliers over the next decade. Egypt will continue to depend
on imports for most major items of equipment, especially those
incorporating advanced technology.
Cairo is concerned over the cost of maintaining a large standing
force. As early as 1975, the Egyptians began to hint at a force reduction
and, on numerous occasions since signing the peace treaty with Israel in
1979, have expressed their intent to reduce active-duty strength. The
savings resulting from a force reduction could be absorbed in expenditures
for replacing obsolete equipment, military housing, and other qualitative
improvements. The reason most often given by the Egyptians for not yet
implementing a force reduction is the negative impact that a large influx
of demobilized troops would have on the Egyptian economy at the present
time. The proposed force reduction depends on an effective reserve and
mobilization system, but Egypt's present reserve system is incapable of
supporting a rapid, large-scale mobilization. Though Egypt may wish to
establish an all-volunteer active force backed up by reserves, it is
improbable that enough volunteers could be found. Thus, it is unlikely
that Egypt will switch to a system heavily dependent on reservists so long
as the threat of hostilities exists in the Middle East.
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