IIA: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00413R000200200004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 7, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
7 August 1984
DDI- 0-4-5Z51.- y
SUBJECT: IIA: Soviet Policy Toward Lebanon
The attached IIA was requested by the NSC.
It was drafted by CIA/DDI (SOYA and NESA).
There was no significant disagreement in the
coordination process.
We plan to release the paper today if you
have no objections.
Graham E. Fuller
NI0/NESA
Attachm
IIA
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National Intelligence Council
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SECRET
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
7 August 1984
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON
Summary
Recent Soviet contacts with Lebanese factional and governmental leaders
represent an effort by Moscow to capitalize on US setbacks in Lebanon and the
fluid situation there. Lebanon still does not occupy a high priority in the
USSR's Middle Eastern policy, but the US military withdrawal and the formation
of a new government have opened opportunities for the Soviets to build
contacts there. Ideally, the Soviets would like to see some kind of leftist
coalition emerge that would serve their interests independent of Syria but
they are not sanguine about the prospects. Assets for the Soviets in Lebanon
become more important as uncertainty about President Assad's health grows. E
Moscow thus far is being careful not to overstep itself and antagonize
Damascus, which jealously protects its predominant position in Lebanon. The
increased Soviet activity risks reviving underlying Soviet-Syrian differences
over Lebanon but such frictions are likely to be manageable. The Syrians,
moreover, have the assets to undermine Soviet moves in Lebanon if necessary.
The USSR is also concerned that tensions in Lebanon not increase to the point
of sparking Syrian-Israeli hostilities, which would risk drawing the Soviet
air defense forces in Syria into the fighting, endanger the Soviet military
buildup of Syria and cause another loss of Soviet prestige.
During the next few months, the Soviets will attempt to manipulate Arab
resentment over the continuing Israeli presence in southern Lebanon to
embarrass the US. The renewal of the UNIFIL mandate in October provides an
opportunity for such an effort. The Soviets, in principle, oppose the
expansion of UNIFIL, but they may suggest to the Lebanese that they would
consider the idea, calculating that if the issue is brought before the
Security Council the US would be forced to veto. Moscow, however, will follow
Damascus' lead on the issue, as it did when the issue was debated in the UN
earlier this year. The Syrians may prefer to leave UNIFIL as is fearing that
its expansion would complicate their efforts to impose a solution on Lebanon
and its removal would lift some constraints on Israeli options in southern
Lebanon and increase the risk of a Syrian-Israeli clash. On ba ~e, however,
they will probably not foreclose their options on this issue.
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was prepared under the auspices
of the National Intelligence Officer for-NESA. It was drafted by CIA and
coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA. Information
as of 7 August 1984 was used in preparing the assessment.
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Leftist Lebanese factional leaders hope to use Moscow's increased
interest in Lebanon to bolster their own power. Most take their direction
from Damascus, however, and will consult the Syrians about greater cooperation
with the Soviets. Lebanese governmental leaders probably will carefully
respond to Soviet overtures for fear of a Christian backlash, and because they
understand that Soviet freedom of action and leverage are distinctly
limited. F-I
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More Active Soviet Role
1. The Soviets, in an attempt to build their influence in Lebanon, have
increased contacts with the Lebanese Government and with factional leaders
since the US Marines withdrew from Beirut and President Gemayel abrogated the
17 May 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement in February and March respectively.
They have:
-- Sent the CPSU's top Middle Eastern specialist, Karen Brutents, in
April to Lebanon, where he met with Gemayel and other Lebanese
leaders.
-- Reported formation of the Arab Democratic Union to coordinate among
Soviet supported elements and the more radical elements.
-- Praised Prime Minister Karami's new government in May and sent him a
message from the Soviet Council of Ministers.
-- Hosted visits in July by Druze leader Junblatt and Shia Amal chief
Barri.
-- Sent the head of the Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, Vladimir
Polyakov, to Beirut in early August.
Moscow may also be seeking to develop a modest military relationship.with the
new government. It suggested that a Soviet military official accompany
Polyakov, according to the Lebanese Charge in Moscow, but Beirut refused. F
2. In addition, the USSR has kept up its traditional ties with leftist
factions, such as the Lebanese Communist Party. The Soviets consult closely
with LCP General Secretary Hawi and presumably encouraged the party's move in
June to create a "National Democratic Front" with Junblatt's Progressive
Socialist Party and other, minor, Lebanese factions.
3. This stepped-up activity coincides with a broader Soviet effort to
improve ties with other moderate Arab states, such as Jordan, Egypt and
Kuwait. The Soviets are trying to capitalize on Arab frustration with US
policy. Their probings in Lebanon are an attempt to take advantage of the US
failure to arrange an internal Lebanese settlement. They evidently hope to
rebuild the smaller leftist factions whose power has been curtailed since the
beginning of the civil war and Syrian intervention in 1975-76. Moscow also
appears to be seeking to develop its own ties--independent of Damascus--with
the more important Lebanese factional and governmental leaders. The Kremlin
has long sought independent lines of influence in Lebanon and probably
believes there is a greater necessity to establish these now, with the
uncertain health of Syrian President Assad and the possibility of leadership
instability in Damascus. The Soviets, however, are likely to pursue such
contacts carefully to avoid alienating Syria, realizing that Syrian influence
with Lebanese leaders is far greater than theirs, and that the Moscow-Damascus
relationship is of paramount importance.
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Lebanon in Soviet Middle Eastern Strategy
4. Lebanon is important to the Soviets because of the Palestinian and
Syrian presence and the US interest in it rather than for its intrinsic
significance. They do not have vital interests at stake there. They have
sought influence with both the central government and the factions but have
never been a major actor. Similarly, the Soviets have attempted--
unsuccessfully--to play some role in the international efforts to resolve the
Lebanese problem. This has stemmed more from a desire to head off a US-
brokered solution and find another entree into Middle Eastern affairs than a
genuine interest in getting involved in the Lebanese quagmire. The Soviets
fear that successful US mediation of the Lebanese problem would enhance
Washington's capabilities for brokering a broader Arab-Israeli peace
settlement that left no role for the USSR.
5. Although Moscow's long-term objective may be the establishment of a
leftist, pro-Soviet regime in Lebanon, it has no illusions that this is likely
to occur soon. More realistically, it probably hopes that leftist groups can
increase their voice in Lebanese affairs and prod the central government
toward closer ties with the USSR. A primary Soviet aim is to ensure that the
government is not closely tied to the US or Israel. The Soviets have long
opposed partition because they fear it would lead to the creation of Christian
and Muslim mini-states dominated by Israel and Syria, respectively.
6. The USSR has benefited, at times, from tensions in Lebanon, most
notably from the fighting in and around Beirut in late 1983-early 1984 that
led to the withdrawal of the MNF. The Soviets gained a propaganda windfall
from the US military intervention against Lebanese factions and the eventual
abrupt pull-out of the Marines. They also exploit the continuing Israeli
presence in southern Lebanon to rally Arab opinion against Israel and the
7. Nonetheless, turmoil in Lebanon has created almost as many problems
as opportunities for Moscow, including acts of violence directed against
Soviet facilities. Soviet influence in the country, never great, dwindled
once the civil war began. The Soviets' relations with Damascus were severly
strained by the Syrian intervention in 1976 and by their inability to prevent
Israel's June 1982 defeat of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Moscow realizes that,
as long as Syrian and Israeli forces sit only a short distance apart in the
Bekaa Valley, the risks remain high of another war, into which it might be
drawn. The presence of Soviet forces manning the SA-5 surface-to-air missiles
in Syria and the likelihood that they would become involved in a major Syrian-
Israeli war in Lebanon makes the limitation of tensions all the more important
to the USSR. The likely future turnover of control of the SA-5s to the
Syrians will decrease Soviet stakes, but the remaining extensive Soviet
involvement would continue to give Moscow good reason for wanting to avoid
major hostilities.
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The Syrian Factor
8. The increased Soviet commitment to Syria--reflected by the presence
of the SA-5 units--highlights the central position Damascus occupies in
Moscow's Middle Eastern policy and strongly suggests that the Kremlin, while
probing to build independent influence in Lebanon, will continue deferring to
the Assad regime there. Soviet-Syrian views on how to proceed tactically in
Lebanon apparently are closer than they have been in years. The Soviets
praised Syria's role at the Lausanne Conference and after in putting together
a government of national unity. Soviet officials also have emphasized in
public over the last year that Damascus has legitimate security interests in
Lebanon--something Moscow has not made explicit in the past.
9. Soviet-Syrian differences persist, however, over broader strategy
toward Lebanon. A Soviet Defense Ministry briefing earlier this year, for
example, reportedly stated that Moscow still does not want to see Lebanon
dominated by Damascus and hopes that Syrian troops eventually are removed.
The Soviets evidently also have made it clear to Assad that they do not
consider themselves obligated to protect the Syrian presence in Lebanon.
During periods of tensions, Soviet public statement of support for Syria
invariably omit any hint that the Kremlin will defend the Syrian Presence
10. Future Soviet-Syrian frictions might arise over a number of issues
concerning Lebanon. Syria's desire to involve the United States in brokering
alternate security arrangements for southern Lebano
could lead to the most significant ditterences. Moscow
would not want to see Washington score a major diplomatic success while the
USSR was left on the sidelines and thus might press the Syrians to move
discussion of the issue to a UN forum. The Soviets would have little choice,
however, but to acquiesce if Syria proved determined to involve the US, and,
in this case, they could only hope that Washington's efforts backfire and lead
to another setback to US interests in Lebanon.
11. Additional frictions in Soviet-Syrian relations over Lebanon, while
unlikely to be major, could develop over the issue of expanding or curtailing
the mandate of UN forces in Lebanon. The Syrians also would not countenance
an aggressive Soviet effort to develop an independent power base in Lebanon
and probably would use their own Lebanese surrogates to hinder Soviet
attempts. Moscow, in turn, would argue against a Syrian decision to put
significantly greater pressure on Israeli forces in Lebanon, fearing this
would risk renewed hostilities.
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Lebanese Response to Soviet Overtures
12. The Lebanese set policy only after close consultation with the
Syrians, and talks between Beirut and Damascus presumably cover Soviet-
Lebanese ties. Junblatt and Barri, for example, stopped off in Damascus after
their separate visits to Moscow in July. Government leaders in Beirut do not
appear to be alarmed by Soviet contacts in Lebanon and probably view Soviet
activities as part of a tandem effort with Syria to impose stability and get
Israeli troops out of the south. F_~
13. Karami's recent public statement that he has no qualms about
purchasing Soviet military equipment probably is a ploy to encourage the US to
be more forthcoming in training and equipping the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Lebanese leaders are sensitive to the potential Christian backlash if the
government moves too far in its ties with Moscow. In any case, apart from
ammunition for a few Soviet artillery pieces.acquired in the 1970s, the LAF
has no current need for Soviet arms, except as a political gesture to assert
Lebanon's non-aligned status.
Implications for the United States
14. Lebanon is unlikely to become a high priority area for Moscow.
Soviet policy in the Middle East will continue to place greater emphasis on
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, the Palestinian issue and the broader
Arab-Israeli peace process. We can expect the Soviets, however, to continue
to be more active in Lebanese affairs than in recent years, especially if the.
Lebanese Government responds positively to their approaches. Arab diplomats
in Moscow believe that Karami will soon visit the USSR, although this has not
been confirmed. The Soviets will attempt to exploit such contacts, probably
with minimal success, to undercut US-Lebanese relations and increase pressure
for Israeli withdrawal from the south. They will portray the continued
Israeli presence to Arab audiences as a result of US designs to prevent the
creation of a unified "Arab Lebanon" and will attempt to claim credit for any
Israeli withdrawal.
15. Moscow may well use the issue of UNIFIL's presence in the south to
embarass the US. UNIFIL's six-month mandate expires on 19 October, and, as
usual, its future will be debated in the UN in the preceding weeks. During
the last mandate renewal debate in April, the Soviets attempted to limit
extension of UNIFIL's mandate to three months and hedged on the Lebanese
Government's idea of expanding UNIFIL's area of operation. They let the US
bear the onus, however, for scuttling the expansion idea, and, ultimately, the
mandate was renewed with no changes for the usual six months. The Kremlin is
again likely to try to manuever the US into appearing obstructive. Although
the Soviets oppose, in principle, the use of UN forces in internal security
situations, they might, for instance, hint to Lebanese leaders that they would
favorably consider the idea of expanding UNIFIL in the south, a scheme for
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16. The Soviets, even if they decided that Barri's scheme was the best
way to undercut the US and get the Israelis out, would not seriously push for
it unless Syria agreed--which is highly unlikely. Recent reports indicate
Damascus wants the Lebanese Army to expand its area of control and eventually
draw up a detailed plan for deployment to the south in order to deprive Israel
of the justification for its presence. Conversely, the Syrians probably would
also oppose a plan to end the UNIFIL mandate before the LAF is ready for an
expanded role. The Syrians' past support for UNIFIL suggests they believe its
presence imposes some constraints on Israeli policy options.
17. Despite a probable Soviet aim of increasing influence in Lebanon'
without butting heads with Syria, Moscow's more active stance is bound to lead
to some frictions with Damascus. We believe, however, that these will remain
manageable, primarily because the Soviets are likely to back off rather than
risk souring their relationship with the Assad regime. The one issue with the
potential to create serious differences is a Syrian willingness to engage the
US in arranging a Lebanese settlement. Moscow has had to countenance this in
the past, and the extent of its concern will depend upon how well Damascus
keeps it informed about such negotiations with the US. Whatever their
concern,heSoviets would be hard pressed to block a US-Syrian agreement on
Lebanon.
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