MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: THE THREAT AND POSSIBLE US RESPONSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00434R000300250023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Inte igenc AAgency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 February 1985
Middle East Terrorism: The Threat and Possible US Responses
Summary
Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the greatest threat to
US personnel and facilities in the.Middle East. Islamic
radicals in Iran view Washington's presence and influence in
The Middle East as major impediments to successful export of
their revolution and regard terrorism as a legitimate and
effective method of attacking the US. Iranian-sponsored
terrorism will continue and possibly increase so long as the
clerics in Tehran do not perceive any significant costs in
launching such operations.
Syria, Libya, and Palestinian radicals also are major
Middle East sponsors of terrorism. Libya regards US
involvement in the region as the primary obstacle to
promoting Arab military action against Israel, but is
reluctant to target the US directly because it fears US
retaliation. Unlike the Iranians and Libyans, Syria and the
Palestinian radicals do not focus on the US as their major
target, and most of their attacks are directed against their
exiled political opponents, moderate Arab states, or other
Palestinian groups. Syria and Libya, like Iran, use
terrorism as an instrument of state policy and provide
extensive support for terrorists.
This paper was prepared by the Persian Gulf Division, Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis, with contributions from. analysts in NESA, Office of
Global Issues, and Office of Soviet Analysis. It has been coordinated with
the National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Near East-South Asia,
and the USSR. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA
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Iran, Syria, and Libya are all vulnerable to US
military retaliation. US strikes on terrorist camps in
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley would send a strong message to all
three countries, but probably also would result in
additional terrorist strikes against US personnel or
facilities, particularly in Lebanon. A single US strike
against targets in Iran or Libya also would lead to
increased terrorist attacks against US personnel and
facilities in the Middle East, Europe, and possibly the
US.
Limited US strikes are unlikely to cause any of the
three countries or radical Palestinian groups to modify
their behavior. In fact, limited strikes against Iran could
strengthen Islamic radicals in the Khomeini regime.
Sustained US military and economic pressure in response to
Iranian terrorism, however, may over the long term
strengthen Iranian moderates who believe violent export of
the revolution does not serve Iran's interests.
Alternatively, sustained US pressure might--at least
temporarily--drive the Iranians closer to the USSR in search
of protection.
Additional terrorist attacks without a commensurate US
response probably would strengthen a growing perception in
the Arab world that the US is a paper tiger. Still,
moderate Arabs would condemn a US strike against Palestinian
elements or Syria, particularly if it killed Arab civilians,
and it might prompt the Saudis and other Gulf states to take
demonstrable actions against US interests. The USSR would
seek to take advantage of the propaganda windfall to stir up
Arab resentment against the US. Moscow also would offer new
advanced weapons to Libya and Syria and probably would try
to wring political concessions from Iran in return for some
arms.
Motivations and Methods
Iran, Libya, Syria, and Palestinian groups were responsible for a quarter
of the approximately 650 international terrorist incidents worldwide last
year. Iranian-backed groups and Palestinians are by far the most active and
were involved in over 120 incidents.
all other terrorist sponsors. Senior Iranian leaders such as Ayatollah
Montazeri, Khomeini's heir-apparent, Prime Minister Musavi, and Consultative
Iran. Radicals in the Khomeini regime are committed to spreading their
Islamic ideology, and many clerics view terrorism as a legitimate, effective
tool of state policy, particularly against the US position in the Middle
East. Iranian-backed attacks increased by about 30 percent in 1984, and the
numbers killed in Iranian-sponsored attacks outpace fatalities in strikes by
Assembly speaker Rafsanjani are implicated in Iranian terrorism.
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Iran generally employs radical Lebanese or Iraqi Shia groups in its
terrorist operations. These groups include:
-- The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain that was responsible
for an unsuccessful coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981.
-- The Islamic Call (Dawa) Party, with branches in Iraq, Bahrain, and
Kuwait, that has bombed the US Embassy and other targets in Kuwait and
is responsible for bombings and assassinations in Iraq.
-- Hizballah and Husayn Musawi's Islamic Amal that operate in Lebanon and
were behind the attacks on the US Embassy and the US Marine barracks
as well as the more recent kidnapings of several US citizens.
Tehran also can call on individual sympathizers worldwide, including some
in the US, to mount terrorist attacks. Iran provides its surrogates with
money, equipment, training, and intelligence. Moreover, its diplomats in the
The most prominent trademark of Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the
willingness of some perpetrators to die in the attempt. Iranian-sponsored
Shia terrorists have carried out several car and truck bombings in Lebanon.
Middle East and Europe are involved in supporting terrorism.
Libya and Syria have long used terrorism as an instrument of state
policy. Both have used their operatives as well as surrogates to carry out
operations. Syria was seriously embarrassed in 1981 when Syrian military
personnel sent to Jordan to assassinate the Prime Minister were captured and
their confessions televised. In 1982, the activities of Syrian intelligence
agents in France brought Damascus into sharp conflict with Paris. Libya has
been more cautious, and its use of hired assassins has increased although
Iraq, and Kuwait. In nearly every instance, the driver was killed.
Libyan intelligence supervises most operations.
The Syrians provide weapons, travel documents, and intelligence support
for operations by their surrogate groups and permit missions by Iranian-
sponsored radicals in Lebanon. Palestinian radicals, including the Abu Nidal
Group, the PFLP-GC, the Fatah rebels, and Saiqa, together with Jordanian
dissidents, Shia radicals associated with the Iranians, and the Armenian
terrorist organization ASALA, have received Syrian assistance or training at
camp's in Syria and Lebanon.
Tripoli provides funds and training to radicals worldwide, but generally
avoids using Libyans to carry out operations against targets other than Libyan
dissidents and selected pro-US heads of state. Qadhafi hires assassins and
thugs when Libyan access to its targets is limited or when he wants to conceal
Libyan involvement. The most recent was the arrest of Maltese hit men in
Egypt for the attempted murder of a former Libyan Prime Minister. Qadhafi
also encourages terrorism by the PLO rebels and other Palestinian groups
aligned with Syria.- The recent mining of the Red Sea and the bombing of
Omdurman, Sudan, by a Libyan TU-22 bomber, however, indicate Qadhafi is
willing to use conventional military forces for subversive operations.
The Palestinian Abu Nidal gro p--which is not a member of the PLO--
remains the primary Pal an organization responsible for terrorism. The
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group once was supported by Iraq, which appears to have abandoned
international terrorism over a year ago. Abu Nidal now depends on Syria and
may undertake operations at Syrian di r n . everal other ra ica
--Pal ti in anngroups aligned wi Syria also are involved in terrorist
operations in Lebanon, Israel, and the West Bank. Reports from a variety of
sources over the past year indicate that the PFLP-GC, the Popular Struggle
Front, and Saiqa have established ties with radical Lebanese Shia and may be
providing them with assistance in terrorist operations
The eight groups within the PLO have abided by that organization's ban on
international terrorism outside Israel and the West Bank since 1974. Yasir
Arafat's mainstream Fatah organization is the principal enforcer of the ban
and supports diplomatic means to solve the Palestinian problem. Some PLO
groups, however, are providing assistance to Lebanese Shia terrorists, and
Arafat is under pressure to respond to Syrian-sponsored Palestinian strikes
against Fatah officials. The most striking feature of recent Palestinian
terrorism has been the attacks of pro-and anti-Arafat groups on each other.
Hitting US Targets
We do not believe the Syrians or the Palestinians would deliberately
attack US targets unless US actions in Lebanon or on the Arab-Israeli issue
were perceived as posing a direct, immediate threat to them. The Syrians,
however, have not moved forcefully to prevent Iranian-sponsored terrorism
against US targets in Lebanon. Syria condons Iranian transits through
Damascus Airport and use of Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon's Bekaa
Valley for terrorist-training activities.
During the past 18 months, Libya has tried to sponsor two terrorist
operations against US personnel or facilities in Latin America and Africa.
Libya also has publicly praised the killing of US personnel by pro-Iranian
terrorists in Lebanon. Tripoli may have provided money to the'terrorists
responsible for murdering the US Naval attache in Athens in late 1983, and to
a Portuguese group suspected of an attempted attack on the US Embassy in
Lisbon last fall. Qadhafi threatened last June that he would "export
terrorism" to the US to retaliate for the "US-inspired" attack on his
headquarters by dissidents last May. Libyan capabilities will be constrained
by Tripoli's generally inept foreign intelligence network, its lack of an
official presence in target countries, and fear of US retaliation.
Iran has amply demonstrated its willingness to hit US personnel and
facilities. It is the most likely state to try to strike additional high-
profile US targets in the Middle East to demonstrate the inability of the US
to protect its interests, and to portray such attacks as actions by local
"Islamic patriots." Potential Iranian or Libyan targets include:
-- US Embassies and associated facilities, notably in the Persian Gulf
states an in Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Khartoum, Athens, and possibly
Tunis. The Iranians and their radical Shia allies in particular miqht
want to strike the Embassy in Beirut, to demonstrate US impotence, or
Baghdad, to harm US-Iraqi relations.
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-- US military facilities in the Persian Gulf area. Examples include
facilities in Bahrain or Oman supporting US warships.and the US
Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia.
-- Qadhafi might target US military facilities in Europe, such as the
NATO cruise missile ase at Comiso in Sicily or th e Hellinikon airbase
in Greece, to exploit local opposition to the US military presence.
-- Iran and possibly Libya are likely to try to strike inside the US if
they have been, or believe themselves about to be, attac a irectly
by the US.
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If the US fails to respond to attacks by Iranian-sponsored groups,
Iranian terrorism will continue and very likely grow. The US will not escape
Iranian-sponsored attacks by inaction because Iran and its radical Shia allies
regard the US as a continuing threat by its mere presence in.the Middle
East.
in Tehran, Iranian radicals might deliberately stage a terrorist attack in
hopes of provoking US retaliation. Moreover, a single US retaliatory strike
A limited or failed US strike against Iran would strengthen the position
of radicals in Tehran who favor aggressive export of the revolution. They
would argue that the ineffective nature of the US action demonstrates the US
cannot counteract the forces of Islam. Given the power struggle now underway
is unlikely to cause Iran to modify its behavior significantly.
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Nonetheless, Iran has moderated its behavior in the past when confronted
by heavy pressure. Tehran ended the hostage crisis,'for example, when its
leaders believed a more aggressive US administration had been elected. We
believe a sustained campaign of US military and economic pressure against
Iranian terrorism would eventually strengthen moderates within the Iranian
regime who believe that violent export of the revolution does not serve
Iranian interests. Alternatively, sustained US pressure could drive Iran
toward the Soviet Union--at least temporarily--in search of protection.
Qadhafi would likely try to strike at US naval and air units near the
Libyan coast and offer to assist Iranian terrorist operations against the
US. He also could attempt to use supporters among the Libyan student
population in the US to bomb US air terminals or federal buildings, as
occurred in the UK last year, although their activities are closely monitored
by the FBI. Qadhafi, however, is more cautious than the Iranians and may be
more restrained in his response.
Both the Iranians and Libyans would be likely to use US retaliatory
strikes to rally their domestic populations and to move closer to Moscow.
Qadhafi is likely to offer Moscow greater access to Libyan ports and military
facilities and to seek additional Soviet arms. The Iranians would seek arms
from Moscow or Eastern Europe particularly antiship and antiaircraft
weapons.
US retaliation against Palestinian facilities would increase US
vulnerability to attacks from groups that usually do not target US
installations, such as the PFLP-GC, PSF, and the Fatah dissidents. The more
moderate wing of Fatah would condemn the US but is not likely to resort to
international terrorism if the US attacked Palestinian radicals.
Arab Reactions
Additional terrorist attacks without a commensurate US response are
likely to strengthen a growing perception in the Arab world that the US is a
paper tiger. The moderate Arabs--vulnerable to radical-sponsored terrorism
themselves--would consider US unwillingness or inability to retaliate as a
demonstration of declining US influence in the region. Moreover, these states
view US inaction as contributing to the spread of terrorism that threatens
their interests. Syria and Libya also would regard continued US inaction as
indicating a lack of resolve to counter actions undermining US interests and,
in the case of Libya, could embolden Tripoli into additional terrorist
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the smaller Gulf states probably would criticize
strongly any US retaliatory strike against Syria or Palestinian elements but
might only mildly criticize strikes against Libya and Iran. Only surgical US
strikes against groups responsible for-carrying out terrorist acts--such as
the Hizballah in Lebanon--would enjoy the unqualified private support of the
Gulf Arabs and Iraq. A general reluctance to support any US military action
against an Arab or Muslim tar et however, would inhibit a public endorsement
of the US move.
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US retaliation against Syria or Palestinians that resulted in civilian
casualties'or was viewed by most Arabs as excessive could prompt the Saudis
and other Gulf Arabs to take demonstrable action against the US. Such actions
could include scaling back military or economic cooperation at least
temporarily and possibly even recalling ambassadors for consultations.
Surgical retaliatory strikes against Libya or Iran probably would not
adversely affect bilateral relations of individual Gulf Arab states and the
-- NI0/NESA disagrees that the moderate Arab states would take any
concrete action to diminish their ties with the US in the event of a
retaliatory strike against Syria. The NIO believes they would limit
themselves to routine expressions of Arab solidarity and condemnation
of use of force by external actors. The reaction of Iraq and Egypt--
both on poor or hostile terms with Syria--would be even more limited
to pro forma statements, he believes.
King Hussein would sympathize with a strike against terrorist bases in
Lebanon but would associate himself with Arab protests. Hussein would oppose
attacks on Palestinians because this could undermine his efforts to persuade
Yasir Arafat to accept his approach to negotiating a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
Concern about Arab criticism would temper Cairo's public approval of a US
attack against Libya. Mubarak, nonetheless, would welcome Washington's move
to "teach Qadhafi a lesson," which he himself has considered since the mining
of the Red Sea last summer. A strike against Syria--and even pro-Syrian
elements of the PLO--would disturb Egyptian leaders. Despite chilly Egyptian-
Syrian relations, Mubarak believes Egypt's full readmission into Arab fora
requires President Assad's cooperation. A US attack would make the Syrians
even more determined to thwart Cairo's objective.
Soviet Reaction. The Soviets would attempt to capitalize on the
propaganda windfall-provided by US retaliation. They would probably issue a
vague warning against further attacks, seek to claim credit when US strikes
ended, and use the attacks to undermine Arab willingness to grant US forces
transit or base rights or to deal with the US on the Arab-Israeli dispute.F_
In Libya, the USSR would try to exploit heightened concern about a US
threat. The Soviets probably would offer increased intelligence support and
greater aid for Libyan air and coastal defenses while implying that such
efforts require greater Soviet access to Libyan military facilities. Moscow
might be more willing to sell Oadhafi advanced air defense equipment and
fighter aircraft.
Moscow would hope a US strike would spur the PLO to reconcile its
differences and hinder Arafat's pursuit of a joint peace effort with Jordan.
The USSR might step up shipments of advanced weaponry to Syria in an effort to
signal the Arab world and the US that Moscow solidly backs its primary Arab
ally. The Soviets, however, are likely to continue avoiding a specific
commitment to intervene militarily if Syria is threatened.
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The USSR would seek to use heightened US-Iranian tensions to make
political inroads in Tehran. The Soviets might offer to provide air defense
equipment and to strengthen Iran's coastal defense but would expect major
political concessions in return. They would move cautiously because anything
more than symbolic aid for Iran could jeopardize their stake in Iraq. Moscow
thus would take this risk only if it calculated its political prospects in
Iran were promising and would emphasize to Baghdad that it was acting solely
in response to US actions and would not help Iran in its war with Iraq.
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SUBJECT: Middle East Terrorism: The Threat and Possible US Responses
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DCI/SA/IA
1 - Executive Director
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/USSR
1 - NI0/CT
1 - C/PES
1 - D/OG,I
1 - D/SOYA
1 - D/NESA
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PPS
6 - NESA/PG/I
DDI/NESA/PG/I
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