PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00623R000200060019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 18, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/25: CIA-RDP87T00623R000200060019-0
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Securit,~ CornmiZtee
18 May 1982
MEMOR4IvZ~Ui`i FCR CHAIR`~Ai\, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Personnel Security Standards for Access to Intelligence
1. n.t are I3 April 1982. meeting of the Personnel Security
Subcommittee, we considered the strawman position paper prepared by
o-f your staff, same subject, dated 5 March. 1982 (copy
attached.,.: This paper had been provided to members on 9 March 1982.
2. ~:.e cza~~c r:-erxise of subject paler is that, pur.s~Fiz~t to
Executive-=r~der 12333, the Director of Central Intelligence. has both
the authority and. responsibility to establish safeguards to protect
foreign.~.~~eliigenee information, whether it be Sensitive Compartmented
Informat_un or collateral. classified information. There currently
exists .--:;-Pied uC,'I program relative to personnel security to protect
the forma-r, Cut there is no unified DCI program relative to personnel
security t~ protect the latter. The strawman paper recommends that the
Security ~`ommittee propose such a unified DCI personnel. security program
to protet_~ ivllater.a?. ft~reign intelligence by establishint: personnel
security friteria far access to this information.
3. The PerSSuh acknowledges the authority and responsibility
vested iii. t7e irire:Ct"~- of Cert_ral Into}_li.ge.nce by EC> 12 ~'_'"~ r,-l.ative
to this issuC. However, it is the consensus of the subcamaittee that
existing departmental and agency clearance criteria for access to
collateral classified information is sufficient to protect non-SCI
foreign intelligence information. Such criteria, although not a unified
DCI program, is the most practicable personnel security standard to
apply as prerequi~;.~te for access to this type of informt ~~r,. in the
absence of a new special access program designed to identify non-SCI
foreign intelligence. Subcommittee members cited a 1979 Intelligence
Community effort to consider the establishment of just such a special-
access program. It was recalled that this effort concluded that such
a program was impractical and counterproductive to the decompartmentation
concept designed to ensure distribution to the maximum number of those
cleared individuals who need this information. To establish another
set of access criteria for these persons would seemingly circumvent,
at Least in part, the intent of decompartmentation.
4. Consequently, the PerSSub contemplates no further deliberations
on this matter within the context of the subject SECOM paper unless
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/25: CIA-RDP87T00623R000200060019-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/25: CIA-RDP87T00623R000200060019-0
directed to do so. If it is decided to ~~ursue this issue, we recommend
the following two steps be taken sequentially prior to attempting to
actually w~ite personnel security standards for access to non-SCI
intelligence information:
a. The Compartmentation Subcommittee should be tasked with
evaluatin; the r~fficacy of a special access program for non-DCI
intell=,Pence in~ormation and, if deemed desirable, propose the specifics
of such a program with a draft DCID and implementing regulatory documents,
to incl~,~d~