THE BEIRUT HIJACKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: June 21, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
CG~~~~~E~ 1 f~~
MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM .
SUBJECT The Beirut Hijacking
As leader of a CIA/DIA intelligence teak' ~n
1978/1979, Chief of the Iran Analytic Center in 1x79, and later
Chief of the DDI Task Force during much of the Iranian hostage
crisis in 1979/1980, I have a feeling of deja vu about the
current crisis:`Basically, I agree with the analysis being
presented by the OGI/NESA t4orking Group. My discussions with
D/NESA and the analysts have been on format and presentation. For.
whatever it is worth:
1. Analysis
--Lebanese politics are like Iranian politics--confused
and unpredictable. Western political thought, morals,
and mores have to be erased from the analytical base.
Shia politics are particularly byzantine because lying
and hyperbole are an accepted way of life.
(This is not an exaggeration).
--There is a relationship, albeit murky, between
Lebanese Amal and some of the Iranian revolutionaries.
Imam Musa Sadr, the Lebanese Shia leader, was the
pre-revolutionary Guru for several Iranian principals,
including Ibrahim Yazdi--a pro-Western, but religious
early adviser to Ayatollah Khomeini. Other Iranian
Shias, who had been exiled by the Shah, lived in~,.Beirut
and became part of the Shia Amal organization. After
the Iranian revolution, many stayed in Beirut. Others
returned to Tehran, but obviously the long established
personal relationships remained intact. (I think this
establishes the similarity of~the situations, the cast,
and possible outcomes).
--The.~same schism that appeared in Iranian politics in
1979/80--between the pro-Western, religious, moderate
socialists and the anti-Western, religious, hardline
fanatics (Hizballah)--has occured in the Shia
community in Lebanon.
--Nabih Barri represents the more moderate Shias.~~He~has
an uncanny resemblance, for me at least, to Sadegh
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
Ghotbzadah had a certain personal following,
albeit not nearly the magnitude of Barris. Ghotbzadeh
tried to .be helpful, promised deliverance,
and failed miserably. He was executed several years
ago.
--Barri appears to be in the same position as Ghotbzadeh.
He wants. to be helpful and would release the hostages
if he had the opportunity. He is a hostage of the
situation, however, because he has to contend with
the radical Hizballah both on a philosophical level
and for practical considerations--Hizaballah has some
of the hostages. He has exaggerated his importance
and lied about the role he can play.
--Barri, therefore, has to meet the bottom line demands
of all of the hijackers including Hizballah--the return
of the Shia -prisoners from Israel. I cannot see any
circumstance, except illness of the hostages, in which
he could accept anything less.
--As the situation drags on, Barri's position will
weaken. While "time " is irrelevant in Middle East
politics--one day, one month, one year, warlords
don't seem to last long under the best of
circumstances, especially if they aren't tough
or radical enough. Barri has told his followers,
as well as the Hizballah, that he can deliver.
If he can't, it is goodbye Nabih. I think his
time is running out.
--Even if the Israeli prisoners are released right now,
there will be prolonged negotiations between Barri and
the Hizaballah over the freeing of all of the hostages.
I believe there is only a 50/50 chance all hostages
will be released. The aircraft crew appears to be in
the most danger if there is no resolution soon. There
does not appear to be any authority in 'Beirut with
the stature of a Khomeini to order no more killing.
Radical Hizballah obviously have no compunction about
murder.
My conclusion, therefore, is the same as the DDI Working
Group: There is a lot of bad news.
--The bottom line settlement is our hostages for
the.~.Shia prisoners in Israel.
~r;l:~~~-Rr~; tt
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
CC~~ICE~mT~~~
--If this demand is not met soon, the impact on
Lebanese politics will be profound. Barri will
be more and more irrelevant as the radicals take
over. Beirut will go from mostly chaos to total
chaos.
--There is now only a 50/50 chance all the hostages
will be released. There is no such thing as a
" Shia promise,''' as Barri says he has.
--The situation more and more appears to be a long-
term hostage crisis--like the Iranian debacle.
--The aircraft crew is in great danger.
--The original Beirut hostages are not part of the
package. If the Dawa prisoners are executed in
Kuwait, they will be killed.
--In retrospect about the Iranian crisis, I believe the
Task Force's. greatest problem was convincing ourselves
that our pessimistic analytic conclusion was
correct--Khomeini's bottom line settlement was
the Shah -and nothing else was important. Other
deals and offers were irrelevant. (After the Shah
died, the goals changed).
--Once we had arrived at that conclusion, it was almost
too late to persuade others. I don't think we ever
convinced the Carter Administration or most of the
State Department.
--I fear a similar situation is developing now. As time
goes by, more and more sources will be reporting
there is a chance for a deal with Assad or somebody
else. There will be reports the hijacking had been
planned by Assad or the Iranians or whatever.~I~laate
to keep harping on the word IRRELEVANT, but that is
what all of the reporting will be. Our intellect almost
forces us to seize on a glimmer of hope. Believe me--
prepare for the worst and hope for the best.
--.Barri and the Hizballah have given their bottom line
for the settlement. It is highly unlikely to change.
The policymakers have to be given the bad news and it
has to be repeated over and over again.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9
co~~~~~~~t~~~~
"Bear before me to Khorasan, Zephyr, a kindly word,
To its scholars and men of learning and not to the witless herd. .
And having faithfully carried the message I bid thee bear,
Bring me news of their doings and how they fare.....
Let not (fortune's) promise .you to destruction lure,
Ne'.er was her covenant faithful; ne'er was her pact secure.'~'.~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/25: CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240073-9