NOTE FROM DCI TO CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 28, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050013-6
28 November 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
83-5736
1. Thanks for your response to my request for concise information about
what the committee is doing, how well it is doing, and how it might do better.
2. The committee seems to have taken on an impressive array of assignments.
I share its frustration at not getting more cooperation and more results on
leaks and uniform protection of intelligence. It might help if I had a review
of how and when prior DCIs have weighed in effectively to read the riot act
and otherwise curb laxity in the handling of classified information. Has
anybody ever had any success at this?
3. I am expecting a briefing on computer security this week.
4. Let me see the comparison of the proposed NSDD on "Telecommunications
and Automated Information Systems Security" with the current environment
governed by PD-24 and the areas in which the proposed NSDD would have impact
on the DCI's statutory and executive order authorities for the protection of
sources and methods.
William J. Casey
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JI_LKL I
10-NOVEMBER 1983
DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
Chairman 25X1
Work done and current focus:
Developed common'personnel, physical, information handling, security
awareness and foreign travel security standards for SCI. Developed security
policy for Community use in protecting intelligence in automated systems;
restricting its use when sensitive sources are involved; and safeguarding
facts of and facts about foreign liaison. Coordinates Government-wide effort
in technical surveillance countermeasures, Community security R&D, and depart-
ment and agency efforts to combat leaks. Current focus is two-fold: (1)
foster homogeneity in application of DCI security policies (e.g., through
Community seminars in personnel and physical security); and (2) trying to
raise level of awareness on unauthorized disclosure problem and to improve
quality of investigations of leaks.
How well is work going:
It goes slowly in personnel and computer security fields where turf
and/or resource considerations are at issue (e.g., revision of SCI personnel
security policy was protracted by resource-driven dispute over period of
coverage of investigations). Efforts to combat leaks on a Community basis
hindered by shortages of investigators, "dirty-linen" syndrome, and competing
priorities. In strictly technical areas (TSCM and R&D) it goes better, but
successful "seed money" budget is being gutted by Congressional cuts.
How SECOM contribution might be enhanced:
1. Leaks - Try to get senior officials to take more aggressive approach
to combatting leaks (e.g., devote more resources to conducting meaningful leak
investigations).
2. Resources - More support needed for Communit R&D in securit field.
Clarification of roles and missions would help (e.g.,
House Appropriations Subcommittee recommended crippling cut in FY 84 SECOM
budget on questionable premise that all computer security is NSA's business
and that all other security R&D could be taken care of with
3. Uniform protection of intelligence - personnel security standards
vary widely for access to non-SCI intelligence (e.g., much imagery is dis-
seminated at Secret level to users whose clearances are based, at CIA, on
background investigations and polygraph, and, at the Military Departments, on
a record check only.) Try to get senior officials to agree to timetable of
meaningful upgrades in standards for initial and continued access to Secret-
level intelligence.
SECRET
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SUP
DDS&T
Chm/NIC
C/IPD/OIS
STAT
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83-5381
7 November 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
E
xecutive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
rKUP7: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Intelligence Committees, Panels, Boards and Groups
p 8 NOY 19d}
1. As you know, I recently called for a listing of all intelligence
committees, both within the Community and "in-house."
2. Please have the chairmen of these committees prepare, for my
attention, a response of three paragraphs, each addresssing:
-- What the committee has done and where its current focus lies.
-- How well the committee's work is going.
-- How the committee's contribution might be enhanced.
3. I'd allow a week after receipt of the request to respond.
William J. Casey
STAT
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP87T00623R000300050013-6