SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: GROUND PREPARED FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940019-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 March 1985
FB 85-10013
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Sino-Soviet Relations:
Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change
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This analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in
foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without
coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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Sino-Soviet Relations:
Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change
The Soviet succession provided the stage for a historic drama in
Sino-Soviet relations, as General Secretary Gorbachev broke with
two decades of precedent to meet the Chinese delegation to the
funeral and Beijing laid aside its doctrine of 18 years by referring
publicly to the Soviet Union as a socialist country. While both sides
have unmistakenly signaled their desire to accelerate the pace of
-
improving ties, it is not yet clear w
et er t ese important symbolic
actions resa e u changes in relations. Neither side has
acknowledged a departure from past po icy or articulated a ratio-
nale to explain a departure. Particularly on the Chinese side, such a
rationale will be necessary to justify further moves toward reestab-
lishment of party relations. Any radical change in doctrine or
relations may provoke controversy and opposition in either party.
Moscow
Gorbachev set forth policy on China with a simple declaration in his 11 March
CPSU plenum address: "We would like a serious improvement in relations
with the PRC and consider that, given reciprocity, this is fully possible." He
underlined his apparent seriousness three days later when he met with Chinese
delegation head Vice Premier Li Peng. It was the first such meeting between a
Soviet general secretary and a Chinese official since Brezhnev met with Zhou
Enlai in November 1964, when the Chinese premier came to Moscow
following the ouster of Khrushchev to explore the possibility of overcoming
differences with Moscow.'
Gorbachev's formulation of policy toward China was more positive than any
used by Chernenko during his tenure as general secretary. While Chernenko
had expressed hope for improved relations, his statements tended to be linked
' Beijing sent State Councillor and Foreign Minister Huang Hua to Brezhnev's funeral in
1982, and he was received by his counterpart, Gromyko. In 1984, Beijing sent Vice Premier
. and Politburo member Wan Li ,to Andropov's funeral, a leader of state rank equivalent to
Huang Hua but of considerably greater political stature. Wan received less favorable
treatment, however, meeting with Geydar Aliyev, who held comparable government and party
posts but was lower in stature than Gromyko.
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General Secretary Gorbachev accepts condolences from Vice
Premier Li Peng at Kremlin reception. (Soviet television,
13 March 1985)
Meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev, with Foreign
Minister Gromyko to his right and Vice Premier Li Peng,
second from left. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985)
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with criticism of the Chinese or qualified with assertions that the interests of
"third countries" could not be prejudiced. Gorbachev avoided such a link, but
did reflect similar concerns in his conversation with the Vietnamese delegation
to the funeral on 14 March. In an implicit reference to China, reported by So-
viet media, he offered support to Vietnam's struggle against "the intrigues of
imperialism and those who abet it." (Emphasis added)
The TASS report on Gorbachev's 14 March meeting with Li Peng indicated
that the general secretary had reiterated his plenum formulation on relations.
Otherwise, the report followed the pattern of accounts of Sino-Soviet meetings
in 1982 and 1984, conveying little of the substance of the meeting beyond not-
ing that the Chinese side had also expressed an interest in improving relations.
Four days later, however, Pravda printed excerpts of a much warmer Chinese
report. Not only did Pravda note that Li had "agreed with the statement made
by Comrade Gorbachev" at the CPSU plenum about the desirability of
improving relations, but it recorded the key Chinese statements that reflected
Beijing's willingness again to grant the Soviet Union socialist status and to
communicate informally between party leaders. Citing the Chinese party
paper Renmin Ribao, Pravda reported that Li Peng had conveyed congratula-
tions to Gorbachev from Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang, had referred to the Soviet Union as a "socialist" country, and had
"stressed" that China was prepared to assist the further development of
relations in the "political" as well as other spheres.
Moscow may see China's gestures in this regard as responding to Soviet
sensitivities expressed late last year in an article written under pseudonyms as-
sociated with the USSR Foreign Ministry. Appearing in the prominent foreign
policy journal Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International ~4ffairs) under the
names "I. Alekseyev" and "F. Nikolayev," the article chided Beijing for
refusing to recognize the USSR as "socialist."
By publishing the markedly different accounts of the meeting without further
explanation, Moscow reinforced a public appearance of uncertainty about
China policy: Earlier, Pravda and Izvestiya had omitted Gorbachev's state-
ment on China in their otherwise thorough reviews of his plenum address in
their 13 March editorials. Pravda included a reference to the "authoritative
statement" at the plenum calling for better relations in its followup editorial
three days later, but the formulation was not cited in similar editorial reviews
of the speech in Izvestiya on the same day or in the military daily Krasnaya
Zvezda on the 15th, 16th, and 21st or in the Russian republic paper
Sovetskaya Rossiya on the 15th.
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Despite these mixed signals, there are tentative signs of central direction to
Soviet media to be restrained in their treatment of China-a tactic employed
on many occasions by Moscow in the past to encourage an improved
atmosphere in relations. There has been little critical comment on China, and
the TASS report on U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost's
17-19 March visit to China avoided either criticism or mention that Sino-
Soviet relations were among the topics under discussion.
Moscow also encouraged the impression that efforts on normalization would
continue to move forward, reporting on 22 March that Gromyko had received
the PRC ambassador at the latter's request. According to a Soviet television
news report, the interest of both sides in normalization was expressed, and the
Soviet. side again "drew the attention" of the ambassador to Gorbachev's
plenum statement on relations.
Background
There is nothing in Gorbachev's past record of public statements on China
that anticipated his initiative to meet with Li Peng or that might have
prompted Beijing's effusive response. He is not known to have ever made a
public statement on relations with China. The few statements in which he
mentioned China were delivered at formal party occasions abroad-such as
the Vietnamese Communist Party congress in March 1982-and offered only
conventional Soviet criticism of Chinese policies. Judging by published
reports, he said nothing about China in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election
speech last month.
Despite the meager Gorbachev record on the China question, his apparent ties
with Andropov and Gromyko associate him with a perspective that has given
more priority to improving relations than did Chernenko. Different approach-
es to the China issue may explain some of the twists and turns in Soviet policy
and behavior since Brezhnev's call in March 1982 for improved relations and
his affirmation that China had a "socialist system":
? Polemical attacks on China were dropped from Soviet media in September
1982 shortly before Brezhnev's death that November, and Andropov
reaffirmed Moscow's interest in better relations with China in a plenum
speech 10 days after becoming general secretary. Andropov referred to
China as "our great neighbor" and said that the USSR pays "great
attention to every positive response" to Soviet efforts to "overcome the
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inertia of prejudices." The November 1982 speech did not criticize China,
and all Soviet leaders refrained from direct polemical attacks on Beijing
during Andropov's tenure, although Soviet media did resume lower level
criticism by the end of 1983-at a time when Andropov's terminal illness
may have reduced his influence.
? Chernenko was less positive than Andropov in his first public remarks on
China after becoming general secretary in February 1984. In his 2 March
USSR Supreme Soviet election speech, he affirmed an interest in improving
relations but noted that "differences on a number of questions of principle"
remain and ruled out any agreements that would "prejudice the interests of
third countries." Moreover, while stating that "the Soviet Union stands for
the level of contacts being raised," he added that this should take place "to
the extent acceptable to both sides."
? By April 1984 low-level criticism of China was becoming more serious, and
on 4 May Moscow released an authoritative TASS statement excoriating
Chinese "military provocations" on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
? An effort at higher level contacts was aborted in May, when Moscow
postponed a scheduled visit to Beijing of First Deputy Premier Arkhipov-a
move seemingly designed to demonstrate displeasure with Chinese policies
toward Indochina and the United States.
? In June Chernenko publicly attacked Chinese policy in Southeast Asia
during visits by Vietnamese and Lao party leaders, condemning Beijing in
stronger terms than had been used by any Soviet leader since October 1982.
? By the fall of 1984 Soviet media had toned down their attacks on China, al-
though criticism still appeared in scholarly journals.
? Chernenko was also milder in his rhetoric in remarks during a visit of a
Mongolian delegation in October. In his first comment on China since June,
using the most positive language that he employed during his tenure as
general secretary, he stressed the importance of normalization of relations
and asserted that "we always keep open the door to constructive talks with
China." His only criticism of China was implied when he stressed that
socialist countries must "hold clear-cut class positions in international
affairs."
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? Gromyko, who has a consistent record of temperate formulations on China
in recent years, was even more positive in his 6 November address marking
the anniversary of the October Revolution. He stated that the Soviet Union's
commitment to "normalizing and improving" relations with China "has
repeatedly been confirmed by us, even at the very highest level," and added
that "we consider a continuation of contacts between representatives of the
two countries useful and important."
? In December the Arkhipov visit to Beijing was revived amid signs that
Beijing was attempting to mollify Moscow on issues that had led to
postponement of the visit the previous spring. Both Beijing and Hanoi
renewed publicity for clashes on the Sino-Vietnamese border as Vietnam's
dry season offensive in Cambodia began, but the level of Beijing's protests
was distinctly lower and their tone more restrained than they had been the
previous April. While Arkhipov was in Beijing in late December, Beijing
conspicuously avoided previously routine denunciations of Moscow on the
anniversary of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan, marking the occasion
only in early January.
? From late January to mid-February 1985, Soviet media increased criticism
of China in the wake of the visit to the PRC of Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Vessey. Much of the Soviet criticism was pegged to
a Kabul protest about alleged Chinese involvement in the Afghan conflict. A
14 February article in Izvestiyk by "I. Alekseyev" also complained about the
"ambiguous" Chinese leadership approach to the Soviet Union. It noted that
Beijing had "verbally" declared its desire to normalize relations and allowed
limited progress but was raising preconditions, had undertaken action
"harmful to the interests of world socialism," and was even posing a "threat
to the security of socialist states." The article advocated bilateral dialogue
and normalization of relations and observed: "We would like to believe that
common sense and a correct understanding of the Chinese people's interests
will sooner or later gain the upper hand in Beijing."
? The last speech attributed to Chernenko-a 22 February USSR Supreme
Soviet election address that was read for him because he was too ill to ap-
pear-was positive about the need for normalization of relations and noted
there should be "efforts by both sides," but again pointed to "serious
political differences" dividing Moscow and Beijing.
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Beijing
In marking Chernenko's death and welcoming Gorbachev's succession, Beijing
violated strictures against confusing party and state relations with Moscow
that it had scrupulously observed for nearly two decades. Taken together,
these departures from precedents and practices rigidly observed in the past ap-
pear intended to convey dramatically a new Chinese assessment of the
potential for fundamental change in Sino-Soviet ties.
? Beijing extended congratulations to Gorbachev on his succession as CPSU
general secretary. The congratulations were extended not only by a Foreign
Ministry. spokesman on 12 March, according to Xinhua that day, but also
personally by several Chinese leaders. As recorded by Xinhua; these include
National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Peng Zhen in his condolence
call at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing on the 12th, Vice Premier Li Peng di-
rectly to Gorbachev in Moscow, and CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang,
as conveyed to Gorbachev by Li Peng. At the time of Andropov's and
Chernenko's successions, Beijing observed constraints in place since the
break in CPC-CPSU ties in 1967 and did not extend congratulations of any
sort-either from party or state spokesmen.
? On meeting Gorbachev at the reception for foreign delegations attending
Chernenko's funeral on the 13th, according to Xinhua the same day, Li
Peng wished the USSR well in "socialist construction." In his meeting with
Gorbachev the next day, by Xinhua's account, Li described China and the
USSR as "great neighbors and socialist countries." These references to the
"socialist" character of the Soviet Union are the first in authoritative
Chinese public statements in at least 18 years. The closest Beijing had come
to such an acknowledgment appeared in Xinhua's account of CPC Politburo
Standing Committee member Chen Yun's meeting with Soviet Deputy
Premier Arkhipov last December, in which Chen observed that China and
the USSR "practice economic planning and are neighbors."
? In his meeting with Gorbachev on the 14th, Li expressed Beijing's readiness
to improve relations in the "political" sphere as well as in the economic,
technical, and cultural fields. Although Beijing has routinely in the past
three years indicated a readiness to improve cooperation in these latter
fields, it has not previously done so in the "political" arena. The closest it has
come to doing so also emerged from Arkhipov's visit to China last
December, when, according to Xinhua, Premier Zhao Ziyang suggested that
"problems in the political relations" between the PRC and USSR should
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Li Peng meeting Gorbachev and Gromyko in .the Kremlin on 13 March. (Renmin
Ribao, 1 S March 1985)
"not be difficult to solve" if both sides took the same "positive" approach
that they have adopted in cooperation in other areas.
? In reporting Peng Zhen's call at the Soviet Embassy on the 12th, Xinhua's
English-language report cited the Soviet ambassador's expression of grati-
tude for Chinese congratulations to "Comrade Gorbachev." Reports on the
same event by Beijing radio and by Xinhua's Chinese service, as published in
Renmin Ribao, went even further, citing Peng Zhen himself as extending
congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Since the break in party ties,
PRC media ordinarily have shunned reference to Soviet leaders as "com-
rades," regardless of the speaker. The only known exception again emerged
from Arkhipov's visit to Beijing last December, when Chinese media
repeatedly cited Chinese leaders calling Arkhipov "comrade." Judging by
the context in which they were made, these references appeared intended to
convey Beijing's gratitude for Arkhipov's contributions to the PRC's
development as supervisor of Soviet aid to China during the heyday of Sino-
Soviet cooperation in the 1950's.
? The condolence message sent by President Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen on
behalf of the NPC on the 11th, Peng Zhen's remarks in his call at the Soviet
Embassy and comments by the Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 11th and
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12th, as reported by Xinhua, all praised Chernenko for his work as an
"outstanding" and "supreme leader" of both the Soviet party and state. By
contrast, comparable authoritative statements had called Brezhnev "an
outstanding statesman of the Soviet Union" and Andropov "supreme leader
of the Soviet Union."
? The party newspaper Renmin Ribao on the 12th carried on its front page
pictures of both Chernenko and Gorbachev together with Xinhua's reports
on the condolence message sent by Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen and on the
CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev. NPC condolences on Brezhnev's and
Andropov's deaths and Xinhua reports on Andropov's and Chernenko's
successions were also carried on Renmin Ribao's front page, but there were
no pictures. Chernenko's picture was also framed in black=treatment that
the Chinese press normally reserves only for the CPC's own leaders and for
leaders of ruling foreign communist parties.
These departures from longstanding Chinese practice indicate that Beijing has
begun publicly to apply to Moscow some of the protocol trappings that Beijing
ordinarily confers to socialist countries, but other signs suggest that China has
not yet resumed party links with the CPSU. Li. Xiannian and Peng Zhen's
condolence message, for example, was sent only in the name of the NPC to the
USSR Supreme Soviet and not also in the name of the CPC Central
Committee, as was the practice before 1967. Chinese media also were
scrupulous about referring to Li Peng as head of a Chinese government
delegation. The PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao on
16 March cited a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment, not reported
in PRC media, that Hu's greetings to Gorbachev as conveyed by Li do not
mean that CPC-CPSU relations have been formally resumed.
The highly suggestive changes in . Chinese practice do, however, appear
designed to convey to Moscow the potential for fundamental change in Sino-
Soviet ties. The gestures were complemented by other Chinese signals in the
same direction. At no time in statements and comment on the Soviet
leadership succession did Beijing raise the three "obstacles" that it long has
insisted block fundamental change in bilateral relations-Moscow's military
buildup along the Soviet and Mongolian border with China, the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnamese actions in
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and Xinhua's report on Gorbachev's plenum speech, on Renmin Ribao's
front page. (Renmin Ribao, 12 March 1985)
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