NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS FOR THE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000901210014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Nicaragua: Prospects
for the Insurgency
Key Judgments
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NOTbR&
MASTER FILE COPY
90 NOT GIVE OUT
0R h1i A RK ON
SNIE 83.3-4-85
July 1985
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SN I E 83.3-4-85
NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS
FOR THE INSURGENCY
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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SCOPE NOTE
The prospective renewal of US financial support for the major anti-
Sandinista insurgent groups, along with the ability to share intelligence
on Sandinista military subjects, is likely to provide a major boost to
insurgent force expansion and effectiveness in the coming months. At
the same time, however, Managua has been gradually increasing its own
counterinsurgency capabilities, with significant Soviet and Cuban sup-
port, and it has demonstrated greater willingness to attack anti-
Sandinista forces inside Honduras and Costa Rica. As a result of these
trends, there is likely to be a continued escalation of the conflict unless
outside pressures force a cease-fire and movement toward political
accommodation between the two sides.
This Estimate examines the prospects for the insurgency over the
next year or so, looking first at recent trends in the conflict and the for-
eign support provided to both sides. In looking at near-term prospects
for the insurgency and the Sandinista response, it identifies alternative
scenarios, as well as the likely future Soviet and Cuban role in the
conflict. Finally, it discusses the impact of the insurgency on Sandinista
policy, as well as the regional impact and the implications for the
United States.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Nicaragua's anti-Sandinista guerrillas have evolved into a relatively
large and viable rural insurgent force which, although currently not
regime threatening, has forced the Sandinistas to commit an increasing
amount of resources to contain it. Guerrilla forces have grown to over
15,000 combatants, and we believe they will continue to grow over the
next year. This force growth will be assisted by the resumption of US
aid and by the fact that the guerrillas have demonstrated significant
staying power in the field. Thus, the Sandinistas face the prospect of a
prolonged and damaging war with little end in sight.
Nevertheless, the insurgents continue to be hampered by a number
of major weaknesses that limit their ability to threaten the Sandinista re-
gime seriously. Their failure to develop an integrated political-military
strategy that would attract widespread popular support for their cause
remains a key weakness, and thus far they have been unable to build an
urban network able to convert passive antiregime sentiment into active
support for the insurgency. The lack of effective cooperation between
insurgent groups has precluded the creation of a viable multifront war
and has allowed the Sandinistas to concentrate their military resources
on the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) in the north, which
Managua considers the most serious threat. Militarily, the FDN remains
the largest, best equipped, and most proficient of the insurgent groups.
However, it continues to suffer from the lingering image-especially
internationally-that it is an extension of former President Somoza's
National Guard.
For their part, the Sandinistas have substantially improved their
counterinsurgency capabilities in the last year, increasing defense
expenditures from 25 percent to over 40 percent of the national budget
and expanding the numbers of frontline units devoted to the war. The
special counterinsurgency battalions, which the Sandinistas are now
employing to spearhead the war, have been generally successful in their
efforts to neutralize insurgent forces in the south and to contain the ex-
pansion of guerrilla operations in the northwest. Despite tactical
improvements, the Sandinista Army continues to be plagued by com-
mand and control problems, inadequate training, and limited close air
support, as well as uneven leadership and combat performance among
units. Moreover, shortages of food, medicine, and ammunition continue
to cause morale problems and desertions, especially among the new
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conscripts, who form the bulk of the frontline counterinsurgency
battalions.
We believe the level of fighting in Nicaragua will continue to
escalate over the next year, although neither side is likely to gain a stra-
tegic advantage despite improvement in the capabilities of both. The
insurgents will probably continue to pursue a war of attrition, emphasiz-
ing mobility, hit-and-run tactics, and attacks against "soft" targets.
They may also succeed in a few spectacular sabotage attacks to provide
a psychological boost, but they are unlikely to attempt more than a few
major operations because of continued logistic problems. The insurgents
probably will expand their areas of operations and improve tactical
coordination between the various groups, although they are unlikely to
create an effective two-front war over the next year. Nor are they likely
to create an effective urban support network to significantly increase
their operations in more populated areas. They probably could not hold
a major town for more than a short period of time, and any attempt to
establish a "liberated zone" would be difficult to sustain logistically
without considerable outside support and would pose tactical risks for
the insurgents.
Sandinista military strategy will probably continue to focus on
containing the FDN in the north and neutralizing Eden Pastora's forces
and Indian groups in the south and east, respectively. The Sandinistas
are likely to launch a major new counterinsurgency effort late this year
in order to weaken insurgent forces and block infiltration of personnel
and supplies into Nicaragua from Honduras and Costa Rica. This will
increase the probability of more frequent clashes with Honduran and
Costa Rican security forces. We believe that Nicaragua will remain
wary of launching a large-scale cross-border offensive for fear of
provoking a potential US military response, but Managua may be
willing to provoke small-scale clashes with Honduras and Costa Rica in
an effort to pressure them into reducing support for the insurgents. The
Sandinistas are well aware that use of Honduras and, to a lesser extent,
Costa Rica remains critical to the insurgency.
Managua will try to exert diplomatic as well as military pressure on
Tegucigalpa and San Jose. The Sandinistas will attempt to attain a
diplomatic solution-preferably in the form of bilateral deals or,
alternatively, within a Contadora regional agreement-that would
result in the cessation of Honduran and Costa Rican support to the
insurgents. So far, however, Managua has been unwilling to make
significant concessions in the Contadora negotiations that would threat-
en its consolidation and seriously undercut broader Sandinista
objectives.
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We believe it is less likely that the continued escalation of the
Nicaraguan conflict over the next year will result in a major shift in the
strategic balance to either side. A critical variable will be the degree of
popular support the Sandinistas or the insurgents are able to mobilize to
their advantage. Another critical factor is the amount of foreign support
that each side is able to obtain to sustain its efforts. In particular,
insurgent loss of support bases in Honduras would be likely to result in a
significant setback.
We believe the Soviets will continue to provide the necessary
military and economic support to sustain the Sandinista regime despite
the increased costs this is likely to entail. This may include more tanks
and new air defense missiles, and we cannot rule out the delivery of
L-39 or other subsonic jet fighter aircraft in the coming year. Moscow
will continue to maintain a low profile in Nicaragua, however, prefer-
ring that the Cubans play a more direct role in the counterinsurgency
effort. If the security situation in Nicaragua were to deteriorate
significantly, Cuba would be likely to commit additional military
advisers who might assume a more direct combat role. However, we do
not believe Havana would risk the threat of a possible US military
response against either Cuba or Nicaragua by sending Cuban combat
units to fight against anti-Sandinista guerrillas within the next year or
so.
We believe that the continued escalation of the fighting in
Nicaragua will place greater strains on the Sandinista leadership while
posing additional problems for the United States and the region.
Managua may take greater risks of provoking a US response by sending
forces more frequently across the border in an attempt to force Costa
Rica and Honduras into either a bilateral agreement with Managua or
international supervision of their frontiers. Internally, forthcoming
elections in both Honduras and Costa Rica may impel both govern-
ments to impose greater limitations on anti-Sandinista force activity
before the end of the year, particularly if the insurgent presence grows
substantially. Finally, the continued buildup of Nicaragua's military
strength and greater Cuban involvement in the war effort is likely to
further upset the regional military balance and complicate US force
planning. Honduras and Costa Rica, although encouraged by prospec-
tive renewal of US funding of the insurgents, are likely to seek a firmer
US commitment to their defense and a clearer definition of US policy
regarding the future of the Sandinista regime.
We judge that the insurgency will remain a major obstacle to the
Sandinistas' full consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist one-party state. The
demands of the war and the need to maintain Western support have
forced the Sandinistas to tolerate nominal political dissent and have
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driven them to pursue negotiations with the United States and in the re-
gional context of the Contadora process. Nevertheless, the Sandinista
leaders are unlikely to make significant concessions to the domestic
opposition as long as they can count on continued Cuban and Soviet
support and are able to contain internal dissent at acceptable levels. A
further growth in the insurgency, coupled with rising military casualties
and higher economic costs, may induce the Sandinistas to accept a less
advantageous Contadora treaty. Sandinista concessions might include
nominal progress in national reconciliation while continuing to avoid
direct talks with the FDN.
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