PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000600550001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holder
Secret
NIE 11-12-83
April 1985
Copy 4 21
Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Prospects for Soviet
Military Technology and
Research and Development
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
OF NIE"11-12-83
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET
MILITARY TECHOLOGY AND
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Information available, as of 3. April :1985? was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which
was approved by the'National' Foreign Intelli-
gence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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SCOPE NOTE
NIE 11-12-83, Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and
Research and Development, was the second in a now-established series
of NIEs on the subject. At the initiative of the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence agreed that a
Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-12-83 would be prepared to
reexamine and clarify a statement in the Estimate that concerned
technology transfer to the Soviet Union and which could be misinter-
preted. We consider this Memorandum an interim report, with the
recognition that still more analysis is needed. The entire issue of the
role, importance, and implications of technology transfer in Soviet
technology development and weapon system capabilities is being
reanalyzed and updated for inclusion in the next issuance (NIE 11-12-
85) in the Estimate series.
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'DISCUSSION
1. In NIE 11-12-83, the Intelligence Community
estimated that the Soviet Union has a large military
research and development program that is capable of
steady progress in key military technology areas; that
there are both significant strengths and weaknesses in
Soviet military technology relative to the West; that
the weaknesses are most evident in the areas of
microelectronics, computers, and automation; and that
the Soviets had to turn to Western technology to
compensate for their deficiencies and would continue
to do so. In discussing the Soviet technological defi-
ciencies, the Estimate states that the Soviets' "practice
of heavily adopting Western ideas and designs will
continue to reinforce their position of technological
inferiority to and dependence on the West."
2. Concern now has been expressed that readers of
the Estimate may interpret that statement as suggest-
ing that the United States could foster a permanent
position of technological inferiority in the Soviet
Union by supporting the continuing transfer of mili-
tarily significant technologies to the Soviets. We have
reviewed the pertinent sections of the Estimate and
believe that this interpretation is unwarranted but
understand how the statement, if taken out of context,
could be misinterpreted.
3. We believe that the Soviet weapons program in
the next decade will be supported by a continued large
resource allocation for military research and develop-
ment. The scope and magnitude of this program, the
Soviets' willingness to exact sacrifices from their civil-
ian sector, their.growing indigenous technological ca-
pabilities, and their practice of heavily adopting West-
ern technological ideas and designs will help
compensate for systemic inefficiencies and assist them
in narrowing the US lead in military technologies and
to develop increasingly complex weapon systems.
4. We believe that Western technology is extremely
valuable to the Soviets. Their exploitation of Western
technology helps reduce the effects of their deficien-
cies and enables them to stay close enough to the West
technologically to maintain the adequacy of their
military systems. We do not believe that the systemic
factors underlying Soviet technological deficiencies
will change significantly over the next decade. Accord-
ingly, it is our judgment that continued success in
acquiring Western technology will be essential to
Soviet efforts to maintain military capabilities relative
to the West.
5. If the transfer of technology to the Soviets were
to cease in areas where they are deficient, the result
would be a reallocation of their R&D resources to
these areas in an attempt to make up for the loss of
Western technology. However, shifting resources to
compensate for these losses would not be sufficient in
some areas, and the Soviets either would not gain or
would fall further behind. Without continued access to
Western technology, the Soviets would find it even
more difficult to compete with the United States.
6. Extensive exploitation of Western technology
brings both risks and benefits to the Soviets. The main
risk is that technology supplies-concepts, designs, and
hardware-are subject to some disruptions through
embargoes or other restrictions. Dependence that
serves to remove the necessity of relying exclusively on
indigenous capabilities may inhibit their development.
We believe, however, that the Soviets find these costs
quite acceptable in view of the substantial benefits
they derive from exploiting Western technologies and
that major acquisition efforts therefore will continue.
There will almost certainly be continued Soviet depen-
dence on Western innovation for leadership and direc-
tion in many areas of advanced technology. This
dependence is particularly significant in microelec-
tronics, and extends to avionics, precision-guided mu-
nitions, communications, robotics, computers, and pro-
duction technologies.
7. As a result of their practice of planned modern-
ization of military systems, the Soviets can field
Western technology in a great variety of sophisticated
and effective weapons in a short period of time,
improve their military capabilities, and concentrate
resources on the development of advanced weapons.
Western technology has also allowed them to field
entirely new weapon systems. Inputs of Western tech-
nology subsidize the continuing growth in and effi-
cient use of Soviet R&D resources. Technology trans-
fer forces the West to devote even greater resources to
offset gains in Soviet military technology and
capabilities.
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8. Soviet technological lags and deficiencies do not
necessarily translate into inadequate military systems
capabilities. The Soviets' persistent modernization ef-
forts help them to reduce the effects. They have been
able, for example, to move computer technology into
deployed systems on the average of six years faster
than the United States, enabling them to offset partial-
ly the US technological lead in computers. Similarly,
frequent modernization of fielded weapon systems
helps the Soviets to offset the effects of the attendant
technological lags that result from reliance or depen-
dence on Western technology.
9. Acquisition of Western technology has been es-
sential to many of the Soviets' military gains and will
continue to be important to them. On the other hand,
they have successfully pursued some independent
R&D paths in areas such as storable liquid missile fuels
and nuclear weapon designs. The Soviet Union cur-
rently leads the United States in several key technol-
ogies, including chemical warfare and some aspects of
millimeter-wave and sensor technology. Soviet ad-
vanced research is also strong in directed-energy tech-
nologies and, indeed, leads in some. Nevertheless, in
most areas the Soviets have followed the Western lead
in technological innovation.
10. Significantly, the effects of dependence could
be even more important in the 1990s than they are
today. The effects of technology dependence on the
present military balance are mitigated by the essen-
tially mature technological base the USSR has already
developed. The next decade is. less certain for the
Soviets, however, because of rapid technological devel-
opment in the West.
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1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. This copy is for the
information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to-
know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials
within their respective departments:
a. Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of Energy
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Deputy Director for Intelligence for any other Department or Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
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agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
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Secret
Secret
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