CHINESE PARTY CHIEF HU YAOBANG SEEKS TO MEND KOREAN FENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940027-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2010/06/07: CIA-RDP87T00495R000900940027-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 May 1985
DPRK-PRC-USSR
Chinese party leader Hu Yaobang's "unofficial" visit to North
Korea appears to have been part of an effort to shore up Beijing's re-
lations with Pyongyang, perhaps because of Chinese concern over
the dramatic improvement in Pyongyang's relations with Moscow
during the past year. Pyongyang has not reciprocated Beijing's
gestures, however, signaling instead that its ties with Moscow
continue to develop at Chinese expense.
Chinese Party Chief Hu Yaobang Seeks To Mend Korean Fences
Hu Yaobang visited the North Korean border city of Sinuiju from 4 to 6 May.
The visit is his third to North Korea: he accompanied Deng Xiaoping on a be-
latedly publicized visit in 1982 and made an official visit in May last year.
Kim 11-song hosted a banquet for the Chinese delegation on the first day of the
visit, and the two sides held talks on the 5th and 6th. As with Kim's unofficial
visit to Beijing last November, both sides reported Hu's visit only after it end-
ed and provided little of the detail or color that typically marks media
treatment of "official" high-level exchanges.
In line with past practice for meetings between Kim I1-song and his Chinese
counterparts, both sides reported that there was a "complete identity" of views
on "all questions" at the talks. However, there is evidence that the two sides
were unable to find common ground on all international issues. In describing
Hu's talks with Kim 11-song, both PRC and DPRK media omitted the usual
reference to "international" issues, noting instead that the two sides had
discussed "a series of important matters of mutual concern." This atypical
formulation follows the public display of Soviet-North Korean unity during
DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam's visit to the Soviet Union last
month, a development that may have made it difficult for Pyongyang and
Beijing to cast Chinese and North Korean foreign policies in the usual terms
of overall agreement.'
'Kim Yong-nam's visit to Moscow is discussed in the Trends of 1 May 1985, pages 5-8.
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FBIS TRENDS CONFIDENTIAL
15 May 1985
Chinese Warmth PRC media reporting on Hu's visit conveyed more
warmth than emerged from Kim 11-song's trip to
Beijing last November or from Hu's "official" trip to Pyongyang last year.
According to Beijing radio's report on 7 May, Hu stated at the banquet on the
4th that relations between the two countries are as close as "lips and teeth," a
formulation conspicuously absent from authoritative Chinese characteriza-
tions of Sino-Korean relations over the past year. Xinhua accounts of the
banquet did not include these remarks, but did note that both Hu and Kim
spoke of the "militant friendship" between the two sides. The Xinhua Chinese
version, for domestic consumers, went on to describe their relations as
"cemented with blood."
These more effusive characterizations of Sino-Korean relations, once standard
Chinese fare, began to reappear with some regularity in PRC media in late
April. They have, however, been confined to broadcasts for domestic Chinese
audiences and have not been included in English-language accounts for
overseas consumers. A 30 April Xinhua domestic account of a PLA banquet
for a visiting Korean army art troupe, for example, reported the Chinese
speaker referring to the two sides as "brothers and comrades-in-arms." The
same troupe was addressed by CPC Politburo member Yang Shangkun on
3 May. According to a Xinhua Chinese account, Yang described the two sides
as having an "intimate militant friendship cemented with blood." The Xinhua
account merely noted that Yang "spoke highly" of Sino-Korean friendship.
Pyongyang failed to acknowledge any of the warmer Chinese language used to
mark Hu's visit. DPRK reportage on the visit itself was confined to a 7 May
account which, like the reporting on Kim 11-song's visit to Beijing last year,
provided no details of the banquet speeches. Hu's visit was mentioned in a
10 May talk on Sino-North Korean relations on Pyongyang radio, which was
virtually identical to one aired last year, a few days after Kim's visit to China.
Pyongyang Uses WW II Date To Underscore Ties to Moscow
Three days after Hu's departure, Pyongyang used the 40th anniversary of the
end of World War II in Europe to focus public attention on Soviet-Korean
friendship. The leadership turnout for the anniversary meetings was larger
and at a markedly higher level than it was for the 30th anniversary in 1975.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 May 1985
Reiterating themes that Pyongyang has stressed over the past year, comment
on the anniversary strongly backed USSR foreign policy against U.S.
"imperialism," lavishly praised Soviet support for North Korea, and hailed the
Red Army as Korea's "liberator" from Japan.
Pyongyang's closer ties to Moscow were highlighted by both sides through an
exchange of air force squadrons to mark the anniversary. Although neither
side depicted the exchange as a demonstration of their military collaboration,
Pyongyang radio reported a speech by the Soviet ambassador at an 8 May ral-
ly in which he extensively praised the Warsaw Pact and argued that the
"strength" of Soviet policy rests on its "close unity" with socialist countries.
This discussion of military cooperation among the socialist countries reinforces
the view that their "military strength" is needed to restrain "imperialism"-a
recurrent theme in North Korean media since last summer.
Kim Chong-il The World War II anniversary celebrations again
underscored the link between Kim Chong-il-Kim 11-
song's son and heir apparent-and improving USSR-DPRK relations. North
Korean anniversary reporting also implicitly connected the younger Kim with
the military aspects of Soviet-North Korean relations. Kim led the Korean
leadership turnout to the Soviet ambassador's banquet on 9 May. According
to DPRK media, he received a gift from the Soviet Defense Ministry,
delivered by the head of the visiting Soviet air force squadron. No gifts were
reported for any other DPRK leaders, including Kim 11-song. At the 9 May
rally for the Soviet pilots, according to a Pyongyang radio report the same
day, the Korean speaker claimed that the mutual visits by the squadrons were
occurring "amid the great interest and consideration" of Kim Chong-il, with
whom he identified a "period of new efflorescence" in Soviet-Korean relations.
While highlighting Kim Chong-il's connection with the USSR, Pyongyang has
been playing down his role in relations with China. This shift reverses the pat-
tern of attention given to his unofficial visit to the PRC in June 1983, which
Pyongyang had previously portrayed as a major event cementing the relation-
ship. For example, the 10 May Pyongyang radio talk on Sino-Korean relations
that mentioned Hu Yaobang's journey to Sinuiju-otherwise identical to a
parallel talk after Kim 11-song's China visit last year-reduced the signifi-
cance of the younger Kim's role. Last year the radio described the significance
of his 1983 visit in "inheriting and developing the traditional friendship,
revolutionary unity, and comradely fraternity between the parties and peoples
... generation after generation." By contrast, the recent commentary noted
only that Kim's visit provided "a firm foundation for inheriting and developing
the glorious tradition of Korea-China friendship over generations."
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FBIS TRENDS CONFIDENTIAL
15 May 1985
Similarly, DPRK media reporting of Kim's recent dealings with the Chinese
has appeared distinctly less cordial than his contacts with the Soviet Union. In
late April, Kim hosted a dinner for a Chinese delegation led by head of the
CPC International Department Qian Liren. Chinese media reported that Kim
had a "friendly talk" with the delegation and that Qian presented a gift to his
host, but DPRK media versions of the banquet made no reference either to
talks between the two sides or to a gift. By contrast, a Soviet delegation led by
0. Rakhmanin, first vice director of the CPSU International Department, was
received by Kim Chong-il together with Kim 11-song, and Pyongyang reported
the guests presenting gifts to both father and son. The younger Kim also
hosted a banquet for the Soviet delegation. Media accounts of that banquet
precisely paralleled those reporting the banquet for the Chinese delegation,
but the report on the dinner for Rakhmanin was published in a more
prominent position in Nodong Sinmun than that for Qian. (u/FOLIO)
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