NSDD-84 NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT FOR SCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00623R000100070027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 2, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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ADr,.NISTRAT.IVE - INTERNAL USE NLY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-162
2 August 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Chairman
SUBJECT: NSDD-84 Nondisclosure Agreement for SCI
REFERENCE: DCI Letter to Judge Clark dated 28 July 1983
1. Action Requested: None - for information only. This provides
background information on negotiations to remedy the problem which occasioned
referenced letter to Judge Clark protesting an appearance of erosion of DCI
authority resulting from planned promulgation of the nondisclosure agreement
for SCI under the terms of NSDD-84.' This suggests an approach for you to use
in your 3 August meeting with Judge Clark.
2. Background: On 28 July 1983, subsequent to receipt of your letter,
Richard Willard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, called and offered a
compromise. If the DCI would accept the wording of the nondisclosure agree-
ment (NdA) as drafted, promulgation of the NdA by the DCI would be assured.
Mr. Willard was greatly concerned that any effort to amend the NdA would
permit further efforts in the working group to weaken the agreement. The
compromise would ensure that the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)
would not appear to have usurped a DCI function regarding SCI security.
3. On 1 August 1983, Associate General Counsel, and I
visited Kenneth deGraff enrei o e Staff to discuss details of how the
NdA for SCI would be promulgated. During this meeting, Mr. deGraffenreid
agreed to propose that Judge Clark use the following language in sending the
new NdA to the DCI for promulgation:
"All NSC members have concurred in the attached Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) Nondisclosure Agreement. I have
determined that the form meets the minimum standards required by
NSDD-84 and ask that you promulgate this as the standard form for
SCI access.
All requests for deviation from the language of this form
will be sent to you for review and approval., In reviewing any
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
request for waiver, minimum standards of NSDD-84 must be applied.
Any deviation, change or waiver which you approve should be sent
to me for a determination that it complies fully with the require-
ments of NSDD-84."
4. The NdA for classified (non compartmented) information will be sent
to the Director, ISOO, for promulgation. There is no plan to give similar
authority for approving waivers or changes in the classified information NdA
to the ISOO Director. Requests for deviations will go directly to the NSC.
The DCI, therefore, will maintain his posture as the U.S. government official
with the primary responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and
methods.
5. Mr. deGraffenreid indicated that the NdA drafts (a copy of the SCI
version is attached) are now being considered by NSC members with a 5 August
deadline. Barring unforeseen problems, the agreements should be sent for
promulgation around mid-August. We should be ready to act promptly in getting
the new agreement sent to the Community. The SECOM staff and the Office of
General Counsel will begin immediately to draft a letter from you promulgating
the forms, and will add the nondisclosure agreement requirement to the DCID
(No. 1/14) which states minimum standards governing access to SCI.
6. Recommendation: In your 3 August meeting with Judge Clark, you might
express pleasure that your concerns regarding the NdA were resolved by the
staffs. You might state that the language worked out with Mr. deGraffenreid
for suggested use by Judge Clark in writing vnu will make it r1car that the
DCI's authorities remain intact.
Copy to: D/ICS w/att
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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The Director of Central intelligence
wash npon.D. 020505
2 8 JUL 1983
The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Judge Clark:
Actions being taken to implement National Security Decision Directive
No. 84 (NSDD 84) have taken a turn which I did not anticipate when the Intel-
ligence Community urged the President to adopt the Willard Report. Current
plans to implement specific provisions of the NSDD will, I believe, signi-
ficantly conflict with the responsibilities of the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) under law.
At the time NSDD 84 was promulgated, the DCI was the unquestioned
arbiter of security standards and criteria relating to intelligence sources
and methods. An SCI nondisclosure agreement (Form 4193), issued in 1981 via
the SECOM mechanism, was accepted throughout the Intelligence Community and
was signed by thousands of persons. While the agreement was tailored to con-
sider the concerns of Intelligence Community members, the basis for requiring
such an agreement as a condition precedent to SCI access clearly flowed from
the DCI's statutory responsibility. The major impetus for Form 4193 was the
Supreme Court's having upheld in the Snepp case a similar nondisclosure
agreement relating to CIA employment. am now concerned, however, that
the NSDD implementation process-may undermine the responsibility of the DCI
to protect SCI and other information relating to intelligence sources and
methods because the DC1 would no longer retain the necessary control of
security standards and criteria.
The U. S. Government generally, and the Intelligence Community in parti-
cular, have long recognized the special responsibility of the DCI, set forth
in the National Security Act of 1947, to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility has been given
effect by the establishment of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) as a
special category of intelligence data. Through Executive Orders 12333 and
12356 and a series of DCI Directives, DCI policy for SCI has been implemented
throughout the U. S. Government. The DCI Security Committee (SECOM) was
chartered to assist in carrying out these responsibilities. It did not occur
to me, nor do I believe it was the President's intent, that the NSDD would in
any way weaken or undermine the role of the DCI in such matters.
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What has happened, however, is that a working group, chaired by the
General Services Administration's Information Security Oversight Office, has
revised the existing SCI nondisclosure agreement which I had promulgated. In
addition, I understand the working group intends to make any agency's use of a
more stringent agreement subject to IS00 approval. In effect, this transfers
the authority for this important aspect of SCI security from the DC1 to the
Director of IS00. It should be noted that the final draft of the NSDD cir-
culated for review did not create such a` role for ISOO and I must say, I was
surprised to find such language published in the NSDD.
I believe the implementation of the NSDD would be best accomplished by
the following steps: IS00 should develop standardized language relating only
to the prepublication review of collateral information. This language should
reflect any agreements reached by the working group concerning collateral
prepublication review. Once this language has been developed, it should be
presented to the SECOM for incorporation into a revised Form 4193, along with
any other suggestions that the working group believes might strengthen the
revised form. After due consideration, a revised Form 4193 will be promul-
gated by the SECOM, at my direction, including the collateral prepublication
language developed by IS00, as well as any other language adopted by the SECOM
to strengthen the revised form, consistent with the NSDD. This will avoid any
appearance of conflict between ISOD and the DCI's established authority to
make the rules for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
I regret the necessity to bring this to your attention, but any erosion
of the DCI's security role would be contrary to the national interest. I hope
this matter can be resolved quickly. In the interim, I shall plan to continue
Intelligence Community use of the present nondisclosure agreement for SCI
access.
Sincerely,
/S/
William 3. Casey
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