POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000100070029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: December 8, 1982
• Content Type: NIE

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Political Instability in
Key Non-Communist Countries
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I-The Estimate
Secret
NIE 7-82
8 December 1982
256
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N I E 7-82
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN
KEY NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Volume I-The Estimate
Information available as of 2 December 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
This Estimate, updating NIE 7-81 (Political Instability and Re-
gional Tensions, September 1981), addresses those non-Communist
countries (and Yugoslavia) of high geopolitical importance to the
United States where the impact of domestic instability, in some cases
stimulated by regional tensions, is most likely to create problems of
major consequence during the next two years,'. As we did last year, we
examine in the Estimate the principal sources of instability, the extent
to which they are, or can be, aggravated by the USSR, Cuba, or other
powers, and the implications of this for US interests and policy. In
addition to last year's concentration on the domestic and regional causes
of instability, this Estimate also assesses the effect of global financial
problems on the stability of major Third World debtors. Fuller
treatment of these questions is provided in the accompanying volume II
of this Estimate.
Domestic Instability
A. The principal countries in
tal to key US interests has at least
the next two years are:
which major change detrimen-
an even chance of occurring in
Mexico Zaire
El Salvador Mozambique
Guatemala Argentina
Somalia Sudan
Iran Lebanon
B. The principal countries in which major change detrimental
to key US interests has a significant, although lesser, likelihood of
occurring in the next two years are:
Pakistan Kenya
Egypt Panama
Yugoslavia North Yemen
Spain
' Political instability is defined as the potential for sudden and significant change in the leadership, pol-
icies, or condition of a country. The most dramatic manifestation of instability is the revolutionary
overthrow of a regime, as in Cuba in 1959 or Iran in 1979, but developments short of revolution can also
lead staites to alter their policies abruptly in ways that can substantially affect US interests. The Estimate
does noit deal with coups d'etat in countries such as Bolivia, where coups can shift the spoils of office from
one set 'of leaders to another but often with little effect on anyone' else. Nor is it concerned with cases of po-
litical violence, including terrorism, that are not related to the possibility of major political change.
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C. In certain other important countries, political stability
appears to be fairly well assured in the next two to three years, but
there are deep-rooted social and economic forces at work that
might undermine stability and lead to major changes of great
consequence to the United States. These countries are:
Brazil. - The Philippines
Greece Saudi Arabia
Indonesia The smaller
Jordan Persian Gulf states
Nigeria South Korea
Turkey '
D. We are also concerned about certain countries of lesser
significance to the United States where currently high levels of
instability could lead to developments, including Cuban, Libyan,
or Soviet involvement, that might require high-level attention by
US or other Western leaders. These countries are:
Eastern Africa
Caribbean
Dominica Chad
St. Vincent and Ghana
the Grenadines Liberia
Suriname
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THE ESTIMATE
Domestic Instability
The following catlegorizations of domestic instabil-
ities in countries of High geopolitical importance to the
United States are based on both the intensity of the
respective instabilities, and the likelihood that devel-
opments will occur -whether stemming essentially
from domestic weaknesses or from outside regional
tensions-which may prove adverse to US interests.
A. Principal coul ntries in which major change
detrimental to key US interests has at least an
even chance of occurring in the next two years:
- Mexico. We are more concerned about Mexico
than any other
The economic
country treated in this Estimate.
and financial-problems of recent
months have already had highly deleterious ef-
fects on US interests, particularly in terms of
increased illegal immigration, a sharp decline in
imports from the United, States, and difficulties
for US banks too which Mexico owes more than
$25 billion. We believe that social and political
instability is likely to remain high over the next
two years because necessary austerity measures,
will probably provoke strong public dissent.
There is considerable strength and resilience in
the Mexican political system that will probably .
enable it to survive these challenges. Nonetheless,
there is at least an even chance that over the next
two years much greater instability will occur
than at present. Particularly ominous would be
signs that elites (political, business, labor, mili-
tary) are losing confidence in President de la
Madrid; that he is incapable of taking decisive
initiatives to calm public fears; that radical ele-
ments are gaining control of the labor movement;
that extreme leftists are acquiring new political
influence more generally; or that the USSR is
increasing its influence in Mexico.
- El Salvador. There have been a number of
favorable developments this year, but the coun-
try still faces enormous problems that could at
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almost any time reverse the progress made so far.
The substantial US stake will be inextricably tied
to the survival of moderate and democratic rule,
which will continue to be threatened strongly by
extremists of the left and right, and by externally
supported insurgency.
Guatemala. Pressures for revolutionary changes
have abated since General -Rios-Montt seized
power last March, but his hold is tenuous in a
highly polarized and violent system. If he fails to
make progress in counterinsurgency, reviving the
economy, and in other areas, he is likely to be
replaced by a rightwing government that proba-
bly would return to repressive policies that would
enhance the long-term prospects of the Marxist
guerrillas.
Somalia. President Siad's position has deteriorat-
ed considerably over the last two years because
of severe economic problems, ethnic rivalries,
and dissatisfaction in the military. Senior officers
have been humiliated by their inability to defend
Somali territory against Ethiopian incursions and
attacks by guerrillas supported by Ethiopia and
Libya. They could move to replace Siad if
conditions deteriorate much more.
Iran. Though Khomeini and the clerics have
consolidated their control over the last year or so,
the violence, fundamentalist zeal, and other
sources of tension unleashed by the Islamic revo-
lution continue to run high and could again
threaten key US and Western interests in the
Persian Gulf area.
Zaire. Perennially unstable, the Mobutu govern-
ment has been further undermined by a deterio-
rating economy over the last year or so. If major
domestic violence or a new guerrilla campaign
with significant outside support were to occur,
Mobutu's chances of surviving would depend
largely on the willingness of the United States
and other countries to come to his rescue, as in
the past.
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- Mozambique. The Marxist regime is under
acute and mounting pressure from a potent
insurgent group supported by South Africa, and
its survival is in jeopardy unless it receives
substantial new support, possibly including Cu-
ban troops, from the USSR and its allies. Moscow
and Havana will be faced with an increasingly
difficult decision, however, given the potential
for casualties, economic costs, and the inherent
difficulties of defeating an. insurgency. On bal-
ance, we believe that the USSR and Cuba will
decide to augment their military advisory pres-
ence, continue the logistic buildup begun last
spring, and send some Cuban combat troops if
such forces are essential to, preserving a sympa-
thetic regime in Maputo.
- Argentina.' Very serious economic problems,
greater political stresses, and widespread popular
disaffection have followed in the aftermath of
the Falklands war. For the United States, sub-
stantial commercial and economic interests are at
stake in a country where deep political cleavages
and unrest are likely to result in weak, largely
ineffective governments over the next two years.
- Sudan. President Nimeiri's position has grown
increasingly precarious in recent months. Many
junior and middle-grade officers have come to
doubt the regime's ability to deal with the declin-
ing economic situation and some are probably
engaged in tentative antiregime plotting. Senior
officers, if they believe that a coup by younger
officers is imminent, could preempt them by
moving first.
- Lebanon. This country is a unique case of
instability, and its prospects are heavily contin-
gent on the initiatives and interference of outside
powers.
C. Other important countries, where political
stability appears to be fairly well assured in the
next two years, but where there are deep-rooted
social and economic forces at work that might
undermine stability and lead to major changes of
great consequence for the United States:
Brazil Saudi Arabia
Greece The smaller Persian
Indonesia Gulf states
Jordan South Korea
Nigeria Turkey
The Philippines
D. In addition, we are concerned about certain
countries that, in themselves, are of lesser signifi-
cance to the United States at the moment but
where currently high levels of instability could
lead to developments that might require high-level
attention by US or other Western leaders:
Dominica Chad
St. Vincent and Ghana
the Grenadines Liberia
Suriname
Regional Tensions
Interstate conflicts growing out of acute regional
tensions are likely to present serious dangers to US
interests during the next two years. The principal areas
where such tensions and armed conflicts are most
likely to spread or escalate and to continue to necessi-
tate US policy responses are:
Israel-Syria-Lebanon Southern Africa
Iran-Iraq-Persian Gulf The Horn of Africa
Central America
B. Principal countries in which major change
detrimental to key US interests has a significant,
although lesser, likelihood of occurring in the next
two years:
Pakistan Kenya
Egypt Panama
Yugoslavia North Yemen
Spain
As tensions in these regions continue or intensify, the
domestic stability of some of the affected countries
may be progressively undermined. In particular, Leb-
anon, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Costa Rica are
countries in which regional conflict is most likely to
impact heavily on internal stability. Moreover, hostile
or meddling neighbors are a major source of instability
in Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Guatemala, and Chad.
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Soviet, Cuban, and Other Exploitation
The USSR and its associates (primarily Cuba, East
Germany, and Vietnam and secondarily Libya, Nica-
ragua, Ethiopia, and South Yemen) will continue to
bolster revolutionary movements and regimes and to
try to undermine US interests around the world:
- Of increasing
so has been the buildup of Nicaragua's power in
Central America with Soviet and Cuban support,
and continuing Cuban-Sandinista support of
guerrilla and terrorist groups in El Salvador,
Guatemala, aid Honduras.
- Economic and security assistance to the radical
regime in Grenada has strengthened Cuban and
Soviet influence in the eastern Caribbean.
- Cuban. troopsi remain in Angola and Ethiopia,
and the ability of both Cuba and the USSR to
stimulate higher levels of strife in southern Africa
and the Horn will continue to challenge US
interests and allies.
in subversive efforts in a variety of
countries and has joined with Ethiopia against
the pro-Western governments in Sudan and
Somalia.
In the Middle East, Moscow will press efforts to
capitalize on Middle(
regional criticism of the United
States for its close association with Israel and to
reverse the decline of its influence in Arab
countries.
- In other parts of the developing world, the USSR
and its associates will continue to exploit new
opportunities for expanding their influence and
reducing that! of the United States and pro-
Western forces.
Events of the last year have also made it more
likely, in our view, that there could be a major
increase in international terrorism over the next two
years:
- The military defeat of the PLO increased the
enmity many I Palestinians and other Arabs feel
toward Israel and the United States, and we
believe this and other developments in Lebanon
have increased the risk of "retaliatory" violence.
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- Libya's Qadhafi has lost prestige over the last
year, but still has significant assets and may be in
a more vengeful mood.
- The Iranian regime will undoubtedly persist in
efforts to export its brand of Shia fundamental-
ism to neighboring countries by training dissi-
dents who return home to engage in acts of
terrorism and subversion.
- Greater contact among guerrilla and terrorist
groups in Central America and the Cuban and
Nicaraguan governments will keep the specter of
violence against US interests, citizens, and allies
high throughout that region.
International Financial Distress
Severe financial and economic distress in Mexico
and a number of other countries of major importance
to the United 'States has resulted in significant new
pressures on US interests:
-T he present international recession will be much
more difficult to handle than previous world
recessions over the past three decades because
more countries are affected, their debt burdens
are heavier, and the current downturn has been
longer and deeper.
- The financial distress in Mexico and other coun-
tries has put the international financial system
under unprecedented strain and can create major
new shocks if economic recovery does not soon
occur in the United States and other industrial
countries.
The total medium- and long-term foreign debt of
the developing nations is likely to reach $550
billion by the end of 1982, as compared with
some $75 billion in 1973. A number of countries
are in arrears, including the developing world's
largest debtor, Mexico; and many others are in
serious trouble, including the second-largest
debtor, Brazil.
We do not rule out the possibility that leaders in
a few of the major debtor countries may feel
compelled for political and emotional reasons to
threaten a debtor revolt.
The austerities imposed by the global recession
will increase the likelihood of political conflict
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between opposing groups in many countries, and
their competing demands will strain the capabili-
ties of existing institutions.
Positive Developments and Opportunities for the
United States
In addition to new challenges, there have also been
a number of positive developments in situations and
countries of high importance to the United States over
the last year or so. Certain of these have enhanced
international perceptions of US leadership and resolve,
or offer the United States positive new opportunities.
The principal such developments are:
- The greater resilience or adaptability of systems
in several countries than appeared would be the
case a year ago-for example, Saudi Arabia, and
even El Salvador and Guatemala, though the
governments in these latter two countries remain
extremely fragile.
- New bilateral economic and defense arrange-
ments with countries in Central America and
elsewhere that have improved their ability to
withstand foreign subversion and intervention.
- The definite setbacks the USSR has experienced
in the Middle East in recent months, and the
more pressing dilemmas for its leaders posed by
growing instability in Mozambique and Angola.
- The lower levels of instability in Greece and
North Yemen than appeared would be the case a
year or so ago.
- In other countries, especially in Africa, leaders
have had fresh doubts about the value of their
relationships with the USSR and have sought
closer relations with Western and pro-Western
countries-for example, Iraq, Benin, Guinea,
Congo, and India.
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u.s ?0
North
Pacific
Ocean
Countries Facing Possible Domestic Instability
Principal countries in which major change detrimental to key US
interests has at least an even chance of occurring in the next two
years.
Principal countries in which major change detrimental to key US
interests has a significant, although lesser, likelihood of occurring in
the next two years.
Other important countries, where political stability appears to be
fairly well assured in the next two years, but where there are deep-
rooted social and economic forces at work that might undermine
stability and lead to major changes of great consequence for the
United States.
Countries that in themselves are of lesser significance to the
United States at the moment but where currently high levels of
instability could lead to developments that might require
high-level attention by US or other Western leaders.
Changing Instability: 1981-82
Mexico More instability
Zaire No change in instability
Greece Less instability
The categorizations of instability are based on
a comparison of NIE 7-91 and NIE 7-92.
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505444 (545038) 12-82
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