GORBACHEV TAKES CHARGE AT CPSU PLENUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940026-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 May 1985
FB 85-10018
Gorbachev Takes Charge at CPSU Plenum
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This analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in
foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without
coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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Gorbachev Takes Charge at CPSU Plenum
The CPSU Central Committee plenum on 23 April provided an
impressive demonstration of the political strength of new General
Secretary Gorbachev. He brought his closest associates in the
Secretariat into full Politburo membership and used his plenum
speech to lay out an economic program that challenges the ministe-
rial bureaucracy and promises a shift of power to the local level. He
also called for a shakeup of party officials at all levels in
preparation for the next party congress-scheduled by the plenum
for February 1986. In his remarks on foreign policy, Gorbachev was
sharply critical of U.S. arms control policies, but affirmed Mos-
cow's readiness to improve relations with Washington.
Leadership Changes
The personnel changes enacted at the plenum greatly strengthened Gorba-
chev's voting support in the Politburo and altered the power relationships in
the Secretariat, putting the general secretary in an excellent position to
influence the composition of the party congress and the new Central Commit-
tee it will elect. The additions made to the Politburo were the most extensive
since 1973. Three leaders who gained their current positions under Andropov
were elected as full members of the Politburo: Cadres Secretary Yegor
Ligachev, 65; economics Secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov, 56; and KGB chief
Viktor Chebrikov, 62. In addition, Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov, 74, was
made a candidate member of the Politburo, and RSFSR Agriculture Minister
V. P. Nikonov, 56, was brought into the Secretariat.
The large number of vacancies in the Politburo gave Gorbachev an unusual
opportunity to put his stamp on the composition of the leadership. The new
promotions restore the size of the Politburo to 13 members-its minimum
membership from 1971 until Andropov's death. Under Chernenko no new
members were added to the Politburo to replace Andropov or Defense
Minister Ustinov, who died in 1984.
Gorbachev showed considerable strength by winning the promotion of his
allies Ligachev and Ryzhkov-the most junior members of the Secretariat-
to full Politburo membership. The feat was all the more impressive because
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neither had been a candidate member-a break with practice since 1973 when
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Grechko were brought
directly into the Politburo.
Ryzhkov and Ligachev have been closely associated with Gorbachev. Both
worked directly under him in the Secretariat and have voiced views similar to
his on economic issues. Since Gorbachev became party leader they have
become more prominent, most notably at the late March session of the
RSFSR Supreme Soviet, where they played roles normally reserved for
Politburo members.
The promotion of Ligachev and Ryzhkov should result in a new distribution of
responsibilities among the senior secretaries. Ligachev is likely to continue to
supervise cadres, but may be given additional responsibilities such as ideolo-
gy-a key portfolio previously held by Chernenko and Gorbachev. Ligachev
has some previous experience in ideology, having served briefly as a deputy
head of the CPSU Propaganda Department for the RSFSR from 1961 to 1962
and again in 1965. That he will play a specially important role in the
Gorbachev regime was suggested by his strikingly high status in the first post-
plenum lineup. On May Day he stood seventh-after Gorbachev, Tikhonov,
Gromyko, Grishin, Romanov, and Solomentsev, but ahead of Aliyev and
Vorotnikov, who had become Politburo members earlier. Chebrikov and
Ryzhkov, on the other hand, stood last, as new members should.
The role of the other new senior secretary, Ryzhkov, is somewhat clearer. He
will most likely be the senior secretary for industrial affairs, jumping ahead of
longtime industry Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh, 60, who is only a candidate
Politburo member. His promotion would also appear to dilute the authority of
the only other secretary who is also a full member of the Politburo, Grigoriy
Romanov, who has played a role in industrial management. If Romanov is not
given new responsibilities-such as ideology-his role could be reduced to
overseeing security matters and defense industries.
The addition of Nikonov to the Secretariat-presumably to become secretary
for agriculture-appears to have been a move by Gorbachev to turn his own
portfolio over to a favorite while ignoring higher level candidates. Nikonov,
who was far down the line among qualified agricultural officials, had
prospered earlier under Gorbachev's tenure as agriculture secretary: In
August 1979 he left his post as first secretary of tiny Mari oblast to become
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Viktor Nikonov, new
CPSU secretary.
USSR deputy agriculture minister, and in January
1983 he became agriculture minister for the whole
RSFSR. It is unclear whether Nikonov, as a junior
secretary, will work under the supervision of Liga-
chev, who has been overseeing agriculture in recent
weeks, or directly under Gorbachev.
The relationship of Chebrikov and Sokolov to Gorba-
chev is less clear. Like Ligachev and Ryzhkov,
however, Chebrikov was an Andropov appointee and
may also be a Gorbachev ally. Sokolov's advance-
ment only to candidate membership in the Politburo
suggests that he carries little political weight in the leadership. Since Ligachev
and Ryzhkov were advanced directly to full Politburo membership, a similar
move could have been made for Sokolov, giving him equal status to the head of
the KGB and that held by the late Defense Minister Ustinov.
Economic Program
Gorbachev's report to the plenum focused mainly on economic policy and
called for immediate and concrete changes in planning and administration to
improve economic performance-which he called "the main issue now." The
thrust of his statements was that the central ministerial bureaucracy must be
changed and its powers reduced in order to stimulate local initiative and
creativity and boost productivity. He sharply criticized past inaction on
economic problems, stating that the need for better management methods had
not been recognized early enough and there had been "no persistence" in
working out and adopting "major measures" to improve the economy.
Gorbachev laid out a number of specific proposals for improving economic
performance:
? Restructure ministerial work. The general secretary called for "restructur-
ing the work of the upper echelons" of economic administration, implying
the need for reorganizing ministries or at least reducing their powers and
changing their methods of operation. He stated that some administrative
units that have turned into "obstacles" to progress must be eliminated and
the state apparatus simplified, and he criticized heads of some ministries for
maintaining "old approaches." He indicated that some ministerial preroga-
tives should be reduced. For example, he urged limitation of central organs'
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practice of issuing "instructions" interpreting party and state decrees, be-
cause, he said, these instructions are sometimes used "capriciously" to
constrain enterprises.
? Change planning procedures. Implying that planning is hampering growth,
he argued that it must be changed into an "active lever" for boosting
production. To this end, he insisted that the number of plan indicators sent
down to enterprises must be reduced and that incentives must play a bigger
role.
? Expand local rights. He advocated expansion of the rights of plants and
also of local government organs in managing economic matters. Local
organs, he declared, should have "full responsibility" for questions in their
jurisdiction and should not buck local problems to the center.
? Increase priority for machine building. He called for sharply accelerating
the replacement of old equipment and the development of new technology in
order to spur economic growth. He also insisted that the next five-year plan
must increase the rate of growth of machine building by 50 to 100 percent.
? Reorganize agricultural organs. Gorbachev indicated that he intends to
strengthen the agroindustrial organs created by the May 1982 CPSU
plenum by expanding their authority over more agricultural and agriculture-
related agencies. Declaring that the management of the agroindustrial
complex "needs further improvement," he called for measures to "make it
possible to manage, plan, and finance the agroindustrial complex as a single
entity at all levels."
Gorbachev's proposals are limited in scope, but they are fairly concrete and
will provoke resistance since they encroach on the powers and prerogatives of
the entrenched central bureaucracy. Gorbachev's intention to frontally assault
the bureaucracy was clear in his first major domestic policy statement after
becoming general secretary-at a special gathering of managers of plants and
associations on 8 April-when he invited local managers to criticize the
existing system.' He endorsed the managers' criticism of higher organs and
their proposals for decentralizing powers in both his closing speech at the
conference and at the plenum. His plenum speech also repeatedly cited
sentiments expressed at the conference, which, he claimed, had "convinced"
him that action is needed to improve management and reduce excessive
regulation from above.
'Gorbachev's 8 April speech is discussed in the FBIS Trends of 17 April 1985, pages 19-22.
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Gorbachev visits Moscow factory. (Soviet television, 17 April 1985)
The Gorbachev regime is conveying the impression that the general secretary's
proposals have strong backing at the top levels of the party. As if to underscore
the clout behind his program, Gorbachev asserted in his plenum speech that
the Politburo had "unanimously" concluded that action is needed. Politburo
support for Gorbachev on this issue also was suggested in a 22 April Lenin
Day speech by First Deputy Premier Aliyev, the top government economic
administrator below Premier Tikhonov. Aliyev argued for reorganization of
the work of the central economic ministries and agencies, for more "flexible
combination of centralism and autonomy" in economic management, and for
greater reliance on economic levers. Prior to the plenum, Pravda on 19 April
reported that the Politburo, in response to the 8 April conference, had ordered
Gosplan and other agencies to work out measures to implement the managers'
proposals, especially on reducing the number of planning indicators sent down
to plants.
Before the plenum speech, Gorbachev had already demonstrated his determi-
nation to make changes by taking action in the sphere directly under his
control-the Central Committee apparat-where he removed two Central
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Committee economic supervisors. The longtime heads of the Central Commit-
tee construction and machine building departments were both replaced just
before Gorbachev sharply criticized these two sectors in his plenum speech.
The head of the Construction Department since 1969, 65-year-old Ivan
Dmitriyev, was transferred to RSFSR deputy premier in late March, and
Pravda on 20 April reported that Boris Yeltsin, 54, had been released as
Sverdlovsk first secretary to become head of the department. On 19 April
Pravda reported that 71-year-old Vasiliy Frolov, head of the Machine
Building Department since 1958, was retiring.
The new construction head appears to share Gorbachev's disdain for the
Moscow bureaucracy. Yeltsin's articles in the central press have sometimes
expressed local leaders' frustration at the inefficiency and lack of coordination
of central ministries. For example, in a July 1983 Kommunist article, he
complained that construction ministries were so uncoordinated in managing
the crucial gas pipeline that his local obkom had to step in and exercise
"leadership over the work of all these state organs" to get tasks accomplished.
Shortly before his new appointment, in a 7 April television interview, he
criticized local managers who turn to central organs for help instead of
resolving problems locally.
Renovation of Party Leadership
Gorbachev has clearly signaled his impatience to change things not only in the
economic sphere but also throughout the party apparat. By calling the plenum
only weeks after taking office and setting the date for the next party congress,
he initiated a process that could considerably change the character of the
party. Toward this end, he used his plenum speech to demand an acceleration
in the renovation of party leadership at all levels.
The long lead time for the congress, which is set to open on 25 February 1986,
may have been determined in part in order to allow adequate discussion of the
new party program that the congress will adopt. According to the Pravda
version of his plenum speech, Gorbachev announced that the program would
be presented to a future plenum and then released for broad public debate.
The date for the October 1961 congress, which adopted the previous program,
was set the previous January and a draft of the program was released in July.
Under Brezhnev, congresses were announced from three to eight months in
advance.
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The schedule will also provide a considerable time for the party election
campaign, which Gorbachev indicated will be used to reshape the party
leadership. He stated that the "leading party organs" elected at local
conferences and congresses will need to be "replenished with fresh forces" and
called upon high-level officials to play a "direct role" in election meetings,
even at low levels, in order to ensure a critical review of leaders and to fully
address any shortcomings.
Gorbachev went much further in stressing the need for a critical review of par-
ty personnel during the elections than Brezhnev had in an equivalent speech to
the June 1980 plenum that scheduled the 26th Congress. Brezhnev had
balanced his call for a review of the party's "omissions and shortcomings"
with instructions to consider also "what is positive" in its work. The same con-
trast is evident in the resolutions on the congresses adopted by the two
plenums. This year, the resolution concluded with a lengthy section directing
that the election meetings make a "profound and comprehensive" examination
of the party's work, discuss "in detail" questions of party management, and
take a "self-critical approach" in evaluating party organs. In 1980, the
equivalent resolution provided no comparable guidelines for the election
meetings.
Gorbachev called for faster replacement of ineffective leaders and more
aggressive advancement of new, younger officials. He acknowledged the need
First woman president of the
Ukraine- Valentina Shev-
chenko-elected 27 March
1985.
to ensure the "correct combination of experi-
enced and young workers," but he leaned in the
direction of youth, saying that there must be no
"stagnation" in advancing cadres and that the
party must promote women and young workers
"with greater boldness." He criticized older
officials who are lax in implementing new
policies and tolerate shortcomings.
Since Gorbachev became general secretary,
increased attention has been given to a new
personnel policy, adopted in October 1984, that
calls for higher leadership standards and re-
placement of those who fail to meet them.'
Aliyev's Lenin Day speech also emphasized the
need for increasing the pace of personnel
changes. He indicated that the party must
2 For a more extensive discussion of personnel policies see the FBIS Trends of 10 April 1985,
pages 12-15.
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"decisively get rid" of ineffective leaders and "be bolder in advancing young
people." In contrast to Gorbachev and to the balanced formula used under
Chernenko, Aliyev failed to mention any need to balance promotions with
retention of experienced workers.
Gorbachev coupled his call for faster personnel changes with a demand for in-
creased discipline. He said that "we will not tolerate" an attitude of "mutual
forgiveness" where managers overlook "indiscipline in workers" and workers
in turn ignore managerial "blunders." He made it clear that enforcement of
discipline should extend to the party, stating that "not a single party
organization, not a single worker" should be exempt.
Foreign Policy
In his report to the plenum Gorbachev criticized U.S. foreign and arms control
policy more sharply than in any of his previous statements since becoming the
top Soviet leader. At the same time, he reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to
promoting East-West detente and its readiness to improve relations with
Washington and seek mutually acceptable arms control agreements. His
mixture of criticism of the United States and advocacy of detente seemed
intended both to assure the party that Soviet interests will be guarded and to
defend the Soviet rationale for continued dialogue with the Reagan
Administration.
Gorbachev toughened his depiction of U.S. policy, leveling a number of
attacks explicitly against the United States:
? For the first time, he directly accused Washington of violating the U.S.-So-
viet accord reached in January on the linking of space, strategic, and
intermediate-range nuclear weapons issues at the Geneva talks. He cited
alleged U.S. refusal to discuss the question of preventing "the spread of the
arms race into space" as the prime indicator of U.S. violation of the January
accord.
? He charged that the United States is not seeking an accord at the Geneva
talks. Maintaining that the first round of the talks "provides grounds for
saying that Washington is not holding to a course directed at accord with the
Soviet Union," he averred that the Administration's "haste" in rejecting
Soviet proposals demonstrated U.S. "unwillingness to steer" negotiations
toward "reasonable results."
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? Elaborating on themes he articulated in his 23 March meeting with
representatives of the Socialist International and in his 8 April Pravda
interview, Gorbachev placed primary responsibility on "U.S. ruling circles"
for creating an "alarming and dangerous" international situation. He
accused Washington of "sabotaging" disarmament and of "trampling on"
the interests of other countries, the traditions of international relations, and
existing treaties and agreements.
In his critique of U.S. policy, Gorbachev appeared to reflect concern that the
Geneva talks might be used to damage Soviet interests and as a justification
for funding U.S. weapons programs. He warned that Moscow would not
encourage a course that indulges in the "hypocrisy" and public deceit of
combining an arms race and disarmament talks, and he underlined his point
with a cryptic reference to the last round of negotiations that were aborted by
a Soviet walkout in 1983: "We would not want a repetition of the sorry
experience of the previous talks." Gorbachev had raised similar concerns in his
28 March reply to German peace activists, charging that statements from
"high-ranking U.S. representatives" had created the impression that they
"need talks as a screen" for carrying through their military programs.
Despite these sharp words about U.S. policy, however, Gorbachev continued to
emphasize both the necessity for improved U.S.-Soviet relations and the
persistence of Soviet efforts to that end. In language similar to his 8 April
Pravda interview, the Soviet leader declared that confrontation was not a
"fatal inevitability" between the Soviet Union and the United States. Rather,
he asserted, the "most rational" course is for both sides to seek to "smooth re-
lations" and "build a bridge of cooperation." In regard to the Geneva talks,
moreover, he pledged that the Soviet Union would "work persistently for
concrete, mutually acceptable agreements," and he asserted that the Soviet
Union stood ready to reach such accords.
Gorbachev's defense of Soviet positions and criticism of Washington is
consistent with Moscow's current tactical approach to relations with the
United States. In statements calculated to affect world opinion, Gorbachev
has taken the lead in seeking to promote opposition to U.S. policies, especially
among U.S. allies, by encouraging doubts about Washington's willingness to
seek compromise solutions while insisting that Moscow is being flexible at the
talks? The same approach was taken in the annual 22 April Lenin Day
' For more detailed discussion of Gorbachev's earlier efforts to intensify public pressures on
the Administration's arms control posture in Geneva, see the FBIS Trends of 3 April 1985,
pages 1-3, and 10 April 1985, pages 1-5.
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address delivered by CPSU Politburo member Geydar Aliyev. While claiming
that Moscow was "unswervingly" pursuing a policy of dialogue and coopera-
tion with all states, Aliyev also used strong language in accusing "aggressive
circles, first and foremost in the United States," of exacerbating the interna-
tional situation, "pushing mankind toward the edge of the abyss," and
elevating "state terrorism" to the status of official policy.
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