THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000800770004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of Central Intelligence Secret
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The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan:
Implications for the Regional
Powers and the United States
Key Judgments
ASTER filE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUF
OR MARK OA j
Secret
NIE 11/37-85
April 1985
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NIE 11/37-85
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL
POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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HIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE..
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT-:AS, NOTED: IN; THE TE-XT.
The 'following' intelligence organizations =participated in"'the preparation of the
Estimate
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
-'`- -Agency;?'and.ahe `intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
it a li' f'
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The AssistantChief 0? Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the implications of a continued Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan through 1990 for the regional pow-
ers-Pakistan, India, Iran, and the Arab world-and for the United
States. It addresses the implications of the Soviet invasion in terms of the
following questions:
- How has the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan influenced the
regional powers' strategic perspectives and threat assessments?
- What impact has the Soviet presence in Afghanistan had on
regional rivalries, especially that between India and Pakistan?
- What options do the Soviets have to manipulate the policies and
internal politics of the regional states, and what are Moscow's
prospects. for success?
- How would domestic instability or changes in government of
the regional states affect their policies toward Afghanistan and
the Soviets?
- How are US interests affected by the policies of the regional
powers, and by Soviet attempts to manipulate the domestic
politics and conflicts of these regional powers?
The Estimate examines Moscow's policy options in Afghanistan
only as far as they affect regional actors and is not intended.to be pre-
dictive of all aspects of Soviet regional policies through 1990 or beyond.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
After nearly 150 years of intermittent competition between Russia
and Western powers in Central Asia and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union
now occupies Afghanistan with a large army, is strategically positioned
between Iran and Pakistan, is the only great power on the ground
militarily in the region, and is 300 miles away from the Indian Ocean.'
Moscow's efforts to consolidate Soviet control over Afghanistan will
increase the potential for regional instability and conflict during the
next five years. The Soviets will continue their efforts to move events in
the region in their favor and will increase the pressure on regional actors
through military and political means as well as intimidation and
subversion.
Should the Soviets consolidate their control over Afghanistan, they
will enhance their strategic and regional position and place themselves
in a stronger position for pursuing other regional objectives at the
expense of US interests. Even if Moscow would only gain modest
strategic military advantages during the next five years, military or
political success toward consolidating their position would place the
Soviets in a better position to intimidate Afghanistan's neighbors and to
meddle in their affairs. All the regional powers-including India and
the Persian Gulf countries-would have to take into consideration the
proximity of Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness to
use force to achieve Soviet objectives.
Regional Reaction to Invasion
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created a new strategic
situation that has already had a major impact on regional politics and on
the strategic interests of powers outside Southwest Asia:
- The invasion sparked an Afghan insurgency that has grown in
size and effectiveness and which prevents the Soviets from
consolidating their control.
- Pakistan, as a result of providing vital sanctuary and support for
the Afghan insurgents and supporting US objectives in the
region, is now in confrontation with the Soviets.
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, is in agreement with this
Estimate but believes it important to point out that the Soviet efforts to consolidate control in Afganistan
"I be very difficult during the five-year period of the Estimate and will most likely have negative effects
on the Soviet Union's position throughout the region and its ability to enhance its strategic position.
Much of this is spelled out in the remainder of the Key Judgments.
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- The Soviet threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan provided strong
impetus to the resurrection of US-Pakistani security ties that
now include closer strategic cooperation and significant US
military assistance.
- US military aid for Pakistan has in turn increased India's
suspicions of both US and Pakistani intentions, has contributed
to greater Indo-Pakistani tensions, and has led to a closer-
though. still limited-convergence of some Indian and Soviet
interests in weakening Pakistan.
- The invasion set back Soviet .efforts to improve relations with
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region and with China. Saudi
Arabia and China both .provide aid to the Afghan insurgents
through Pakistan, and the Saudis have increased their assistance
to Islamabad.
The very process by which Moscow attempts to further consolidate its
power in Afghanistan will have ongoing strategic impact on the region.
Prospects and Implications of Soviet Consolidation
There - is a range" of opinion within the intelligence Community
about whether the Soviet Union will be able to consolidate its position in
Afghanistan beyond the period of this Estimate. If the Soviet Union can
further consolidate its position, Moscow's prospects for achieving long-
term strategic objectives in the region. would increase:
- Firmly establishing Afghanistan within Moscow's "empire"
would demonstrate the Soviets' resolve and increase fears
among regional states about Soviet expansionism.
- Moscow would be in a stronger geographic position to further
expand its political influence in the region, in some cases at the
expense of US influence.
Within the time frame of this Estimate,. the USSR will steadily
improve its military infrastructure in Afghanistan . to support its regional
defense requirements and ability to project power. Major improvements
in air and logistic facilities and the deployment of additional forces
would be essential for the Soviets to undertake and sustain large-scale
operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan or Iran.
Over the next five years, the Soviets' improvements in the logistic
infrastructure in Afghanistan will improve their capabilities against the
resistance and could also support Soviet military operations against Iran
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and Pakistan. Over the longer term the military significance of
Afghanistan as a forward base will grow. However:
- The difficult terrain, rudimentary transportation network, and
poor logistic facilities in Afghanistan, together with the range
limitations of tactical aircraft currently in the Soviet inventory,
limit the strategic military advantages that the Soviets would
derive from victory in Afghanistan in the near term.
- Logistic and terrain difficulties would also limit the use of
Afghanistan as a forward base for a land invasion of Pakistan
and, to a lesser extent, Iran.
- However, beginning in the late 1980s, expected improvements
in Soviet tactical aviation-including an air-refueling capabili-
ty-would allow aircraft launched from Afghanistan to support
Soviet military operations in the Persian Gulf region, improving
existing capabilities.
Military and Diplomatic Costs to Moscow
So far, however, the invasion has resulted in significant military
and diplomatic costs for Moscow that offset potential strategic gains.
The regional reaction to the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation
of Afghanistan has been uniformly negative. This has given the United
States an opportunity to make some concrete, though still modest, gains
in its relations with several of these states. Continued US interest and
commitment, appropriate to the variety of states in question, is
perceived by the regional states as critical to their continued opposition
to the Soviets in Afghanistan.
To date, Moscow's invasion has incurred the following military and
diplomatic costs:
- Five years after the invasion, the Soviets and their puppet regime
in Kabul still do not control most of Afghanistan, and their combat
losses-while still relatively small-are increasing.
- The invasion helped provoke an enhanced US commitment to
regional security, complicated Indo-Soviet relations, and has rekin-
dled suspicions about Soviet ambitions in the Arab world.
- US military planning and force structuring for contingencies in the
Persian Gulf have been given increased impetus by the invasion.
Projected Soviet Policy in Afghanistan
The judgments in this Estimate are based on our belief that, during
the next five years, the Soviets will neither withdraw from Afghanistan,'
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nor succeed in reducing significantly the level of Afghan resistance. The
USSR may marginally improve its political military position in Afghani-
stan and will take whatever steps are necessary to avoid a severe
deterioration of its military position in Afghanistan.
Specifically, we believe that:
- The Soviets will not withdraw from Afghanistan because such a
move would represent a clear failure of Soviet policy and force
of arms both at home and abroad.
- The Soviets will not be willing to make the type of concessions
that would permit a political compromise acceptable to the
Afghan resistance.
- The Afghan resistance will increase its effectiveness against the
Soviets as it becomes better armed and trained.
- Unless the Soviets are faced with a serious deterioration in their
military position, we still expect them to make continued
incremental increases-of perhaps 10,000 men per year-in
their troop strength. Should resistance capabilities improve
significantly and the Soviets face a deteriorating military situa-
tion, however, they could consider even larger increases in troop
strength and stepped-up pressure against Pakistan. .
- Nevertheless, we do not believe the Soviets will opt for a
massive reinforcement of the approximately 115,000 men now
in Afghanistan because of the likely diplomatic, economic, and
military costs. To use military force alone to crush the resistance
would, in our judgment, require 400,000 to 500,000 troops.
Pakistan
The Soviets will concentrate on political and military efforts to stop
the flow of men and supplies across Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan.
To accomplish these objectives, the Soviets probably will:
- Increase cross-border air and artillery strikes into Pakistan and
probably support limited ground incursions in an attempt to
undermine the Pakistani public's support for the Afghan resist-
ance and confidence in President Zia.
- Step up subversion to weaken the Zia regime and try to help a
pliable civilian government-which would be more accommo-
dating to Moscow's interests-come to power in Islamabad.
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- Seek ways to reinvigorate Baluchi, Pushtun, and Sindhi separat-
ist tendencies in order to threaten the unity of Pakistan.
- Foster tensions between India and Pakistan.
Soviet policy choices will be affected by Moscow's view of
Pakistan's political stability and weaknesses, US-Pakistani ties, Indo-
Soviet relations, and its own limited resources in Pakistan:
- Moscow would view Zia as more vulnerable to pressure if he
were to become seriously weakened politically.
- The Soviets would be wary that too tough a policy could
strengthen Zia, as well as US-Pakistani security ties, and possibly
lead to a confrontation with the United States.
- Further, Moscow would not want its actions against Pakistan to
result in major strains in its relations with India, and especially
not in closer Indian ties to the United States.
Pakistan's resistance to greater Soviet pressure will depend princi-
pally on its perceptions of US support:
- Zia's Afghan policies are predicated on tying the Soviets down
in Afghanistan in the interests of Pakistan's own security. His
willingness to run the risks of increased tensions with the USSR
reflect in part his hope that the United States will reciprocate
with a full commitment to his regime-against India as well as
against the Soviets.
- The Pakistanis will continue to press for additional arms and
would expect more direct US military help-including logistic
support and possibly a show of force-if the Soviets conduct
cross-border operations.
As long as Zia remains in power and so long as he feels he can rely
on US support, Pakistan is unlikely to alter its policy on Afghanistan or
reduce its ties to the United States. However, a major internal crisis or
an erosion of public support for the Afghan cause might compel
Islamabad to alter its policies even if it had US backing:
- Another military regime might be more likely than Zia to adopt
a conciliatory policy toward Moscow and Kabul..
- A leftist civilian government-which is least likely to come to
power in the next five years-would be most willing to reach
agreement with Moscow and Kabul.
Moscow's efforts to bully Pakistan into changing its tough policy on
Afghanistan have so far been counterproductive and are likely to face
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continuing difficulties. The threat to Pakistan from an alien and "anti-
Islamic" Soviet force in Afghanistan has worked to:
- Strengthen national unity by rallying Pakistanis to a government
confronting a foreign force-the threat serves to help Zia retain
control.
- Strengthen Pakistan's security and economic relationships with
the United States, China, and the conservative Persian Gulf
Arabs, with visible benefits of economic assistance and improve-
ment in Pakistan's armed forces.
- Complicate Soviet-directed subversive efforts.
- Defuse the Pushtunistan separatist issue.
- Encourage Pakistan to seek better relations with India.
A Pakistani accommodation with Moscow would have major
strategic implications for the United States:
- The Afghan resistance would be severely weakened without
Pakistan as a sanctuary and supply base.
- A much wider expansion of Soviet control over Afghanistan
would be virtually assured, although some level of resistance
would continue.
- Pakistan would become less supportive overall of US strategic
interests.
India
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would like both the USSR and the
United States to end their involvement in South Asia. At least over the
near term, however, the consequences of the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan-notably US security assistance to Pakistan-may serve as
a basis for the de facto convergence of some Indian and Soviet
objectives. India and the Soviet Union both want, for different reasons:
- Weakening of Pakistani security ties to the United States.
- Establishment of a more pliant government in Pakistan.
- An end to the Afghan insurgency.
The Soviets have tried to heighten India's suspicions about Paki-
stan's intentions and its security relationship with the United States in
order to foster Indo-Pakistani tensions and heighten New Delhi's
dependence on Moscow. In the Soviet view, conflict between India and
Pakistan would work toward solving Moscow's Afghan problem and
would give Moscow opportunities to strengthen its position in South
Asia.
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The Soviets would almost certainly condone even an Indian
preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities in the belief that it
served Moscow's interests, by weakening Pakistan. However, a pre-
emptive. Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities is unlikely.in the
near term.
Even without Soviet encouragement, India's suspicions 'of Pakistan
and the United States and its 'dependence on Soviet arms will persist and
could even increase as a result of closer US-Pakistani security coopera-
tion. Some in New Delhi believe this cooperation has already acquired a
dynamic independent of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, India is likely to
become- increasingly concerned about' long-range -Soviet intentions in
the region, and could find itself . moving toward confrontation with the
Soviets if Pakistan were effectively neutralized:
New Delhi regards Pakistan =as a strategic buffer against the
USSR and' would oppose Moscow's efforts-to dominate Pakistan.
77- New, Delhi and Moscow could find, themselves supporting rival
factions within Pakistan.
- The Indians would seek to. significantly, reduce their depen-.
deuce on Moscow and reorder their strategic relationship with
the USSR, the United States; and China if they perceived Soviet
ambitions as extending beyond Afghanistan toward the
subcontinent.
Iran
Soviet relations with, Iran probably will be more determined by
bilateral issues other than Afghanistan. Nonetheless:
Soviet pressure on Iran probably will intensify if Tehran
increases its support for the Afghan resistance. Greater Soviet
pressure would be unlikely, however, to cause Tehran to change
its Afghan policies.
Iran might increase its aid to the insurgents once its war with
Iraq is over, but Iran's support is not nearly as crucial to the re-
sistance as Pakistan's.
- Should Pakistan cease support to the Mujahedin, Iranian support
would become critical to the survival of the insurgency but
would not begin to replace current supply levels through
Pakistan.
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Arab States
Soviet success in controlling Afghanistan would heighten Arab
concerns about Moscow's intentions in the Middle East. However, the
potential for US-Arab strategic cooperation-and Arab views of Soviet
policies-will be influenced much more by Arab-Israeli and Gulf war
issues than by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states will continue to back Pakistan in its support for the Afghan
resistance.
China
Beijing views the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an ominous
extension of Moscow's military assertiveness that threatens China's
broader strategic interests. China will continue to support Islamabad's
role in aiding the insurgents, but has limited potential for helping
Pakistan in the face of greater, Soviet pressure. The Chinese, however,
would not want Pakistani policy to result in successful Soviet efforts to
neutralize Pakistan because Islamabad's role as Beijing's key South
Asian ally is even more important to China than its role in opposing the
Soviets in Afghanistan.
Implications for the United States
Pakistan is likely to continue to oppose the Soviet military presence
in Afghanistan as long as it perceives it has continued strong US support.
Even Iran, which may feel compelled to move to improve its relations
with the Soviets, will continue to support the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from its neighbor. For the new Indian leadership, however, the
US-Pakistani' security relationship will hamper any reassessment by
India of its public position on Afghanistan.
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