THE FUTURE OF SOVIET SCIENCE

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• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

The,Future, of Soviet_ Science.
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Central
I ~` i ~ Intelligence
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secret
The Future of Soviet: Science
National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
N!B I /-7-85
November 1985
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Research Environment ..................................................................... 7
Concentration ................................................................................ 7
Rigid Hierarchy ............................................................................ 7
Political Factors ............................................................................ 9
Military and Industrial Influence ................................................ 9
Science to Technology Transition ................................................ 10
Policy ................................................................................................. 11
Resources ........................................................................................... 13
Funding ......................................................................................... 13
Instrumentation ............................................................................. 15
The Soviet Scientist ........................................................................... 15
Compared With Western Counterparts ...................................... 15
Importance of Western Science ................................................... 16
Participation in Military, Government, and Party Activities.... 16
Education ...................................................................................... 16
Soviet Scientific Research ................................................................ 17
General Considerations ................................................................. 17
Relative Strengths and Weaknesses ............................................. 18
Future ................................................................................................ 19
Intelligence Gaps .............................................................................. 21
ANNEX: Formal Organizational Structure ........................................ 23
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate addresses the sector of Soviet society at the very
leading edge of future technology development-the sciences. The
sciences, under which we include fundamental and applied science, are
concerned with the discovery and conceptual development of new laws
of nature and the preliminar steps taken to explore possible applica-
tions of these discoveries.
Science, and in particular fundamental science as distinguished
from applied science, is so far removed from weapon systems, products,
and processes that have an obvious effect on our relations with the
USSR that it is difficult to convey with clarity the far-reaching and
long-term effects it has on societies. However, science serves as the
wellspring of new concepts and theories from which new technologies,
and finally products and processes, evolve. An understanding of Soviet
science, consequently, can provide the first indications of fundamental-
ly new approaches to problems of defense and the economy. These
early indicators can serve to alert the Intelligence Community to areas
where the Soviets are particularly strong and where surprises are likely
to be in store. More generally, an overall sense of the state of Soviet sci-
ence, as well as how it couples to industry, can contribute a background
of reality against which to evaluate the viability of intended policies and
programs initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The intent is to develop, in a broad sense, an understanding of the
current health of Soviet science and to speculate on the implications of
its current and likely future course. This entails an understanding of the
environment within which Soviet science is conducted, in addition to a
general assessment of the relative strength of Soviet scientific research
in various fields of science as compared with that in the United States.
We have tried to identify and discuss the implications of the striking
differences between the Soviet and US research environments in such
areas as organization and management, resources. science policy and
education, and the nature of the Soviet scientist.
We have limited this study primarily to science sponsored by the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, and, furthermore, primarily to the physical
sciences; we have also collected data and impressions on applied science
in industrial research institutes as well. We believe, however, that the
environmental factors identified are generally applicable in describing
the conditions for all of Soviet science. In addition, we have explored
somewhat the transition of science and technology to industry
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Finally the judgments were
cross-checked against several studies/reports/surveys that were con-
ducted outside of the Intelligence Community. We found the themes to
be largely consistent among these various sources.
We do not attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of Soviet
scientific capability; rather we have focused on the research environ-
ment, nnl;~rces, and scientists that affect science in the Soviet
Union.
This study is intended to break ground in developing an under-
standing of Soviet science, and to serve as a basis upon ?,~l,;~h f?rthP,-
analysis may build a more complete and detailed picture
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Soviet science may undergo a gradual evolution over the next two
decades, which could result in a more effective system for responding to
the technology needs of the country. Over the next decade, party policy
initiatives from the new-generation leaders, which have been designed
to focus Soviet scientific talent on economically and militarily relevant
research, could result in a reduction or leveling off of Soviet research in
areas of fundamental science having little or no obvious applications.
Beyond that time, an improved technology base could result in a
significant reduction in the problems imposed by the Soviets' traditional
lack of instrumentation and computing power. This, coupled with their
large applied science effort, could allow them to overcome more easily
future technical deficiencies in their military systems and civilian
products, thus increasing their competitiveness.
The transfer of science to technology and application is difficult
for the Soviets because of:
- An incentive system that does not strongly support technical
innovation and implementation.
- Restricted communication.
- A rigidly hierarchical bureacracy that does not easily allow
interministry scientific proiects
It is likely that the new generation of Soviet political and scientific
leaders will institute substantive changes that affect both the S & T
administrative bureaucracy and the research environment, which could
improve the science-to-technology transition problems and the inade-
quate instrumentation infrastructure:
- We expect that substantial impact resulting from any changes
will be slow and gradual, and that the current research problems
are likely to continue for the next 10 years.
- Beyond that time, however, if the new generation of leaders is
successful in instituting changes, we may expect to begin to see
substantial impact on the Soviet technology base.
- Many new leaders in the scientific community are also of the
new generation and have made their careers in applied science.
They may be expected tc, nernetuate any changes over at least
two decades.
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There will probably be a further shift of Soviet scientific research
toward applied sciences in the f uture:
- Should the Soviets be successful in improving their ability to
move science to technology and application, the expected
increasing focus on applied science, combined with their dem-
onstrated ability to come up with new scientific concepts, could
lead to an increased likelihood that the United States may be
surprised by an unanticipated applied scientific development.
The occurrence of such a surprise in applied science could in a
short time impact on militarily and economically important
technologies.
- This shift will probably substantially affect the Soviet Academy
of Sciences and result in a reduction or leveling off of f unda-
mental science, particularly experimental science, although a
smaller core of scientists can be expected to continue to produce
world-class scientific results.
- Some areas of fundamental science that have traditionally been
closely coupled to applications, such as condensed matter
physics and semiconductors, may in fact receive greater
emphasis.
- A greater reliance on the West for fundamental scientific
research can be expected in the future.
- Even after the technology base begins to respond substantially to
the new policies, vigorous Soviet efforts to acquire Western
technology can be expected to continue.
The best Soviet theorists have capability comparable to that of
their Western counterparts in all fields of physical scienc~
Soviet theoretical research is largely comparable in scope and
quality to that in the West:
- The Soviets are particularly noted for their strength in turbu-
lence, plasma physics, laser physics, mathematics, and
astrophysics.
- The Soviets' lack of large-scale scientific computers for compu-
tational physics may limit their contribution in the future.
- US scientists have attributed the Soviet absence in, for example,
the band theory of conduction to inadequate computer power.
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The best Soviet experimentalists are just as good intellectually as
their Western counterparts:
- The Soviets have been lauded for their contributions in materi-
als science and laser physics.
- They are, however, frequently limited by problems with quali-
ty, availability, and maintenance of instrumentation.
- Nevertheless, the Soviets frequently surprise Western scientists
with the quality of the data they obtain with relatively crude
equipment, and they often demonstrate a deeper physical
insight
In scope and quality, the Soviets' experimental research is general-
ly not on a par with their theoretical research. The Soviets have been
conspicuously absent in some fields, in large part because of the lack of
necessary techniques and equipment:
- Such has been the case in surface physics, where the availability
of ultrahigh vacuum techniques is essential.
- Lack of sophistication in vacuum and cryogenic technology has
limited Soviet contributions in low-temperature physics.
- While ultrafast laser spectroscopy has been a major interest in
the United States, the Soviets have been slower to achieve
extremely short time resolutions.
The presence of just a few very bright scientists can, and has, made
the difference between very significant Soviet contributions in a f field
and the virtual absence of a Soviet contribution. Even where the Soviet
contribution is significantly poorer than that of Western countries, as in
biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, it is possible to
find specific examples within the broad field, such as biophysical
chemistry and protein conformation, that are regarded as world class by
Western scientist
Soviet scientists generally show an overall excellence in mathemat-
ics education, which exceeds that of their Western counterparts. This
has:
- Contributed to excellence in theoretical physics.
- Allowed them to circumvent inadequate computer capability to
some extent, thereby allowing analytic solutions where Western
scientists would be more likely to pursue a numerical solution.
- Allowed adequate numerical results to be obtained on comput-
ers of comparably lesser capability in some cases
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Should state-of-the-art computers become available to the Soviets,
the possibility of a surge in their scientific computation capability exists
because of their excellence in mathematics:
- This surge could be mitigated to some extent becaus
need for special programing knowledge and experience.
Soviet scientists are often the f first to come up with a new scien i is
concept, but generally the USSR lags the West in fully developing the
idea. Such has been the case, for example, with the Tokamak for
controlled thermonuclear fusion, and optical phase conjugation, which
can be used in correcting atmospheric distortion of electromagnetic
wave propagation.
Restricted freedom of communication is a fundamental flaw in the
Soviet scientific research environment that results in:
- Reduced synergism among scientists.
- Duplication of effort despite central planning.
- Slow diffusion of new ideas and technologies.
- Errors resulting f rom inadequate peer review
The best Soviet students have had depth, breadt-h andquality of
scientific education comparable to that of their US counterparts. They
generally have, greater mathematical expertise than their US counter-
parts, however
Because teaching and research are largely separated institutionally,
the interchange of ideas between researchers, professors, and students is
reduced:
- Soviet awareness of this situation has resulted in efforts to
decrease the separation, but the problem persists.
- Students often need substantial retraining to participate effec-
tively in a research institute.
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DISCUSSION
Research Environment
1. The formal organizational structure of Soviet
scientific policy, administration, and research entities
has been described at length in other studies. For the
interested reader, the essential elements of this struc-
ture have been briefly summarized in the annex to this
Estimate. The fundamental perspective that should be
carried into the following chapters is the critical role
played by the leading members of the State Commit-
tee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and the Soviet
Academy of Sciences (AN SSSR)' (see figure 1 and the
foldout, figure 2) in formulating, coordinating, and
executing Soviet science policy as defined b he
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).~
Table 1
Manpower in the Academies of Science a
Total in Academy Percentage in Soviet
System b Academy of Sciences
a The academies represent about 10 percent of the country's
scientific manpower.
b 1983 figures.
Including corresponding members.
2. In the Soviet Union, research activity is highly
concentrated organizationally and geographically. The
Academy dominates the republic academies both in
terms of numbers of people and the overall quality of
research (see table 1). Similarly, the Moscow area
dominates the other major scientific centers (Lenin-
grad, Novosibirsk, Kiev). Politburo member V. V.
Grishin recently noted that over half the scientific
personnel of the Academy are located in Moscow's
research institutes and laboratories and nearly 35
percent of all doctorates and 30 percent of all candi-
dates of science are in Moscowl
Rigid Hierarchy
3. Many characteristics of the Soviet research envi-
ronment that have a strong impact on how effectively
and efficiently research is conducted in the Soviet
Union can be tied to the rigidly hierarchical lines of
authority. Of central importance is the strong role of
the institute director. The director has vast authority
in deciding what projects will be undertaken, by
whom, and what resources will be made available, as
well as in authorizing travel to scientific meetings,
especially those overseas. The influence is so extreme
that the director's own scientific or ideological views
can dominate those of all the researchers in the
' Unless otherwise specified, Academy will refer to the AN SSSR
as distinct from the republic academies.
institute. This was the case, for example, with V. V.
Belousov's suppression of work on plate tectonics in
geology. Throughout an institute, there is a tendency
toward ossification because of the pervasive inability
to challenge superiors-even, in some cases, on the
technical validity of an argument. The management
structure in the institutes tends to be very shallow,
with sometimes 10 or more laboratory chiefs reporting
to one director. The director spends most of his time in
committee meetings with financial and administrative
matters and has difficulty in providing effective tech-
nical direction for the laboratory chiefs. Furthermore,
a director can easily remain in place for life. Conse-
quently, the suppressing effect on the younger, up-
coming scientists is, in the words of one Soviet emigre
scientist, "like ice on the water.'
4. Conversely, in the hands of a strong scientist/
administrator, such as Lev Landau was, an institute
can flourish greatly, developing a tradition of excel-
lence. Furthermore, the director can shield researchers
from the bureaucracy, allowing considerable autono-
my in what projects may be undertaken once the
researcher gains the director's support. This leads to a
general trend in which it is easier for Soviet scientists
to work off the beaten track and maintain funding
over many years than it is for their US counterparts.
5. The strong hierarchical lines, which run not only
through the institutes and the academy structure but
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Figure 1
Soviet Science Planning and Management Structure
The abbreviated committees under the Council
of Ministers are:
GKNT-State Committee for Science
and Technology
GOSPLAN-State Planning Committee
GOSSNAB-State Committee for Material
and Technical Supply
GOSSTROY-State Committee for Construction
Affairs
GOSKOMIZOBRETENIYA-State Committee for
Inventions and Discoveries
GOSSTANDART-State Committee for Standards
VAK-Higher Certification Comission
AN SSSR-Soviet Academy of Sciences
Industrial Ministry
Research Institutes
Communist Party of
the Soviet Union
Academy Research
Institutes
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Ministry of Higher
and Specialized
Secondary Education
Research
Republic Academy
Research Institutes
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also through the various industrial ministries, lead to a
severe isolation of institutes and laboratories. This
isolation hinders Soviet ability to carry on "big
science," such as the construction of large, forefront
high-energy particle accelerators. Many design/pro-
duction bureaus and research institutes do not want to
loin large cooperative proiects because it is not clear
who will get the credit for the work. This has been
part of the reason why large Soviet accelerator con-
struction proiects generally are completed after the
Western research community has already explored the
accelerator's attainable energy rang
6. Soviet attempts to deal with the problem of
organizational isolation have included the establish-
ment or proposal of special interministry organizations
that can coordinate and direct large proiects that cut
across organizational lines. These concepts include:
- Scientific research institutes, similar to the Paton
Electric Welding Institute, that cut across minis-
terial lines and can conduct applied research,
engineering, and technology design.
- Interbranch Science-Production Associations
(NPOs-nauchno-proizvodstvennyye obyedin-
eniya) and similar S&T centers that promote
collaboration of scientific, educational, and pro-
duction establishments in the development and
diffusion of key technologies.
- Temporary proiect teams, developed to solve
long-term, complex S&T problems or to design
new equipment and technology. If successful,
they may be changed into NPOs. A ioint decree
issued by the CPSU Central Committee and the
USSR Council of Ministers on 28 August 1983
explicitly calls for the creation of such ad hoc
collectives, and the USSR Council of Ministers in
January 1984 adopted a resolution regulating
their formation and operation
7. The isolation also severely restricts Soviet ability
to participate in the rapidly expanding multidisciplin-
ary fields where, for example, biology and laser
spectroscopy come together. In this case, the organiza-
tional isolation is aggravated by a restricted freedom
of communication of scientific research (see inset on
Freedom of Communication). (u)
8. The size of Soviet scientific research institutes is
one of the first and strongest impressions noted by
visiting scientists. Many of the main research institutes
are very large by US standards, with 500 to several
thousand workers. The productivity in Soviet institutes
is low compared with that of the United States. This is
because it is necessary to devote large numbers of
people and amounts of time to instrument design,
construction, and maintenance. Nevertheless, in a lab-
to-lab competition between a Soviet and a US lab, the
Soviet lab can sometimes obtain results faster than can
the US lab through the sheer s effort that can
be marshalled for a given topid
Political Factors
9. The party bureaucracy plays an important role
in staffing institutes with scientific personnel. The
hiring decision is not made solely by the director, but
rather by the director, the secretary of the party
organization, and the personnel department collective-
ly. Often factors such as party membership, social
activity, and nationality pla re important role
than scientific qualifications.
10. Party membership becomes an increasingly im-
portant issue to career advancement as the level of
institute director is approached. The ability to obtain
approval for proiects within an institute or funding for
an institute from the Academy depends to a large
extent on the "old buddy" system. At the institute
director level and higher, the lack of party member-
ship becomes more and more conspicuous, and posi-
tions of higher authority are almost always filled with
party members.~~
Military and Industrial Influence
11. The Soviet military has three basic mechanisms
for tapping the talent in the Academy. One formal
way is through the Applied Problems Section directly
under the Presidium of the Academy. Through this
mechanism, problems of interest to the military are
brought to the attention of the Presidium, which can
then allocate resources from within the Academy's
institutes to work on the problem. A second formal
approach is via research contracts negotiated directly
with an institute. Although we have no direct indica-
tion of the number of military contracts taken on by
the Academy, V. V. Grishin, Moscow party chief and
Politburo member, recently noted that "every year
over 11,000 contracts between scientific research insti-
tutes and design bureaus and enterprises are imple-
mented...." The third, but more informal, way is
through individual consulting agreements.
12. Scientific research done under military contract
is probably attractive to many researchers because it
allows them access to better funding and equipment,
some of which they can use for their own fundamental
research proiects. It is avoided by some, however,
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An essential element of the Western scientific re-
search environment that can greatly contribute to the
quality and rate of progress of science is the capability
to effect rapid and broad dissemination of ideas. This
characteristic, which appears to be missing in the Soviet
Union, is a fundamental flaw in the Soviet research
environment. There are numerous reports of highly
restricted communication between researchers, even to
the point where scientists in a given institute may be
unaware of relevant work going on in their own
institute. Many US scientists have noted their Soviet
counterparts asking for copies of Soviet papers that
were apparently difficult for the Soviets to obtain.
Access to scientific literature varies from institute to
institute, but many examples of poor access have been
cited. Furthermore, access to photocopying machines is
highly restricted, requiring the authorization of a super-
visor for each use. The use of electronic mail systems
has been very rare, and limited in access and coverage.
In addition, travel between institutes for collaboration,
especially intercity travel, is restricted.
This lack of broad and easy communication leads to a
number of effects. Because the wide dissemination of
new ideas is slow, there is slow movement of the
scientific community into new fields and slow diffusion
of new technology to different research groups. It also
leads to an inefficient use of people because of duplica-
tion of effort. Productivity is reduced because of the
reduced synergism among scientists, both from an
intellectual sharing perspective and from a ioint experi-
mentation perspectives
This difficulty is alleviated to some extent by the high
concentration of scientific workers in Moscow, where
results tend to be propagated through seminars held at
the institutes rather than through iournal articles. How-
ever, attendance at these seminars tends to be restricted
to only persons from a few of the leading institutes in a
given field
All publications, such as iournal articles, must pass
through a series of committees before being published.
This includes a special party censor and a censor who
screens the material for sensitive military-related tech-
nical information. As a result, scientists heavily
their own articles prior to submission for publicatio
The Soviet solution to these problems has been to
establish a centralized management structure that links
a network of S&T information organizations into a
single system. This system, known as the "State Scientif-
ic and Technical Information System" (GSNTI), is made
up of a hierarchy of thousands of institutions involved
in activities such as collecting, translating, indexing,
abstracting, and disseminating primary S&T sources.
The GKNT (State Committee for Science and Technol-
ogy) is responsible for the supervision of the GSNTI,
including its several all-union (national) information
agencies. The most important national agency, the All-
Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information
(VINITI), handles most of the literature in the natural
sciences and technology. Other important agencies in-
clude the All-Union Center of Scientific and Technical
Information (VNTITS) and the All-Union Scientific
Research Institute of Interbranch Information (VIMI),
which manages defense-related materials.ss
because it limits the scientist's ability to travel and
meet Westerner
13. Emigres have indicated that virtually all re-
search institutes, particularly in the physical sciences,
have some fraction of their budget, which varies from
institute to institute, allocated for military-related
work. Many institutes have a closed section (for exam-
ple, afloor or building) that is devoted to military-
supported works
Science-to-Technology Transition
14. Incorporation of new scientific ideas into a
development and product/process phase is difficult in
the Soviet system. Formal review and approval must
take place through the laboratory, institute, Academy,
and state committee levels of management. Imple-
mentation would then be called for through a Ministry
directive. Line managers, however, often ignore the
directive for fear of not meeting short-term quotas as
specified in the current plan. Furthermore, adminis-
trative boundaries are strict and tend to separate the
functions of academy, branch ministry, and university
research, compounding the difficulty of integrating
these efforts. Science-Production Associations have
been established to try to smooth this transition. These
associations, however, have been in existence for 15
years and have not been successful. Academy Presi-
dent A. P. Aleksandrov recently called for more lateral
communication between industry and Academy re-
search institutes. To improve the Academy's participa-
tion in applying the results of research into production,
CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, at the
\Central Committee Conference on S&T Progress in
June 1985, endorsed the new "technical center" con-
cept developed by the Ukrainian Academy of Sci-
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ences. The technical centers consist of an institute, a
design bureau, an experimental works, and a pilot
production plant. The director of the institute carries
out supervision of the center. Six of these centers have
been established in the Ukraine. The technical centers
have also been endorsed by USSR Academy President
Aleksandrov and leading economist Academician Abel
Aganbegyan. Independently, examples have also been
cited of large teams of engineers going to a research
institute for several months to pick up a new process or
technique. Conversely, research laboratories have
been set up at plants; the Zil factory in Moscow has a
laboratory where scientists from the Kurchatov Insti-
tute and the Scientific Research Center for Industrial
Lasers come to test the use of lasers in the auto
industry. Recent changes have been made that allow
production quotas in the current plan to be reduced
for a period of time following the introduction of a
new instrument or process to encourage risk taking
through implementation of technical innovations. ~
Policy
15. Decrees from the leadership of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, and their implementation
within the government, state the intended directions
for current and future Soviet scientific work. Pro-
nouncements from the 26th CPSU Congress indicate
the high priority being attached to scientific and
technical progress as a means for fulfilling the eco-
nomic and social development of the country. During
that congress it was stipulated that S&T research in the
future should be even more supportive of the econom-
ic and social needs in the Soviet society. With the
general goal of increasing industrial efficiency and
labor productivity, the CPSU Central Committee and
the USSR Council of Ministers issued on 28 August
1983 a joint decree titled "On Measures on the
Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress in
the National Economy" that calls for increased de-
mands on Soviet science to support the raising of
Soviet standards of machine outputs, equipment, in-
strumv~~other products to the highest world
levels
16. The trend toward pushing science to support
economic needs was already present in the 11th Five-
Year Plan (1981-85) with the implementation of a state
integrated scientific and technical program. A total of
170 state comprehensive scientific-technical programs
were established by Gosplan (State Planning Commit-
tee) Q, GKNT, and the Academy, and incorporated as a
E See the annex for a discussion of the organizations involved in
Soviet S&T policy formulation, administration, and execution.
Concept, Theory, and Experimental Verification
Examples of Topics First Conceived in the USSR, but
Pushed Further in the West
Tokamak for thermonuclear fusion.
Inflation theory in cosmology.
Optics:
Optical phase conjugation (having implications for
correction of atmospheric distortion of electro-
magnetic wave propagation).
? Interaction of fast laser light pulses with semicon-
ductors.
? Brillouin back-scattering (scattering of light from
sound waves).
Gerber-Markusev methods for velocity inversions in
seismology.
Radio-frequency quadrupole accelerator.
Nonlinear laser techniques for driving chemical
reaction pathways.
One widely held view among US scientists is that the
Soviets are often the first to come up with a new scientific
concept. US experimentalists often find that a new
measurement they have made has already been predicted
by a Soviet theorist. Beyond the initial conceptualization,
however, the Soviets begin to lag. They are generally
slower to work out the details of a complete new theory
from the initial concept. The Soviets, for example, were
the first to note property changes of materials on the
nanosecond time scale when illuminated by short light
pulses. They attributed the property changes to phase
transitions. Later, the United States, working with pico-
second resolution, showed the changes to be due to a rapid
melting and recrystallization in an amorphous state. There
is now a large effort in this area in the United States, in
part because of possible applications to semiconductor
doping technology. Finally, the movement of new theoreti-
cal developments into applications has been particularly
ineffective. We believe this is largely due to the strong split
between theoreticians and experimentalists and the inade-
pply and maintenance of experimental equipment.
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component part of the 1981-85 development plan.
These programs allow scientific workers to focus their
efforts on developing and rapidly introducing into
practice more advanced equipment and production
methods. The maiority of the programs pursue the
development of the machine-building base (see tables
2 and 3). Most of these programs are under develop-
me t~nclusion in the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-
90).
17. It is within this context that one can look at the
Academy and ask what effect these programs will
have on its research. The clear implication in the
programs backed by the CPSU is that applied science
will be heavily favored over fundamental science.
Furthermore, according to Academy Vice President V.
A. Kotel'nikov, "There does not need to be such a
large increase in the number of those working in
scientific institutions as took place in previous Five-
Year periods." Given the demand for applied research,
greater pressure will be exerted on scientists in the
institutes of the Academy to pursue applied research
at the expense of fundamental science. Since the
Academy now performs about 50 percent of all funda-
mental science, this portends a gradual reduction or
leveling off of the fundamental scientific research
effort in the Soviet Union.
18. The Academy has in the past been able to exert
a substantially independent force in Soviet society
largely through the great respect accorded academi-
cians and, in some cases, through the personal actions
of its internationally recognized scientists. As a result,
the Academy has been able to protect its scientists
pursuing fundamental science from party demands for
research that can be directly tied to application. The
percentage of academicians who are party members
has been rising steadily since the 1950s, however,
when it was 33 percent. With the Academy member-
ship elections on 26 December 1984, the fraction of
academicians who are party members exceeded 70
percent. There is little doubt that the influence of the
party on Academy affairs will be likely to increase, for
it now has sufficient strength to exert substantial
influence on future decisions made by the Academy
membership.
19. These statements on S&T progress as a way to
improve economic output are not new ideas, having
been stressed throughout Soviet history. There has not
since Brezhnev, however, been a leader in power long
enough and with a solid enough political base to push
through to fruition the necessary changes. With the
accession of the younger and dynamic Gorbachev, we
expect these changes to move more rapidly from
Table 2
Priority S&T Topics in the 11th Five-Year Plan a
Biotechnology and genetic engineering
Anticorrosion protection (new lacquer coverings, new methods of
electrochemical protection)
Highly filled polymers and composites
Powder metallurgy
Powerful superconducting magnet for industrial magnetohydrody-
namic electric power station
Fast breeder reactors and thermal neutron reactors for both heating
and power
Automation of scientific research and computerized design
Microelectronics and microprocessors
a Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the applied nature of the research we
believe the party and government will be supporting heavily. This is
not a comprehensive list of topics and is not meant to imply that
fundamental research will be unfunded.
Table 3
Targeted S&T Programs Assigned to
Academy of Sciences System
Lasers Lebedev Physics Institute
Scientific Research Center for
Industrial Lasers
Powder metallurgy, composites, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
and coatings Institute of Problems of Materi-
al Science
Experimental industrial powder Institute of Metallurgy
metallurgy for the nuclear met-
allurgy complex
Optical fiber light guides with Lebedev Physics Institute
low optical losses
Superconducting magnetic sys- Institute of High Temperatures
terns for industrial magnetohy-
drodynamic electric power sta-
tions
rhetoric into substantive action. Gorbachev's ability to
push for action from a strong position of power is
underscored by his recent success in getting two strong
political allies, Ligachev and Ryzhkov, who are rela-
tively young, promoted directly to the Politburo,
bypassing the usual candidate stage.
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20. Gorbachev himself stressed the essential role of
S&T progress in socioeconomic development in a
speech on 8 May 1985 at the Kremlin Palace of
Congresses celebrating the 40th anniversary of the
Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War:
"The party considers the main task of the
present is to substantially accelerate the socioeco-
nomic progress of Soviet society.... What it
amounts to primarily is the intensive and dynam-
ic growth of the national economy, which relies
entirely on the latest achievements of science
and technology. It is the basis that will make it
possible to ensure the further growth of the
people's well-being, to strengthen the economic
and defense potentials of the country and com-
prehensively to perfect developed socialism ... .
The principal way to achieve this goal is scien-
tific and technical progress. The rate of our
development and the course of economic compe-
tition with capitalism will depend to a decisive
extent on how we resolve the problem of acceler-
ating scientific and technical progress and on how
efficiently and how timely we apply the achieve-
ments of science and technology in the national
economy.'
21. These ideas were reiterated at a special S&T
conference held on 11 June 1985 in the CPSU Central
Committee. In a speech delivered at the conference,
Gorbachev specifically noted the role of science in the
acceleration of scientific and technological progress:
"Comrades, the frontline of the struggle to
accelerate the scientific and technological prog-
ress in the national economy advances through
science ....One can be proud of the pioneering
achievements in space research, mathematics,
mechanics, thermonuclear synthesis, and quan-
tum electronics.... At the same time, comrades,
we can and should obtain incomparably greater
achievements from science. We should take a
new look at the tasks of science based on the
requirements of our time, the requirements that
science be turned decisively toward the needs of
social production.... It is from these positions
that all links in the chain that binds science,
technology, and production ought to be analyzed
and strengthened."
We believe that Gorbachev gave only lipservice to
fundamental science in his comments and that the true
thrust of his program will be demands for relevant
applied research
22. Furthermore, concrete indications of substan-
tive change occurred in the Academy with the estab-
lishment in March 1983 of the Department of Infor-
mation, Computer Technology, and Automation
under Ye. P. Velikhov who, like Gorbachev, is from a
new generation. This is the first new Academy depart-
ment to be created since 1968. There have also been
decrees introducing provisions allowing short-term
falls in plan production when technical innovations are
introduced. Furthermore, a recent joint resolution of
the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR
Council of Ministers called for a change in the wage
structure for scientific workers and engineers, increas-
ing their salaries and adding bonuses for innovation.
This measure was also intended to reduce the time of
development and introduction of new technology and
equipment
23. Although we do expect changes to occur more
rapidly in attempting to solve some of the traditional
problems of the centralized Soviet system in regard to
S&T progress and its impact on the Soviet economy,
there will nevertheless be tremendous inertia to over-
come. In addition, the continued influence of some
"old guard" nonprogressives and the collective deci-
sionmaking process will serve to make real improve-
ments take place slowly and gradually.
24. The combined party pressure for applied re-
search, the newly created department in the Acade-
my, and the advent of younger men, who are oriented
more toward applied work, to leading positions in the
Academy should succeed in shifting the Academy
toward a much more applied orientation. This shift
will probably be perpetuated by the entering young
generation of leaders who might be expected to re-
main in power for several decades. This implies that,
in addition to the directed and intended impact of
Academy contributions to the economy, there will be a
long-term deterioration or leveling off of Soviet funda-
mental science unless specific measures are taken to
bolster and protect this aspect of Soviet 'science. It
should be noted, however, that some areas of funda-
mental science that have traditionally been very close-
ly coupled to applications (for example, solid state and
semiconductor physics) may in fact receive greater
emphasis.~~
Resources
Funding
25. Financial resources for conducting research in
the Academy institutes are available through several
mechanisms-the formal Academy budget, contract
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Table 4
Breakdown of Fundamental Versus Applied Science Funding a
Rubles
(billion)
Percent of Total Science
Budget
Rubles
(billion)
Percent of Total Science
Budget
Rubles
(billion)
Percent
Total
2.48
9.0
25.02
91.0
27.50
100
Academy
1.24
4.5
0.41
1.5
1.65
6.0
Branch
0.99
3.6
23.76
86.4
24.75
90.0
VUZ b
0.25
0.9
0.85
3.1
1.10
4.0
e The uncertainty of these numbers is considerable-typically plus
or minus 20 percent. These figures are based on information
received between 1982 and 1985.
b Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education.
research, and consulting fees. We estimate that about
90 percent of the research conducted by the higher
educational institutions is done under contract and
that most of this is applied research
26. Because Soviet official statistics report annual
expenditures only for total science, the distribution of
spending by research and development stage (that is,
fundamental, applied, developmental) is uncertain.
Soviet scholars, using unknown methodologies to cal-
culate expenditures for individual R&D stages, pro-
vide disparate estimates of the distribution of R&D
expenditures. These estimates, although seemingly
consistent in their coverage of fundamental research as
defined in this Estimate, appear to incorporate differ-
ent definitions of activity in applied R&D. Therefore,
we can estimate expenditures only for fundamental
science.)
27. Several Soviet authors have estimated that ex-
penditures for fundamental research range from 9
percent to 14 percent of the total published science
budget (see table 4). By applying these ratios to official
Soviet statistics, we estimate that 1985 expenditures
for fundamental science probably totaled between 2.4
billion and 3.7 billion rubles. It should be noted that
official Soviet statistics on science spending include a
broad range of R&D work, including work done in the
social sciences and not included in the traditional
Western concept of R&D. Our knowledge of Soviet
accounting systems leads us to believe that this total
includes civilian and the majority of military funda-
mental research. A recent Soviet published source
indicates that, of this total, about 50 percent was spent
by Academy of Sciences institutes, and the remaining
50 percent by ministry scientific organizations and by
higher education institutions. The Academy share of
expenditures for total fundamental research has de-
creased from an estimated 70 ercent in the early
1970s to 50 percent in the 1980s~
28. The level of review for approuuval of funding for
major scientific projects within the Academy is gener-
ally afunction of the ruble amount of the project:
29. The contract and consulting research, as well as
problems presented to the Academy's Applied Prob-
lems Section, are generally for applied research with
more obvious applications to the sponsoring industry
or military service. The Applied Problems Section is
the key link between military objectives and the
fundamental research conducted by the Academy of
Sciences, coordinating and monitoring all military-
related programs within the Academy. The main goal
of this Section is to study all scientific research areas
and to seek technology that could support military
interests or be applied to weapons systems. The
amount of contract work done by the Academy has
increased steadily since the 1960s. e-
port that between 1960 and 1970, income from con-
tracts grew from 8.5 percent to 12.6 percent of the
Academy budget. US scholars estimate that today
contracting provides 20-25 percent of the total budget.
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30. Funding, however, is not the maior difficulty in
putting together a new research plan, according to
emigre scientists. The problem is getting the people
and equipment required for the protect entered as a
part of the plane
31. Science drives, and is driven by, technology. As
much as new scientific principles are incorporated into
new instrumentation and products, advances in experi-
mental science often depend on advances in instru-
mentation technology
32. There is a widespread lack of experimental
equipment, parts, and maintenance personnel in the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the overall quality of the
instrumentation is often far below that of Western
laboratories. Even where Western equipment is avail-
able in Soviet laboratories, the equipment is often in
disrepair because of the absence of spare parts or
personnel to repair the equipment.
33. Research equipment is extremely hard to ob-
tain. Generally, it is necessary to develop and maintain
the equipment at the institute. This uses up a large
fraction of the institute's time and personnel. In some
institutes, as many as half of the personnel are techni-
cians devoted to building and maintaining instrumen-
tation. This function is served to a large extent by
private industry in the United States. In the USSR,
there is no private sector pushing science through the
development of new instrumentation. Some institutes
have alleviated the equipment/manpower shortage
problem by developing a large in-house shop. These
institutes have gained some measure of self-sufficiency
by not only building their own equipment, but also
manufacturing equipment for outside use to generate
funds (for example, small accelerators for medical
purposes at the Institute for Nuclear Physics in Novosi-
birsk).
34. m~igre scientists have indicated that the formal
means of obtaining equipment and other resources
from sources outside their own insititute are so cum-
bersome that ways of working around the system have
been widely developed. This "underground" bartering
system introduces some flexibility into the otherwise
rigid research environment
35. This lack of instrumentation support not only
slows the Soviet research effort, but, in ,some fields,
leaves Soviet experimentalists unable to participate
effectively in forefront research. They are unable to
compete in many new experimental areas (for exam-
ple, molecular biology) because they do not have as
responsive an infrastructure of equipment and services
as is available in the United States. Marked increases in
publications have been noted from specific institutions
when they have been able to obtain new pieces of
Western-built equipment
36. Lack of computing power is endemic in the
Soviet Union and constitutes a severe handicap in their
research capability. Soviet computers typically are not
very powerful (the workhorse for Soviet computation,
the BESM-6, is comparable to widely used US personal
computers) and have severe reliability problems.
Technicians needed to maintain these computers are
in short supply. The use of scientists' time is inefficient
because of the lack of adequate computing power that
in some fields severely hinders their participation in
forefront research. ~~
37. There is a general shortage of office space for
scientists. Most theorists, even at some of the best
institutes, work in their apartments and come in to
their institutes only once or twice a week. Consequent-
ly, they have reduced opportunities for informal inter-
changes of ideas with the experimentalists and other
theorists.)
38. In some cases, even basic supplies have proved
to be significant stumblingblocks. A US scientist re-
ported that in his role as chairman of an international
conference held in the Soviet Union, he was responsi-
ble for the distribution of the conference proceedings.
He was told that the sponsoring institute did not have
enough paper allocated to it in the Five-Year Plan to
publish the proceedin
The Soviet Scientist
39. Science as a profession is highly respected in the
Soviet Union. Senior scientists generally receive higher
salaries and better benefits than people in other
professions. The theoretical sciences stand above ex-
perimental sciences in prestige, and physics in particu-
lar has been referred to as the "queen of Soviet
science." Recent changes in the wage structure now
give equal pay to both experimentalists and theorists.
Compared With Western Counterparts
40. For most fields of theoretical physics, senior
Soviet scientists are on a par with their Western
counterparts in terms of depth and breadth of capabil-
ity. Senior Soviet experimentalists in virtually all
fields, although on a par intellectually with their
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Western counterparts, are generally unable to contrib-
ute to the advancement of their field at the same level
as their theorist colleagues. This is because of the lack
of adequate experimental instrumentation. Many of
the secondary Soviet scientists and candidates are
given tasks of an unimaginative nature, for example,
laboriously measuring the physical properties of vari-
ous new arbitrary combinations of materials. ~~
even applied-scientific work because this destroys
their opportunities for traveling abroad and restricts
the already limited means they have for communica-
tion and publication.
44. The Academy is regu ar y yawn upon as part
of the Soviets' S&T collection effort from the West,
and, although the practice is distasteful to many Soviet
scientists, these scientists respond to S&T collection
requirements during trips to technical conferences
Importance of Western Science
41. Soviet scientists, both theorists and experimen-
talists, are keenly aware of US experimental work and
value it highly, since the scope and depth of Soviet
experimental work is not as great as that in the United
States. Some Soviet theorists have even expressed
concern to US counterparts about the credibility of
Soviet experimental work in some fields (a widely held
view among US theorists and experimentalists). Never-
theless, US scientists have noted that visiting Soviet
experimentalists are often able to loin international
collaborative experiments and, even though they have
never worked with some of the advanced instrumenta-
tion, they quickly become fully contributing members.
This probably reflects the close scrutiny the Soviets
give to Western literature, including instrumentation
manuals. The Academy is known to have access to
unclassified Western scientific data bases via comput-
er.
42. Soviet scientists very highly prize the opportuni-
ty to travel abroad to conferences, universities, and
laboratories-not only for the material learned and the
feedback on their own work, but also for the peer
recognition of their work. Soviet scientists feel that the
West does not appreciate the value of Soviet scientific
work. In meetings between US scientists and their
Soviet counterparts, the visiting US scientists are left
with the feeling of having been completely drained of
information
Participation in Military, Government,
and Party Activities
43. Many senior Soviet scientists serve in advisory
capacities to the military and have used their military
connections in rising through the bureaucracy. The
staff members of the scientific research institutes of
the Ministry of Defense are responsible for maintain-
ing contact with personnel in the relevant industrial
and academic institutes and design bureaus. Further-
more, some military scientists study or participate in
research within the Academy institutes. Many Soviet
scientists, however, completely shun military-and
abroad
45. Many senior Soviet scientists serve in high-level
government and party positions. For example, G. I.
Marchuk, who was formerly an Academy vice presi-
dent and headed the Academy's Siberian Department,
is currently director of the GKNT. His predecessor at
the GKNT, V. A. Kirillin, had also been an Academy
vice president. Yu. A. Ovchinnikov, who is a vice
president of the Academy, is a candidate member of
the Central Committee of the CPSU; Academy presi-
dent, A. P. Alexandrov, is a full member.
Education
46. The best Soviet students who have come to the
United States have had depth, breadth, and quality of
scientific education comparable to that of their US
counterparts. One difference that has been unani-
mously noted by US scientists is that the preparation of
new Soviet candidates (Ph.D equivalent) in analytic
mathematics is generally better than for their US
counterparts.
47. Soviet universities tend to have more upper-
level specialized laboratories (for example, in fluid
mechanics, turbulence, and lasers) than US universi-
ties. Their large scientific manpower pool enables
them to add these specialized labs to the curriculum
even though adequate equipment is often lacking. In
the United States, the equipment can generally be
obtained, but there are not enough people to teach the
labs.
48. Access to computers in the universities, both
large mainframes and personal computers, is very
limited. According to a Soviet magazine article, there
were two computers in preuniversity Soviet schools in
1983-84. The Soviets began in September 1985, how-
ever, to introduce compulsory courses on computer
technology and programing into all primary, second-
ary, and vocational schools. Furthermore, they intend
to set up special classrooms in 200 middle schools, each
with 15 to 20 personal computers, during the 1986-90
Five-Year Plan. This, however, will have a negligible
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effect on increasing Soviet computer literacy because
it represents. an average of less than one personal
computer per 1,000 student
49. Teaching and research are fairly distinctly di-
vided, with teaching taking place largely in the uni-
versities and fundamental research in the Academy
institutes. Some institutes award candidate degrees for
research within the institute, and a small amount of
fundamental research takes place in a few select
universities (for example, Moscow State University).
Because of this overall separation of teaching and
research, active researchers generally have little con-
tact with teaching and students, and vice versa. Fur-
thermore, scientists teaching in the higher educational
institutions lose touch with the excitement and vitality
of forefront research, making it more difficult to
convey these qualities to the students. Attempts have
been made to get the researchers more involved in
teaching, but the physical separation of university and
institute facilities has strongly hindered this effort. The
large number of candidates who receive their degrees
in the universities require substantial retraining to
become productive in the institute research environ-
ment.~~
50. Students have the freedom to apply to any
institute or university. Although they may choose the
field they want to pursue, each year the number of
people for each field is determined by the government
and then competitive examinations determine the
cutoff. The entrance examinations are crucial and are
taken at the institute to which the student is applying.
Failure to be accepted within two years generally
results in the student being called into military service.
The university entrance examinations for physics are
separated from the other subiects and given first
because the field is so prestigious that the competition
is very high. This staggering of examinations gives the
students who fail an opportunity to try other fields.C
51. Decisions on the filling of faculty positions are
strongly influenced by outside effects: ethnic origin,
general ideological standing, and personal connections.
Faculty positions are routinely filled by the universi-
ty's own graduates, which contributes to the lack of
cross fertilization among universities
52. The party plays a strong role even in the
granting of candidate degrees. As a formal part of the
general examinations (even for the advanced degrees),
a candidate must pass an oral section on political
history and philosophy
53. The scope and quality of fundamental scientific
research in the Soviet Union has to a large extent been
determined by the conditions of the research environ-
ment discussed in previous chapters. Most notable is
the striking difference in scope and quality between
theoretical and experimental work in virtually all
scientific fields.
54. The scopes Soviet research in theoretical
physics is by and large similar to that of the United
States. The quality is as good as that in the United
States in most fields and perhaps better in a few fields
that have been traditional Soviet strengths (for exam-
ple, turbulence and laser physics).
55. The scope of Soviet experimental science has
frequently been limited by the availability of instru-
mentation, computers, and maior research facilities.
The effort has been further hindered by lack of an
adequate infrastructure for servicing the available
equipment and for developing new equipment that
can advance the limits of knowledge. The quality of
experimental work has suffered correspondingly, and
the interesting discoveries are generally made by
Western scientists because-for one thing-the equip-
ment is available to them first. Western scientists,
however, are frequently surprised by the quality of
Soviet scientific results obtained with relatively crude
equipment. The Soviets compensate by paying much
closer attention to theoretical details and often demon-
strate adeeper scientific understanding of the problem
than is common in the West. One American theorist
who spent several months in the USSR characterized
the research he saw as "modern science in an underde-
veloped country"-a tribute to the skills and talents of
Soviet experimentalists. In addition, when hard cur-
rency is available, much of the laboratory instrumen-
tation can be obtained from the West, although prob-
lems with maintenance still remain
56. The Soviets have been conspicuously absent in
some fields, in large part because of the lack of
necessary techniques and equipment. Such has been
the case in surface physics, where the availability of
ultrahigh vacuum techniques is essential, and in low-
temperature physics. This inadequacy probably result-
ed in the establishment in 1980, probably at Velikhov's
insistence, of the Center for Vacuum and Surface
Science. US scientists have attributed the Soviet ab-
sence in the band theory of conduction and in theoret-
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ical high-energy physics Monte Carlo gauge theory
calculations to inadequate computer power
57. Given the frequent inadequacy of the available
tools for doing forefront experimental research, the
organizational difficulties in maintaining and building
these tools, the societal bias that places the theorist on
a higher intellectual plane than the experimentalist,
and the differences in salary and benefits, it is not
surprising to find the toughest competition for en-
trance to universities and institute res ositions to
be for positions in theoretical physics
58. The excellence in mathematics demonstrated
by Soviet scientists has contributed to excellence in
theoretical physics. The Soviets often produce sophisti-
cated theoretical solutions to problems in analytic
form where the United States typically would rely on
numerical computer solutions. Examples exist in the
field of hydrodynamics where the Soviets have ob-
tained accurate solutions on computers of significantly
lower capability than US computers through insightful
choices of boundary conditions and clever mathemati-
cal techniques, or efficient programing. Such was the
case, for example, with a Soviet calculation of the
magnetic field-induced compression of a thermonucle-
ar fusion target that the Soviets suggested might have
commercial power applications. The Soviets have been
essentially forced into the position of having to rely on
clever theoretical approaches to computer calculations
because of their lack of the most advanced computer
systems. On the other hand, it can also be suggested
that if state-of-the-art computers do become available
to them, a potential exists for a surge in their computa-
tional capability that could go beyond the effects of
lust the improved computer capability. Such a surge,
however, might be mitigated or slowed by inadequate
preparation to handle advanced programing tech-
niques used for supercomputers
Relative Strengths and Weaknesses
59. Beyond these overall trends, which have afar-
reaching impact on many fields, it is difficult to find a
means of summarizing the relative status of science in
the Soviet Union as compared with that in the United
States. Even where the Soviet contribution is signifi-
cantly poorer than that of Western countries, as in
biological sciences and molecular biology in particular,
specific examples within the broad field, such as
biophysical chemistry and protein conformation, can
be found that are regarded as world class by Western
scientists. Furthermore, we note that, despite the poor
overall performance in molecular biology, the Soviets
are currently investing heavily in this field. Another
example of this nonuniformity across a field is in fluid
dynamics, which we have assessed as being compara-
ble in status to that in the United States. Current
Soviet work in experimental plasma physics, particu-
larly in their fusion energy program, is not keeping
pace with the West. On the other hand, Soviet experi-
mental work in shock physics is greatly respected. In
contrast, some field areas, such as oceanography, have
traditionally had massive resources allocated to them,
but the overall results produced have not greatly
impressed Western scientists. The presence of lust a
few very bright scientists can, and has, made the
difference between very significant Soviet contribu-
tions in a field and the virtual absence of a Soviet
contribution.
60. We expect Soviet work in a number of theoreti-
cal fields to suffer in the future as a result of inferior
large-scale scientific computing capability. Fields such
as fluid dynamics, astrophysics, and some calculations
in high-energy and condensed-matter physics will
become increasingly computer intensive in the next
five years-as much as 25 percent of astrophysical
work may be based on computer simulations in this
time frame. Fields such as astrophysics and high-
energy physics will be likely to suffer further under
party and government pressures for relevant applied
research. On the other hand, condensed-matter phys-
ics, because of its close connection to semiconductors
and electronics, and molecular biology, because of
possible genetic engineering applications in agriculture
and other areas, may receive considerably greater
support. This may be particularly true for molecular
biology, given Ovchinnikov's active role in this field
and considerable influence in the party and the
Academy.s
61. The interest, or value, of Soviet work to West-
ern scientists may not necessarily reside so much in the
sophistication of the research as in the access to data
unavailable through any other source, such as in
geology. This has also been the case in oceanography,
where the huge fleet of Soviet oceanographic research
vessels has gathered a vast amount of data. And in
materials science, the Soviet brute-force approach to
research has resulted in a wealth of data on physical
properties of new materials with possible application
to, for example, new lasers.s
62. With these points in mind, we can nevertheless
ask where the Soviets stand relative to the United
States in a given field of science in an overall sense.
We are relying largely for this comparison on the
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assessment of primarily US, and to some extent Euro-
pean and emigre Soviet, scientists. Table 5 summarizes
these subjective overall assessments for the limited set
of fields on which we have focused in this Estimate.
(u)
Table 5
Relative Strength of Specific Fields
of Science Compared With
the United States
63. We expect that the continuing Soviet drive for
scientific and technological progress directed toward
meeting specific economic and military needs will
play a major role in shaping the nature of their science
over the next 10 to 15 years. The advent of Gorbachev
as General Secretary of the CPSU represents the
beginning of the transfer of power from the "old
guard" to the younger political leaders. The initiatives
for accelerating S&T progress that began to be formu-
lated in the late 1970s will now begin to ,receive the
political support from the top leadership required to
implement necessary changes in the Soviet system.
These changes may be slow and gradual, as Gorbachev
faces a bureaucracy with a substantial "old guard"
element. He has already, however, shown a surprising
ability to accelerate political allies into top leadership
positions. (u)
64. Several changes have already taken place over
the last several years. These include: the creation of
the Academy Department of Information, Computer
Technology, and Automation in 1983; changes in the
wage structure for scientists and engineers; new mone-
tary incentives for technological innovation; allowance
for adjustments in plan quotas to allow for downtime
during the introduction of new technologies; and the
creation of cross-disciplinary/interministry groups
with the authority to coordinate large technical proj-
ects. We expect such changes to continue to receive
support from Gorbachev and his allies in the future,
providing the necessary backbone for what had been
hollow rhetoric in the past. (u)
65. The implication for science, as a whole, will be
that the emphasis gradually shifts further toward
applied research, even within the premier organiza-
tion historically dominating fundamental Soviet sci-
ence-the Academy. Younger men such as G. Mar-
chuk, Ye. Velikhov, and Yu. Ovchinnikov, ~ who have
to a large extent climbed to the top because of their
work in applied science, are gaining positions of great
responsibility in terms of science planning and man-
agement within the GKNT and the Academy. Velik-
hov is reported to be in weekly contact with Gorba-
chev, serving in essence as his science adviser.
Fundamental scientists had dominated the Academy
Note: An arrow indicates the estimated direction of change of the
future relative status where we are reasonably confident. Some
fields have not been divided into theory and experiment because of
lack of data.
The Soviets were not found to be grossly stronger than the United
States in any of these fields.
leadership from 1960 until recently. These men can be
expected to influence strongly the nature of Soviet
science for at least the next decade, and the results of
their influence will continue into the years beyond. (u)
66. In the short term, the emphasis on applied
research will further focus the attention of the high-
quality scientists in the Academy on the priority
economic and military problems of the country. In
terms of manpower, however, this will be a small
addition to the already enormous Soviet applied sci-
ence effort. (u)
67. In the long term, given the smaller fraction of
scientists devoted to fundamental science, we expect to
see a gradual reduction or leveling off in Academy
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fundamental science having little or no obvious appli-
cations and, consequently, in the pool of new ideas
generated by Soviet scientists. The Soviets may feel
that, with easy access to Western literature on funda-
mental science, they can accept a minimal fundamen-
tal research effort in order to accelerate their drive for
technology development. We expect, consequently, an
increasing Soviet reliance on Western science, as well
as technology, as a source of new ideas. This will come
at the price of reduced international prestige, and
there will be a timelag before the Soviets can pick up
and exploit Western science
68. Regardless of the extent to which applied sci-
ence encroaches on the Soviet fundamental science
research effort, basic research in general will continue
to suffer from two maior handicaps that we believe
will remain largely unremedied over the next decade.
69. The first handicap is the lack of the necessary
tools for conducting research, particularly in experi-
mental science. This includes instrumentation, com-
puters, large-scale research facilities, and the people
and parts needed to maintain them. Although the
Soviets have demonstrated the ability to do surprising-
ly good research with equipment considered relatively
crude by Western standards, the lack of a broad
infrastructure for producing and maintaining high-
quality, reliable instrumentation will slow their prog-
ress and continue to absorb the time of large numbers
of the personnel of their research institutes. In some
cases, the lack of sophisticated instrumentation and/or
computer support may completely exclude them from
effective participation in forefront research. This lack
of equipment may be alleviated to some extent when
the equipment can be purchased in the West, although
the problem of the availability of parts and mainte-
nance personnel will remain. The structural and in-
centive changes that the new, younger political leaders
are exploring, even if successful, probably will not
begin to show a maior effect on the instrumentation
problem for another 10 years.
70. The second problem, that of restricted commu-
nication and travel among scientific researchers, is a
particularly thorny issue for the Soviets. The strong
penchant for secrecy and the sharp institutional
boundaries that are at the heart of the communication
problem are unlikely to loosen in the near future, and,
if there is a further shift toward applied science, are
likely to tighten even further. The importance of the
control of information in Soviet society is so high, and
the threat from uncontrolled publications so great, that
a vast opening up of communications is almost incon-
ceivable. As a result, even with the help of a central-
ized scientific information distribution center, dupli-
cation of effort, reduced synergism among scientists,
and the slow diffusion of ideas and techniques will
continue to hamper Soviet scientific research
71. Even though the research environment has led
to many negative effects, there may be some effects
that are advantageous to the Soviets. Several factors
suggest that the probability of Soviet technological
surprise, resulting from work in the leading edge areas
of applied science, may increase in the future. This
prospect stems not from any particular strength or
excellence of Soviet scientific research, but rather
from the systemic conditions under which it operates.
72. It has been widely noted by US scientists that
the Soviets frequently work in areas considered to be
off the beaten track by Western scientists. Further-
more, Soviet scientists working in these areas can often
get continuing support over many years. Although
much of this work never leads anywhere, it is from
these areas that an unexpected development might
arise, as well as from the Soviet brute-force approach
to exploring scientific problems. If the Soviets do move
even further toward applied research, we would ex-
pect some of their best scientists to spend more time on
applied problems. Fundamental science in areas not
pursued by the Soviets but still needed to fuel applied
science developments will continue to be available to
the Soviets through Western literature, but will come
at the cost of a delay in the assimilation of fundamen-
tal science into their scientific community
73. The lack of adequate computing power and
instrumentation available to Soviet scientists has im-
posed constraints upon them that force careful study
of a problem in order to deal with it within those
constraints. This has created an environment that puts
a premium on analytical mathematical ability, physi-
cal insight, and insightful design of experiment. Thus,
Soviet research is characterized by cleverness of ap-
proach and design. They are often able to squeeze
more performance from their computers and instru-
mentation than that which is normally associated with
the level of technology embodied in that equipment.
Given upgraded computers and/or instrumentation,
therefore, a surge in Soviet performance beyond that
expected is likely. The probability of technological
surprise will increase faster than the Soviets' level of
technology, and further technological surprise is more
likely to manifest itself in the form of clever designs
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based on technology inferior to that of the West than
on technological breakthroughs
74. Over the next decade, we see Soviet science
overall as making a transition to an even greater focus
on applied science that can directly contribute to
economic growth and military strength. Despite its
problems, Soviet science constitutes a formidable force
in many fields and should be closely monitored, if for
no other reasons than its vast size and potential and the
high priority attached to scientific and technological
progress by the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, we
expect Soviet science to continue to be hampered by
low productivity compared with that of the West as a
result of the existing research environment. It will be
of crucial importance to the United States and its
allies, however, to observe to what extent the new
generation of Soviet leaders is successful in modifying
and changing the Soviet scientific research environ-
ment over the next 10 years, thereby releasing its
enormous potential. The consequences of such success-
ful political and administrative initiatives will be felt
for decades to come~~
Intelligence Gaps
75. In addition to the obvious need to explore other
areas of science, such as chemistry and biology, as well
as to further fill out the developing picture of the
physical sciences addressed, the following specific
topics should be considered for further analysis:
A. The most significant Soviet scientific results
over a given period of time that appear to be ripe
for exploratory development should be identified.
Such identifications could serve to focus community
attention on potential new technology
developments.
B. The importance of personalities, the behind-
the-scenes politicking, and how these features of the
Soviet system affect the direction and conduct of
Soviet science need to be addressed.
C. The success with which Gorbachev is able to
carry out economic and administrative reforms that
have an impact on science and the industrial base
that supports science should be monitored. Some
indicators with which to recognise significant suc-
cess should be developed.
D. The effects on science of the evolving demo-
graphic trends in the Soviet Union need to be
examined, for example, the expected increase in the
non-Slavic population.
E. Better definitions of how much money and
resources are being and will be devoted to various
scientific fields should be developed. This can help
in recognizing how much importance the Soviets
place on any one area.
F. The dilemmas faced by the Soviet leadership
in maintaining competitiveness on the frontiers and
applications of science.
G. The implications of the assessed trends in
Soviet science on Soviet society and education and
vice versa.
H. The extent to which Soviet secrecy and decep-
tion may affect our perception of Soviet science.
I. More detailed and broader studies of competi-
tive advantage in specific fields following from
systematic exploitation of open literature.
J. How would reduced scientific contact affect
Soviet science?
K. How has emigration policy and discrimination
affected Soviet science?
L. What are the areas of the US technology lead
that Soviet science could reduce if the SoviPte
increase their emphasis on applied science.
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ANNEX
Formal Organizational Structure
Basic scientific research in the Soviet Union, as with
most activities, is centrally planned. The organizations
responsible for policy guidance, administration, and
performance of research are embodied in a rigid,
hierarchical structure that provides a mechanism
whereby Communist Party Central Committee policy
initiatives can directly influence the direction, scope,
and level of effort in all fields of research. (See figure
1, page 8.~
The USSR Council of Ministers serves as the top
administrative body of the government responsible for
day-to-day operations of the economy, and the devel-
opment of an integrated economic plan, which in-
cludes basic science. It is also responsible for reflecting
broad policy initiatives, as set forth by the party, in its
planning and administrative activities. The Council of
Ministers exercises its responsibility for planning and
administrative duties through a series of state commit-
tees, reporting to the council, which are oriented
toward specific functions for example, finance, plan-
ning, supply, and S&T)
The primary players who coordinate the overall
scientific research plan for consideration by the Coun-
cil of Ministers are the State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKNT, an All-Union state committee
under the Council of Ministers, chaired by G. I.
Marchuk) and the Presidium of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR (AN SSSR, A. P. Aleksandrov,
president). The State Planning Committee of the
Council of Ministers (Gosplan) and the Ministry of
Finance participate with the GKNT and the AN SSSR
in setting the overall funding levels. For proiects which
require maior resource allocations, other committees
under the Council of Ministers, such as the State
Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstroy) and the
State Committee for Material and Technical Supply
(Gossnab) also participate~~
The GKNT is charged with the coordination of a
unified state S&T policy. It prepares S&T forecasts,
drafts a list of maior S&T problems to be solved during
the next Five-Year Plan, develops proposals with the
AN SSSR and Gosstroy for inclusion in the five-year
S&T plans and longer range S&T programs, and works
with Gosplan and the Academy in developing proposals
for the introduction of R&D results into the economy.
The GKNT has little direct managerial control over the
actual conduct of institute research)
The AN SSSR plays a pivotal role in the planning,
management, and conduct of fundamental science in
the Soviet Union. In addition to the overall planning
functions performed in collaboration with the GKNT
noted above, the AN SSSR maintains direct manageri-
al control over the bulk of the fundamental research
programs in the country. We estimate that about 50
percent of the research conducted in fundamental
science in the Soviet Union takes place in the scientific
research institutes of the Academy system, with the
remainder taking place mostly in the universities and
other institutes of higher learning (VUZy) under the
Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educa-
tion, and to some extent in the research institutes of
the industrial ministries. In addition, the AN SSSR by
charter is given responsibility for overseeing and coor-
dinating all fundamental scientific research in the
country, although its direct managerial control only
extends to its own institutes. Thus, the research plans
of the Union-Republic Academies of Sciences, for
instance, must be passed through the AN SSSR via its
Union Republic Academies of Science Coordination
Council. (See figure 2~
Each Academy institute generates a proposal for its
own research plan that forms the substance for the
deliberations of the upper levels of the AN SSSR (depart-
ment, section, and presidium) and the GKNT in formu-
lating the overall research plan for the country~~
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